The politics of education funding in Brazil, 1964-1984. by de Mattos, Pedro Lincoln C L
THE POLITICS OF E D U C A T I O N  FUNDING 
IN BRAZIL, 1964-1984
by
PEDRO LINCOLN C. L. de MATTOS 
Department of Government 
The London School of Economics and Political Science
Thesis submitted to the University of London in partial 
fulfilment of the requirements of the degree 
of Doctor of Philosophy
Aut umn, 1988
UMI Number: U615529
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI U615529
Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
f
65&S
Edineide
"The Brazilian nation should 
feel emotion in facing the 
drama of education in this 
country. "
Col. S6rgio Pasquali, former 
General Secretary of the 
Ministry of Education and 
Culture
(who felt this emotion himself)
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ABSTRACT
THE SUBJECT. This thesis lies in the field of public 
policy and its purpose is to interpret the decision-making 
process of education funding by the Brazilian federal 
government during the period 1964-84. The descriptive 
approach is meant to leave room for original information 
on a recent aspect of the educational issue in Brazil.
THE MAIN ARGUMENT. As from the mid-fifties the impetus of 
the country's industrial economy raised the standard of 
development as the leit motiv of policy-making. 
Traditional, liberal views of public responsibilities in 
education services on the grounds of humanistic and 
democratic values were increasingly replaced by 
considerations of education as an investment for economic 
development. The economic approach to education was to be 
central to the decisions on finance allocation to 
education and implied a preliminary attention to the 
rationalization of education administration. The 1964 
authoritarian regime implemented this policy by 
concentrating the decision-making process in the 
bureaucracy, since the nature of education funding was 
seen as a technical matter.
THE CONTENTS. The thesis scans some aspects of the 
federal bureaucracy's historical background on which the 
policy stepped <and eventually stumbled) and the origins 
of policies on education funding. Two crucial elements of 
the decision-making process are then investigated: the
stance of the military towards education and the reflexion 
of the expansion and crisis of the Brazilian economy on 
the provision of tax finance to education. At its height, 
the research goes into several vital decisions for the 
education funding to find out how they were actually made 
and on which reasons they were based, whether giving or 
denying education a special budgetary treatment. Finally, 
a look at the poor results of planning and ration­
alization in relevant points of the policies unveils the 
importance of some cultural and social components of the 
organizations involved.
THE CONCLUSIONS. The thesis concludes that, as far as 
Brazilian experience suggests, the economic justification 
for funding education and rationalizing its spending is 
fragile and of little effect, since the allocation of 
public resources proves to be a political not a technical 
process. The cause loses rather than gains as the 
decisions are entrusted to economic bodies.
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INTRODUCTION
INT. 1, The subject and its relevance
This thesis is a study of the decision-making process in 
education funding by the Brazilian federal government 
during the period 1964-84. Although events, trends and 
policies constitute the main object of the research, its 
final rationale could lie behind the question: "how did
Brazilian government justify its decisisons on the 
financing of education?". The political significance of 
the question is especially pertinent in a developing 
country where a pressing demand for education is found 
against a context of euphoric economic investment.
Since the issue of financing of education has more 
frequently been seen in its technical aspects than 
identified with the justification of education itself, 
political scientists have not occupied themselves so much 
with the subject but have left it to economists. Meagre 
reactions to that particular issue have come from 
theoretical concepts of education, in its sharp turn from 
the liberal, innovative optimism in the first decades of 
this century, particularly under Dewey's ideas on the 
socially transformative role of school, to the bitter 
Marxist critique of the school's function of reproducing 
class structure and capitalist values, in the seventies.
Suppositions in the early sixties about the key role of 
self-developed human resources to explain increases in 
national output over the expected result of the classical 
production factors (physical capital, manpower and land) 
triggered the interest of economists in education and
- 14 -
produced intensive literature on what appeared to be a new 
vein of scientific knowledge. From the main theory on 
education as a capital investment, studies were developed 
on rates of return and cost-benefit analysis, manpower
forecast techniques and specific methods and problems of 
the financing of education. In spite of controversies 
over basic issues, the "economics of education" 
consolidated and began to be used by government advisers 
and international planning agencies.
When this influx came to the field of policy-making and 
other professionals in governmental bureaucracies and
politicians became involved, a certain practical approach
to the financing of education was formed an passed on to
■
broader circles interested in the matter. Education
gained a new status among government programmes as an 
investment — rather than expenditure —  in the economic
development and from there on a main justification for 
spending on education was defined; education began to be 
planned under economic techniques; a major concern with 
the rationalization of schools operation and output 
originated reforms (after all, education appeared too 
important to indulge itself in unprofitable
expenditure. . . >. In many developing countries, including 
Brazil, this "economic approach" came to prevail over 
other, often humanistic views.
Nevertheless, an ill-disguised discrepancy is undeniable 
between the theoretical importance of education for
development — relevant rates of return to education are 
worked out by economists — and the experience of clumsy 
implementations of policies inspired by that economic 
approach to education. The thesis is chiefly interested 
in this point. It is illustrated by the following
quotations from two eminent economists of education who 
have published a great deal on the subject. The texts
- 15 -
also opportunely convey complementary information to this 
sect ion.
George Psacharopoulos, reviewing the evidences and 
objections to the theory of human resources in a recent, 
outstanding article, assesses confidently that:
"There is widespread evidence that an individual's earnings 
increase with each extra year of schooling. The explanation of 
human capital theory is that education makes the individual more 
productive not only in the market place but also in the 
household. (...) .
Estimates on the returns to education are now available for over 
sixty countries. Table 1 gives a regional summary and raises 
several noteworthy points.
The social returns to education in developing countries 
are at least as high as as any reasonable measure of the 
opportunity cost of a capital or a social discount rate. 
In other words, invest mment in people may be more 
conductive to economic growth than investment in machines. 
Rates of return are higher in primary education, followed 
by secondary education and then university levels. For 
primary education, unit costs are small relative to the 
extra lifetime income or productivity associated with 
literacy. For university education the opposite is true. 
The same diminishing returns apply across countries: the
more developed the country, the lower the returns to 
education at all levels. The high returns to education in 
low-income countries must be attributed to their relative 
scarcity of human capital.
Private returns are higher than social returns at all 
levels — a result of the public subsidization of education 
in most countries. The discrepancy between private and 
social returns is greatest at university level — which 
raises issues of of equity as well as of how educational
- 16 -
expansion shoud be financed". 1
Professor Mark Blaug, for two decades one of the 
enthusiastic pioneers of the economics of education and 
the implications of the theory of human resources to 
government policy-making in the area, recently confessed 
his revisionist position.^' A decade ago, he had stated:
"The golden days of the economics of education are over. In the 
1950's and I960's, economists were thick on the ground in every 
ministry of education in every capital of Asia, Africa and Latin 
America. (...) .
To be an economist interested in education in the 1970's is not 
quite so easy. The streets of Calcutta, Karachi, Cairo, Accra, 
Bogota and Buenos Aires are filled with unemployed university 
graduates, even as the civil services in these countries are 
overstocked with graduates. In Africa the so-called 'school 
leaver problem', which only ten years ago referred exclusively 
to unemployed leavers from ‘primary’ schools, now designates the 
unemployed products of secondary as well as higher education 
schools. In the famous Addis Ababa Conference of 1961, African 
Ministers of Eduction looked forward confidently to universal 
primary education by 1980. 1980 is only one year away and yet
in more than half of the forty six countries in tropical Africa 
it is now perfectly obvious that universal primary education 
will not be achieved even by the year 2000. Everywhere there is 
deep dissatisfaction with the quality of education. (...) Ivan 
Illch's books appear to be addressed to audiences in advanced 
countries and yet his thoroughly subversive ideas of ‘de- 
schooling* have not fallen entirely on deaf ears in developing
1, Psacharopoulos, 6, "Education and Development, a Review", Research Observer. 3, n,l 
(January 1988), p , 101,
2, Blaug, M, The Economics of Education and the Education of an Economist. Aldershot, 
Edward Elgar, 1987, p.vii.
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countries. "3
Noting the fact that the situation described by Professor 
Blaug for Africa is surprisingly the same as that in 
Brazil, including for the 1980 targets for universal 
primary education, accorded in the 1961 Inter— American 
Conference of Punta del Este, and that Dr Psacharopoulos 
includes rates of return and other figures for Brazil in 
his article (Tables 7, 8 and Appendix), the distance
between the human capital theory and the policies to 
implement it raises some remarks.
Given the difference of their source of evidence, the two 
assessments are not contradictory (it would always be 
possible for Psacharopoulos to argue that the rates are 
those in spite of gloomy results of policies, which even 
suggests that they would be higher if correct policies had 
been introduced). However, their contrast in exactly the 
relevant details (developing countries, elementary and 
higher education, etc. ), leaves us with some questions. 
If recent facts have current statistics,
the latter could not s >ng term. What would
effectively bridge the gap in the case of attempts to use 
Psacharopoulos' conclusions in the policy-making process? 
There must be something else to question about the odd 
results of education plans based on the economic approach 
in developing countries (where else were they applied?) 
other than the simple reason that technological change and 
its implication for market demand for skills are too 
elusive to predict; granted the obsolescence of manpower 
forecast methods, there still remains a great deal of 
disillusion with the outcomes of the education-development 
policies. Besides, leaving aside the references to the
o m c CJ- a t i o n in Developing Countries: Current Trends and
January 1979, pp.73-4,
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two quoted positions, if the returns to education are so 
unquestionable, why are complaints from schools or 
teachers and governments against each other over finances 
for education so frequent everywhere? After all, what is 
wrong with the implementation of policies based in the 
"economic approach"? Should not the political issue of 
the allocation of public funds play a decisive role in the 
answer to these questions?
Incidently, one fact suggests how distant academic studies 
on economics of education are from the formulation and 
implementation of policies on the financing of education. 
In spite of the fact that economic crises have been 
frequently affecting developing countries in their 
dependency on international markets — Brazil is a good 
example — literature on the financincing of education in 
this determinant context is extremely rare.A
The author is confessedly suspicious of a dangerous gap 
between policies arising from the concept of education as 
a profitable investment and the disturbing methods of 
their implementation and results. It seems that the study 
of the financing of education at the level of public 
policy analysis (thus involving the real context of 
implementation) requires the issue to be set at the level 
of the decision-making process, as this thesis endeavours
4, Not a single article on this subject was found in the following major colletanea or
reviews on economics of education, totalling more than 150 works: Bowman, M, J, "The
.A
Human Investment Revolution in Economic Thought", Sociology of Eduction, v o l .39 (1966), 
pp.111-38; Bowman, M. J, (ed) Readings, in Economics of Education. Paris, UNESCO, 1968; 
Blaug, M, (ed,) Economics of Education. 2 vol, Middlesex, Penguin, 1968/69) 
Psacharopoulos, 6, (ed,) Economics of Education, Research and Studies. Washington, The 
World Bank, 1980) Blaug, M, The Economics of Education and the Education of an 
Economist. Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1987,
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to do. This immediately directs the researcher towards 
the challenging complexity and richness of events and 
introduces him into crucial political scenes where the 
turning point of decision occurs. The difference that 
unapparent facts, such as formalism, autonomous behaviour 
of the bureaucracy, its internal bargains, and 
circumventions of the law and plans, make to the 
interpretation of policies and their results can only be 
detected at the level of detail. s The analysis of the 
decision-making process in this fashion is an essential 
methodological feature of this thesis and involved the 
author in difficult options such as that of renouncing 
theoretical contributions, or risks such as that of 
dispersion or over— extending descriptions.
In particular, the thesis's questioning of the conception 
of education as investment and of the propriety of the 
ensuing administrative strategy arises from the results of 
the action of the Brazilian government in education over 
two decades. Poor education results, chiefly of
elementary and secondary schools, contrasted with the 
increase in Brazilian Gross National Product. Even among 
the economically active population in industry, 
educational achievements did not match gains in this 
sector, leading to the suspicion that, after all, basic 
and general education is only marginally necessary for
5, Typical facts, such as those mentioned, are pointed to as the main cause of the 
poor outcomes of the Brazilian efforts in administrative planning durning the 1950‘s 
and half the I960' by Dr Robert Daland in: Brazilian Planning: Development, Politics 
and Administration. Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1967. To his 
interpretation of the phenomena, Dr Daland rely on Fred Riggs' theory of the 
“prismatic" bureaucracy, (Riggs, F. Adninistratitt.il.in Developing Countries; The Theor.y. 
of Prismatic Society. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1964), Interesting analysis in this 
book stimulated the research of some subjects in Chapter Six of this thesis,
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lemg-fcarm econoroie growth, ^  Figures for the participation 
of education in the total governmental investments during 
the period 1964-85 (Section INT. 5) are incompatible with 
the official stance on the importance of education.
However, the purpose of this research goes beyond its main 
theme of the vicissitudes of the financing of Brazilian 
education under the economic approach which prevailed 
during the 1964-84 period. The original recovery of a 
substantial selection of events, often from reports by 
people directly involved in the decision-making process 
and from unpublished government documents and financial 
reports is a goal in itself, so far as it intends to 
provide information to other researchers into the same 
field who are available to further, necessary theoretical 
developments.
Finally, the period and context in which the theme is 
studied displays an interesting confluence of facts. When 
the 1964 political change occurred, Brazil had had its 
debut in the era of the modern planning for economic 
development in the early fifties with the USA's technical 
assistance ("Point IV Programme"). International co­
operation was still welcome, in the sixties, including for 
education planning, when the 1967/68 internal military 
movement inside the regime cast the country into a cycle 
of authoritarianism which justified itself by means of 
nationalist ideals of rapid development, otherwise a 
solution for an acute social conflict. Then, the country 
inherited a century-old educational gap and 45% of its
6, This point has been sharply raised in Brazil during the eighties: Sale, C, Escola e 
Trabalho. S,Paulo, Brasi1iense, 1980; interesting suggestions froa the statistics of 
the 1980 Brazilian census in: Deao, P, "Educa?lo, Culture e Poder, Hipdteses store a 
Importincia da Educa;3o para o Oesenvolvinento*. Brasilia, nineo, 1982,
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population were between 5 and 24 years of age. The grim 
educational situation in international comparisons shook 
those ideals and a political motive boosted the 
sponsorship of education by central economy planners, 
whilst technical bureaucracy found a suitable milieu under 
the political authoritarian rule. The association of
education with development fluctuated along the seventies 
in the competition with economic programmes for finance, 
until it was not possible for a country depending on oil 
and financial markets to postpone the effects of the 
international economic crises. Previous educational
investments and rationalizing policies by the bureaucracy 
were then put under check.
Brazilian literature and academic tradition in the field 
of public financing of education has not matured yet or 
was interrupted in the early eighties, at least in
relation to its promisslng economy-related branch. 
Generally, lack of relrable and regularly supplied 
official information, particularly on the states and 
municipios, has been the major shortcoming, hindering the 
development of studies. Nevertheless, after being limited 
to a half dozen authors during the fifties, publications 
considerably increased between 1966 and 1978, taking up 
the momentum and themes of the official policies.
Government-subsidized institutes of educational research 
(such as the National Institute of Educational Studies, 
INEP, and the Regional Centre of Educational Research, in 
SSo Paulo) led the way during the first years of the
movement.
Two main lines of titles predominated: institutional
aspects of the organization and structure of the financing 
of education, and the typical themes of the economics of 
education (general approaches and planning, cost and
- 22 -
productivity).7 While in the former the best work has 
come from authors somehow directly involved with 
government organizations (so relying in personal sources), 
in the latter some creative work has replaced translations 
of foreign literature from the late sixties (further 
information may be found at the end of Section 2.2.3. 2). 
The World Bank has produced some good quality reports, 
often collecting or screening, by its own means, 
worthwhile financial information, otherwise difficult to 
obtain at the necessary level of detail. e Of particular 
note is a vacuum in original research into the political 
aspects of the financing of education, the academic 
interest stopping at the level of the politics of 
education in general or specializing in higher education 
polit ics.
INT. 2. The structure of the chapters
Following the authoritarian feature of the regime (1964- 
84) and a long history of state centralization, the 
federal bureaucracy — including dozens of universities and 
technical schools — is the basic element which composes 
the context for the decision-making process on financial
7. Although aention of particular works is out of scope, a book fron a doctoral thesis 
represents outstandingly the best syntesis at that nonent: Pontes, H. Educa;go para o 
Desenvolvittento1. Estudo Critico da AdBinist r a ^ o  Educacional no Brasil. S, Paulo, 
Connpanhia Editora Nacional, 1969,
8, liahar, 0. J. and Oillinger, W, R, Financing State and Local Government in Brazil, 
Recent Trends and Issues. World Bank Staff Working Papers, n,612, Washington, The World 
Bank, 1983; The World Bank, Brazil, Finance of Primary Education. A World Bank Country 
Series, Washington, 1986; Psacharopoulos, 6. Earnings and Education in Brazil: 
Evidence froa the 1980 Census. EOT Series, The World Bank, Washington, 1987,
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and educational matters. It is a normal setting of events 
in the thesis.
After reviewing some active elements from the past 
centuries in the cultural and organizational tissue of 
this bureaucracy (Chapter One), the research continues on 
the way in which the main policies on education funding 
were formed between 1966 and 1970, breaking down 
resistance and bringing hopes on effects of planning and 
rationalization of expenditure (Chapter Two). Then, two 
elements are investigated as crucial components for the 
development of events: first the stance of the military
towards education —  their concerns and interventions — as 
they held the political power during the period, and 
secondly the repercussions of the expansion and crisis of 
the Brazilian economy on the provision of tax finance to 
education (chapters Three and Four).
The research proceeds to its main course by studying four 
series of vital events for education funding in order to 
find out how decisions were actually made (Chapter Five). 
They are presented under the common theme of the permanent 
struggle for funds for education which was the real scene, 
beyond official discourse and policies on the matter. The 
two first sets of events refer to a tendency to give 
education a special budgetary treatment, be it by creating 
earmarked financial sources or instituting minimum 
percentages of ordinary revenues for education. Non 
completion or discontinuity in legally defined policies 
are investigated. The two last groups of events took 
place in the 1980-84 period when the effects of the 
economic crisis turned narrow financial limits into 
revealing conficts, involving the economy central planning 
body and either educational authorities or university 
staff.
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Finally, a view at the poor results of planning and 
rationalization policies in facing cultural and social 
components of the educational organizations shows the 
decisive role of the non-technical elements, raising 
doubts over the propriety of the bureaucracy's economic 
approach to expenditure on education (Chapter Six).
INT. 3. Some caveats
Some caveats about the subject or the range of some 
expressions must be borne in mind.
A preliminary point must be stated about the scope of this 
thesis. Its focus is put on the process, not on the 
results, of the financing of education. This is so in a 
twofold sense. First, that the thesis is not stuctured to 
show and explain the favourable or unfavourable picture of 
the finance finally allocated to education; general 
financial results are summarily presented in Section INT. 
5 of this Introduction and assumed as a backgound data, 
the attention being concentrated on the decision-making 
process which produced those results but is quite more 
significant in its non-financial aspects. Second, the 
educational achievements (in terms of schooling or 
literacy rates, education standards, etc) of the 
government's disbursements during the period are not under 
consideration and the same is to be said of judgements on 
the adequacy or inadequacy of the sums actually spent in 
relation to educational needs. These are substantial 
questions which involve other fields besides politics and 
public administration.
The research is limited to the Brazilian federal 
government funding, although this represented (1984)
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approximately only 36% of the country's total public 
expenditure on education, since most of the elementary and 
secondary education systems are run by the states and 
muni cipi os.
It was not possible to avoid the fact that figures 
presented on education budgets or expenditure include 
cultural and sports programmes, owing to the structure of 
federal organization and their close links with education. 
Those programmes, however, did not reach 2% <1984) of the 
total expenditure of the Ministry of Education and Culture 
<MEC>~\ For similar reasons, science & technology
programmes associated with education are not distinguished 
as such; figures for education expenditure include all 
research and post-graduation programmes of federal 
universities and other MEC's agencies. Incidentally,
expenditure on higher education by MEC was <1984) as much 
as five times all the rest of the federal investment in 
science & technology, including the programmes of the 
National Research Council <CNPq>.
INT. 4. A first introductive excursus: the institutional
framework of the Brazilian education system 1°
The constitutional nucleus of education rights and 
provisions about education supply survived the changes of
9, Given the large number of abbreviations in this thesis, it was found more practical 
to explain each of them at its first appearance in every chapter than refer the reader 
to a single list of abbreviations,
10, The content of this section (comprising sub-sections 1NT, 4,1 and 4,2) represents 
the situation during the period under study (1964-84), However, most of legal and 
administrative institutions actually extended further, no major changes having been 
introduced by the 1988 Constitution,
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the last forty or fifty years, as opposed to the 
organization of systems at the three levels of regular 
education which were reformed by the last governments.
INT. 4. 1. Constitutional aspects
The Brazilian Federal Constitution during the 1964-84 
period set forth education as firstly and generally being 
a right for all, to be given at home and school <Art. 176). 
Particularly, primary education <7-14 years) was stressed 
as an obligation to all citizens. The provision of 
education, however, was not as unambiguous. The constitu­
tional text did not indicate how this obligation would be 
met by an adequate, accessible education, particularly in 
primary schools. It said that education was to be
provided by both the state and private initiative, the 
former being urged to mantain schools at all level, the 
primary ones being free. Despite extended discussions, 
the members of the constitutional assembly, from 1946 
onwards, did not manage to reconcile the right to 
education by a guaranteed supply of the service with 
liberty for private — mainly religious — education 
organizations. Because of the strong lobby of these, it 
was assumed that any other formulation would fall into a 
totalitarian state solution. Yet, the other side of the 
conflict was that the state was not compelled to have a 
complete elementary school network and relied on private 
organizations which at the present time account for 13% of 
the total enrolment in primary schools.
Even so, a large proportion of the total financial onus 
for primary education was not directly defrayed by the 
state. The constitution <Art. 178) transferred this duty 
to private firms which had to mantain free primary
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education for employees and their children. They could 
carry out the duty directly or pay a government-estimated 
cost per pupil to private schools or to the government 
itself. This last option, the Sal£rio Educag8o>
instituted in 1964, will be studied in Section 5. 2. 1. 1,
Still according to the Constitution, education at the
secondary and higher levels in public schools was to be 
free only for those unable to pay for it and, the gratuity 
system would have to be replaced by a scheme of
scholarships to be later reimbursed by the student. This 
never came to practice and some attempts at its
implement ion in higher education are related in Section 
6 . 1.
The organization and maintenance of education systems — 
primary, secondary and university institutions (Art.177) — 
were the responsibility of the states which also drew the 
basic organization of education in the municipios 11 . All 
this organizing activity, however, was subject to the so- 
called "directives and bases of national education" which 
was a special legal competence of the Federal Union 
(Art.8^, XVII, q). To avoid the effects of strong 
historical trends, a "subsidiary" role was left for the 
Federal Union in the direct provision of education with 
its own system. The actual profile of the provision of 
education in Brazil is presented in Table 1, below.
11, According to Brazilian Public Law, the »unicipio is the seal lest of the three 
administrative expressions of the state - the others are the states and the result of 
their cohalision which is the Federal Union, Municlpios are created in the 
Constitution of a state and, in the limits instituted in it, they have political and 
administrative independency (elected Legislative and Executive powers), The same as 
for the Federal Union and each state, each municipio is a different juridical person 
("Brazil" is a juridical person only in International Public Law) responsible to state 
and federal courts, These peculiarities made translation probably inappropriate,
- 28 -
Recalling an original feature in the nineteenth century, 
the federal public system favours higher education and 
technical secondary schools, which is more a tribute paid 
to political pressures from 61ite or specific development-
promoting policies than the accomplishment of its
constitutional supplementary role. Except for pre­
schools, the state systems provide for the greater part of 
the total supply. Private initiative has become more 
interested in preschool and universities, generally
attended by children or youth from upper classes. The 
number of private schools stopped growing in the mid­
fifties although their enrolment has closely followed the 
general increase in the supply.
TABLE 1. BRAZIL: SUPPLY OF EDUCATION PER LEVEL OF SCHOOL, 1985
TOTAL
ENROLMENT
(1,000) Total
PRE-SCHOOLS 1,866,8 58,8
PRIMARY SCHOOLS 22,297,6 86,7
SECONDARY SCHOOLS 2,874,5 59,0
UNIVERSITIES 1,436,3 39,8
TOTAL 28,475,2 79,7
PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL ENROLMENT 
PUBLIC SCHOOLS PRIVATE
Federal State Municipal SCHOOLS
(2,8) (44,3) (52,9) 41,2
(0,5) (62,6) (39,9) 13,3
(5.7) (86,8) (7,5) 41,0
(57,8) (25,3) (16,9) 60,2
(2,4) (63,5) (34,1) 20,3
Source. MEC/S6/SEINF/Servi$o de Estatlstica da Educa^So e Cultura, (Information 
directly collected),
Political and economic factors from the late last century 
determined the extension and quality of each system.
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Generally, south-eastern and southern states had the best 
systems and north-eastern the more inadequate ones. The 
northern and western states, which were more recently 
established following south-eastern models, had not 
overcome their basic problems related to enormous 
dist ances.
INT. 4.2. Other administrative aspects
As a consequence of some assumptions about the national 
nature of educational matters and historical centralizing 
trends (Chapter One), the Federal Union prodigally 
exercised the role of laying down the "directives and 
bases of the national education" and thus set up a large, 
legal and organizational apparatus. Besides, this
organizational structure grew considerably during the last 
decades in order to plan and control not only the 
development of the federal system but also the increase in 
financial transfers to states and municipios.
In 1961, Law 4024 reorganized an almost century-old 
institution and called it the Federal Education Council 
<CFE> which was placed at the top of all systems as far as 
specific educational matters were concerned, enjoying a 
privileged position in the first-rank federal body for 
education, the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC). 1^ 
Law-by-decree 464, of 11/2/69, introduced some changes in 
CFE's attributions. It became more dependent on the major 
government policies and MEC. It maintained, however, a 
nationwide jurisdiction in order to define minimum
11, In 1985, just after the end of the period to which this thesis refers, a Ministry 
of Culture was created and MEC became the Ministry of Education (the abreviation 
remained the sane),
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curriculum contents at all levels, to inspect all schools, 
to control its set-up and judge technical educational 
matters in the last instance. CFE had an additional, 
politically sensitive role, which concerned the annual 
fees for all private higher education schools. The twenty 
four members of CFE were appointed ad libitum by the 
President of the Republic. In principle they were to 
represent all the regions of the country, the levels of 
education and both public and private school networks.
The federal education system was run by MEC. It comprised 
in 1984 a set of central bodies, the so-called "Direct 
Administration" (about 25 councils, secretariats, 
administrative departments and other sections, plus a 
representative office, Delegacia in each state), and more 
than a hundred decentralized units: 48 universities and
isolated colleges, 21 secondary industrial schools, 33 
secondary agricultural schools and 10 specialized agencies 
for technical and financial fostering or foundations for 
programmes such as student assistance, school material, 
literacy and education for the disable. Making a large 
"organizational chandelier” (whose growth is explained in 
the thesis) these units had different administrative 
regimes, greater or lesser degree of independency, all 
subjected, however, to the authority of the Minister of 
Education who was assisted and represented by specialized 
secretariats for each area. The General Secretary co­
ordinated the activities of the ministry, as he was also 
the head of its planning an financial system.
As an extension of its constitutional tasks of financially 
and technically assisting the states in their educational 
systems and acting in the implementation of the national 
development plans, MEC increased its influence in the 
relationship with the states, inasmuch as this trend was 
favoured by the authoritarian and centralizing political
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feature of the regime: the greater the financial
dependency towards the federal government, the greater 
this influence of MEC on each state education authority.
The functional aspects of the federal system were largely 
determined by the regime's administrative reform <1967 
onwards) whose principles were extended to states and 
municipios by the Institutional Act n2 8, of 2/4/69. The 
essencials and consequences of this important reform are 
studied in chapters Two and Seven.
As well as MEC, other ministries had some training schools 
(police, diplomacy, public finance, etc); on the other
hand, regular education schools were sometimes granted by 
funds from development programmes which were run outside 
MEC. The federal educational structure also included 
another system which followed specific rules beyond MEC's 
jurisdiction, that is, the military education system which 
comprised secondary and higher education schools.
MEC's central or decentralized units were basically 
maintained by the Federal Treasury and directly inscribed 
in the Budget and, for these reasons, were subject to 
ordinary federal financial controls and regulations. 
Decentralized units, particularly universities and
university hospitals, were also granted by other
ministries from both the Federal Treasury or other
sources. All decentralized units were legally allowed to 
have their own financial sources, mainly from services and 
fees, Such resources represented from 11% (technical 
secondary schools) to 17% (universities) of the total
expenditure of these units, except for two cases of
foundations enjoying special sources hence larger 
proportions. Further details of the federal finances in
education are included in the next section (INT. 5).
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It was established by law that a "State Education Council" 
had a position and functions corresponding to those of
CFE's at national level in relation to each state and its 
municipios, A State Secretariat for Education was the
chief executive body for each state and a Municipal 
Secretariat for Education for each municipio, For reasons 
of administrative flexibility, most states and larger 
municipios had their systems of primary and secondary
schools formally included in foundations which were run by 
the education authorities themselves. State and municipal 
universities were generally organized as decentralized 
unit s.
Education in the average states (S&o Paulo was far an 
exception) had about two-thirds of their expenditure
covered by their own-source revenues, the rest being 
supplied by federal specific transfers, chiefly the 
Sal Sri o-EducagSo and the earmarked shares of the State 
Participation Fund <FPE>. Municipios were in a worse 
position of dependency from both the federal and state 
governments' transfers.
INT. 5. A second introductory excursus: a panorama of the
federal public expenditure on education in Brazil
Table 2 provides the basic figures (1984/85) to place the 
specific area of the federal government expenditure on 
education in a wider context and to draw the profile of 
the expenditure of MEC in terms of origin of the funds, 
its nature and the purposes to which the expenditure was 
legally addressed.
Issues on tax-originated and non-tax originated finance 
(the latter representing a significant proportion) are
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studied in Chapter Five. The trends of events at the
origin of a massive proportion of expenditure on personnel 
and higher education, particularly from the safer, tax- 
originated sources, are matters for Chapter Six. Several 
other categories appearing on this table, such as the 
repayment of debts and other current expenditure 
(personnel excepted), will also be referred to in 
important sections.
TABLE 2, BRAZIL: GENERAL PROFILE OF THE ALLOCATION OF PUBLIC FEDERAL FUNDS TO
EDUCATION, 1984/85 1 
(Percentages)
EDUCATION & CULTURE IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET 10,3
FEDERAL BUDGET'S SHARE IN TOTAL PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EDUCATION 2 36,0
Directly Spent by federal education bodies 65,0
Transferred to other executors 35,0
THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION & CULTURE (MEC) IN THE FEDERAL BUDGET 6,7
Qrigip.-fil.ttEC1 s Financial Sources
TOTAL TAX NON-TAX INDEP, 3
O RI GINAL O RIGINAL
100,0 49,2 41.2 9,6
(continues)
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Origin of M E C 1s Financial Sources
TOTAL TAX
0RIGINAT,
NON-TAX
0RIQINAT,
INDEI
100,0 49,2 41,2 9,6
Purpose of MEC's Expenditure 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Primary Education 41,7 0,9 86,1 60,6
Secondary Education 4,3 7,7 1,1 0,5
Higher Education 42.1 71,4 10,1 28,5
Culture and Sports 1,9 2,9 0,8 1,5
Other Educational Programmes 0,2 0,3 0,1 -
Central Planning and Administration 2,7 3,3 1.2 6.7
Repay of Debts 4.4 9,0 - -
Social Security & Health 2,7 4,5 0,6 2,2
Nature of NEC's Expenditure 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0
Personnel 38,7 75,7 0,1 15,9
University Personnel 84,2 87,0 - 11
Autarquias 65,0 64,1 - i
Foundations 35,0 35,9 -
Other NEC's Bodies and Schools 15,8 13,0 0.0 88
Other Current Expenditures 42,5 12,9 70,1 74,7
Capital Expenditures 14.4 2,4 29,8 9,4
Repay of Debts 4,4 9.0 - -
Notes
1) The initiil position of the 1985 budgets is taken, Initial budgets usually take 
into consideration the current position of expenditure at the tine they are made (in 
this case. 1984); as they quickly become outdated because of high inflation, figures in 
this table represent an average of 1984/85,
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2) S U t i  ind nunictpiot funds complete the total, As f of or the rest of this table, 
figures do not include finance of state-owned companies which also spended some money 
in education, residually, as part of larger projects, directly involving grants for 
researchers or local communities,
3) Resources independently obtained and run by NEC's decentralized agencies, chiefly 
universities, This category varies significantly during the execution of the budget 
and budgets' forecasts are underestimated for this reason, Actually, its share at the 
end of 1984 went to 15,2%, However, about 40% of these resources are obtained from 
other federal agencies, chiefly for research programmes and activities in special need,
Sources
MEC/SG/SQF, "Proposta 0r<ament4ria 1985", 1984, Tables II, XXXIV, XXXVI, XLV, XLIX; 
BRASIL/PR/SEPLAN, Qrtamento da Uni3o, Exercicio Financeiro de 1985, Projeto de L e L  
1985; BRASIL/IBGE, Anu&rio Estatistico de Brasil, 1986. 1987,
The two following tables serve as a general appraisal of 
the total federal government expenditure on education if 
compared with those on other sectors, which exactly 
reflects the political side of the decisions. Two
approaches must be taken. The first concerns the Federal 
Treasury (tax-originated resources or not) whose budget is 
annually presented to Congress and approved by law after 
several months of preparation within federal bureaucracy 
(during which the ministries struggle for greater shares 
for their programmes). Real increases in appropriations 
of the Treasury for education are scanned throughout a 
long series starting from 1964 and sectioned into 
government periods.
TABLE 3
BRAZIL: THE FEDERAL TREASURY'S EXPENDITURE ON EDUCATION, 1964-84
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YEAR /
PERIOD
CURRENT CONSTANT CHANGE
1970/73 IN PERIOD 
Cr$ Million Cr$ Million %
1964 13 1. 122
1965 18 1.402
1966 27 1.620
C. Branco's Government
1967 49 1.180
1968 70 1.267
1969 162 1.389
C. e Silva's Government
1970 387 1.415
1971 559 1.863
1972 570 2.596
1973 830 3.076
M4dicl's Government
1974 1.150 3.215
1975 1.385 3.541
1976 1.758 4.253
1977 2.612 5.779
1978 3. 165 6. 353
Geisel's Government
1979 4.305 6.442
1980 6.420 5. 179
(continues)
22. 0
-3. 3
22, 8
16. 2
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YEAR /
PERIOD
CURRENT CONSTANT CHANGE
1970/73 IN PERIOD 
Cr$ Million Cr$ Million %
1981 11.242 7.252
1982 22.133 8.047
1983 35.089 6.529
1984 56. 109 6. 590
Figueiredo's Government 2. 3
Notes.
1) To equalize basic data in the series, some earmarked financial 
sources <Sal6rio-Educag8o% loans and lotteries) were excluded because 
they did not belong to the Treasury Budget until 1980.
2) As for the Constant Cr$, GDP deflator was used with the average 
1970/1973 prices = 100
Sources
BRASIL/IBGE. AnuArio Estatistico do Brasil, 1966, p. 513;
BRASIL/MEC/SG. Retrato Brasil; EducaySo. Cultura. Desporto. 1970- 
1990. Brasilia, 1985, p.551; MEC/SG/S0F. Report T08L003T, of 
8/10/86; IMF. International Financial Statistics. Yearbook 1986. 
pp.166-7 (for GDP deflator indexes).
The second table includes a wider circle of financial 
sources such as public borrowing, lotteries and compulsory 
contributions (not classified as taxes) which are added to 
non-tax resources and developed outside the Treasury (thus
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under the exclusive decision of some ministerial
authorities) as special, flexible instruments to manage 
economic policy and to support priority investment 
programmes. The set includes the resources of the
National Welfare System whose revenue was also run outside 
the Treasury’s Budget. Conceived as investment, education 
had participation in some of these kind of revenues and 
this appeared to be even higher than in the tax-originated 
resources. The series is sectioned into government
periods beginning in 1970, when main economic and
educational policies of the government had already been 
launched.
TABLE 4
PERCENTAGES OF EDUCATION IN THE TOTAL EXPENDITURE OF THE BRAZILIAN 
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT, 1970 - 1984
YEAR / BUDGETARY EXTRA-BUDGET. TOTAL
PERIOD ACCts ACCts
1970 4.6 8.9 6.7
1971 4.3 7.9 6.3
1972 5.1 8.0 6.8
1973 5. 3 9. 4 7. 6
Medici's Government 4,8 8,6 6.8
1974 5.6 8.7 7.4
1975 4. 6 6. 1 8. 6
1976 4.6 6.8 5.8
(continues)
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YEAR /
PERIOD
BUDGETARY
ACCts
EXTRA-BUDGET.
ACCts
TOTAL
1977
1978
2 . 1 
1. 9
8. 2 
7. 8
5. 1 
5. 0
Gelsel1 s Government 3. 8 7. 9 6. 0
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
3. 4 
2. 5
1. 4
2. 6 
1. 8 
1. 6
7. 2 
6. 3 
6. 1 
6. 5 
5. 8 
5. 3
5. 4 
3. 4
3. 8
4. 6
3. 7 
3. 2
Figueiredo's Government 2.2 6. 2 4. 0
Notes
1) Figures of the total expenditure of the Brazilian central 
government do not include the balance of the government's subsidized 
lending or the expenditure of the government's state-owned companies 
as far as they do not depend upon funds from the federal Exchequer.
2) "Budgetary Accounts": tax-originated finance only; "Extra-
Budgetary Accounts", all other sources either included in the 
Treasury's Budget (Table 3) or not.
Source. FGV/IBRE. Agreement with IMF for financial statistics of 
Brazilian public sector, Table B. Data for the period 1975-84 were 
published by: IMF. Government Finance Statistics. Yearbook 1986. pp.
188-97.
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Some conclusions can be drawn from Tables 3 and 4, on the 
aggregat e.
Expenditure on education by the Federal Treasury (Table 3> 
increased in real terms by almost 600% from 1964 to 1984 
and had gone beyond this some years before. Incidentally, 
another important figure should be remembered: the share
of public expenditure on education in the Brazilian GDP 
rose from 2.6 to 3.2% (after having reached 3.8%). The 
country changed dramatically during these two decades and 
so did education.
However, if the comparison is made in the context of the 
whole investment of the federal government in the economy, 
which expanded outside the Exchequer, the picture appears 
differently (Table 4>. From the early seventies, just 
when the implementation of the 1968 and 1970 national 
plans was going to take place, percentages of expenditure 
on education in the total government investment decreased 
almost invariably to 60% of the 70-73 levels at the end of 
the regime (drop from 6.8 to 4.0%). The ordinary funds 
from tax revenues (Tesouro OrdinSrio, as they were called 
in Brazilian budgetary jargon) slumped from 4.8% to 2.2%. 
Also of particular note is that the majority of 
expenditure on education outside the Treasury Budget, thus 
displaying the same kind of instruments in use for special 
economic programmes, fell from 8.6 to 6.2%, and this 
happened some years before the 1979 financial crisis).
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CHAPTER ONE 
DETERMINANT ELEMENTS FROM THE PAST
In the Brazilian tradition, education has not been a 
cultural patrimony of the local communities, an object of 
their concern and support, but a task which was either 
taken up by a distant governmental authority or simply
left to it. Even when state governments organized
education systems within their vast jurisdictions, the 
central government has never ceased to perform decisive 
controlling functions. This is a fundamental
characteristic to be borne in mind in order to understand
the issue of education financing because it put the
bureaucracy — more specifically the federal bureaucracy — 
in the centre of the stage.
Starting from such a feature, this chapter attempts to 
recover from past centuries selected elements which played 
a determinant role in the formation of the background 
patterns of the trends to be studied in the following 
chapt ers.
The first section describes the sudden change from the 
Jesuit incipient autonomous teaching units in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (which could have been
the embryo of a community-based system) to the Lisbon- 
controlled public education system. Then the arrival of a 
century-old Portuguese bureaucracy following the move of 
King JoSo VI to the colony in the early nineteenth century 
was a decisive step for the consolidation of this trend. 
An important social trait lying at the origins of the 
Brazilian culture and later interfering with the regime's 
rationalizing policies is the patrimonial concept of the 
state which reflects on both prebendal ism of the
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bureaucracy and a consequent, distorted demand on state 
resources. When the three-century educational gap began 
to be filled in, two decisive facts occurred provoking a 
strengthening in the federal bureaucracy's position vis-a- 
vis education funding: first, the rise of nationalist and
liberal ideals about education which confused the national 
nature of the educational issue with a centralizing 
administrative strategy for the services; second, the 
federalization of number of higher education schools 
between 1930 and 1960, establishing a sort of pattern 
which has not stopped since. By means of its historical 
social status, higher education literally overwhelmed 
federal educational bodies and their resources. Finally, 
much of the scene of the 1964-84 events came directly from 
the two Vargas government periods, an administrative 
legacy which this chapter attempts to summarize.
The confluence of these elements formed the underlying 
social and institutional background opposing the 
geographic reality of the country and eventually proving a 
stumbling-block for government policies. Some of the 
following chapters benefit from the conflicts this 
opposition produced.
1. 1. FROM THE JESUIT ERA TO THE POMBAL' s REFORMS
The mainland Portugese government was scarcely concerned 
with public services in Brazil, as the political and 
economic relationships with the colony were quite well 
defined: Brazil was expected to be no more than a
complementary economy for Portugal's foreign trade.1
1. Prado Junior, C. The Colonial Background of Modern Brazil (Trad.). LA, University 
of California Press, 1969, p.202.
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Government investments were, therefore, limited to 
internal or external safety and to judicical and fiscal 
activities, although some police services for public order 
were later introduced in the main towns. 3 There was no 
government body in the administrative structure to deal 
with education under either the major— captains or, later, 
the provincial governors. Periodic queries related to 
education were handled by governmental bodies of general 
administration: the General, Provincial and Local
Committees ("Juntas") in which the religious authorities 
took part.
Educational activities from 1549 to 1759 were considered a 
matter for the Jesuits. The newly founded Company of Jesus 
<1540) had been commissioned to carry out doctrinal 
activities in the colony where the first missionaries 
arrived with special status and facilities. The literacy 
and further education of natives and children was soon 
understood to be complementary to their religious 
education or conversion to faith. Elementary schools were 
established in each village where the missionaries taught, 
as well as high schools in towns, mainly to provide 
ecclesiastical personnel, and even two Fine Arts Colleges 
(Bahia and Rio de Janeiro)3 - Following the Jesuits, 
several parishes held "first letters schools" so that 
children could read and learn the catechism. This 
educational infrastructure was partially taken over by 
governmental education policy after the Jesuits were 
expelled <1759).
The Jesuits were given special areas <sesmarias) to set
2, Ayellar, HAlio de A, Histdria Administrate  & EconOaica do Brasil. Rio, 
MEC/FENAME, 1970, pp.161-5.
3, Leite, Serafii, Novaa Piqinas de Histdria do Brasil. S,Paulo, Companhia Ed. 
Nacional, 1965, pp.161-5,
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up and develop farms in order to support their 
activities.^ This scheme — which also applied to 
important Portugese settled in the colony —  resulted in an 
interesting, effective way of indirectly "financing" 
education. The farms prospered and came to stimulate 
local economies. Further grants were awarded to the 
Company of Jesus but only for teaching Christian doctrine. 
The clergy always held that education was their concern, 
not that of the Crown; the schools were a private 
activity,® and they ran their teaching and curricula 
according to their own scholastic methods <Ratio 
St udi or uni) .
The Jesuits' educational activities, however, were 
accepted on sufferance only and they were never allowed to 
award higher education degrees.® The Company's chiefs in 
Brazil usually compromised with Lisbon's policies but in 
many affairs firmly opposed local authorities by defending 
the freedom of the natives or the autonomy of their 
schools. Nevertheless, the Jesuits built up an efficient 
network of activities close to the communities in Brazil, 
with solid political support in Portugal's Court and 
important Portugese institutions,^ As for Brazilian 
education, it remained for two centuries as a humanitarian
4. T o b i n ,  Josd A. Histdria di Educatlo Brasileira. 2 ed,,S, Paulo, Juriscredi, 
undated, pp,58-62,
5, The issue of the real purpose of state grants and other donations to the Jesuits 
vas widely discussed between the clergy and the Lisbon Sovernnent in the affair of the 
"brown youngnen", See Leite, Serafin, Histdria da Coapanhia de Jesus no Brasil. 7 vol, 
Rio, Civiliza?So Brasileira/Inst, Nacional do Livro, 1938-1949, vol, VII, pp.200-8,
6. See Leite, Serafin, Histdria da Coapanhia de Jesus no Brasil, Op, Cit,, pp,195-9.
7, The Jesuits frequented the Court as the tutors of nobles1 children and cane to 
control the royal university of Coinbra (1573) after creation of the University of 
£vora (1558), See; Costa, Antdni* de, Histdria da I n s t r u ^ o  Popular an Portugal. 
Lisboa, Inprensa Nacional, 1871, chap IV,
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and Christian service, resulting from the institutional 
links between the Roman Catholic Church and the Portugese 
Crown.
The 1750's were the start of a new era for the state of 
Portugal and, then, Brazil. The accession of King Jos6 I 
to the throne was the culmination of an internal crisis in 
Portugal's ruling 61ite as a result of an evident decline 
in the economic and political importance of the country 
among Western European nations. The disadvantageous terms 
of trade with England for five decades <the Methuen 
Agreement of 1703) and the increasing dependency on that 
country for safety and industrial products {;i proved the
failure of the feudal monarchy and its leadership based 
on birth and ownership of land. A coalition of part of 
the court with the commercial bourgeoisie and the state 
bureaucracy was able to put forward a set of policies 
aiming at economic and political emancipation, whilst 
maintaining good relations with England. In fact,
Portugal enjoyed a marked political and administrative 
transformation over 27 years under the strong leadership 
of Sebasti&o Jos6 Carvalho de Melo, afterwards created 
Marquis of Pombal, himself a former Portugese ambassador 
to England.
Some ideological elements supported the political and 
administrative changes after 1755. The "enlightenment" 
brought an increasing confidence in rational 
administration and pragmatic procedures for external 
politics and commerce. Governmental bureaucracies were 
reinforced, affluent bourgeoisie co-opted and nobles
called on to take over new functions in the state, now 
based on competent participation in commerce, technical
8. Sinonsen, Roberto, Histdria Econdiica do Brasil (1500/1820). S Paulo, Nacional, 
1957, p.376,
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bureaucracies and state interests abroad. Thus they were 
able to keep their position in the new structure of 
political power as the state evolved from a feudal to a 
bureaucratic monarchy.
Under Pombal, it was considered necessary for the state to 
intervene strongly in the main institutions supporting the 
national culture. Regular education was to be taken over 
by the state and administered to the people in a selective 
and controlled way. For many reasons the Jesuits were 
seen as opposition to this project.3 The order's links 
with some groups which made an attempt against the life of 
the king in 1758 were the excuse for its total banishment 
from the country and colonies (Royal Act of 26/6/1759).
An overall administrative reform of educational structures 
(Royal Act of 6/11/1772) was intended to carry out a new 
policy for education and to fill the vacuum left by the 
Jesuits' expulsion. 13 years had elapsed by then, and only 
five years later Pombal himself would be deposed (1777), 
Even so, the disruption of the Jesuits' scheme for 
education and its dilatory substitution by a centrally
9, See Alden, Davril. "Aspectos EconOmicos da Expuleao dos Jesuitas do Brasil: Noticia 
Preliminar", In: Keith, H,H, and Edwards, S.F, <ed,) Conflito & Continuidade na 
Sociedade Brasileira. Rio, Civiliza^ao Brasileira, 1970, Besides ideological reasons 
(the strongly anti-Protestant Jesuits' doctrine rejected soie capitalist procedures) 
the activities of the Jesuits in colonies created problems for the government's 
economic policies for a fast formation of capital, mainly through industrial and 
commerical monopolies, In Brasil, the order opposed the slavery of indians or even 
their absorption into European culture and carried out an idependent trade in spices 
(drogas do sertlo), The Spanish Jesuits resisted the sovereignity of Portugal by force 
in the provinces east of the Uruguay river (Agreement of 1750 with Spain), Above all, 
they did not render obedience to the king, considering themselves directly under the 
Pope's authority,
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controlled strategy would directly influence the following 
decades with repercusssions for the whole XlXth century. 
Furthermore, Pombal's provisions brought the first 
introduction of the definitive bureaucratic pattern in the 
administration of Brazilian education.
Pombal's education policy served two purposes: first, to
provide the nobles and upper bourgeoisie with technical 
competence instead of the "academic and useless" — as it 
was called — teaching of the Jesuits, so that they could 
perform their new role in the economy and administration. 
Second, to keep education under the control of the state, 
particularly in the colonies, and selectively administered 
as a political resource, by preventing some social 
betterment of the rural or urban population. 10 These 
ideas were propounded by some of the intellectuals who 
were very close to Pombal, such as Verney ("Verdadeiro 
Metodo de Estudar", 5 volumes) and Sanches ("Cartas sobre 
a Educagao da Mocidade"). 11 Black people were forbidden
10, In hit four "Letters to Brasil" as in the introduction of his "Plan and Overall 
Calculation" Pombal said; "It is enough for people of rustic offices or factory arts to 
be taught by parish priests; people directed to be clerks in commerce or public service 
should be given exercises for reading, writing and accounting, Only the few young men 
who aspire to the Colleges, where statemen are made, are expected to qualify in 
philology" (apud Sonza Campos, Ernesto, Educa^So Superior no Brasil - Esbogo de um 
Quadro Histdrico, 1549 -1939. Rio, MEC, 1940, pp.97-8)
11, The following quotation is from the "Cartas"; "All children of poor people or 
peasants must be kept away from schools of reading and writing because, if they become 
literate they will either leave the countryside or require to be other than fishermen 
or countrymen or humble craftsmen, as their parents, That is the cause of the children 
of peasants running away from their parents' homes, The cure for that should be to 
abolish all schools of those places, There should be neither public nor private fee- 
paying or free schools in villages or hamlets in which one could not count more than 
two hundred firesC,,,) Schools should be forbidden in colonies to avoid the utmost 
damage to the kingdom through native subjects being able to achieve honours and such a
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to go to school (''3 ), a situation which lasted until the 
1870's.
The governmental reform created a General Authority of 
Studies (with local representatives and commissioners in 
colonies) regulating the operation of schools in great 
detail. All schools belonged to the state, "the royal 
classes", including those of distant provinces, except for 
the "first-letters classes" which were committed to the 
charge of the parish priests or some individual teachers 
in their homes. The education provided by the Church and 
its religious order was seen as a public service until the 
Republic (1889), since the Roman Church was linked to the 
state and subject to its control. 13 The appointment and, 
in most cases, the selection of teachers by governing 
authorities ("governors" in Brazilian provinces) with the 
agreement of the religious authorities was instituted. 
Teachers were to be special civil servants, particularly 
loyal to the government and distinguished by the same 
status and priveleges of judges, such as life-time tenure.
Although Pombal's reforms and the disruption of the
11, (cont,) status that they leave the class of peasants, merchants and clerks, Thus, 
all honours, public functions and jobs should only come from the jurisdiction and 
authority of the sovereign so that the colony remains dependent on the capital, But 
there is no eore efficient method to this end than that the colony's youth is raised 
oversears in the lands of the kingdom" (Tobias, JosA A, Histdria da Educa^So 
Brasileira. Op, Cit., pp.119-20),
12, Tobias, JosA A, Histdria da Educa^So Brasileira, Op, Cit,, p , 133,
13, Roman Catholicism was the official religion of the Portugese kingdom, The type of 
relationship between the Throne and the Church was that of patronage, The state 
collected the tithe due on all kinds of income and provided for all the material needs 
of the Church, The king also had the power of appointing bishops, subject to approval 
by the Pope, On this regime in Brazil, see Bruneau, Thomas C, Q Catolicismo Brasileiro 
em Epoca de Transi^o. S,Paulo, Loyola, 1974,
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Jesuits’ educational schemes had had disastrous results, 1^  
the policies were substantially retained during the 
imperial period (Act of 15/10/1827) and framed the 
centralized bureaucratic nature of Brazilian educational 
inst it ut ions.
1.2. A SCENE FROM THE XlXth CENTURY
Some features of the social and political context in which 
the implementation of the policies of the 1964 regime on 
education took place could be already seen in the 
nineteenth century: the central role of the government's
bureaucracy with which higher education institutions 
became associated in order to enjoy their privileged 
social position, the patrimonial trends in the demand for 
and use of the state resources and even the liberal good 
intentions in relation to primary education. This section 
traces these features back in the form of a scene from the 
nineteenth century.
As a consequence of the Napoleonic wars, the political and 
administrative nucleus of the Portugese state moved to 
Brazil. Under the alliance and protection of England, the 
royal ships left the invaded Lisbon on the 29th November, 
1807 bringing King JoSo VI, his Court and all the 
Portugese bureaucratic apparatus and civil servants to the
U ,  See Azevedo, Fernando de, A Cultura Brasileira. S, Paulo, Melhoraaentos, 1971, 
pp.47, 51-2, The historian Primitivo Moacir (A I n s t r u ^ o  e o Imp6rio. Subsidios para a 
Histdria da Educaggo no Brasil. S, Paulo, Nacional, 1936, vol.1, p.36) quotes an 
official report of the Viceroy L, de Vasconcellos (1789) about the regretable situation 
of the education, "nainly the first letters", everywhere, See also; Tobias, Josd A, 
Histdria da E d u c a t e  Brasileira. Op, Cit,, pp, 134-6, 139,
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viceroyalty. The large, scattered colonial provinces were 
given a monarchical bureaucracy matured over a century, as 
its new, model central government. Lisbon's old
governmental organizations settled in and did not leave
when King JoSo VI returned to Portugal on the 26/4/1821.
This was of the utmost importance in the formation of the 
tradition and culture of the Brazilian public 
administ rat ion.
More than carriers of a centralized and over— detailed 
administrative system, Portuguese officials were the 
inheritors of a century-long patrimonialist tradition 
deeply rooted on the typical Iberican monarchy. 1 s From 
this bureaucracy the basic patrimonial institution which
oriented the colonization of Brazil and laid the 
foundations of Brazilian state had come three centuries 
before: the grant of the colony lands <sesmarias> by the
king to certain nobles, appointed as capitain-majors 
< caplt Ses-mor') or governors <from 1558), as a hereditary 
right of possession and the subsequent distribution of 
such rights to others, well-positioned or willing to 
undertake colonizing enterprises. The king remained
formally the sovereign of the land but the full governing
power — military, judicial and administrative, including
all fiscal and economy-regulating activities —  followed 
the grant of the land. The capltSo-mor, thereby, was the 
highest authority and public offices were a function of
patrimonial administration. Furthermore, public office 
was essentially a prebend, a benefice from state functions
15, Brazilian sociologist Raymundo Faoro describes the Portuguese bureaucracy as a 
development of the primitive patrimonii ism of the Iberian kings, particularly those 
preceding the Portuguese Avis dinasty (XlVth-XVth century) and who adapted to 
conciliate the requirements of the mercantilist capitalism (Faoro, R, Qs Bonos do 
Poder. F o r m a ^ o  do Patronato Politico Brasileiro. Rio, Qlobo, 1958, pp.3-43),
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or resources which was appropriated by the incumbent as an 
object of personal right in exchange for his services. 
Somehow, officials "shared" state patrimony. The disposal 
of state resources by them generated the process of 
prebendalization of office.
Public jobs, therefore, had a typically patrimonial use 
when they were sold to affluent people as a hereditory 
right in order to reinforce public coffers1® or commonly 
granted as an instrument of patronage politics to assure 
control of local elections1'-7 ("patronage is a part of the 
syndrome of patrimonialism", notes Graham16*). That is why 
Brazilian bureaucracy was not formed under the canons of 
rationality and had a peculiar function of mediation. 1
"The colonial world, with its subjective and particularized 
social relations, simply did not provide the basis for the 
bureaucratic principle of social co-ordination, with its 
insistence on objectivity and universality, to become a 
constitutive element of these relations. H:;z:0
For the purpose of this section, however, the most 
important is that prebendalism inflating bureaucracy,
16, Qa Donos do Poder. F o r m a t e  do Patronato Politico Brasileiro. Op, Cit., pp.1 OS-6,
17, Soares, Galvio A, D, Sociedade e Politica no Brasil. S, Paulo, DifusSo Europ6ia do 
Livro, pp.19-24,
18, Graham, Lawrence, Civil Service Refori in Brazil. Principle Versus Practice, 
Austin, University of Texas Press, 1968, p. 172.
19, Incidently, this analysis of the patrimonial characteristic of Brazilian 
bureaucracy must not be confused with Weber's category of "patrimonial bureaucracy" 
which is a form of rational and traditional authority (the two forms of domination 
combined): Weber, M, "The Social Psychology of World Religions", in Gerth, H, H, and 
Mills, C, W, (eds,) From Max Weber: Essay in Sociology. New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1958, pp,299-300,
20, Uricoechea, F. The Patrimonial Foundations of the Brazilian Bureaucratic State. 
Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1980, p . 15,
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turning public jobs into sinecures and becoming a basic 
political mechanism projected an image of the state on 
society. A social demand for what appeared as a
legitimate use of public resources was raised and finally 
a pattern of relationship between citizen and state was 
developed. It seems, therefore, appropriate to treat the 
issue of patrimonialism not only as a prebendalism of the 
bureaucracy but as a patrimonial conception of state, a 
cultural element evolving through social and political 
transformations. Aspects of a social behaviour, connected 
to government intensive bureaucratic activity, and a
popular aspiration towards prebendas appeared in a 
perceptive description by an eminent sociologist in the 
nineteenth century, Joaquim Nabuco:
"In this regime everything is expected to come from the state 
which, as the unique active association, sucks up and absorbs 
through taxes or public borrowing all available capital and
distributes it among its clients as public jobs, draining the 
savings of poor people by force and rendering unstable the 
fortunes of rich men. Just for that, as a consequence, the 
civil service is the profession and the aspirations of
everybody. Take twenty or thirty Brasilians at random from any 
place where our cultivated society is meeting: all of them
either were or are or certainly will be public servants; and, if 
this is not the case for themselves it will certainly be for 
their children."21
As a consequence, payrolls were the centre of public
expenditure, a feature which permeated down to all levels 
of government, as Faoro remarks:
"The provinces, in their narrow field of action, imitated the 
central government and had their budgets almost completely eaten 
up by the ‘ulcer of civil service* as the Viscount of Uruguay
21, Nabuco, Joaquin, Q ftbolicionisno. Rio, Civi1iza^So Brasileira, 1938, pp, 178-9,
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acidly remarked.
The longer Brazil remained a rural country — a feature 
which actually began changing only from 1930 — with self- 
sufficient and politically influential latifundia and 
without independent professional corporativism in towns, 
the more Brazilian society prolonged the evolution in the 
patrimonial conception of the state.
Within a few years from the arrival of the Portuguese 
Court in Brazil, the government created a dozen colleges 
or culture-promoting institutions to provide for the 
technical needs of new economic and military horizons and 
services for the upper— class. 2:3 However, the essential 
requirements of the political, juridical or administrative 
institutions of the state were met by the two Law 
Faculties (S. Paulo and Recife, both in 1822). Soon they 
attracted the majority of higher education students. ^
The administrative structures of the imperial state 
expanded during the nineteenth century and were adapted as
22, Faoro, Raymundo, Qs Donoa do Poder. F o r m a ^ o  do Patronato Politico Brasileira, Op, 
Cit,, pp.227,
23, Courses of Medicine (initially including pharmacy,odontology and obstetrics), 
mathematics and engineering (initially in military schools), geology, agriculture, 
chemistry, fine arts and architecture, political economy, history, the Botanic Gardens, 
the Public Library (60,000 volumes brought from Lisbon) and the "S.JoSo" theatre, Most 
of them were set up in Rio de Janeiro, Salvador and Ouro Preto, Oetails of these first 
institutions and their evolution can be found in; Cunha, Luiz A, A Universidade. 
Temporg. Q Ensino Superior da ColOnia i Era de Vargas. Rio, Civiliza^go Brasileira, 
1980, pp.69-70, 90-107,
24, Cunha, Luis A, A Universidade Temporg. Q Ensino Superior da Colbnia i Era de. 
Yaigaa, Op, Cit,, p,71,
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an extension of old Portuguese courts, a locus for 
sinecures, a refuge of members of the upper classes in 
need of occupation and higher educated 61ite3-\ As early 
as in the second half of that century, holders of law 
degrees became an influential, illustrious stratum among 
politicians and higher civil servants.-26” They exerted an 
important social and political function of mediation 
between the central government and the periphery, 
representing either the imperial power —  by which they had 
been educated and then appointed —  in distant provinces 
and towns27 or the local, patrimonial leaders (the 
corongis and traditional landlords) in parliament and 
governmental bodies. 32ei Education brought them to the 
larger towns and cities, leaving domestic rural traditions 
of farms and engenhos. Gilberto Freire describes in vivid 
colours the family's and acqaintances' feelings of pride 
regarding the young new-graduates who seemed to be 
surrounded by an aura like newly-anointed priests. 33 As 
they joined public administration, the middle class 
cultivated them, in pursuit of privileges, monopolies, 
jobs and loans. 30 This marked the origin of the higher 
education special political status in Brazil.
25, AragSo, Jolo 6, Adm i n i st r a ^o  & Cultura. Rio, Imprensa Nacional, 1951, pp. 163-8,
26, The functions of the bachelors of the XIX** century Brazil have been compared with 
the Chinese sandarinate, following Weber1s analysis ("The Religion of China", chapter 
5), See Pang, Eul-Soo and Seekinger, Ron L, "The Mandarins of Imperial Brazil", 
Coaparatiye Studies in society and History* Cambridge, vol.14, n.2, Mar. 1972,
27, Cunha, Luis A, A Universidade Temporl. 0 Ensino Superior da ColOnia k Era de 
Vargas, Op, Cit,, pp.71-2,
28, Uricoechea, Fernando, The Patrimonial Foundations of the Brazilian Bureaucratic. 
State. Op, Cit., p,58,
29, Freire, Gilberto, Sobrados & Mocambos. Rio. Melhoramentos, 1958, pp, 96-100,
30, Faoro, Raymundo, Os Donos do Poder. F o r m a ^ o  do Patronato Politico Brasileiro. Op, 
Cit., p,225,
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As regards educational policies the imperial state was 
prodigal with fair proposals. Elementary education was 
declared public and free all over the country and 
obligatory in some provinces (Article 179, paragraphs 32 
and 33 of the Constitution of 25/3/1824). Good intentions 
could not be denied to liberals of the XIX Century Brazil. 
The problem was (and has been since then) the conflict 
between the needs of a widespread population in a vast 
country and a centralized government with a short social 
commitment, issuing policies which reflected the situation 
in the environs of the capital. Despite some feeble 
decentralization of the first level of education (the Act 
of 1834), the results after more than fifty years were 
disappointing. 31 The educational reform which followed 
("Ledncio de Carvalho", 19/4/1879) extended government 
intentions and primary school became obligatory everywhere 
for those between 7 and 14 years of age: for girls who
lived up to 1 Km and for boys who lived up to 114 Km from 
the nearest school. . .
1.3. THE NATIONALIST AND LIBERAL IDEALS OF THE 1920*
The transformations in the imperial-type Brazilian society 
actually occurred some decades after the proclamation of 
the republic. While regional rural-based oligarchies 
(including the coronals in the north-east) shaped the 
scenery of national political power, a new demographic and
31, According to the first Brazilian census in 1872 the literacy rate was 15X and the 
schooling rate in primary school (5-9 years) was 7.3% (AnuArio Estatlstico do Brasil 
1939/40, Separata, pp.9, 13, 107), Even benefiting fron the effects of the states 
autonony with the republic (1889), at the end of the century literates were about 1/4 
of the population and the schooling rates in prinary education did not reach 15X (sane 
source),
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social reality arose in emerging cities. 3:2
As a result of this first burst of urbanization, a 
movement by intellectuals, politicians and journalists in 
the first decades of this century produced a definitive 
change in the views of large sections of the ruling 
classes in relation to education, which began to influence 
the federal government's policies on the matter until the 
mid-sixties and still had repercussions on the official 
discourse later. The trend in giving a special budgetary 
treatment to education, which is studied in Chapter Five, 
stemmed from this movement.
Workers movements (eventually parties), the middle strata 
of society, the press and established institutions such as 
the Roman Catholic Church and the army became increasingly 
involved in social and political problems, whether inside 
or outside political parties. Overall proposals for the 
country were currently discussed among politically 
organized groups —  positivists, liberals, monarchists, 
socialists and even anarchists. Intensive participation 
in meetings and the media reflected a new awakening in 
social life. A nationalist wave was the general outcome 
of this fresh, intensive communication process33, 
eventually, bringing significant political consequences
32. Between 1900 and 1920 the population of the nine biggest cities grew at an average 
of 140X whereas that of the whole country was 76X. Batley, Richard, Power through 
Bureaucracy; The Urbanization Process in Brazil. Hants, Bower, 1983, tables 2,1, and 
2.2, pp.31-2,
33, For a general view of current ideas in the period, their channels and links, see 
Costa, JoSo C, "As Transforea?Ges do Pensanento Politico Brasileiro no Sdculo XX e 0 
Nacionalisno", Revista Brasiliense, S,Paulo, n.40, nar-abr, 1962, pp,51-64, and Chacon, 
Vaaireh, HistOria das IdAias Socialistas no Brasil. Rio, Civilizagao Brasileira, 1965, 
pp.351-64.
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under the Vargas regime. As it could be expected,
education, a constant subject of liberal and positivist
programmes, became a focus of special interest on the wake 
of the nationalist trends.
The results of the first statistical census of the country 
(1920) shocked influential people whose view had been 
limited to the cities. *'A Educational targets were 
included in the statutory programmes of many
associations33 and seen as a basic condition of "solving 
the country's problems" and realising general aspirations. 
The liberal preaching of Rui Barbosa (leader of his party 
and candidate in the presidential elections of 1910) still 
resounded among his numerous followers. The decade was 
really marked by a special feeling about education which 
was described as "an enthusiasm for education and 
pedagogical optimism"3*3.
In 1924, the Brazilian Association of Education 
(Associagao Brasileira de EducagSo% ABE, whose members 
called themselves "education professionals") gathered 
together teachers and intellectuals for the first time at 
a national level. ABE claimed a special right to request
changes in educational systems as the first group to have
defined education as a scientific matter, and so requiring 
specialized professionals. Among them, the Pioneers of 
the New Education <Pioneiros da Educagao Nova'), a
34, The census figure of 75.5% of illiteracy was issued just when the country started 
the celebrations of the centennial of its independency (1922),
35, Education was an iten in the basic programme of the active Nationalist League of 
S,Paulo (connected with the League of National Defence and later, in 1927, becoming the 
National Democratic Party),
36, Nagle, Jorge, E d u c a t e  & Sociedade na Primeira Reptiblica S.Paulo. EPU/EDUSP, 1974, 
pp. 97-101, Other quotations in this paragraph are also from these pages,
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movement linked to the Dewey's "New School" (USA), was 
specially active and its members were appointed to 
strategic positions as head of education administrative 
bodies of important states and the federal government
The ABE held nationwide enquiries and conferences-""' to 
discuss current educational problems from a non­
governmental point of view and suggested new policies for 
the sector. Other influential events should also be 
mentioned, such as the Rotary Club Meetings on Education 
and the enquiries directed by the distinguished writer 
Fernando de Azevedo in 1926, sponsored and published by 
the newspaper 0 Estado de S. Paulo. 33
The picture of a flowering of interest in educational 
matters was completed by a rising, politically crucial 
issue: since the Constitution of 1891, literacy was a
legal condition for the right to vote; more literates — 
easily obtained with a widespread campaign against 
illiteracy — would mean more votes, changing the regional 
map of political influence.
The relevance of all these facts — most taking place near 
the centre of power or involving elites — was to have 
introduced the idea that education was, before all, a 
matter of national priority and should not simply be left 
to the states or restrained by their autonomy. Federal
37, Cunha, Luis A, A Universidade Temporg. Q Ensino Superior da Colflnia k Era de 
yaiaas. Op. Cit,, p, 196,
38, The "Conferfincias Nacionais de Educa$4o" were held in; 1927, Curitiba; 1928, Belo 
Horizonte; 1929, S,Paulo, A Congress of Higher Education was held in August 1927 
(First Centennial of Law Colleges), See also the nationwide enquiry; Associa^So 
Brasileira de Educa;3o, Q Problema Universit&rio Brasileiro. Rio, ABE, 1928,
39, Azevedo, Fernando de, A E d u c a ^ o  Publica en> S.Paulo. Problemas & Discussdes. 
S,Paulo, Nacional, 1937,
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government was repeatedly called upon to intervene more 
drast ically.
In 1921, as a consequence of the Nationalist League of 
S. Paulo's activities, whose affiliate Sampaio Doria had 
reformed the elementary education in the state, the 
federal government called upon an Interstate Conference of 
Primary Education (Rio de Janeiro, 12/10/1921), to be 
preceded by a report of the Minister of Justice to the 
President of the Republic and the work of a preparatory 
commission.'40 The Conference set up a juridical basis for 
the intervention (officially called "cooperation") of the 
Federal Union in state primary education and produced 
plenty of substantial proposals for assuring a universal, 
public elementary education. Provisions for a scheme of 
financial support for the states by the federal government 
and an obligation of investing a minimium percentage of 
the states revenues appear for the first time. “41
Most of the conclusions of the Conference were not 
implemented immediately but could have become law some 
years later through the Decree 16782-A of 13/1/1925, an 
overall reform of public education, including the above 
mentioned financial provisions regarding schools.'42 The 
decree came into force, but no additional budgetary 
appropriation was made by the Parliament^3 which impaired
40, Ministtrio da Justica e NegOcios Interiores, ftnais da Confer&ncia Interestadual do 
Ensino Primirio. Rio, 0 Norte, 1922,
41, The Federal Union would have to pay a minimum salary to qualified teachers of 
primary schools who were also entitled to be given houses by the states. These would 
have to spend a minimum of 10% of their revenues in that level of school, Priority 
would be given to rural schools,
42, An analysis of this important act in Nagle, Jorge, E d u c a ^ o  & Sociedade na 
Primeira Repflblica pp. 139-63,
43, Idem, p,140,
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the whole effectiveness of the reform. Despite this, the 
Executive adapted the National Department of Education
(DNE) to perform wider functions of control. The DNE'S 
chairman was also to head the National Council of 
Education <CNE), itself widening its scope and structure.
The influence of ABE extended for the first years of 
Vargas's tenure until the Estado Novo <1937) and was 
decisive in the initial reforms of the revolutionary
government. The creation of a ministry of education
("Ministry of the Affairs of Education and Public Health", 
Decree 19402, of 14/4/30), an old demand of the group, and 
the Intergovernmental Agreement on Statistics with the 
states were long-lasting results of that influence. The 
principles expressed in the "Manifest of the Pioneers of 
Education" (1932) a leading group in ABE, were adopted by 
the 1934 Constitution, after been discussed in the ABE's 
V th National Conference of Education.'14
Finally, to draw attention to simultaneous nationalist
pressures, one should mention that the federal government 
supported the Southern states between 1918 and 1929 in 
setting up and reforming primary schools in places where 
new colonies of European immmigrants had settled in.4 -'
44, Information in this paragraph i n  f ro m  Paixoto, Ana M,C, "Reflexos da Revolu?Io 
de 30 na Educa;2o Brasileira", Simpdsio sdbre a RevolutSo de 30. Porto Alegre, 
URG8/ERUS, 1983, pp,199-202, Incidently, Francisco Canpos, the first Minister of 
Education (1930-32) and a leader of the authoritarian ideology in the Ministry of 
Justice (1937-43), paradoxically held some common positions with these liberal groups 
through his admiration of Dewey, Decroly, Clapardde, Kirkpatrick and the methods of the 
"New School" (Medeiros, Jarbas, 'Introdu;3o ao Estudo do Pensamento Politico 
Authorit^rio Brasileiro, 1914-1945,' Revista de Cidncia Politica. FSV.vol. 17, n, 1, 
Mar, 1974, pp.81-2),
45, Nagle, Jorge, Educa;3o & Sociedade na Primeira Reptiblica. Op. Cit., pp,285-6, 
Similar governmental policy was developed afterwards, inspired by the same intentions
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In addition, literacy in foreign languages was 
prohibited and the vernacular became obligatory in 
schools.
1. 4. THE VARGAS LEGACY
HThe Estado Novo brought irreversible changes in the 
institutions of political life and public administration (... ) 
In 1945, Brazil inherited a federal executive which was 
immeasurably stronger than the one the revolutionaries had 
seized in 1930. The process by which federal government was 
steadily strengthened at the expense of state and local 
government began in November 1930 and was accelerated after 
1937".^
Skidmore's assessment can adequately introduce the 
significance of the 1930-45 Brazilian experience for the 
1964-84 administrative model. The institutional apparatus 
which came with Vargas remained and was developed as a 
part of the bureaucratic context in which, eventually, 
the process of federal finance allocation took place. Two 
points are emphasized in this section: first, the rise of
a large organizational structure to carry out new
45, (cont,) in Vargas' Estado Ndvo as a part of the programme of the National 
Commission for the Primary Education (Law-by-Decree 868 of 18/11/1938), Then, more 
than 800 schools were directly reformed and financially supported by the federal 
government,
46, The strong reaction against foreigners who usually held the capital of many banks
and major companies was also extended to Portugese as "suckers" of Brazilian good
markets and dreamers with the "Luso-Brazilian Confederation", In schools the 
discipline was called “Brazilian Language" (.Lingua Brasileira) not "Portuguese", From 
this time the spelling "Brazil" was changed into "Brasil".
47, Skidmore, Thomas, Politics in Brazil. 1930-1964. ftn Experiment in Democracy. New
York, Oxford University Press, 1967, p.33,
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functions of the state in the economy and to expand poli­
tically important activities of organizing labour 
relations and providing social security; a similar tenden­
cy occurred in eductional services. Second, the historic 
role of the Administrative Department of the Public 
Service CDASP) in introducing policies of rationalisation 
of administration and by this means, bringing about 
amalgamations to prebendalist and patronage trends.
1. 4. 1. The expansion of the federal government structure
The task of controlling crucial sectors of the economy or 
public finances, with immediate political consequences, 
generated organizational ramifications and preceded 
structures of planning development policies often fostered 
by nationalist views.
In the first years, the increasing national debt brought 
about both the individual assumption of states debts by 
the federal government and the suppression of states 
autonomy for borrowing abroad. As a consequence, the 
Ministry of the Treasury adapted its structure to assess 
and approve projects.
Vargas guaranteed financial support to coffee farmers, in 
a decisive political maneouvre coopting this key group 
based in S. Paulo <a Bureau for Industrial and 
Agricultural Credit was inaugurated in Banco do Brasil') 
but a production and trade control policy was made after 
that by federal bodies, the new National Council (then 
Department) of Coffee and its re-organized executive 
agency, the Instituto Brasileiro do Caf£t IBC (1934). 
Soon the same happened to tea (.Instituto Nacional do Matet 
1938), wheat (Instituto Nacional do Trigo, 1937), salt
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(.Instituto Nacional do Sal, 1940) and pinewood (Instituto 
Nacional do Pinho, 1941). The model had already been
applied in 1933 to sugar and alcohol (Instituto Nacional 
do Alcool), just when S. Paulo's increasing plantations — a 
consequence of unstable coffee prices — menaced the 
traditional planters of the north-east. The list of this 
sort of "topical intervention policies" and their new 
agencies is very long. Aex These agencies evolved
afterwords as ministerial bodies or decentralized 
organizat ions.
To formulate and implement policies on planning and 
economic development, which were a significant 
contribution of the two Vargas governments, the federal 
bureaucracy expanded by creating or reformulating central 
bodies, whether of a general or specialized nature. In
48, Some examples are; Vegetable Health Oefence Service (1934), with seven regional 
Inspectorates, and Anieial Health Defence Service (1933-43); National Centre of 
Agricultural Education and Research (1938), with eight institutes and one university; 
Executive Cosaission for Manioc Production (1942); the experimental fields or 
laboratories of cacoa (1931,1935), tobacco (1933), cotton (1942), rice (1942), corn 
(1939, 1940), fruit and fermentation (1936, 1942), vegetable oils (1943); the Forest 
Service (1938, after the forest code of 1934) and the five national parks; the hunting 
and fishing authority (1933), Outside economic area, an example of the "topic 
intervention policy” is the Special Service for Public Health (SESP, 1942), for the 
control of malaria and other tropical diseases.
49, The following should be mentioned; the Federal Council of Foreign Trade (1934), 
the National Institute of Statistics (1934) and the Brazilian Council of Geography 
(1937) the two ones later merged in the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics 
(IBGE), the Technical Council of Economy and Finance (1937), the Super intendency of 
Currency and Credit (1945, SUMOC), the Water Service (1933) later National Council of 
Water and Electric Power (1939), the National Department of High-Ways (1934), the 
National Department of Mineral Production (1933) later National Council of Nines and
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addition, some regional sectors such as the Amazonian 
rubber economy were also assisted by a set of new 
governmental agencies. 30 The federal government firmly 
established its presence in the productive sector chiefly 
boosted by nationalist sentiments or favourable trade 
conditions during the Second World War. •ffil
One of the first important administrative provisions of 
the 1930's Revolution was the creation of two ministries, 
amplifying the government's capacity to reach neglected 
social areas and buid up a basis for political control and 
support. A Ministry for the Affairs of Education and 
Public Health (14/11/1930) was finally separated from the 
Ministry of Justice and Internal Affairs, and a Ministry 
of Labour, Commerce and Industry (26/11/1930) was given 
the fundamental task of developing and implementing 
corporatist policies, among others. The Ministry of 
Labour expanded rapidly through the creation or 
supervision of Unions, their activities, revenues and
49, (cont,) Metallurgy (1938), the National Council of Oil (1938), and the National 
Department of Animal Production (1938),
50, They are: credit for planters; The Credit Bank of Rubber: support for colonists: 
The Super intendency of supply for the Amazon Valley; transport: The Navigation Service 
of Amazon and Administrative Service of the Port of Pari: research: The Agronomic 
Institute of the North,
51, During the Estado Novo the following state-owned companies were created: The 
National Siderurgic Company (1941), the Vale do Rio Doce Company (1942), The Brazilian 
Alcalis Company (1943), the S3o Francisco River Hydroelectric Company (1944), The 
following groups appeared during the second Vargas government; Petrobris (1953), Bank 
of the Northeast of Brazil (1951) Eletrobris (1952), National Bank of Economic 
Development - BNDE (1952), Until then, the hundred year old Banco do Brasil was the 
only public company,
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elections and the preparation of copious regulations.
On another front, the new ministry inspected the 
implementation of the new labour or nationalist laws by
the f i r ms.
The highly-staffed social security agencies completed the 
typical civil service panorama left by Vargas. He added 
five new large public institutes for pensions and 
allowances to the two existing ones, besides numerous 
small savings organizations for pensions (.Caixas de Pensao 
e Aposent adori a) which were all ref ormulat ed. The
revenues of these institutes — amounting to one third of 
the Gross National Product (GNP) — were often used by the 
government to cover temporary financial difficulties and 
for various deals, sometimes for disputable purposes. S4-
52, After the creation of the Ministry itself, Decree 19443 of 26/11/30, the most 
important acts enlarging its activities were: Article 121 of the 1934 Constitution 
(protection of the worker and conditions for work), the decrees 19671-A, of 4/2/31 
(attributes of the New National Department of Labour), 19770, of 19/3/31 (organization 
of unions of workers or employers), 24694, of 12/6/34 (organization of professional 
unions), 19482, of 12/12/30 (minimum quota for national employees in each firm, the 
“two thirds" law) and law-by-decrees 1843, of 7/12/39 (new restrictions of foreign 
enterprises), 1985, of 29/1/1940 (the "Mining Code") and 5492, of 1/5/43, a general 
code of recapitulation and completion of labour laws,
53, During the 1920's the institutes of pensions of the railway workers (Law 4682 of 
1923) and civil servants (Law 5128 of 1926) were created, The following came with the 
Varga* government: institute of pensions and allowances of the commerce (IAPC, 1934),
of industry (I API, 1934), of bank workers (IAPB, 1934), of the merchant marine (IAPM,
1933), and transport and freight workers (IAPETC, 1938), The civil servants pension 
institute was reformulated to provide further, medical services (IPASE, 1931) one of 
the best of its nature in the capital,
54, See exemples in: Henriques, Affonso, Ascenggo e Queda de Qetftlio Vargas., S, Paulo, 
Record, 1966, vol.2, pp,216-20,
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From 1938 to 1960 the number of federal civil servants 
jumped from 131,628 <DASP 1938 census) to 345,568 
(Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics, IBGE 
census), a growth of 262%. The ratio of
population/federal civil servants fell from 308 to 205 
(50%) in the same period, approximately. From the study 
of GrahamS6 it is possible to conclude that the post 
dictatorship, populist governments have increased the 
number of civil servants significantly more than the 
Vargas Estado Novo did. The latter, however, set up the 
organizational bases for that expansion by multiplying 
federal agencies and bodies.
Obviously, the consequence of this rapid enlargement in 
the services and structure of the federal government was a 
complete change in the context of competition for funds.
The centralizing administrative strategy of the federal 
government led it to set down successive regulations whose 
implementation irreversibly broadened its presence in 
education for the following decades, 57
55, There was no statistical census in 1930, In the previous one, it is impossible to 
distinguish some part-time civil servants from other part-time workers (for example the 
liberal professionals) among which they might have been counted; besides, military and 
civil servants are counted in one single category, The censuses of 1920, 1940 and 1950 
did not distinguish federal civil servants from the state and municipal ones, (Cunha, 
N, U, V, da. 0 Sistema Administrative Brasileiro, 1930-1950. HEC/INEP, 1963, pp,110- 
115,
56, Graham, Lawrence, Civil Service Reform in Brazil. Op, Cit,, Table 6, p , 132,
57, In a first cycle of legislation, clearly inspired by liberal ideas of previous 
decade, secondary education was reformed (Decree 19890, of 18/4/31) and universities 
had their first statute (Decree 19851, of 11/4/31), followed by Decree 24279, of the 
22/5/34, concerning the state and private independent colleges, The Constitution of 
1934 widened the functions of CNE (Art,152), A second cycle of
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The existing policy of Mexemplarism" — a few federal 
schools maintained as a model for all the others in the 
country — was reinforced and extended, this time to higher 
education. The University of Rio de Janeiro (URJ, later 
Uni versidade do Brasil CUB) was held up as the reference 
standard,53 For the following two decades, until 1961, 
this policy of "exemplarism" would determine even the 
internal routines and nomenclature of jobs in other 
universit ies.
The federal administrative structure of education followed 
the enlargement in its legal jurisdiction. Just after its 
creation <1930), the "Ministry of the Affairs of Education 
and Public Health" suffered several organizational 
arrangements and then Law 378, of 13/1/37, under the 
direct influence of the Federal Council of Civil Service 
(predecessor of DASP), brought rationalizing reforms. In 
1953, all bodies related to health were set apart from the 
ministry, which became the Ministry of Education and
Culture <Minist6rio da EducagSo e Cultura% MEC, Law 1920 
of 25/7/53). From 1930 to 1953, the ministry — except the 
bodies for health and the decentralized entities — had 
expanded its organizational structure from 39 to 202
sections.53 Instead of a single university
57, (cont,) legislation for elementary and secondary schools was issued a decade later 
(laws-by-decrees 4073, of 30/1/42; 4244, of 9/4/42; 6141, of 28/11/43), even after 
Vargas leave (laws-by-decree 8529, of 2/1/46; 8530, of 2/7/46; 9613, of 22/8/46), and 
reflected both the influence of the italian fascist system and the government concern
with qualified man-power to meet the needs of a growing, diversified economy,
58, Decree 24279, of 22/5/32; Article 5, §2 of Decree 22597, of 27/3/33; Law 452 of 
5/7/37 and Law-by-Decree 305 of 26/2/38,
59, Information in this paragraph is from; Gama e Silva, Jos6 S, e Marques, Lucy, 
E v o l u m e  do Ministerio da E d u c a ^ o  e SaCide. Rio, FGV, 1953,
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and half a dozen isolated colleges in 1930, the Ministry
directly controlled 16 universities, 21 colleges and 20
secondary technical schools, by the end of 1953. In 1938
the Ministry and its decentralized units had 5,988 
occupied positions whereas in 1960 they reckoned 23481.,:0
Once more, the post-1946 period seems to be the most
prodigal in appointments. Only during the 12 months
following the end of the dictatorship 989 people were 
admi 11 ed to M E C . rV- 1
1. 4. 2. The role of the Administrative Department of the
Public Service fDASP)
Modernization through the rationalization of
administrative activities was one of the most marked
strategies of the victorious movement in 1930. The 
revolutionaries were inspired by patriotic ideas of
decisively overcoming the chaotic and inefficient federal 
bureaucracy, which had been weakened during the previous
40 years. A Central Purchase Commission (14/1/31) was set 
up only two months after Vargas had taken national power. 
It was followed by intensive studies for an early 
organization of personnel manning t ables.
60. BRASIL/IBGE, Anu4rio Estatistico do Brasil. 1938, p.812 and 1962, p.336,
61. Official information of the government to the request ( requerimento) n. 100/46 
from the Deputy Raul Pila, BRASIL/Congresso Nacional. Annaes da C&mara dos Deputados. 
vol, XI/47, p.93.
62. "Until 1930 - writes a former divisional head in DASP - the panorama of personnel 
administration was characterized by a general acceptance of nepotism, a complete 
decentralization of activities whether regulative or executive and a lack of
systematization. There was no central agency for personnel nor general laws on
personnel administration, Each ministry and sometimes each department had its own job 
evaluation and pay scales, seldom according to the nature or requirements of functions,
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Law 284, of 28/10/1935, created the Federal Council for 
the Civil Service, directly responsible to the President
of the Republic, and efficiency Commissions were
established in each ministry as the instrument of a broad 
policy of modernizing federal administration.
The head of Council and the key-man for the eventual
development of that policy until 1945 was Luis SimSes 
Lopes, presidential advisor on this issue and a very close 
friend of Vargas. He had travelled through Europe and the 
USA, noting their recent experiences in the organization 
and management of the public sector. The Council then
sent a large number of technicians to the US for training.
The necessity of a permanent executive agency, overcoming 
the Council's collegial mode of operation, was soon 
perceived and further recommended by the good quality of 
the services of the body led by SimQes Lopes. The 
Constitution of 1937 provided for the establishment of 
such an agency and the Law-by-Decree 579, of 30/7/1938, 
created and organized the Administrative Department of 
Public Service, DASP. The new agency was given a wide 
jurisdiction to regulate the matters of personnel 
management, material <absorbing the Central Purchasing 
Commission), budgeting, civil works, assistance for the 
President of the Republic in the revision of legislative 
bills, general organization and whatever rationalization 
federal bodies needed, including the inspection of their 
services and the control of their efficiency. The 
administrative bodies of the two other constitutional 
powers, Congress and courts, had partial autonomy from 
DASP's regulations whilst the armed forces were outside 
its jurisdiction.
62, (cont,) (,,,) Some order had to be established in that primitive chaos," Wahrlich, 
Beatriz de S, ftdministratSo de Pessoal. Principios e Tunicas. Rio. F6V, 1964, pp,23-4-
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The idea of DASP was based on W. Willougby's theory 
("Principles of Public Administration") of a department of 
general administration and its distinction betweeen the 
management of means and that of ends. DASP*s organization 
and functions were decisively inspired by the USA's Civil 
Service Commission, the Bureau of Budget and the Executive 
Office of the President, as a compound of these bodies. e J
Under DASP, regulation and standardization activities were 
intensive, definitively marking the organizational 
structure and life of public f ederal instituti ons. The 
agency had representatives and advice commissions in 
ministries, besides influencing the appointment of the 
head of the Personnel Division of the ministries. A 
Council of Administration of Personnel regularly gathered 
these directors at DASP. DASP teams were asked for and 
sent to most states — then run by federal interventors — 
to provide advice and help in organising DASP-like Public 
Service Departments. These and other training activities 
were the most effective way for DASP to penetrate all 
layers of federal bureaucracy and develop a special 
loyalty in civil servants to the principles of the 
reform.
DASP played a conflicting and contradictory role in the 
context of populist government. It tenaciously held to a 
policy of staffing public services by open competition 
examinations alone, urging good attendance at work and 
forbidding the holding of several positions
64, Viana, Arizio de, DASP. I n s t i t u t o  a Serving do Brasil. Rio, DASP, 1953, p.9; 
Wahrlich, Beatriz de S, A d m i n i st r a te  de Pessoal, Princlpios e Tunicas. Op, Cit,, pp, 
25-9,
65, Only between 1941 and 1945, 49,881 public servants were trained, including those 
sent abroad, and the annual average in 1952-53 was 5,000, Viana, Arizio de, DASP, una 
I n s t i t u t e  a Service do Brasil. Op, Cit,, pp,81,83,
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simultaneously, irrespective of the nominee's social 
status. This clashed with the traditional patrimonialist 
use of public jobs by elites, limited public
administrators in their prebendalism and often disturbed 
the patronage habits of politicians. Furthermore, until 
the early sixties, DASP was frequently found to oppose 
unions and labour movements on behalf of the interests of 
the Treasury, the biggest employer in the country. Except 
for Caf 6 Filho <1954-1955) and J&nio Quadros (Jan-Set
1961) all other Presidents, including Vargas himself, had 
an ambiguous public position on DASP, using the agency as 
a shield for unpopular decisions, the so-called tactic of 
"DASP the whipping-boy". . .
Conversely, DASP obtained the support of most government 
technical staff and the average civil servant, by offering 
them new professional prospects, and many low income civil 
servants saw DASP as dispensing justice and providing 
protection against the arbitrary local bosses (before DASP 
even the monthly pay was not made regularly). G,‘7 Serious 
studies on DASP — G. Siegel and B. Wahrlich are probably
the best — do not take this aspect into consideration in
their final evaluations of the role of DASP, for their 
sources were taken only from top political events or 
personalit ies.
The influence of DASP and its technical level was critical 
in the years folowing the dictatorship and periods of 
decline after the second Vargas tenure, DASP's "old 
guard" elite settled in Gettilio Vargas Foundation (FGV),
66. Siegel, 6ilbert, The Vissitudes of Governmental Reform in Brazil: a Study of DftSP. 
Op, Cit., pp.66-7, 121, 126, 186,
67, In this assessment the author is also based in many talks with grassroots old 
civil servants and DASP's officials, when he worked in the area between 1970 and 1976,
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chiefly the Brazilian School of Public Administration 
(EBAP), from the late forties. It developed a pioneering 
role in education, research and publishing on 
Administration and Government with the co-operation of 
American universities. Its influence in government
organizations has repeatedly made itself felt through the 
regular provision of technical advice for administrative 
improvement and reforms.
Over decades, a curious amalgam of the effects of DASP’s 
modernizing patterns and the strong roots of the Brazilian 
patrimonial state appeared. Instead of a grant of the 
holders of patrimonial or political power, public jobs 
became seen as an individual right. Once obtained, it was 
firstly to be enjoyed. After having lawfully entered a 
governmental body — or been "blanked-in" by frequent 
populist decrees — the incumbent of a public position was 
almost a "citizen” of the civil service. His security in 
job tenure was unquestionable and after that he was free 
to seek further professional or financial advantages, 
scarcely related to his performance at work. GSI This new 
patrimonial status of civil servants gave rise to unending 
legal discussions or pleas on rights, public bodies 
staffing and management tables. An overall assessment of 
the DASP story would find the agency finally overwhelmed 
by stronger political ramifictions of patrimonial trends. 
DASP often took refuge in detailed regulations and 
judgements of rights and fell into formalistic compromises 
with faits accomplis and situations which frequently 
escaped out of its control or political influence.
68, On this point, see the interesting; Vieira, Ast6rio, "0 Interdsse PGblico e o 
Interdsse Privado na Administra^So de Pessoal, Estudo Comparativo dos Sistemas 
Brasileiro e Norte-Anericano", Revista do Servi^Q Ptiblico, vol.II, Abril, 1938, pp.9- 
12,
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1. 5 . THE FEDERALIZATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS
The 30-year-long process of the federalization70 of higher 
education institutions is a key fact in understanding the 
present profile of finance allocation on education in 
Brazil. Since these institutions were declared to be 
under the federal government's jurisdiction — and so
awarded a permanent place in the federal budget — they 
have always had a prevailing role in the share of federal
resources by means of their links with elites or
influential members of the parliament and the federal 
bureaucracy of education.
Up until the early thirties the federal government had a 
dozen colleges, some of them century-old institutions, and 
just one university, the University of Rio de Janeiro 
<URJ>, formally constituted in 1920 from three existing 
colleges. The majority of states had created higher 
education institutions in the previous forty years, since 
the creation of such institutions was a signal of
prosperity and prestige of local oligarchies which
supported the organization of states after the
proclamation of the Republic.
The revolution of 1930 brought drastic political and
69, "Federalization" stands for the change of jurisdiction from states or private 
owners to the federal government, The government takes over patrimony and general 
expenses including personnel who. then, have access to a new status, Federalization 
may be only partial, refering to specific colleges of a university, but this have 
usually been a step towards the federalization of the whole aggregate, All information 
in this section are from the author's specific reserch in: Mattos, Pedro L, de, As.
Universidades e o Soverno Federal. Recife, UFPE, 1982, pp, 49-66 and Anexo I, pp, 203-
14,
- 74 -
economic changes in intergovernmental relations. Taxes on 
exports passed to federal government control and 
interstate trade taxes were abolished. The states were 
not compensated by any new direct source of revenue, 
whereas they lost the autonomy to recover the equilibrium 
of their budgets through external loans. This new
situation soon produced repercussions such as pressure on 
federal bodies for budgetary transfers or support.
As early as during the late twenties the "exemplarismM 
policy and the concept of education as a national matter 
led to the idea of an upper jurisdiction at which 
educational problems should be solved. This reinforced 
arguments for more links with the federal government. The 
Decree 19851, of 11/4/1931, the "Brazilian Universities 
Statute", in article 8, left a safety valve for these 
pressures. The provision allowed for the possibility of 
federal universities being created from both federal or 
state colleges which would keep their previous juridical 
capacity. At the time, however, the federalization tout- 
court did not meet requirements in the studies for the 
1934 Constitution regarding the national organization of 
education, namely the state character of organizational 
systems of education. Only a supplementary role remained 
for the federal government.
The terms of the 1934 Constitution, repeated in that of 
1937, were fully observed during the first Vargas 
government <1930-1945) and the reasons for that would have 
been primarily budgetary. DASP was firmly taking care of 
the federal budget balance. As from 1946, however, the 
resistance of planning bodies in federal bureaucracy fell 
under political pressure and Article 8 of Decree 19851 was 
used as an indulgent, legal device. The Universities of 
Pernambuco and Bahia in 1946 and Minas Gerais in 1949 were 
federalized, some of their colleges still remaining under
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state jurisdiction. This situation, however, proved
administratively impractiable and those colleges were also 
federalized in 1950. Since then numerous, successive 
federalizations of colleges or universities have occurred 
beyond control.
Pressure arose first from the universities or colleges, 
both state and private, and from their lecturers and 
professors. Counting on the support of the deputies and 
senators for their state, they lobbied the state 
governors, who were themselves interested in relieving 
state budgets. States financial constraints reflected on 
salaries of university teachers who were lured by a 
recently organized career plan by DASP, with well-defined 
rights, including security of tenure, and regular monthly 
payments. Besides these reasons, any teachers of state, 
private or even municipal institutions aimed at the supe­
rior status of being a federal professor <catedratico).
From one federal university with some ten units and half a 
dozen individual colleges in 1945, the federal higher 
education institutions in 1961 had become 19 universities 
with 104 colleges or institutes. At one sitting alone, 
the Congress inserted the federalization of 26 faculties 
in a bill (then Law 1254) in which the Executive proposed 
another matter (supplementary appropriations for MEC' s 
institutions), despite an evident lack of finance. 70 The 
door was definitely open and, after 1961, 20 more federal
universities with numerous colleges were federalized or 
simply created as federal schools and similarly supported 
by the federal government, although under the institute of 
f oundat i on.
70, BRASIL/Camara dos Oeputados, D U r i o  do Congresso National. Ano V, n. 210, 
18/11/1950, pp.8, 211-15.
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The repercussion of the federalization on the 
administrative and political life of those institutions 
was definitive and originated profound conflicts. 
Financial procedures changed for both the revenues (now 
legally considered "federal public money") and the 
expenditures. The system of rules for the administration 
of personnel and the "culture of DASP" soon made teachers 
aware that "federalization" also meant something further 
than being given new salaries and status. Above all, 
since the federalization, each university or college 
changed its political axis: its directors and leaders
began to gravitate around the federal government which 
appointed them and supported them financially. They began 
another political life.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE FORMATION OF THE POLICIES ON EDUCATION FUNDING
This chapter sets out the main feature of the policy of 
the 1964 regime on education funding, after investigating 
the immediate political background — namely the tendencies 
and moves under the military rule — from which it took 
form. This feature is the association between economic 
development and education. It first came from a
practical (and therefore limited) approach to the 
"connections and contributions" of education to 
development and was quite clear during the 1950's. From
the early 1960's, even before the sweeping political 
changes of 1964, however, there was a subtle but highly
significant change in the views on this education- 
development connection when, under external influence, it
was set in the context of the economic theory.
Some of the following chapters will deal with particular 
decisions of developments of this policy and so complete 
the picture. For the moment the focus is put on the 
stance, the discourse and the reasons presented when the 
subject appeared at the level of policy definition (plans, 
laws, speeches, etc. ).
In the structure of the subjects, it was assumed that the 
period 1964-78 was that in which the policy was developed 
and implemented. From 1979 the impact of the economic 
crisis and the shortage of resources for a government
heavily in debt cooled down the motivation towards the 
previous policies. Their effects.' however, remained.
Special attention is given to th 966-73 as that
in which the policy actually rose and peaked.
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Since the subject has an important administrative 
dimension, fair space is allowed in this chapter for a 
particular implication of the economic approach of 
education, namely the rationalization of the 
administrative process through planning and control of 
expend!t ure.
2. 1. THE 1964 REGIME AND ITS POLITICAL STRATEGY
2. 1. 1. The regime, from 1964 to 1984 
(An interpretative outline)
The coup of March 1964 was a civil-military institutional 
disruption which aimed to restore the traditional patterns 
of democracy, to impose order in the streets and barracks 
and to maintain the country's international framework of 
trade links and alliances.
The complex coalition which supported the coup involved 
the majority of the traditional political forces in the 
country. These ranged from organizations inspired by the 
Catholic Church to the two biggest political parties. 
Anticommunist and semi-fascist forces spoke for rural 
oligarchies in some states and industrialists in others, 
all menaced by the reforms (including some relating to 
military institutions) which the populist platform of the 
government used to mobilize the masses or specific sectors 
of the public. The military were not passive spectators 
in their historic role of active participation in 
Brazilian politics. Preliminary alliances and even plans 
against JoSo Goulart began soon after the military attempt 
to prevent his rise to constitutional Executive Power in 
1961, after the resignation of President J&nio Quadros.
- 79 -
Indeed, the early intention was merely to organize 
resistance to a populist left-wing republic which was 
believed to be looming. 1 An organization was established 
in Rio de Janeiro for this purpose by late 1961, although 
it had been formally created to be an "institute for 
social and economic research", the IPES (usually called 
IP£s>. Here, convergences of interest and viewpoint among 
retired military, businessmen, liberal professionals and 
journalists were sought. The military were particularly 
interested in making alliances with civilian leaders 
through some retired officers who were legally permitted 
to participate in the activities of IP£S.2 Conceptual, 
links with the Escola Superior de Guerra-ESG were 
developed in addition to personal relationships (Gen 
Humberto Castello Branco, a close friend of one of the 
creators of IP£S, Gen Golbery do Couto e Silva, was the 
then director of studies of ESG). However, no specific 
plans to overthow Goulart's government were made either in 
ESG or IPES.
Today there is a consensus that the intention of the 
military - at least the group initially at the head of 
the new government - was to hold power for a short 
period, only as long as was necessary to "replace the 
train on the rails", restoring discipline in the armed 
forces, producing some institutional reforms and "cleaning 
up" the economy. Political power should then be returned 
to civilians, through presidential elections to be held in 
1965.
1, Some groups of Army officers had made detailed plans with their colleagues of the 
air force to flee in an emergency situation to remote parts of Goi&s and Mato-Grosso to 
organize an armed resistence to the coup from there, ' (Interview with Col, Sdrgio 
Pasquali, who was a major in 1964 and was directly engaged in plans and operations of 
the 1964 coup, >
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The active military nucleus which carried out armed 
interventions — the operations simultaneously planned in 
some units of Rio and Minas Gerais since 1962 — and broke 
the line of tenure in political power was a composite of 
some traditional tendencies in the army. A large majority 
of these groups have been rashly called "hard liners", for 
their position of intervention by force. These groupings 
shared a sense of nationalism, anti-communism and a 
loathing of the style of the professional politicians 
(which they referred to as "demagoguery"). Most of them 
were typical professionals, although the views of the "new 
professionalism" were actually a rising trend among the 
military Elites, as noted by Stepan.3 Hierarchy and 
discipline in the armed forces were issues of principle 
for them, the absolute limit of toleration. Only in the 
aftermath of the coup internal groups within this general 
tendency took form. Although top level settlements had 
entrusted the provisional high command of the movement to 
the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and his "intel­
lectuals" (or more charmingly called the "Sorbonne" 
group), power increasingly ran in other directions in the 
following ten years. Together with the assent of the USA 
Ambassador in Brazil, Gen. Castello Branco had the 
decisive support of some figures highly respected by the 
military, as some old tenentes and commanders from the 
second world war, themselves conspirators against Goulart
2, "In 1961 we were defeated by Brizola because we did not take civilian support into 
account" (Sen, Solbery do Couto e Silva, interview with the author),
3, Stepan, A, Qs Hilitares: da Abertura i Nova Reptiblica. 2 ed, Rio de Janeiro, 1986, 
pp, 21-2, It could be said that many studies in the Brazilian military of this time 
lose accuracy in using tout court a polarization between the "Sorbonne" group and the 
"hard liners", Actually the large majority of the military who participate in politics 
have a profile such as is described above, The "hard liners" would be a specific 
trend, at the other end of the spectrum,
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(Cordeiro de Farias, Eduardo Gomes, Juarez T6vara, etc. ) 
and leaders of a tradition of military participation in 
politics since the Vargas era.
The analysis of the fate of the March Movement would, 
however, benefit from stressing a particular feeling or 
reaction of many officers among the nationalist, 
professional, anti-communist majority of the military 
which is also the origin of political shifts in the 
regime. Such reaction referred to the facts of the 
political life of the country between 1964 and 1967, 
namely, the passionate competition among various civilian 
groups to fill the power gaps after the definitive 
overthrow of the previous government and chiefly the 
dispute for the succession of Gen. Castello Branco. A 
leading section of the military thought the revolution 
belonged to them rather than to some civilians ambitiously 
and opportunistically interested in seizing power.** These 
officers had risked their lives; they had committed 
themselves to the hard tasks of repression; they had to 
run the IPM's (mi1itary-police investigations); they had 
had to purge the armed forces of thousands of brother 
soldiers; they had been facing, as an institution, the 
blame for the excess or faults in the repression; they 
were mocked by cartoonists and students. Now, they wanted 
to have close control of political power themselves.
From this first position or simple reaction they became 
motivated by a nationalist project of development for the 
country. 43 This was the stance of the self designated
4, The author expresses here his personal perception fron long talks and relationships 
with some military officers, two of them holders of high positions in the Central 
Agency of SNI, as well as interviews quoted in this chapter,
5, "As we had prevaricated against the Constitution, the best would be to go ahead with 
our goals”, joked Col, Hauro Costa Rodrigues, when interiewed about the natter, Col,
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"nasserist group" which was led, until 1967, by Gen. 
Albuquerque Lima among officers on active duty and by Gen. 
Costa Cavalcante among the retired ones, and the feeling 
of the average military engaged in the political process. 
That is why the "nasserist" group held the leadership in 
the political moves among the military who controled the 
government until 1968. Then, attacks by urban guerillas 
and other violent actions by the opposition brought about 
the rise of the "hard-liners" (or, in Geisel's 
conciliatory phrase, those "sincere but radical").
Political circumstances boosted this lastly-mentioned 
group. First, they were stimulated or urged by civilians 
- early supporters of the coup or just right-wing late 
"cooperators" - to extend purges and so benefit by 
clearing political ground. The weakening of Castello 
Branco's position in the dispute over his succession, as 
he ended by breaking with his early favourite candidate 
Carlos Lacerda and losing political control of the 
process, opened opportunities for other candidates who 
looked for alliances with Costa e Silva and divided his 
support in Congress. Some conspiracies on the part of 
military groups remaining from the deposed regime were 
discovered. The defeat of government candidates in the 
1965 gubernatorial elections for the key states of Minas 
Gerais, Rio de Janeiro and S. Paulo showed the 
unpopularity of economic policies, lessening democratic 
outlets open to the purposes of the regime. In the eyes 
of the military of 1964, the aims of orderliness and the 
banishment of the populist politicians did not seem to 
have been secured. This view began to be
5, (cont,) Hauro Rodrigues belonged to the earliest 1964' Military groups, He was in 
charge of the IPM against the forner President JoSo Goulart and very close to generals 
Albuquerque Lina and Costa Cavalcante,
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widely shared among the military only one year after the 
1964 coup.
The rise of Costa e Silva was really a matter of the 
informal takeover of political power by the Army, or the 
military as institution, than any sort of new faction of 
the military or civil-military coalition, profiting from 
the military institution support, as happened in March
1964. This is essential in understanding the political 
decision-making process in the following two governments.
Costa e Silva, the Ministry of the Army (denomination 
replacing ’’Minister of War" from 1967), acted as the 
legitimate representative of the military institution in 
his public declarations and political contacts in the 
frame of presidential succession of late 1965. His 
audience was primarily the military, not the nation or the 
politicians. Even before the end of 1965, two facts 
showed that the presidential succession was already 
virtually decided. First, the secret meeting of army 
officers with Costa e Silva at Vila Militar, the strongest 
artillery unit of the Army, in Rio de Janeiro, in October
1965, when he was "sworn-in" by military leaders. *=• 
Second, his speech, some weeks later at an unplanned 
public meeting of three thousand officers who gathered to 
greet him before he left on an official trip of six weeks 
to Europe and the Middle East. x
6, Col, Hauro Rodrigues, who was present, reported about this meeting, "We were lead 
by Gen Albuquerque Lina, He spoke, and after some discussions Costa e Silva was told; 
Gastello has turned into a 'flag1, We don't want 'flags' any more, You will be the 
President, Gut we want a standard-bearer, not a standard, Costa e Silva replied: I 
accept the condition of being a standard-bearer," (Interview with the author),
7, Costa e Silva said in this speech: "I leave as Hinister of War and I'll be back as 
Hinister of War," This phrase, as pronounced in the specific political context of a
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The composition of Costa e Silva's Cabinet reflected major 
trends in the army. The High Command of the Army, where 
only the highest-ranked generals (Generais-de-Ex4rci t o') 
sat, was the top monitoring body of the government and the 
official expression, "the supreme command of the 
revolution", actually translated it. When Costa e Silva 
became ill, no real political crisis or discontinuity was 
felt in the country, despite the fact that the vice- 
president was not sworn-in. The ministers of the army, 
the navy and the air force assumed the Presidency of the 
Republic to finish Costa e Silva's mandate. Then, the 
next president was selected from among the generals at the 
top of the career structure on active duty, by a direct 
consultation with the officers through their generals. 
Similar consultations were held at Geisel's selection in 
1973.
Between 1967 and 1974 the army was generaly understood by 
the public to be running the country. Periodical seasons 
of promotion of officers to the High Command of the Army 
were publicly expected and the press highlighted profiles 
of candidates and appointees. Candidates for ruling 
positions in governmental institutions (including those of 
chancellor of a federal university or principal of a 
federal school) normally presented their curricula vitae 
to local commanders of army units, where the decisive 
contention for positions took place. Even ordinary people 
often went to headquarters to present their complaints 
about any supposed unfair decision of a local authority or 
harmful inefficiency in a public service. Commanders 
accepted this odd role, although their ensuing actions
7, (cont,) presidential succession contest already open*, was then interpreted by the 
press as a clue to the special capacity in which the Minister of the War presented 
himself, The fact was later recalled, with such a meaning by Jemal do 
Brasil/Especial, "64/84 autoritarisuo e audanpa, Sunday, 1st April 1984, p,6,
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were usually discreet or manifested by informal means.
The mounting wave of protest actions or violent opposition 
was the key political fact supervenient in the rise of the 
Army to power from 1967, as already noted, It contributed 
sharply to the course of events in the politics of the 
regime. Organized radical left-wing movements re-emerged 
as early as 1967. Some had international connections and 
most were active in student organizations, mainly the 
National Student Union <UNE> and its state bases, the 
state student unions (UEE's). They acted through the 
Roman Catholic Church's middle class lay movements whose 
activities were mostly directed at the politicization 
< consci ent izagSo') of urban fringe populations and had the 
support of members of the hierarchy, boosted by the 
influential Church "social doctrine" (the Pope's 
encyclicals). The Catholic University Youth <JUC>, very 
important in social campaigns by the Church until the 
early sixties, split up and gave place to many local 
groups which were stimulated by priests, rushing to 
promote new theological post-Vatican II ideas. A
particular faction of the old JUC, the Popular Action 
<AP>, assimilating marxist principles, stood out in 
student movements and was later involved in armed and 
clandestine actions. Student movements, which furnished 
most of the militants for the clandestine violent groups, 
will be discussed later, Section 3. 1. 1.
Urban guerilla tactics were successfully used in some 
state capitals between 1967 and 1969, initially in student 
riots and then by armed groups. The Police were caught 
unprepared but massive student-public demonstrations were 
easier targets for its mostly violent repressive action. 
Clandestine organizations resorted to bank robbery. A 
handful of kidnappings, chiefly those of the ambassadors 
of the United States, Federal Republic of Germany and
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Switzerland brought the term "terrorist" into the press 
vocabulary for the first time. Some guerrillas broke out 
in the rural areas of the states of Par£ (Araguaia), Minas 
Gerais (Caparao) and S3o Paulo <Vale da Ribeira).
These events brought about a hardening of opinion in the 
military, The range of the actions to be repressed 
actually alarmed the military in positions of power. The 
Armed Forces were formally mobilized in order to treat the 
situation as a state of civil war. The 2nd Sections of 
the Staff of all regional armies of the country began 
planning operations and gathering information, exchanging 
it through the Army Information Centre <CIE) and its 
counterpart in the Navy (and later also in the Air Force), 
regardless of the activity of the SNI, which only took 
partial control of the area during Geisel's Government. 
Costa e Silva was directly pressured by regional 
commanders and other influential military officers to give 
them exceptional powers to deal quickly with the 
situation. 3 Making opportune use of a minor conflict with 
Congress the military close to the President forced the 
declaration of the Institutional Act n^ 5 (AI-5) of
December 1968 which plunged the country into the state of 
a totalitarian dictatorship for some years.
The military requested or was offered the cooperation of 
the civil police and even right-wing radical groups. They 
ended up working together in fighting, hunting left-wing 
activists, arresting and often torturing whoever appeared 
to participate in "subversive" or "terrorist" activities.
8, The importance of the outbreak of urban and rural guerillas to a sharp swing in the 
regime in 1968 was stressed by Col, Pasquali, who was present, as Costa e Silva's 
assistant, at the moment of the signing of the AI-5, He was also in charge of the 2nd 
Section of the 1st Army in Rio in 1975,
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The basic organizational units in regional armies in 
charge of operations (Centre of Operations of the Internal 
Defense, CODI) did not always have a proper command of 
them. It was not long before the leading professional 
military of the 1965-68 period ended by losing control of 
the repression. Their own officers broke the hierarchical 
chain of command to their local superiors, reporting 
directy to Brasilia (CIE>. Arbitrary action against 
opponents, or even simply non-supporters of the regime, 
spread in many civil or bureaucratic institutions. Para­
military groups, such as the death squads, raided free of 
constraints. When Geisel's government tried to restrain 
the apparatus of repression, armed groups from the 
security forces began acting by themselves without 
incurring punishment, using typical terrorist methods.
In Stepan's notable words about the project of "abertura" 
designed by Gen Geisel and his close advisers in late 
1973:
"Indeed, there was not enough external pressure on the military, 
either from the civil society or from the political society to 
force an opening of the regime".-5 
No significant industrial action came from labour until 
1977. The dissatisfaction of some leading groups of
businessmen —  actually afraid of their prospective reduced 
means of influence in a society without democracy — began 
to be expresed in late 1974, under the allegation of
excessive state interference in the economy. The
campaigns by well regarded institutions of civil society 
such as the Brazilian Order of Lawyers (OAB) and the 
Brazilian Press Association (ABI) were not yet organized, 
because censorship was not lifted until Geisel's 
government did so. The incessant complaints of the Church 
regarding the violation of human rights was not actually
9. Stepan, A. Os Hi 1itares... op. cit, p.43.
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any menace for the regime. As no political regime is 
supposed to act to hand over its power, how should the 
movement of 1974 be understood?
Two facts of a deep, if not immediate, political meaning 
brought about and made feasible the liberalization aimed 
at by the fourth government of the 1964' regime.
First, the increasing isolation of the military 
government. This was already perceived during Medici's 
government when intensive official press campaigns were 
held to ameliorate the government's image; policies in 
social areas and the results of economic growth and 
administrative reforms were frequently used as argument 
for a thesis of legitimization through good results. 
Brazilian culture rejects authoritarian solutions to 
political conflicts. 10 The accepted authoritarianism is 
that of paternalist authority. The violence of the 
repression shocked the common sense of the population 
which had never approved the acting authorities. 
Increasingly, respected liberal intellectuals stood aside 
from the regime, whose praises came from old fascist 
figures. The military were never welcomed by the majority 
of university academic staff or students. The exodus of 
scientists between 1967 and 1972 is an aspect of this 
sent iment.
Second, between 1970 and 1978 a new conscience regarding 
the participation of the army in politics had slowly grown 
in the barracks. Political prisoners were held in
military premises where illegal acts of violence were 
fairly common knowledge among the troops. The military
10, See; Linz, J, "Totalitarian and Autoritarian Regimes", In; Sreenstein, F, and 
Polsby, N, (orgs,) Handbook of Political Science, v,3, Addison-Wesley, Massachusetts, 
1975,
- 89 -
authorities were often ridiculous with embarassing 
explanations of "disappearances" or refusals to give 
legally requested information about detainees. The large 
majority of the Armed Forces took no part in repressive 
activities and felt unhappy with a sort of identification 
of the army with the police. As things were, the Armed 
Forces were continuously exposed to criticism and public 
judgement. The excesses and even crimes of some officers 
of the security system tarnished the military institution 
as a whole.
Above all, one issue was crucial and led to sensitive 
repercussions throughout the higher ranks of the military: 
the breach of discipline and hierarchy, the very point 
which had finally brought the military out of the barracks 
to overthrow Goulart! Furthermore, the formation of the' 
so-called "security community" proved the division of the 
large group of nationalist professional officers who had 
spoken for the army between 1964 and 1968. The repression 
system sheltered the "hard-liners" whilst the majority 
withdrew with serious doubts about the future of the 
institution if the situation continued as it was. "Back 
to the barracks" seemed to be an increasingly wise slogan. 
When, in 1977, the Minister of the Army, Gen. Silvio 
Frota, wanted the Army to repeat its movement in early 
imposing Costa e Silva as its natural candidate for the 
presidency, he failed. The Army's feelings towards
politics had changed. Moreover, when he attempted to 
resist his dismissal by Geisel (12/10/77) and called upon 
the regional commanders to gather in Brasilia, he received 
a lukewarm response and the Planalto Palace was able to 
dismantle the plot. Geisel's tough style as commander in 
chief was at last accepted by military in his moves 
against the repression system < dismissal of the generals 
D'Avila Melo and Danton de P. Avelino from the 2nd Army, 
S. Paulo, and the CIE, respectively).
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The choice of Figueiredo by Geisel for his succession from 
the beginning of 1975, 1 1 assured his commitment to the 
liberalization project and the measures taken in the first 
two years of his government (the abolition of the AI-5, 
the revision of the law of security, the complete freedom 
of the press, the call for important elections in 1982 and 
the amnesty) definitely changed the political scene. 
Despite some serious setbacks, mainly terrorist acts by 
the underground "security community", the conditions of 
the amnesty — forgiving crimes of the "two sides" — and 
the good image of Figueiredo with the military, the
abertura was a fact and from then, the main political 
issue was to be the succession; that is to say, the future 
of the regime.
The package of measures imposed by the government on the 
country in April 1977 (Congress had been put in recess) to 
prevent relevant changes in the political institutions 
created by the regime included a new six-year presidential 
mandate (1985-1991) as part of a plan to extend the
military presence for a transition period. Gen.
Figueiredo was to transmit the power preferably to a 
reliable civilian but not to an opposition party in 
1985. 1 :2:. The idea of a full democracy, where power was 
accessible to the opposition, could still not have been
11, See; Stuapf, A, and Pereira Filho, M, A Segunda Guerra: a SucessSo de Geisel.S. 
Paulo, Brasiliense, 1979,
1’2, In August 1982 there was a barbecue on Geisel's small farm in Teres6polis, state 
of Rio, which the top military attended, including President Figueiredo himself. The 
succession was discussed there and some inportant points for the future of the regime 
were defined, A military succession was only a hypothesis "for odds and security", 
Some weeks later, a reshuffle in the Cabinet, mainly in the group close to the 
President, removed Gen, Rubem Ludwig from the Ministry of Education to the Military 
House, Ludwig was repeatedly indicated by the press as a strong candidate for the 
succession,
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the intention of the military. 1
However, from the early eighties, the regime decayed 
sharply. After some concessions (with special regard to 
the constitutional amendments reinstating parliamentary 
immunities, increase in the tax shares of the states and 
municipios and restoration of the normal use of TV 
broadcasts by political parties) parliament was kept in a 
balance slightly favourable to the government until the 
eve of the indirect elections for president in 1984. 
However, as far as the civil society was concerned, the 
government was completely discredited and visibly
unpopular. Negotiations or cooperation to implement
policies, mainly in sensitive areas such as labour and 
education, became impossible.
Some facts speeded up this deflation — and so overturned 
military political plans — either by weakening the 
government position or nourishing the arguments of an 
enlarged opposition. The promises of a better
distribution of income (bigger shares after the increase 
of the cake, as the government had said during the 
sixties) and the improvement of welfare failed. The
census of 1980 had given the figures. The causes of the 
economic crisis were not only external (oil prices and 
rise in interest rates): the failure of the 1967
administrative reforms; the uncontrolled expansion of the 
organizational structures of the state; the gigantism of 
development projects; the abuse of internal and foreign 
borrowing as an easy source for the boom in new
programmes; the unwillingness to face the problem of 
subsidized sectors of the economy, all these led to a 
huge public deficit, the true root of a mounting inflation 
and the misleading of public budgets. Obviously the lack
13, This issue is discussed by Stepan, op, cit, pp.70-1,
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of control on the state by society for last two decades 
was the political cause of that. Besides, Brazil had 
ovei— reached itself in pursuing economic development. In 
short, the economic and social situation could be argued 
as the failure of the military project for the country. 
The impact of this argument was devastating.
On the other hand, from the mid seventies, new pressures 
had emerged in the civil society, first raising the issue 
of the violation of human rights and then, as the 
inflation mounted, the appealing banners of reposition or 
increase of salaries. The old fascist policy of
corporativism under the "protection" of the state was 
disparaged by parallel, unofficial unions in S. Paulo. 
Many businessmen gave wage increases in direct 
negotiations with employees, bypassing the twice amended 
law of November 1979 which stated bi-annual fixed 
increases below the inflation rates, mostly for middle- 
range salaries. In five years the government had not been 
able to control inflation with such a policy. It claimed 
to have distributed income for the lower levels of the 
population but had decisively lost the support of the 
previously benefitted middle classes.
This would certainly have carried weight in the 1982 
elections and the impressive mass demonstrations of 1984. 
Indeed, these two facts signalled the advent of a post- 
1964 society. Elections turned attention to the force of 
new political groups on the left, such as the Partido dos 
Trabalhadores <PT>, the rise of the returning populist 
appeal of Leonel Brizola <a hard blow to his old radical 
opposition, the military) and the widespread organization 
of the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB). 
The unprecedent street demonstrations of the "Diretas J6" 
campaign (direct, immediate elections for president) 
achieved more than they aimed for on the grounds of the
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politically possible: they assured the pace of the
opposition to displace a two-decade old, decadent 
government; they prevented the top government last minute 
tactics and a large faction of the Democratic Social Party 
<PDS> from supporting Mr Paulo Maluf1 s adventure in the 
Electoral College. Some weeks later, a secret settlement 
for a pacific transmission of power was agreed between 
high positioned military and the elected President 
Tancredo Neves, a capitulation as it were. On the 14th of 
March of 1985 Gen Figueiredo left the Planalto Palace
through the back door without handing over the 
presidential insignia in the official public ceremony.
2. 1, 2. The political and administrative strategy
When the military saw, even during Castello Branco's
government, that they had definitely "crossed the Rubicon" 
towards a political enterprise quite a lot larger than 
they had intended at the outset, a "project" began to 
emerge from the contributions of several centres of 
support, whether civilian or military, the barracks or the 
Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG). 1 *
14. The link between this "project" and the ESG's ideology ~ a rigid methodological
framework for studies on national security - was the concept of "National Objectives"
among which national integration and national prosperity had a central role and are 
expressed in the "Policy of Development", This appeared as vital in the real state of 
international relations, determining the current and future position of countries, 
See; Gen, Carlos de Meira Mattos, "Ensaio sdbre a Doutrina Polltica da RevolugSo", Q. 
Processo Revolucion4rio Brasileiro. BRASIL/Presidfincia da RepDblica/AERP, 1969, pp,5- 
16, Meira Mattos, an important figure among the top 1964 military and very close to 
Castello Branco, had been a member of ESG's permanent teaching staff, The general uses 
the same words as the government's 1968 Development Strategic Programme and describes 
the development as a target to be achieved "at any cost and in the short term, a term
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This move from the early military intentions to broader 
views is clearly stated in the opening of the document of 
guidelines which marked the crucial political change from 
Castello Branco to Costa e Silva. 1 The key-stone of the
project turned out to be the idea of Brazil, as an
emerging power aligned with the so-called modern western 
democracies — the "club" of the developed nations — and 
triggered the word of command of development as the utmost 
expression of political will. It passed down through 
governmental organizations and was overwhelmingly cast 
through the media, as a major policy of the Public
Relations Office of the Presidency of the Republic <AERP>. 
After being completely absorbed, this master— idea was
fully expressed in the 1970 government major planning
document (Met as e Bases para a AgSo do Governo') on which 
the 1970-73 National Development Plan was based:
" T h e  n a t i o n a l  a i m s  a r e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :  I. A s  s y n t h e s i s - a i m ,  t h e
a c c e s s  o f  B r a z i l  t o  t h e  d e v e l o p e d  w o r l d  at t h e  e n d  o f  t h e
c e n t u r y .  A  r e a l l y  d e v e l o p e d ,  d e m o c r a t i c  a n d  s o v e r e i g n  s o c i e t y  
w i l l  b e  b u i l t  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  e c o n o m i c ,
14, (cont,) which should not extend beyond one generation or twenty five to thirty 
years, say from now to the year 2000" (p. 13), In 1970 President Medici asked a more 
direct contribution from ESG to the planning of specific government policies, besides 
its doctrinal discourse: President M6dici, ConsciAncia do Brasil (discursos),
Secretaria de Imprensa da Presiddncia da RepCiblica, 1970, pp.65-7.
15, BRASIL/MINIPLAN, Diretrizes do Governo. Programa EstratSgico de DesemvolvifflentQ. 
July, 1967, The same was repeated later by the Minister of Planning, Mr, Hdlio 
BeltrSo, in the inaugural lecture of the ESG's 1969 courses and then softened in 
euphemistic terms: "In its sanitizing tasks, the Revolution had a broader meaning of 
preserving a threatened national development", (BRASIL/MINIPLAN, A Revolt^So e o 
Desenvolvimento. 1969, p , 11, The sharpness of the change, however, was regreted, from 
the point of view of the planning, by Gastello's Minister of Planning, Mr Roberto 
Campos ("The Brazilian Planning Experience", in: A Nova Economia Brasileira / The New 
Brazilian Economy (original title registred in Portuguese and English), Rio, Crown - 
Ed, Internacionais, 1974, p,56-7),
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s o c i a l  a n d  p o l i t i c a l  f e a s i b i l i t y  o f  B r a z i l  a s  a g r e a t  p o w e r .  " 1 *=■
As from 1969 to 1975, at the time of the Institutional Act 
n2 5, the urban and rural guerillas and the intensive 
repression by the the government's security apparatus, the 
official discourse adopted the formulation "development 
and security", but the appeal of "development" was not
reduced. Fast development would be a potential common 
denominator among ruling political groups, meeting 
aspirations of all sections of Brazilian society and being 
raised to a sort of supreme value. Success in developing 
aims was believed to bring about a full political 
legitimation a posteriori for the 1964 coup d'etat.
A controversy in governmental circles —  in which education 
authorities were often involved — whether it should be 
"economic development" and then "social development" or 
"economic and social development" at a time, has never 
ended. The prevailing formula until 1974 was to put
forward the policies of economic development and act
simultaneously on the so-called "social infra-structure" 
of the economic development, so that the fruits of the 
development could be effectively distributed. As from 
Geisel's 1975-79 National Development Plan a move appeared 
to accelerate economic development so that the social 
distribution of the resulting wealth could be effected
"while" it was generated17 The "social" element of the 
formula was never omitted but not fully implemented
either, as the income distribution in 1980 had worsened in
comparison to that of 1970.
16. BRASIL/Presidfincia da Reptiblica, Hetas e Bases para a At So do GovSrno. September, 
1970, p. 15.
17. BRASIL/Presid^ncia da Reptiblica, ProJeto do II Plano Nacional de DesemvQlvimentQ 
(1975-1979). 1974, p.40.
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The extension and versatility of "development" virtually 
penetrated all government activities and the making of 
governmental policies, in such a way that it is possible 
to weave a synthesis of principal political and 
administrative strategies of the government over the 
period, as the following paragraphs endeavour to do.
Ideological stances about the role of the state in 
society, mainly in the issue of national security, met the 
requirements of political stability and public order for 
the success of the development policies. A strong central 
government was to have all institutional instruments to 
protect the "major national objectives" of development and 
security. Opposition groups were to be kept under
control, the forms of repression following political 
circumstances. The government security apparatus would 
never leave the background of the scene. 1,3
With the same intent, a new constitutional order was to be 
established to put main political instruments, elections, 
individual guarantees, political parties and the 
legislative process under a unified control in the hands 
of the military presidents. With the direct appointment 
of state governors or the indirect control of their 
elect ions for at least thirteen years, the country 
virtually- became a central rather than a federal republic.
Still the development was to be conducted by a strong 
Executive Power, as a technical matter, the Legislative 
Power not being admitted to decide on some of its specific 
roles, particularly financial and budgetary decisions. 
Congressmen were assumed to be unavoidably driven by 
clientele politics when it came to' the allocation of 
public funds.
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Development meant investment and fast growth required 
massive public investment or incentives to private 
initiative, the financial maket being fully re-organized. 
The Exchequer's ordinary taxes would not be enough to 
cover ambitious development aims. So the government
increasingly resorted to new financial sources, ranking 
from compulsory "contributions", as exceptional levy for 
priority programmes, to the issue of public securities and 
foreign borrowing and culminating in a large increase in 
the direct money supply. Despite the cautious views of 
the 1966-69 planners, Brazil fully presented a model of 
economic growth by heavy — internal and foreign — 
borrowing during the 1970's, mainly when overflowing 
dollars from the oil commerce needed to be re-cycled by 
international bankers.
The concentration of the country's most public finance in 
the federal government — the states and municfpios 
receiving transfers from it — had the inicial purpose of 
rationalizing the levy system (Tax Constitutional Reform 
of 1966). 1® As from 1969 (Complementary Act n. 40) it was 
politically used to reinforce the Federal Exchequer. The 
power of "generating resources" by means of the extra- 
Budget financial mechanisms, however, together with the 
control of prices and the economy's indexation, became the 
major instrument of an intentional centralization of 
control over the economy.
19, Although it net the regime's feature of a strong central government, the 1966 tax 
reform, soon adopted by the 1967 Constitution, stemmed from technical purposes, See 
Exposifio de Motives of the Constitutional Amendment n2 18 in: HINIPLAN/EPEA, 0. 
Programa de AgSo e as Reformas de Base, vol.l, Doc, EPEA n,3, Dec, 1965, pp,219-28, 
The concentration of most tax revenue and its partial transfers to local governments 
formed the institutional background from which some very important issues on education 
funding derived (Chapter Five),
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Rationalization and modernization of public administration 
was a basic instrumental policy for the development aims. 
Planning was the magical word to efectiveness and
would secure the vital connections between aims, targets 
and implementation, through the allocation of financial 
resources according to defined priority programmes and 
specific policies.
The implementation of large development programmes was to
be entrusted to a decentralized system of organizations,
chiefly the state-owned companies and public foundations. 
Most of the new or non-tax sources were not to be
registered by the Federal Budget, as they were run by
these autonomous organizations for the sake of
2.2. THE GENESIS OF THE POLICIES ON EDUCATION FUNDING
2. 2. 1. The approach until the early sixties
The decades which preceded the period 1964-84 were marked 
by humanistic and liberal-democratic views towards 
education funding. Since the 1920's a consciousness had 
been formed among the intellectual elite about the matter 
(Section 1.3). Education was seen as the main instrument 
to develop national ideals, democratic and human values in 
society. Their thought was that man would liberate
himself and grow by means of knowledge; higher levels of
civilization and culture required expanding systematic
education and social life could not reach better standards 
without enabling individuals to control a diversified
achievement of targets. The Programme-Budget technique
adminis-t ive flexibility.
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language. It was essential to overcome old concepts which 
associated education with the elite and did not provide 
public institutions with means to extend the availability 
of education . These views were politically used to put 
pressure on the government for the expansion of elementary 
education services which should not be left to religious 
or charitable organizations.
Following trends from the nineteenth century, the 
development of professional skills was still a sort of 
minor, specialized branch of the education system, no 
national policy occurring in this field before the first 
brightness of the industrialization under Vargas. It took 
two decades, therefore, until some move occurred in the 
main reasons for funding education: from the sole societal
development by the democratization of the opportunities 
for individual cultural improvement to new reasons of 
economic development. Even so, the latter had a limited 
range. Education per se and primary education, which 
concerned the majority of the population, was justified by 
democratic and human — even Christian — values. Ruling 
liberal politicians shared these views.
With regard to the composition of leading groups with 
political influence on education, the field was 
passionately divided between professional, lay educators — 
often working in governmental bodies — and those linked 
with, religious organizations, particularly the Roman 
Catholic Church whose religious orders ran schools at all 
levels throughout the country, including the most 
prestigious section of the secondary education schools, 1 
The two factions, however, shared similar views on the
19, The Church's hierarchy always jealously preserved the position of religious orders 
in the education system by using their social influence and mobilization capacity in
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reasons for funding education.
As from the mid-fifties the impetus of the country's 
industrial economy had raised the standard of development 
as the leit motiv of policy-making. Education made its 
debut in the context of governmental economic plans in the 
President Kubitscheck's Programs de Metas, 1957-60. The
idea of solid links between education and development was 
then widespread. The acceleration of economic development 
was soon going to require specialized jobs, new educatio­
nal standards from the work-force in general, and "a new 
generation of citizens would be called upon to create and 
run new economic areas". The Plan said that this could be 
a powerful motivation for youth and the government was to 
state that "the economic infra-structure had to be 
followed by an educational infra-structure".20 So the
19, (cont,) political - usually secret - agreements with the government, During the 
crucial period of Vargas educational reforms, the Church and the Minister of Education, 
Gustavo Capanema, kept an agreement by which education policies would be subject to the 
Church's placet in exchange for a neutral position towards Vargas' Estado Ndvo regime, 
the well-known Catholic philosopher and writer Alceu de Amoroso Lima being in charge of 
the monitoring of the agreement's accomplishment, See Schwartzman, S, et alii, 
Capanema and Education. Rio, Paz e Terra, 1984, It became publicly known that the 
coordinated actio* of Rio de Janeiro's Cardinal Jaime C&mara through the pugnacious and 
influential deputy (later Rio's Governor) Carlos Lacerda in order to avoid what 
catholic called Maicization" of education in the important Bill of Directives and 
Bases of Education (1948), Church-linked educators and intellectuals provoked a 
nationwide controversy on "public versus private" education and pressures on the 
Congressmen resulted in a long blockage of the Bill for years, Mr Lacerda, a personal 
friend of the cardinal, presented a controversial substitute Bill, and after changes, 
a compromise was reached when the project (Law n2 2024, "Directives and Bases on the 
National Education", LDB) was already being seen as outdated in some aspects (1961),
20, BRASIL/Presidftncia da Reptiblica/Conselho de Desemvolvimento, Programa de Metas. 
1958, vol,I, pp, 41 and 95,
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Target n2 30, ’’Technical Personnel Formation", determined 
"the intensification of the technical personnel formation 
and the turning of education to the development", this 
last part of the policy being strategically important.^'1
Janio Quadros did not have an opportunity for a government 
plan in his meteoric transit through the Presidency of the 
Republic <31/1-25/8/1961) but in his address to the 
Congress, marking his style, he interrupted the 
existing trend and simply promised to be practical on the 
matter. 3:2
The ephemeral Programs de Gov&rno <1961) in the short 
period of the parliamentary system of government 
(2/9/1961-6/1/1963), realistically stressed the aim of 
overcoming illiteracy and the primary education deficit as 
vital for the productive integration of individuals, "a 
socio-ecomomic imperative for the recovery of the Brazi­
lian people which, in remaining illiterate, will be lost 
for the nation and will be led to a marginal life".33
21, BRASIL/PresidAncia da Reptiblica/Conselho da Desemvolvimento, Programs da Matas. 
Op. Cit,, p. 13. The Commission of Education and Culture of the Development Council 
which was headed by the minister of education approved specific educational targets in 
March 1957 (vol. Ill, pp. 372-94), The report of the Commission was based in a study 
under the supervision of Dr, Roberto Campos who also later supervised the first plan of 
the 1964 government for education: Campos, R, et alii, "Anilise do Esfor;o Financeiro 
do Poder Ptiblico com a Educa?3o (1948-56)", In; Presiddncia da Reptiblica/Conselho de 
Desemvolvmento, EducatSo para o Desemvolvimento, 1957,
22, He said: "One cannot delude the Nation with promises of applying greater finances 
to education, (,,,) During this government, however, the constitutional provision which 
requires the application of ten percent of the tax revenue in the maintenance and 
development of the education will be accomplished in its full exension," (HEC/INEP, Al 
E d u c a t e  nas Hensagens Presidenciais, Perlodo 1890-1986. 2 vol., Brasilia, 1987, p.351)
23, BRASIL/Conselho de Hinistros. Programa de 6ov6rno, Bases, Anilise da Situaggo 
Econbmica e Social do Brasil. Brasilia, 1961, p , 140,
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Education status took a new step forward among economic 
planners, following the "human capital" theoretical trends 
and "man-power" planning approach which boomed in the
early sixties. President Goulart's development plan
(.Plano Trienal de Desen vol vi men t o Econdmico e Social, 
1963-65) opened a larger room for education funding, 
defining it as "pre-investment for the betterment of human 
factor". The importance of elementary education was
stressed for the provision of basic knowledge which 
enabled people to be inserted into the job market.2*
2. 2. 2. The 1966-73 key-period
In spite of no immediate change having occured in the
official plans for education by the newly arrived 1964 
military government, a sort of "re-start" mood in
education planning appeared from 1966 but had already been 
incubated since 1964.
The government's provisional economic plan, the Programs 
de AgSo Econdmica do GovSrno 1964-66, used a synthetic 
formulation about the subject and placed education among 
the "instruments of action".2® In practice, the signals
24, BRASIL/Presidfincia da Reptiblica, Plano Trienal de Desenvolvinento Econdmico e 
Social. Dec, 1962, pp, 89-92, It should be pointed out that the Plan's language 
reflects the extension of the concept of "human capital1, beyond the simple utility of 
education for the development; the government must substantially intensify its 
action in the field of education , in scientific reseach and technology and in public 
health in order to guarantee a rapid improvement of the human being as a development 
factor,,,", Idem, p.7,
25, Under the title of "Social Productivity", letter d) talks about the aims of 
education; "To amplify opportunities, rationalize outlay of money and adjust the
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which came from the centre of the government featured the 
rationalization of planning and expenditure as the actual 
focus of attention (Section 2.4). No fresh plan, as such, 
was issued for education, as the National Plan of 
Education <PNE, 1962) was in force as a consequence of Law 
4024, of 20/12/61. The Ministry of Education (MEC), in 
charge of the matter according to the same law, provided 
for a revision of PNE by the Federal Council of Education 
<CFE) in 1965, introducing slight changes in targets and 
taking into consideration the financial effects of the 
recently created Sal6rio-Educa$3o (Section 5. 1. 1. I)2265.
However, what was going to happen from 1967 in the field 
of education planning and financing was basically designed 
during the period 1964-66 in an economic planning office — 
the Office for Economic Applied Research, EPEA, later I.PEA 
(Institute) — which was freshly set up by Mr Roberto 
Campos, the number 1 civil minister of President Castello 
Branco in the second quarter of 1964. To compose his team 
of close collaborators, Mr Campos brought most of the 
members of the technical staff of his consultancy firm in 
economics in Rio de Janeiro, Consultoria TScnica e 
PlaneJamento - CONSULTEC. From CONSULTEC he chose a 
young, recently graduated economist, Mr Arlindo Lopes 
Correa, ta take over the area of Human Resources (educa­
tion and employment) of the Sector of Social Development
25. (cont.) composition of the teaching to the technical and cultural needs of a modern 
society," BRASIL/MINIPLAN, Programs de flggo EconOmica do 6ov6rno 1964-66 (Slntese). 
Documentos EPEA n2 1, Nov, 1964, p, 16, Indeed, a brief, previous text "Prograna da 
PfSo Econdaica do Gov&rno Ravolucionirio, 1964-66 (Resuao)* had been distributed to 
federal authorities with the Circular Letter 5361, of 29/10/64, without mentioning 
education among those "general instruments of action"- (as it did to other social 
priority programmes such as housing),
26, MEC/CFE, Plano Nacional de E d u c a ^ o  (Revisg'o 1965). Rio, 1965,
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of EPEA. :Z"' Mr Arlindo Correa was entrusted with the 
studies for a nationwide diagnosis of education and a long 
term planning document of education policy, as a section 
of the Decenal Development Plan. He gathered a few, young 
collaborators, "mostly economists and engineers", and 
worked full-time with the decisive support of the 
minister, being "independent of direct influence or 
pressures from other bodies" and "completely free of 
involvements with the current administrative problems of 
educat ion".
All had a taste of "starting from scratch". After
completing the diagnosis — the only one of its range ever 
made since then^'3 —  which emphasized the huge problems of 
primary education and was enriched by quite a few 
statistical data, some of them from original surveys, the 
team set out to prepare the first long-term plan for 
education. Mr Arlindo Correa described the general design 
of the ten-year plan, recalling the fact (vital in the 
context of this Chapter) that it was inspired in the 
Mediterranean Region Plan by the Organization for the
27, To CONSULTEC also belonged Nr N&rio Henrique Simonsen, a master-mind of the new 
economic policy and the first head of the planning technical body, Dr, JoSo Paulo dos 
Reis Vellosor who was the major coordinator of all the government's plans until 1979, 
when he was replaced by Nr Simonsen having been minister of planning between 1970 and 
1978.
28, Expressions from Nr Arlindo Corrda, interviewed by the author, In CONSULTEC, Nr 
Arlindo Corrda had made studies in the economic planing of school units of Rio de 
Janeiro State and gained position in this field with an article on "Education and 
Regional Economic Planning" for a collective work, ordered from CONSULTEC by the 
University of Harvard, replacing Nr Campos who had just been appointed Brazilian 
ambassador in Washington, Then he was still an undergraduate student, Later he 
published: Economia da Educa^So. IPEA, 1969,
29, BRASIL/MINIPLAN/EPEA, E d u c a ^ o  (II). Oiaqndstico Preliminar. (Plano Decenal de 
Desenvolvimento Econdmico e Social), 1966,
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European Economic Development, OECD30. He added:
" F o r  t h e  f i r s t  g r a d e s  of b a s i c  e d u c a t i o n  w e  h a d  a d e m o g r a p h i c  
a n d  s o c i a l  a p p r o a c h .  W e  w a n t e d  t o  p u t  B r a z i l  i n  t h e  c o n t e x t  of 
t h e  n a t i o n s  i n  t e r m s  o f  c o m p u l s o r y  e d u c a t i o n  a n d  l e n g t h  of  
p r i m a r y  s c h o o l  ( s i x  y e a r s ) ,  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  m a n - p o w e r  n e e d s .  
F o r  f u r t h e r  e d u c a t i o n  w e  g a v e  t h e  p l a n  a n  e c o n o m i c  a p p r o a c h :
B r a z i l  h a d  t o  p r o d u c e  t h e  n e c e s s a r y  h u m a n  r e s o u r c e s  f o r  t h e  
r e q u i r e m e n t s  o f  t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  e x p a n s i o n  o f  i t s  e c o n o m y . " 31
Stressing what he saw as a change from the previous 
education planning, Minister Roberto Campos, himself, 
wrote later:
" T h e  r u d i m e n t a r y  p l a n n i n g  f o r m a l l y  u n d e r t a k e n  w a s  m a i n l y  b a s e d  
o n  t h e  d a t a  o f  d e m o g r a p h i c  g r o w t h ,  l e a d i n g  t o  a c r e a k i n g  
o p e r a t i v e  r i g i d i t y  i n  t h e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  e d u c a t i o n a l  
i n v e s t m e n t .  T h e  n e w  a p p r o a c h  w a s  b a s e d  o n  s t u d i e s  o f  t h e  l a b o u r  
m a r k e t ,  t h e r e b y  c o r r e l a t i n g  i n v e s t m e n t  p l a n n i n g  m o r e  d i r e c t l y  
w i t h  t h e  d e m a n d  f o r  s k i l l e d  l a b o u r . " 3 3
Mr Arlindo Corr§a sometimes went to MEC to talk with
members of the "experts commissions" in the Directory of 
Higher Education, particularly to determine the 
quantitative targets of the plan, and had technical 
assistance from international organizations (see next
30, "The Mediterranean Regional Project CHRP) which began in 1961 was in many ways, 
the quintessence of educational planning in the 1960's, It was a cooperative programme 
to plan the long-term development of education in the six Mediterranean member 
countries of the Organization for the Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) - 
Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and Yugoslavia, The MRP methodology was widely 
imitated in many developing countries during the 1960's," Williams, G, "The OECD's 
Mediterranean Regional Project", In Psacharopoulos, 6, Economics of Education. Research 
and Studies. Washington, The World Bank, 1987, p.335,
31, Mr Arlindo Corr6a, interview with the author,
32, Campos, R, and Simonsen, M, A Mova Economia Brasileira. Ih£ .Mett..Bnazilian Economy,
Op, Cit,, p,55.
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section). The Decenal Development Plan33 had just been 
completed when President Castello Branco passed the office 
on to Gen. Costa e Silva. The document was handed over as 
a basis for a medium-term plan by the incoming government, 
although not received irt a similar cooperative mood. 
Nevertheless, as far as education was concerned, the 
"Strategic Development Plan" <1968-70) did not innovate 
much from the Decenal Plan, except to adapt educational 
targets to the requirements of the increase in the 
targeted rates of economic growth <8 instead of 6% p.a.), 
the fundamental conception remaining the same. 3d
There were developments, however: new institutional and
financial instruments were created for the policies and 
two major reforms — not defined in the Decenal Plan — 
changed the structure of basic education and university 
(particularly public federal universities). The latter, 
which was initiated in 1965 and after hesitations was 
finally set in motion in special political circumstances 
in June 1968 (Section 3.3.1), featured as a rationalizing 
effort. It will be briefly commented on later in Section 
2.4. Nevertheless, a close association between higher 
education and the specific needs of the economic 
development appeared clearly in the definition of 
priorities^ in new courses, teachers full-time working 
conditions, post-graduate training and research 
facilities. The studies towards the reform of basic
33, BRASIL/MNIPLAN, Plano Decenal de Desenvolyimento Econ^mico e Social. 15 vols., 
1967,
34, Hr Edson Machado, who participated directly in the preparation of education plans 
in IPEA (interview with the author), See: BRASIL/MINIPLAN, Programs EstratSqico de 
Desenvolvimento, 1968-1970. Area IX, Infraestrutura Social, vol, 1, "Educa?3o e 
Recursos Humanos", Fevereiro, 1969,
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education, helping in foreign technical assistance and 
leading to Law 5692, of 11/8/1971, introduced a change in 
the originally planned idea of a purely social and 
demographic approach to primary education.
After the reforms, the system, which had originally been 
set up on the basis of a clear division between primary 
education and the two other further levels, was now 
conceived for the primary and secondary education as a 
composition, resulting in an approach markedly directed 
towards the preparation for work and profession-oriented 
curricula; even the primary schools in their extension to 
eight years, already had to have some vocational 
purposes. 33
Still with regard to the development of the economic 
approach in higher education policies, it is opportune to 
mention the role of a small group of economist students 
and teachers from the Department of Economics of the 
University of Brasilia (UnB). Following the political 
crisis of UnB <1965) in which a considerable part of the 
teaching staff left the university (Section 3. 1.2), the 
group, led by Prof. David Carneiro Junior, set up a 
private consultancy firm in economics (.Consul t oria 
Econ6mica e. Estatisticat ERGO) which offered its technical 
services to EPEA, during the preparation of the Decenal 
Development Plan <1966). One of the studies ERGO was 
engaged to make was an assessment of the economic 
performance of the federal universities, to support the 
work of the Area of Human Resources, then under the
35, See articles 1 (head and paragraph first) and 4 (head and paragraphs first and 
second), For further information on the reasons and- details of this reform, see; 
Boynard et alii, ft Reforma do Ensino (Lei n2 5,692, de 11/8/71, publicada no D U r i o  
Oficial de 12/8/71), S3o Paulo, LISA, 1972.
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supervision of Mr Arlindo Correa. "We used technical 
instruments of micro-economic analysis, as the university
was seen as an economic unit", explained Mr Edson Machado 
de Souza, in charge of the r e s e a r c h . O t h e r  studies
followed and, after participating in the make-up of other 
government education policies in EPEA, most of the group
joined this agency permanently in 1968. Mr Edson Machado 
became Head of the National Centre for Human Resouces 
<CNRH, the body which replaced the Area of Human Resources 
in EPEA), MINIPLAN's representative at the Federal 
Education Council <CFE), and then (1974) was appointed 
MEC1 s Director of Higher Education, being in charge of the 
implementation of the university reform.
It could be affirmed that, in the decisive period 1966- 
1970 when most innovative policies and programmes arose, 
the leadership in the education policy-making was 
definitely of IPEA's, which was an agency specifically
designed for economic development. Being attached to the 
views of the 1961 reforms of the Law of Directives and 
Bases of Education, the Ministry of Education (MEC) often 
came after or even resisted the initiatives.37 The events 
and meaning of MEC’s slow and conflicting accommodation to 
the new political rule is studied later, in Section 2.3.
36, Interview with hr Edson Machado, to whom other information from this paragraph is 
also due. Actually! the research stemmed from Hr Machado's HsC dissertation project in 
UnB.
37, "EPEA always had the technical leadership in the meetings and works of planning, 
besides the political one, Its team worked full time and used its own surveys and 
statistics whereas the technical weaker position of MEC's officials was obvious, This 
was the root of the MEC1s acceptance of USAID's offer of technical assistance," (Mr 
Edson Machado, interview with the author). Assuming the uneasiness of MEC's staff or 
members of CFE with the use of economic instruments of analysis (their "weakness"), the 
decisive fact was always the position of EPEA on the direct line of political power,
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Formally, the plans were committed to joint commissions, 
involving, in the case of education, MEC and sometimes 
non-governmental organizations, such as the National 
Industry Apprenticeship Service (SENAI) and the National 
Commerce Apprenticeship Service (SENAC), which are linked 
to the national unions of employers of industry and 
commerce, although supported by legally established 
financial contributions. The singular presence of SENAI 
and SENAC, whose training programmes were often seen as a 
model, gives a clear indication about the stance of the 
ruling policy-making agency, IPEA.
Following the relative positions of influence among 
agencies in the federal bureaucracy, the economic approach 
to education gained its full expression in government 
development plans from the late sixties until 1979: "The
education system was seen as a part of the programmes for 
the economic growth".3**
When the regime made its definitive step forward with the 
appointment of the Minister of the War, Gen. Costa e Silva 
as President, and the military considerably widened their 
presence in the government, the move was indicated by a 
new government plan (the Programs Estrat£gico de 
Desen volvimento 1968-70') which was preceded by a directive 
document, overshadowing the previous government's Decenal 
Development Plan. Section I in Chapter V ("Social
Infrastructure") of this document deals with education 
exclusively as a provider "of strategic human resources 
for the development programmes" from which higher 
productivity was expected. 33 The set of "priority
38, Hr Edson Machado, interview with the author,
39, See BRASIL/MINIPLAN, Diretrizes de 6ov6rno. Programa Estrat6gico de Desenvol- 
vimento. Julho, 1967, pp,95-101, See also the headlines ("Education as Instrument for 
Development", etc,) under which the Strategic Development Programme 1968-70 put
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projects” which were first sketched in the 1967 directive 
document and subsequently repeated up to the 1972-74 First 
National Development Plan with some increase (from 23 to 
33 projects) is a clear expression of the prevailing views 
and political options: except for six of them (related to
culture, literacy, physical education, student assistance 
and widening of primary education opportunities) the large 
majority directly concerned the formation of man-power and 
technological knowledge or rationalization of education 
administration. Finally, the overwhelmingly publicized 
connections between education and economic development, 
leading to the foreseeing of the "Brazil, world power by 
the year 2000" project, were the causes of the expression 
by which the Gen. Medici's 1970 directive document of 
government, followed by the First National Development 
Plan (1971), defined the regime's expectations On 
education: "REVOLUTION BY MEANS OF EDUCATION" (capital
letters are from the original).'110
39. (cont,) education subjects: BRASIL/MINIPLAN, Programa EstratSqico de
Desenvolyimento 1968-1970. 6ifia .lL..,Ininas truWr a, Social. Vol. I "EducaqSo e Recursos 
Hum anos\ Fevereiro, 1969, p. 10.
40, BRASIL/PresidSncia da RepOblica, Metas e Bases para a A^So do Gov&rno. Setembro, 
1970, p.51-73, see particularly the section: "Definipdes bisicas para ima politics 
educacionaT, The fine-sounding expression first appears in an early planning document 
of the newly-irrived MEC's administration (November 1969); MEC/S6, Planeiamento 
Setorial. ProJetrte Priorit&rios. Brasilia, 1970, p,13, which was prepared by Col, Mauro 
Rodrigues, the- new MEC's General Secretary, and is atributable to Minister Jarbas 
Passarinho in his swering-in speach; "We were asked in a hurry to present an early 
plan, We defined some 'stumbling blocks' in education, Then I simply made-up a set of 
priority projects almost copying the same set of the previous governmental plan, For 
the introduction I made a composition of pieces of Minister Passarinho's first speech," 
(Col, Mauro Rodrigues, interview with the author), Besides being used in the First 
National Development Plan 1972-74, the same words also stood out in the First Sector 
Plan of Education 1972-74,
- 1 1 1 -
The section 1969-74 could be said to have been the peak of 
the period 1964-84 regarding education. Minister
Passarinho succeeded in a very energetic administration, 
assisted by military officers in key-positions, and in 
keeping the momentum of the launch of new programmes, an 
impressive-sounding discourse and the gathering of 
political sympathies towards education in, and even out 
of, government. In comparative terms, education was in a 
better position in the allocation of federal finance (see 
Table 3), and almost all new policies which the following 
administration implemented with political repercussions 
had their definite rise between 1969 and 1973.4tl The 
period 1974-79 lost this momentum but extended the 
concepts of education as investment and institutionalized 
the "priority programmes". 42
Although the same line had been kept from 1966 to 1979 in 
governmental plans for education, as described, changes in 
the procedence of these occured as from 1970. The style 
of IPEA/CNRH's leadership was shaken when MEC's new 
administration refused a position of simple acquiescence 
to plans drawn up in that agency; it was understood that 
the text should first come out from MEC, after active 
participation by its bodies, before it reached its
41; Exaaples art: the tain eletenti of the National Post-6raduation Plan including the 
full-tite work acheae in universities, the new federal job organization plan, 
progranaes of the university refore including developeent of canpuses, the basic 
eleaents of the Physical Education and Sport Plan and the renovation of the federal 
support to cultural patriaony and arts,
42, The 1975-79 Developeent Plan, not only placed education aaong pre-investaent, 
social infra-structure or instruaents for the econoaic developeent, but made it an 
integral part of the econoaic strategy: BRASIL/Presiddncia da Repdblica, Proieto do 11 
Plano Nacional da Desenvolviaento, 1975-79 (Projeto de Lei), Setenbro 1974, Capitulo 
II, pp,25-30,
- 112 -
completion in the central planning agency. This move
corrected the previous course of the education policy­
making, but, in the end, turned out to be an extension of 
the prevailing approach."11^
2, 2. 3. The external influence
The concern of this Section is limited to highlighting 
some events of external infuence in the process of policy­
making of education funding as far as they refer to the 
relevant periods or government bodies. Following the 
periodization of the policy-making activities of the
government which was defined at the beginning of this
chapter, greater importance will be attributed to the
period 1961-68. Direct external influence was sharply
reduced from the early seventies.
2.2.3. 1. The Brazil-USA early links for economic
development
43, Col, Mauro Rodrigues, the new General Secretary of Minister Passarinho (himself a 
former eilitaryman) describes the turning point: "Some day, Mrs Terezinha Saraiva (from 
IPEA/CNRH) came to us with the draft of the plan (First Nation Develpment Plan, 1971), 
telling us'whatrwe had to do. We stopped her, They (technicians from CNRH) might stay 
as observers, We made our people discuss and introduce changes if they like, and the 
text only came out when we approved it," (Interview with the author)
44, Besides the fact that the first text - and so the basic conceptions - still came 
from IPEA, MEC absorbed some staff from CNRH, Mrs Terezinha Saraiva was later invited 
by Minister Passarinho to be the Head of the MEC's Primary Education Department, the 
same happening to Mr Edson Machado in relation to the Higher Education Department, who, 
however did not accept the invitation (information by Senator Passarinho, interview 
with the author), Just afterwards he was appointed Head of CNRH,
- 113 -
A landmark in the formation of Brazilian qualified 
personnel for the modern economic development planning was 
the official technical cooperation by the USA government 
<"Point IV Program") which was agreed in December 1949 and 
held between 1950 and 1953. The activities of the heavily 
manned Economic Development Commission <54 members) 
involved studies and training of tecnicians in USA and led 
directly to the creation of the National Bank of Economic 
Development (BNDE) which was to channel and lead foreign 
and internal investment capital. No reference appeared
in the Commission's work to education, but the links and 
relations which started from there, including those with 
The United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), were influential in the formulation of the policy 
on education for more then two decades — a matter to be 
studied later in this section. Besides, of particular 
note is the special position of Mr Roberto Campos, Senior 
Counsellor of the Commission, who later supervised the 
Kubitscheck government's policy on the financing of 
education (see footnote 22 in this chapter) and was the 
first Minister of Planning for the 1964 regime and the 
mastermind of its planning system.
The initial accord was given an unlimited extension in 
terms of the "Agreement on Special Technical Services 
between the Government of the United States and that of 
Brazil",- on 30/5/1953, to "any sector of activity related 
to the economic development of Brazil".
2.2.3.2. Theoretical influential trends
45, Brazil-US Econoaic Development Commission, The Development of Brasil. Report of
x  •
the Joint Brazil-US Economic Development Commission. Washington, 1953,
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However, before international technical cooperation became 
important again in the Brazilian process of policy-making 
during the 1960's, a fact in the external academic centres 
had repercussions to influence governmental planners,
eventually reaching Brazilian academic sectors. It is 
commonly referred to as "the boom in the economics of 
education". In her survey of the literature in this area 
until 1964, Dr. M. J. Bowman estimates that 90% of works 
appeared after 1955, and the number more than doubled from 
1960. About the same turning point Professor Mark
Blaug, reputed specialist in the economics of education,
wrot e:
"Rarely is it possible to trace the take-off point of a new 
subject or a branch of an old subject to a particular book. The 
'birth' of economics of education, however, can be clearly dated 
from the presidential address of Theodore W. Schultz, Professor 
of Economics at the University of Chicago, to the Annual Meeting 
of the American Economic Association in December 1960. This is 
not to say that nobody published in this field or even that 
nobody used the ' label' economics of education before 1960, but 
simply that most economists before 1960 were not aware of the
fact that widely observed economic phenomena could be rendered
intelligible by the idea of human capital formation. The result 
was a sudden acceleration of the research in this area and a 
sudden proliferation of publications concerned with the economic 
value of education.""*3'
46, , the pice at which social scientists (and pseudo-social scientists) are adding
to the printed pages on the economics of education is stunning," (Bowman, M, J, "The 
Human Investment Revolution in Economic Thought", Sociology of Education, v, 39 (1966), 
p.111).
47, Blaug, M, Economics of Education. (Selected Readings). Middlesex, Penguin Books, 
v.l, p,11, In fact T, Schultz had already written on his ideas before this "birth": 
Schultz, T, W, "Agriculture and the application of knowledge", A look to the future. W, 
K, Kellog Foundation, Battle Creek, 1956, pp,54-78; —  , "Investment in man: an 
economist's view", Social Service Review, n.33, June, 1959, 109-117; —  , "Capital
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Professor Theodore Schultz clearly set his original 
perception of investment in human capital which was 
largely developed through studies on the rate of return of 
outlays on education and particularly the investment in 
education in developing countries. He started with a 
powerful argument to turn the economic instruments of 
analysis to a new academic lode;
"Although it is obvious that people acquire useful skills and 
knowledge it is not obvious that these skills and knowledge are 
a form of capital, that this capital is in substantial part a 
product of deliberate investment, that it has grown in Western 
societies at a much faster rate than conventional (nonhuman) 
capital and that its growth may well be the most distinctive 
feature of the economic system. It has been widely observed 
that increases in national output have been large compared with
the increases of land, man-hours, and physical reproducible
capital. Investment in human capital is probably the major 
explanation of this difference."
"Much of what we call comsumption constitutes investment in
human capital. Direct expenditure on education, health, and
internal migration to take advantage of better job opportunities 
are clear examples. Earnings foregone by mature students 
attending school and by workers acquiring on-the-job training 
are equally clear examples. Yet nowhere do these enter into our 
national accounts. The use of leisure time to improve skills 
and" knowledge is widespread and it too is unrecorded. In this 
and similar ways the quality of human effort can be greatly 
Improved and its productivity enhanced. I shall contend that 
such Investment in human capital accounts for most of the 
impressive rise in the real earnings per worker. M
47, (cont,) Foraation by Education", Journal of Political Economy, n,68, December, 
I960, His vork on this subject extended until 1967 .and the nost outstanding are: 
M n v estae nt in Huaan Capital*, American Econoaic Review, v,51, Harch 1961 and Ihfi. 
econoaic Value of Education. Nev YoHc, Coluabia University Press, 1963,
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Although initially contested, from the point of view of 
the classic concepts of market and investment/consumption 
(H. G. Shaffer), the broadness of the conception and its 
position in the intersection of major themes of the 
economics methodology proved stimulating, decisively 
helping the research in the area by economists, with 
repercussions in the activity of politicians, journalists 
and other professionals involved with policy-making."*3
One could distinguish four main areas of interest in which 
studies on investment in human capital have branched, 
especially with regard to developing countries: a) the
global or aggregative measurements of the magnitude of 
human capital formation and its contribution to national 
income, often using functions of aggregate output and, 
less frequently, making international comparisons; b) the 
statistical and econometric estimations of human resources
— conventional education, other forms of special on-the- 
job training and scientific and technological development
— for specific targets of economic development, the so- 
called "man-power approach", as well as estimates of 
educational needs to meet demographic trends; c) 
applications of micro-decision theory, particularly cost- 
benefit analysis, to determine rates of return of 
investment in education, most based on the correlation
48, Schultz, T, V, "Investment in Human Capital", American Economic Review, v.51, 
Harch 1961, p , 1, \
49, With regard to the period 1961-68, which was crucial for the introduction of the 
new views in Brazilian economic planning, three works adequately summarized hundreds of 
the most significant contributions for such developments: Blaug, H, Economics of 
Education, (Selected Readings). Middlesex, Penguin Books, 2 v t, 1968, and Bowman, M, J, 
et alii, Readings in the Economics of Education. Paris, UNESCO, 1968, Between 1962 and 
1968 UNESCO's International Institute for Education Planning intensively published on 
investment in education in developing countries,
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between the increase in education and the increase in 
individual income; d) the cost studies in educational or­
ganizations and the improvement of their effectiveness, so
In Brazil, the new literature on the economics of 
education or education in the context of economic planning 
for the development, had significant expansion only from 
1 9 6 6 . Theodore Schultz's works were translated into
50, During the seventies, further academic studies and the experience of the policies 
hastily taken from the early trends of human capital theory (Psacharopoulos, 6, 
"Economics of Education; an assessment of recent methodological advances and empirical 
results", Social Science Information, y , 16, 1977, pp,351-71) brought about doubts and 
controversy among top names in the area (Husgrave, S, W, "The Economics of EDucation in 
Britain, An Outsider's Attempt at Synthesis", Journal of Human Resources, Winter 
1978,), The so-called "screening hypothesis"/"educational credentialism" (education, 
before all, select according to native, behavioural and social abilities; school awards 
become the most cost-effective way for employers to recrute according to those 
qualities which reproduce the labour structure) impaired the confidence in previous 
theories, Hark Blaug, Professor at the University of London Institute of Education and 
a pioneer in the field, assessed the present situation; "The evidence may excuse a 
'jaundiced' attitude to human capital theory but it does not justify an outright 
rejection of it," (The Economics of Education and the Education of an Economist.
Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1987, p.viii), Drawing on the experience of the World Bank in
education projects, see; Psacharopoulos, G. and Woodhall, H, Education for Development. 
An Analysis of Investment Choices. Oxford University Press / The World Bank, 1985,
51. The statement is based on three bibliographic surveys of the Brazilian Centre of 
Educational Research (INEP/HEC), which were carried out in 1967, 1970 and 1973, the 
second of them having been published in Revista Brasileira de Estudos Pedagdgicos, n, 
119, Jul/Set 1970, Before 1966, almost the only authors to be found are those linked 
to government organizations, such as Carlos Pasquale (INEP/HEC), Arlindo Lopes Correa 
(HINIPLAN/EPEA from 1964), Jos* Roberto Horeira (HINIPLAN/EPEA from 1964) and Carlos F, 
do R*go Haciel (Regional Centre of Educational Research* Recife, linked to INEP), the
two last having had pioneer work in the area since the early sixties,
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Portuguese and published by Zahar Eds. <Rio de Janeiro) 
from 1967. Mention should also be made of the first
academic researches on the case of Brazil which were 
developed between 1967 and 1970 under the influence of the 
existing theories of investment in human capital, as they 
actually had repercussions among education policy­
makers. 33
2. 2. 3. 3. The 1961-63 inter-American conferences
52, They were; "Gustos em Educa$So" and "Educa$So como Investimento", two articles in 
the collective work: Pereira, Luis (ed,), Deseflivolvimento.Trabalho e Educate. Rio, 
Zahar Eds,, 1967, pp,86-110; Schultz T, Q valor Econflmico da E d u cate. Rio, Zahar 
Eds,, 1967; Schultz T, Q Capital Huiwano: Investimento em EducagSo e Pesquisa. Rio, 
Zahar Eds,, 1973,
53, Castro, C, H, Investment in Education in Brazil: ft Study of Two Industrial
Communities. PhD Thesis for the University of Vanderbilt, USA, 1969; Langoni, C, 6. A.
Study of Economic 6rowth: The Case of Brazil. PhD Thesis for the University of Chicago, 
USA, 1970; Levy, S, An Economic Analysis of Investment in Education in the State of
SSo Paulo. Institute de Pesquisas EconOmicas, USP, 1969; Pontes, H, EducaySo para q
Desenvolvimento. SSo Paulo, Companhia Editors Nacional, 1969, Doctors Cl&udio Moura 
Castro and Geraldo Langoni (both teachers at GetOlio Vargas Foundation, FGV) published 
in Portuguese.summaries or developments of their original works which conincided in 
finding high return rates for investment in education (ranging from about 15X for 
higher education to 40* for primary education, slightly above the percentages of Dr, 
Levy's study); see: Castro, C, H, "Investimento em EducagSo no Brasil: Compara^So de 
Tr&s Estudos", Pesquisa e Planeiamento EconOmico, n. 1, Jun./Nov, 1971, pp,141-52), 
Doctor Castro, who continued producing original work in the area, later (1979) became 
Head of CAPES/MEC and then (1982) Head of the National Centre of Human Resources 
(CNRH), Dr, Langoni became Chairman of the Brazilian Central Bank (1980) and published 
on in economics of education until 1976 (see event reported in the end of Section 
5,3,2), At the end of the 1970-75 cycle of planning, a new FGV thesis was issued on 
return rates of education in Brazil: Gibbon, V, H, S, Taxas de RetOrno dos
lnvestimentos em Educa^go no Brasil; Uma An&lise Agregada. IBRE/F6V, 1975,
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The particular reason for the importance which was 
attributed in the last pages to the foreign academic work 
on the economics of education is that it actually 
nourished the meetings and technical cooperation of 
international agencies involved in the policy-making 
process of developing countries.
Keeping the momentum of US President Kennedy's launch of 
the Alliance for the Progress and the expansion of US 
political influence in America, the Organization of the 
American States <OEA> summoned a special meeting of its 
Inter-American Economic and Social Council which is 
composed of ministers of the member— states between 5th and 
17th August 1961 in Punta del Este, Uruguay. The Punta 
del Este Conference, as it became known was a decisive 
turning-point in international technical cooperation for 
education which was the privileged vehicle of the 
influence of the developmentalist ideas in Latin America, 
chiefly the concept of education as an investment in human 
capital.
Before Punta del Este and since World War II, a few inter—  
American conferences were held by OEA on education without 
effective repercussion. 54 This time the conference
54, P a n m i ,  25/9-4/10/1943, which was rather a proclamation of the democratic ideals 
of education (See: OEA, Di&rio de la Priaera Conferencia de Ministros y Oiretores de 
Educacidtr de las Reptiblicas Americanas. Panama, Comp, Ed, Nacional, 1943); Lima, 3- 
9/5/1956, This conference was participated in by UNESCO and emphasized the ideas of 
overall education planning and compulsoriness of primary education, It was extended in 
a regional meeting (23/4-5/5/1956) with the same purpose, sponsored by the same 
institutions plus the government of Peru and introduced the idea of consensus on 
voluntarily assumed targets of education development by the countries (.£1 Projecto 
Principal of UNESCO), Despite its obvious political obstacles, this idea was 
repeatedly pursued in the following" decades, possibly encouraged by the M a n  of Punta 
del Este,
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counted on strong political (diplomatic) and financial 
support from the USA through the Alliance for the 
Progress. Its purpose — confirmed by a joint seven-point 
resolution and solemnly signed by all ministers of state
on behalf of their countries — was to draw up "the bases
of a policy inspired by the Alliance for the Progress",
particularly a "Decenal Plan of Education" for this 
institution, assuring better results for its financial
resources. Punta del Este boosted the language of
education as "a decisive factor for the economic and
social development", a field where "high results of 
investment" could be expected and whose plans should be 
urgently integrated in national development programmes. ss 
The details of the resolution and the Decenal Plan were to 
be set down in the following inter— American meeting of 
ministers of education which followed six months later.
Indeed, a "Conference on Education and the Social and 
Economic Development in Latin America" was held in
Santiago (5-19/3/1962), sponsored by OEA, UNESCO, CEPAL
(United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America) 
with the participation of OIT (Labour International 
Organization) and FAO (United Nations Organization for 
Food and Agriculture). As an extension of Punta del 
Este's, Santiago Conference defined targets to be 
implemented by individual countries and reached by 1970. 
A few months earlier in Brazil, the Law of Directives and 
Bases* of National Education (Law 4024, of 20/12/1961) 
provided about a National Plan and targets for education. 
Stemming, therefore, from this law and the international 
committments, the National Plan of Education (PNE) adopted 
the targets and 1970 term of Santiago Conference with 
slight adaptation to the Brazilian education system, the
55, Quotations in this paragraph are from the text of the "Declaration of Punta del 
Este" in: INEP/HEC, C o n f e r ee i a s Interamericanas de EducaySo. INEP, 1965, pp, 111-15,
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procedence of the figures being explicitly mentioned. Sl£
The 1962 elan was temporarily halted by the political 
opposition mood of some Latin American countries in the
1963 OEA conference (BogotA, 4-10/8/1963) which 
highlighted the prior need for economic and social justice 
among countries for education to succeed.3"-7' The targets
of the National Plan of Education, however, were upheld.
They had influence in the initiative for the creation of 
an important financial source for primary education <the 
Sal 6ri o-EducagHo, Section 5. 1. 1. 1) and their origin in the 
two previous intei— American conferences was again
mentioned in a revision of this plan, which was carried 
out in 1965, simply ignoring the terms of the 1963 Bogotd 
conference. s,i;H
2. 2. 3. 4. The MEC-USAID agreements
The USAID's agreements of technical cooperation with the 
Ministry of Education (MEC), acting as a vehicle for the 
existing conception of education in the context of 
economic development started only in 1964 and were
56,. MEC/Cdnselho Federal de EducagSo, Plano Nacional de Educate. 1962, pp.11, 33-4, 
See specially the terns (pp.62-3) of the basic docunent presented by the writer of the 
Plan, Prof, Anlsio Teixeira, to the Federal Council of Education (CFE), which was 
annexed to that publication,
57, Reflecting the discourse of the Goulart government in 1963, Brazilian delegation 
made a harsh, separatate declaration of vote in the final session, referring to 
"present iniquous structures” and advising the Alliance for the Progress "to avoid 
settlements with priviledged groups and support basic reforms”, MEC/INEP, ConferSncias 
Interamericanas de Educaggo. 1965, p.66.
58, MEC/Conselho Federal de Educagio, Plano Nacional de EducagSo, RevisSo 1965. 1965, 
P.3.
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permanently controversial, being accused by left-wing 
opposition, particularly in universities, of being an 
instrument of an alleged "americanization" of the 
Brazilian education system.
As an initiative of the MEC's National Institute of 
Educational Studies (INEP), six American experts gave 
technical advice on primary education, through an early 
agreement USAID-MEC <26/6/1964). Soon, two new
agreements with USAID and the Council of Technical 
Cooperation of the Alliance for the Progress (CONTAP) were 
drawn up, this time under the direct influence of the 
MINIPLAN's EPEA, e'° They were intended to support the 
activities of MEC's specialized bodies which were going to 
be entrusted with the implementation of major reforms, 
then under planning by MINIPLAN/EPEA: the first, for the
"Reestructuring and Reform of Secondary Education" 
<31/3/1965) and the second for the "planning of higher 
education, its expansion and improvement" <23/6/1965).
Standard activities of these two agreements were the 
advice by American and Brazilian experts <always in equal 
numbers) to education political bodies of MEC or state 
secretariats of education, visits to and special training 
in the USAr.by Brazilians, and studies and seminars. They 
had diverse fates, however.
This agreement, to the value of US* 375,000, had sone additional US* 131,000 
initially (29/12/1965) and was extended (30/12/1966) to 30/6/67 to involve the 
participation of the Alliance for the Progress (the Council of Technical Cooperation of 
the Alliance for the Progress, CONTAP) with Crl 443 million,
60, Information by hr Arlindo Correa, who was the Head of the Area of Human Resources 
in EPEA (interview with the author),
61, Information on these and other MEC/USAID agreements are from MEC/INEP and the 
Di&rio Oficial da UniSo, There is no full or satifactory publication of MEC/USAID 
agreements, With regard to the main agreement for higher education, an official report
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That for the secondary school — through its Technical Team 
for the Reform of Secondary School (EPEM) was successful 
in harmonizing the external advice (San Diego State 
College Foundation, California) with the general movement 
among Brazilian professional educators for a change in 
secondary school and therefore managed to influence the 
studies and the Bill which resulted in the important Law 
5692, of 11 /&/71. The agreement was extended on
17/1/1968 to have the support of CONTAP and finished at 
the end of 1971. Thechnical agreements were followed by 
loan implementation programmes from USAID, the Inter—  
American Development Bank (BID) and the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, The World Bank), 
which extended for the 1970's and even the early eighties, 
in the case of IBRD. t7i3
Diversely, the activities of the agreements for external 
technical cooperation in higher education were 
frustrating. Pressure on MEC's officials, collaborators 
and members of the Federal Education Council (CFE) was 
permanent by political opposition, a considerable part of 
the press and active groups of teachers and students in 
universities. Until the first quarter of 1967 MEC had not 
even managed to gather a team of Brazilian experts for the 
two-year agreement of June 1965, and the counterpart team 
of Americans which had arrived in Brazil for the joint
61, (cont,) vii issued; MEC/EAPES, Relat6rio da Equipe de Assessoria ao Planeiamento do 
Ensino Superior (EAPES). 1969. Some scattered texts, not mentioned in EAPES* report, 
can be found in a propaganda booklet by the left-wing Oeputy MArcio II, Alves; Q BeabA 
dos HEC-USAIQ. Rio, Ed. Gernasa, 1968,
62, Information by Hr Edson H Souza, who was a member of CNRH at the time, The reform 
aimed to extend primary education to eight years and give professional skills to 
youngsters over eleven, this becoming a major feature of the secondary school,
63, General information on loan by the federal government for education can be found 
in Section 5,1,1,2, under the header "LOANS",
- 124 -
works one year before, Some weeks before its expiry, the
agreement was renewed <9/5/67) until 30/6/69, but the
fiasco became obvious when a second team of Brazilian 
experts again failed to take up the work and a third team, 
which finally gathered in January 1968, scarcely managed 
to have some meetings and present scattered suggestions, 
suddenly closing down the activities of the agreement 
(30/6/68) twelve months before it was due to expire, just 
on the eve of the day the University Reform started its 
work (Decree 62937, of 2/7/68) ! No work by the American 
experts was published.
Meanwhile, on 30/6/66, MEC had a separate agreement with 
USAID for "advice on the modernization of university 
administration" which was due to provide technical
assistance (training for university administrative staff) 
to 18 Brazilian universities in subjects such as finance 
and cost controls, the planning of campuses and academic 
activities organization. A member of the staff of the 
University of Houston, Mr Rudolf Atcon, with wide 
international experience of advice in the administration 
of universities, was in charge of the programme which was 
conducted closely to the Council of Chancellors of the 
Brazilian Universities <CRUB).e's Mr Atcon's enthusiastic
64** An interview published by Jornal do Brasil, edition of 30/4/67, with Mr Alvanir 
B e z e r r a d e C a r v a l h o  (possibly a pseudonym of a member of the few Brazilians left with 
theVmetter) describes a situation of mismanagement or neglect of MEC administration 
towards the commitments of the agreement,
65, See MEC/EAPES. Relatbrio da Equipe de Assessoria ao Planeiamento do Ensina 
Superior (EAPES). Op, Cit., especially pp,. 12-21, This chaotic 650 page collection of 
texts, often irrelevant, is a clear indication of how isolated the MEC-USAID Commission 
was,
66, Although the circumstances of the first introduction of Hr Rudolf Atcon to the 
Brazilian authorities are not d e a r  and his links with USAID are undeniable, he had 
been engaged by HEC's Directory of Higher Education as an independent adviser between
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crusade among public universities raised as much 
controversy and left-wing opposition as the other MEC- 
USAID agreement for higher education planning. The
agreement for the modernization of university 
administration was due to expire in 1970 but was finished 
by MEC on 31/7/1967, in the first quarter of its course.
Loans were contracted from foreign agencies for the 
implementation of the university reform (1965 and then 
1968), most from BID for buildings, equipment and 
administrative training, and from governments of Eastern 
European countries also for equipment, e,'y Even sometimes 
involving the advice of American experts, programmes of 
loans were mostly staffed by Brazilians and the external 
influence was more limited, as far as the formulation of 
the policies on education was concerned.
There were other, minor, agreements with USAID in 
educational matters but virtually without involvement in 
the formulation or support of federal policies.6"®
66, (cont,) June and September 1965, before joining the 1966 MEC-USAID agreement, to go 
for a long tour of Brazilian universities, after which he gave a gloomy picture of the 
administration of these institutions, matching central government's worries, and wrote; 
R u m  & Rgforaulatftt Estrutural da Uniyersidade Brasileira, Rio, MEC, 1966, "Mr Atcon 
exerted a ‘personal proselitism among chancellors, suggesting to them the creation of 
the Council- of Chancellors of the Brazilian Universities (CRUB) of which he became the 
first general secretary," (Mr Edson Machado, interview with the author),
67, Beneral information on loans by the federal government for higher education can be 
found in Section 5,1,1,2, under the header "LOANS",
68, On November the 1st, 1966 a Letter of Agreement in general terms was signed by 
MINIPLAN, MEC and USAID, to pave the way for specific agreements, A MEC-USAID 
programme for the agriculture education (secondary and university level) was agreed on 
27/11/67 and 30/4/69; USAID had already had similar agreements with the Ministry of the 
Agriculture and the cooperation of CONTAP, Other agreements; MEC/Committee for 
Technical and School Book (COLTED)-Coordination Commission of the Alliance for the
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2.2.3.5. Assessing the influence of the MEC-USAIDs
One could affirm that the actual importance of the MEC- 
USAID agreements for higher education in the decision­
making process was overestimated as an effect of being a 
main target of opposition campaigns.
"I would affirm that, unlike what most people say, precisely 
what came from MEC-USAID Commission was preliminarily rejected 
or misconsidered by the Task-force of the University Reform 
because of the fragility of their group, including the American 
advisers who only repeated current American experience of 
university organization. The Task-force had a feeling of 
disgust for the work of the Commission. H,s3 
Indeed, no member of the MEC-USAID Commission had any part 
in the work of the Task-force of the University Reform and 
two key figures of the latter, Professors Newton Sucupira 
and Valnir Chagas left the Commission twice in spite of 
having been officially appointed, the same happening to 
other members of CFE. The several points the reports of 
the two groups have in common should rather be attributed
68. (cont,) Progress (CQCAP)-USAID-National Union of Book Publishers (SNEL), on 6/1/67 
for the production of 51 Million books in three years; Super intendency of the 
Developaent of the North-east (SUDENE)-MEC-State of PernaMbuco-USAID-CONTAP for the 
creation of a Centre of Educational Training, linked to a regional sector of INEP, on 
30/12/68v
69. Nr Edson Machado, who was directly involved in the works of the University Refore, 
interview with the author, Studies with an approach too close to the student and 
teacher opposition views sees to have slid into this Mistake; Roaanelli, 0, 0, Histbria 
da E d u c a ^ o  no Brazil. 1930-73. Petrbpolis, Vozes, 1978; Fivero, M. L. A Universidade 
Brasileira ee Busca de Sua Identidade. Petrbpolis, Vozes, 1977; Serrano, J. (coord.) 
■Atcon e a Universidade Brasileira", Revista dos Tribunais. 1974; Vieira, S, L, &  
(Dis)curso da (Re)foraa Universitiria. Fortaleza, UFCE/PROED, 1982,
- 127 -
to an existing consensus about obvious shortcomings which 
appeared in most criticisms and suggestions since the 
early sixties. On the other hand, considerable experience 
had been gathered by Brazilian experts on university 
reform, particularly after the University of SSo Paulo 
<1932), the University of the Federal District (1935-39) 
and the new University of Brasilia (1962), whose model, 
incidently, was inspired in the German and American model.
2.2.3.6. Significant influence from other agencies
The ideas which related funding of education to the major 
needs of the overall economic development plan also came 
from other international agencies fostering the making of 
corresponding policies through conferences and technical 
cooperation, as mentioned. In this context, of special 
importance is the statement by Mr Arlindo Correa, head of 
area of human resources and labour (later CNRH), 
responsible for education general plans coming between 
1964 and 1970. Asked about the influence of other areas 
of the government on his work, he replied outright:
"Absolutely not. We worked independently at our own discretion. 
Now, of course, we had the technical assistance of UNESCO and 
OEA. (...) During the first years, somebody from OECD, Mr Anglos 
Medici, came regularly to inspect the work at the request of 
Minister Roberto Campos".70
Also of particular note is that a close collaborator with 
Mr Correa, Mr Jos6 Roberto Moreira, who had been the 
Director of UNESCO's Centro Latino Americano de 
Investigaciones en Ciencias Sociales (CLAICS), in
70, Hr Arlindo Corrda, interview with the author,
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Santiago, Chile, in the early sixties and was a pioneer in 
the propagation in Latin America of the "human capital 
approach" in the economic planning in developing 
countries.
Besides the decisive fact which was the establishment of a 
structure of permanent and opportune presence in 
educational bodies through agreements of technical co­
operation, the external influence continued by the 
attendance by Brazilian selected officials at interna­
tional conferences in which the issue of investment in
education for economic development was discussed. Even 
without producing joint commitments on educational targets 
to be achieved by individual countries, as in Lima, Punta 
del Este and Santiago, the following conferences of 
international agencies must be mentioned: OEA, Technical
Conference on Secondary Education Planning, Mexico, 14- 
26/6/1965; CEPAL, Regional Seminar on Technical
Assistance on Investment in Education in America Latina, 
Santiago, 1966; UNESCO and CEPAL, Conference of Ministers 
of Education and Planning in Latin America, Buenos Ayres, 
21-28/6/1966; OECD, Conference on the Financing of 
Education for Economic Growth, 21-24/9/1967; UNESCO, 
International Conference on Education Planning, Paris, 6- 
14/8/1968; UNESCO, XXXIVth International Conference on
Education, Geneva, 1973; IRDB, Seminar on the Financing
of Education in Latin America, Mexico City, Nov-Dee 1978.
7?, See Hr Horeira's articles on the subject in CLAICS's Builetia, n. 1, 2 and 3 of 
1960 and n.3 of 1961, and "EducaciOn y desarrollo" in Revista de la Universidad de 
Buenos Ayres, n, 1, 1961, pp.99-125, In Brazil he published; Educa^So e
Desenvolviaento no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro, CLAICS, 1960; "Alguns Aspectos do 
Planejaaento da Educa^So no Brasil", Ravista Brasilairi.AL.Estudoa PedagOgicos, n, 98, 
Apr-Jun 1964; with other authors; "A Educa;2o e as ResistAncias As Mudan^as Sociais", 
ResistAncia is Hudangas Sociais. CLAICS, I960, •
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2. 3. FROM THE HUMANISTIC TO ECONOMIC APPROACH: THE CHANGE
In describing the origins and the formation of the 
policies on funding education as connected to
government's strong aims at economic development, the 
previous Section 2. 2 showed a move towards an economic 
approach from the mid-sixties which was considerably 
fostered by external influence. This section focuses 
specifically on federal bureaucracy in order to relate how 
the change occurred in it and how the conflicts were 
set t led.
Until the mid-fifties public expenditure on education was 
claimed on grounds of several ideological trends: liberal
ideals on individual development, democratic beliefs on 
the extension of opportunities for social ascent for all 
by means of education, and convictions about the superior 
values of culture, civilization and spiritual development 
in a society. They had in common the fact that education 
was justified in itself (it delivered its own excellency) 
not in its productivity, and a general humanistic, not 
economic approach. The difference did not turn into 
conflict, however, until it came to the first, basic step 
of the decision-making process: planning.
When the 1964 government first faced this issue, the 
previous experience in education planning by the Brazilian 
federal authorities had been the National Education Plan 
<PNE, 21/9/1962), which was made by the Federal Education 
Council (CFE) according to the Law of Directives and Bases 
of Education <LDB, Law n2 4024, of 20/12/61) and was to 
last until 1970. LDB had extensively provided for the 
financing of education including the disposal of all 
federal financial sources in three funds for primary, 
secondary and higher education respectively, after
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deducting one tenth for all expenditure of the central, 
administrative bodies. An "Education Plan", corresponding 
to each fund, had to be issued by CFE (Article 92, §§ 1
and 2). CFE elaborated one plan (PNE) for the three funds 
and integrated it with targets and criteria about what per 
cent and to whom the resources were to be allocated among 
the states which were supposed to prepare their own 
internal plans involving each municipio, further
calculation being made by a MEC's technical body.
Although having its merits in the circumstances of the 
time, PNE did not withstand a criticism by modern planning 
techniques. 7:2 Nevertheless, having its status from a
high-ranked law such as LDB and the supreme technical
authority in the area of education, CFE, the plan was 
inviolate in MEC or among other public educational bodies.
Thus, when MINIPLAN/EPEA's economists set out in 1965 for 
a ten-year education plan they certainly were on a course 
of collision with MEC/CFE's humanists. Then, sharp
differences of conceptual approach turned into clashes. 
The first occurred when Mr Arlindo CorrSa, in charge of 
EPEA's Area of Hunan Resources, went to Prof. Lednidas 
Sobrinho Pdrto, MEC's Head . of National Education 
Department <DNE) to explain what he intended to do. After 
involving a direct intervention of MINIPLAN's Minister 
Roberto Campos the affair was settled by a compromise
73, Besides not drawing up a policy which related education to other variables 
involved and defining priorities, PNE's targets were almost arbitrarily defined and the 
allocation itself, whose criteria conflictingly started from roughly estimated cost per 
pupil and apportionment of the total funds, did not keep direct relation with the aimed 
targets. See MEC/CFE, Plano Nacional de Educaggo. 1962, pp,33-40; see also the basic 
study (May 1962) of PNE's writter, Prof. Anizio Texeira, pp.68-79, Except for the 
suppression of the cost per pupil as a paramiter, the revision of PNE in 1965 did not 
change those shortcomings of the original methodology,
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which preserved the position of MINIPLAN.'^3 Beside the
fact that the incident was the tip of an iceberg, also
noteworthy is the way it was handled by the Minister of 
Planning, showing that he shared the new authoritarian 
rule of the regime.
The dispute, however, was not over. Authorities in
education bodies kept a reserved but unchanged position 
often intensifying criticisms in general terms against the 
"functional" or MtechnicalM approach to education. '-74 Such 
a reaction lasted for at least four years but did not
impede the progress of EPEA's planning activities and the
implementation of the new policies. On the contrary, it 
could have contributed to the "impatience” from the 
military with the slow reaction by MEC to the announced
reforms, thereby leading to the "intervention" by the 
Special Commission headed by Gen. Meira Mattos between 
December 1967 and May 1968 (Section 3.3. 1>.
A way to perceive the early thought (and its later change)
73, Mr Arlindo Correa reports; "He (the head of ONE) simply opened the drawer of his 
desk, picked up a volume of LOB and put it in front of me, 'Read Article 92, please',
(This article was on the statutory competence of CFE to draw the plans of education),
'PNE is^not a plan', I replied, 'it is a mere scheme of distribution of funds', We 
were unable to reach un agreement, Then, Minister Roberto Campos asked Prof, C16vis 
Salgado (former minister of education, 1956-59), the Chairman of CFE, an authority 
formally subordinated to the minister of education, to visit him and told him; 'Arlindo 
will make the plan' (the Decenal Plan), It was also agreed that a member of CFE, Prof, 
Ourmeval Trigueiro, would be assigned to write the introduction," (Interview with the 
author),
74, Prof. Durmeval Trigueiro, who later became a shap critic of the technocratic 
reasoning (see his "Desemvolvimento, Tecnocracia e Universidade", Vozes, Revista de 
Cultura, n,6, 1975), was compulsorily retired together with other university teachers 
for ideological reasons,
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of MEC authorities is to research into the terms of the 
President of the Republic's annual address to the Congress 
(March) reporting on his administration. The texts were 
usually a composition which was made by the President's 
Office as a routine from the corresponding (unpublished)
reports by the ministries, without interference by the 
Ministry of Planning, to which, diversely, the texts of
plans and programmes were due.
There is no trace of the theme of the economic value of
education for development in President Castello Branco's 
1965 and 1966 speech (the 1964 one had already been given 
by President Goulart) but recurrent references to LDB. 
The same happened in 1967, with a brief mention of the 
Decenal Plan to add: "whose democratic feature is
evident". Following an older trend, an artificially
balanced composition of texts was used when a development- 
related justification for education appeared. Thus, the
1968 presidential speech uses an ambiguous formula:
"Under the views on the priority aim at valorization of 
Brazilian man, access to the education system was widened with 
the purpose of preparing necessary human resources for the 
productive sectors, education being a means at the service of 
the integrated development of the country.
Even in 1969 a composite formulation revealed remaining
75, Thit is the case of President Kubitscheck, who, adressing the Congress in 1957 and 
after ttresiing his policies on education, science and technology for the development, 
added that this would be made "under the influx of Christian ideals", aiming "a 
technical progress which preserve the spiritual physionomy of the nation so that it 
could boost itself in the world as one of the most splendid conquests of the Latin and 
Christian civilization; that is the ideal which polarizes the expectations of all 
Brazilians today," MEC/INEP, A Educaggo nas Mensaqens Presidenciais. PerlodQ 183.Q-. 
1986. 2v, Brasilia, 1987, v . H ,  p,301, All references or quotations in this paragraph 
are from this source, volume two (1956-86),
76, MEC/INEP, A E d u c a t e  nas Mensagens Presidenciais. Op, cit., p.397.
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hesitations in spite of already giving a prevailing 
position to the economic approach:
"In its conviction that the educational sector is one of the 
main factors of development, the federal government channelled 
its efforts into expanding and reformulating the education 
system in order to form human resources, indispensable to the 
country's economic needs, and also aiming at the process of 
democratization of opportunities which is necessary to political 
and social perfection."'7'7
Following the settlement in the first conflict MEC- 
MINIPLAN (reported above), the formula of admitting a 
MEC's humanistic writer for the introductions of develop­
ment plans (the space for conceptual, discursive 
statements) and mantainingMINIPLAN's EPEA as the author of 
the plan contents (what actually mattered) became a usual 
procedure. In attempting some conciliation, the
introductions themselves revealed the conceptual conflict 
between the two government bodies. 713
77, MEC/INEP, ft E d u c a ^ o  nas Mensaqens Presidenciais. Op, cit,, p.397-8,
78, For example, in the Strategic Development Programme (1968-70) which was markedly 
directed to the rationalization of education and was a product of EPEA's work, one can 
read in its introduction by a writer from CFE (Father Jos6 Vasconcellos): "The 
Strategic Programme adopts an integrated view of education, Stressing its function of 
spiritual leadership and instrument of social transformation in a democratic frame, the 
Programme involves its socio-cultural and economic dimension, (,,,) The basic aims of 
the Brazilian educational system reform are; I, To provide for the leadership which the 
country needs to achieve its major national targets of reconciling the technological 
progress of our time, the aspirations of economic development and social and spiritual 
progress; II, To transmit the creative genius of Brazilian culture; III, To prepare 
human resources for the development - 'development' in that whole meaning of building a 
new society," Just after this, however, the three "general basic objectives of the 
Strategic Plan" are reminded, sharply contrasting with this statement, Again, after 
explaining that the "integrated vietf* (beginning of the text) is founded on the Pope's 
encyclical, "Populorua Progressist the vacillation of the positions appeared when
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The relations could not go on as they were, and pressures, 
including from the military, for the reforms —
particularly the university reform — induced MINIPLAN and
MEC to settle their differences. This turning-point could 
be identified on a series of private meetings which took 
place on the premises of the GetOlio Vargas Foundation 
(FGV) in Rio de Janeiro on Saturdays in the first half of 
1968 gathering together eminent "economists and 
educators", most of them holding top positions in the 
government. Mr Arlindo Correa, Head of CNRH, who was
present, relates:
"The objective and the result was a sort of a 'pact': we (he
spoke as a MINIPLAN's economist) wanted from them a committment 
with rationality. But we also were soothed in relation to a 
more humanistic view of education. All of us benefitted from 
those meetings."
Finally, the conceptual conflict between the humanistic 
and economic aims of education seemed to have been
78, (cont,) education is then presented as; "I, Instrument of the acceleration of 
development; II, Instrument of social progress; III, Instrument of the expansion of job 
opportunities," BRASIL/HINIPLAN, Programs EstratSqico de Desenvolvimento 1968-1970. 
Area IX Infraestrutura Social. Vol.I, EducagSo e Recursos Humanos, Fevereiro 1969, 
pp. 5, 6, 10.
79. Interview with the author, Hr, Arlindo Corrda named the following persons; 
economists;* Prof; Isaac Kerstenetzky (General Director of the Brazilian Institute of 
Geography and' Statistics, I6GE), Ambassador Roberto Campos (Former Minister of the 
Planning), Prof, Mdrio H, Simonsen (Director of the Economy Post-Graduate School, FGV, 
a mastermind of the first government economic plans and later Minister of the 
Planning), Dr, JoSo Paulo dos R, Velloso (MINIPLAN*s General Secretary and President of 
IPEA), Prof, Julian Chacel (Brazilian Institute of Economy, FGV); educators; Raymundo 
Moniz de AragSo (former Minister of Education, Director of F G V s  Institute for Advanced 
Studies in Education) and the following members of CFE; Prof, Roberto Santos, Father 
Jos6 Vasconcellos, Prof, Vicente Sobrinho Pdrto and Profs, Newton Sucupira and Valnir 
Chagas, who were members of the task-group for the University Reform,
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overcome through the linkages of both to the superior
community needs* as it appeared in the government's
document of directives <1970). Nevertheless* the
formulation of "community needs" in a strictly economic 
context, left the core of the issue untouched. In the 
section "Basic definitions for an education policy", the 
document started stressing the qualification of man-power 
as a condition for a country to enter the society of
developed nations, and enunciated:
"The individual valorization must be achieved for the benefit of
community needs, say, as a production factor, not a professional
surplus, at the margin of the productive process. "3°
A theoretical consensus was never reached, but a modus 
vivendit following a clear political prevalence of the 
views which came from the body undoubtedly better 
positioned in the centre of power, could be seen from the
early seventies. This can fairly be attributed to the
personal relationship of Minister Jarbas Passarinho (a 
politician and former militaryman) with the members of
CFE. Mr Edson Machado, who was then a member of this 
council, recalled:
"From the beginning, he (the minister) tried to maintain an 
intensive relationship with CFE. He broke the formal style of 
relationship and looked for dialogue and competent assistance. 
For both purposes he had informal meetings with small, selected 
groups- in, the ministry and sometimes welcomed the whole Council 
to his house. "I31
He invited one of CFE's most eminent leaders, Prof. Newton 
Sucupira, to be his Special Adviser for International 
Affairs (1971-73). Prof. Sucupira in this period was 
Chaiman of UNESCO's Education International Bureau.
80, BRASIL/Presid^ncia da RepOblica, Hetas e Bases para a At So do Gov&rno. Setembro, 
1970, p,60,
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Minister Passarinho, himself, had never been a technician 
and his humanistic culture <he was a member of the Arts 
Academy of his state of Para, for his literary activities) 
complemented his professional military formation. His 
early influence as minister of education was humanistic 
and even Christian and the language of his speeches made 
easier the conciliation he obtained in the area, in spite 
of having followed the mainstream of the official 
discourse on education.3 '^
A last, decisive factor for the consolidation of a 
technical, often economic treatment of policy-making on 
education must be mentioned: a change in the composition
of MEC's staff involved with the subject. By the mid­
seventies, a new generation of technicians in education 
planning had already been trained in other agencies, 
including those linked with international technical co- 
opertion, reflecting the new trends. The administrative 
reform of federal universities had also stimulated the 
formation of new skills in the rationalization of
81, Interview with the author,
82, In the early sixties, when he was still a colonel in the A m y  and Chief of Staff 
of the Army's unit in the State of Pari, Passarinho, under the influence of a sister of 
his who was a ; nun, attended meetings of a Catholic ilite, He new well the recent 
social encyclical* of the Pope and became enthusiastic about Father Bastos O'Avila's 
theories of thev *Christian Solidarity", as an alternative to Marxism and Capitalism, 
He declared he had read three documents before making up his mind, just arrived at MEC: 
a book by a young university teacher in Philosophy of Education, Dr Arnaldo Niskier, 
the "Meira Mattos Report" (See Section 3,3,2) which had been given to him by a relative 
who was a MEC's officer, and a work by the most eminent leader of the liberal 
professionals of education, Prof, Anizio Teixeira, an indefatigable fighter for the 
democratization of elementary education and then recently deceased, "The readings of 
Anizio Teixeira, Senator Passarinho recalled afterwards, was decisive for me," 
Interview with the author,
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education administration <MEC central bodies have always 
had a considerable part of its staff from federal 
universities). The increasing identification of views — 
as far as the economic approach of education was concerned 
— between many MEC and MINIPLAN officials smoothed down 
remaining resistance, while the institutional structure 
until 1975 had been completely reformed by new 
regulations, extinction and creation of bodies. 
Definitely, in a decade the centre of gravity for the 
making of education policy had been moved from CFE to
MEC's specialized departments and the economic approach 
had prevailed over the humanistic one.
2. 4. THE RATIONALITY OF PLANNING AND EXPENDITURE ON
EDUCATION
"The yield of federal Investment in higher education is so
scandalously low that it would be unwise to increase expenditure 
without correcting the causes of the spillage. (...) Brazil does 
not spend absurdly little on education, it spends absurdly 
badly.He'3
"Brazil invests little but spends worst on education."3'*
These public declarations of the first two ministers of 
planning of the 1964 regime are exceptionally precise in
elucidating the government's most spontaneous reaction 
towards funding education in the first years and a
permanent feature of decisions on the matter afterwards. 
Although the approach had been particularly used in the
83. Former Minister of the Planning Roberto Campos, Q Qlobo. edition of 31/1/68,
84. Minister of the Planning H61io BeltrSo, Jornal do Brasil, edition of 15/5/68,
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case of the federal universities, it was typical for all 
direct federal expenditure on education (federal education 
organizat ions).
The search for the underlying reasons for this attitude 
would firstly turn to the modernizing trends which are 
related to bursts of economic expansion under the
leadership of the governmental sector. Governments
expressed in these situation a need for providing
themselves with a managerial infra-structure to implement 
development policies, and this brought about repeated
administrative reforms with the accent on efficiency and 
suppleness.
Section 1.4.2 studied the rise and the reformist
activities of the Administrative Department of the Public 
Service (DASP) under the Vargas' new concept of the state
role in leading industrialization policies during the
thirties up to the end of the World War II. A decade
later, the pattern came back with the intensive
development aims of the Kubitscheck's government <1956- 
60), reinforcing a weakened DASP with a Commission for the 
Bureaucratic Simplification (COSB, 14/7/1956). As a
second pole of his modernizing policy, Kubitscheck managed 
to create a Commission for Administrative Studies and 
Projects (CEPA, 24/8/1956), strategically placed in the 
Congress structure, just where all institutional changes 
were expected to come from. When political circumstances 
did not allow new economic projects, such as in 1953 and 
1962/63, bills of administrative reform remained stuck in 
the Congress or were not implemented. as
85, Details of these and later reforms or attempts at reform in: Wahr1ich, B, "Reforma 
Administrtiva Brasileira: passado e presente", Revista de A d m i n i s t r a ^ o  Ftiblica. vol.8, 
n,2, 1974; Neto, J,P, "Co ntMbui;3o ao' estudo dos Problemas da Reforma
A d m i n i s t r a t e " ,  Revista de A dm inist rate Ptiblica, vol,8, n,3, 1974,
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During the two first years of economic purge and austerity 
in the Castello Branco's government, when a ten-year 
development plan was born, a new £lan pushed ahead the 
work of a Commission for the Studies on the Administrative 
Reform (COMESTRA, November 1964).'=:"s Again, when a 
political developmentist project finally began to emerge 
from 1967, a major administrative reform (Law-by-decree 
200, of 25/2/1967) gathered the necessary momentum and 
political stamina to change the figure of the federal 
Executive Power completely during the following ten years 
with intensive projections in the state administration 
(Institutional Act n2 8, of 2/4/1969).37
In a well designed scheme of sequential steps, the reform 
was to reach all government organizations of any kind, 
including the state-owned enterprises, and bring about a 
revision and adaptation of all federal laws. In
comparison with the previous administrative reforms its 
new element was the teleological concept of "efficacy" 
(Amintai Etzioni) — the effectiveness towards the 
governmental and organizational ends — beyond the simple 
"efficiency" which was defined in relation to the most
86, COMESTRA used the results of the 1963 group of studies (CommissSo Amaral Peixoto) 
and was basically developed in FGV's Brazilian School of Public Administration (EBAP) 
which originated from a dissident group from DASP, in the late forties, Also of 
particular note is the influence of the seven-year technical cooperation agreement 
between EBAP and the School of Public Administration of the University of North 
Carolina (headed by Professor Frank Sherwood, who often visited Brazil). The agreement 
had the support of USAIO,
87, Law-by-decree 200 had its provisions frequently altered or extended, 
BRASIL/Senado Federal/Subsecretaria de Edi?5es TAcnicas, Reforma A d m i n i s t r a t e .  
QraganizatSo da Adm in i s t r a t e  Federal. Brasilia, 1984, lists 16 alterative
acts and 116 acts extending original rules and structures,
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economical and output-producing combination of means. aa 
Law-by-decree 200 explains the practical "principles" of 
the reform as (Articles 6 to 14): "I. Planning; II.
Coordination; III. Decentralization; IV. Delegation of 
legal capability; V. Control."
The three other pillars of the whole plan were: a) the
close links between planning, programme-budget and 
financial flows programming (Articles 15 to 18) to secure 
the achievement of planned targets; b) the ministerial 
supervision, as the backbone mechanism of central
coordination and control (Articles 19 to 29); c) the 
stucturing of the so-called "auxiliary services" — staff 
management, material, accountancy and other services such 
as cleaning, security, communications, etc. — as
specialized systems throughout the whole federal 
organization, and so directly ("technically") connected to 
central bodies of the same nature, issuing specific rules. 
A "line-linkage" (or hierachical dependency) was supposed 
to remain between each individual service and the 
departments, agencies or bodies in charge of the "end- 
activities" or governmental services. This "system
structure" —  from which state-owned companies and public 
foundations were excluded — was later generally used for
several other activities, not properly classifiable as 
"auxiliary services" such as planning, security & 
information, public relations, etc. These three "pillars" 
of the new administrative system were the crucial 
elements, finally responsible for the outcomes of the 
following ten or fifteen years of the implementation of 
the rationalizing policies. Such results in the case of
88, On the theoretical framework of the 1967 Administrative Reform, as explained from 
its own point of view, see; Teixeira Oias, J,N, A Reforma Administrativa da 1967. 
(Cadernos de A d m i n i s t r a t e  PGblica n2 73), Rio, FGV, 1968,
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federal educational organizations will be studied in 
detail later, in Chapter Seven.
Law-by-decree 200 dedicated special space to an ambitious 
reform of the personnel in thirteen items which would 
later be specifically regulated (Articles 94 to 97). The 
model was a typical Weberian-type civil service; 
professional, trained, publicly selected, paid according 
to objective criteria, with good career prospect and
judged by disciplinary and ethical standards. In a word,
a rational bureaucracy.
The first signs of serious worries towards the rationali­
zation of federal educational organizations were from the 
early moments of the 1964 regime. The choice of the
Chancellor of the Federal University of Parand (UFPR),
Prof. F16vio Suplicy de Lacerda, as the first minister of 
education could have been influenced by UFPR's image of a 
"tidy university" to military eyes.'3-5* The Ministry of 
Education (MEC), however, did not produce effective
policies before late 1965, when an agreement with USAID
gave rise to intiatives of modernization of administration 
in federal universities.30 Even so, the first acts
changing some aspects of the academic organization of
99, Referring to Prof, Lacerda's administrative performance, Col, Mauro Rodrigues, who 
actively participated of the first military moves in power and later became M E C 's 
general secretary; remembers: "I always heard something about it when his name was 
mentioned1, (Interview with the author),
90, A declaration of an adviser from the University of Huston, Hr Rudolf Atcon, who 
made a survey of the administrative situation of Brazilian federal universities and 
then was put in charge of the MEC-USAID agreement, provoked a passionate controversy, 
He said that only three of Brazilian universities had- administrative conditions to 
operate, (The statement was quoted from newspapers by Deputy M, Horeira Alves in his 
pamphlet-styled: Q BeabS dos MEC-USAID, Rio, Bernasa, 1968, p. 35).
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universities (laws-by-decree 53, of 18/11/66 and 252, of 
28/2/67) were not implemented before the university reform 
in the second half of 1968.
A few months after the launch of the administrative reform 
the government showed in its general plans how far it took 
the rationalization in education:
"Consonant to the orientation of the Strategic Programme, the 
basic directive of the Brazilian educational policy will be
complying with the principles of planning, simplification of
bureaucratic procedures (desburocratizagSo)% decentralization, 
coordination of administrative activity, privatization of some 
special services and communitarian cooperation. "-*1
Due to historical reasons (Chapter One), the large number 
of federal education organizations linked to MEC, made it 
an important target for the central management of the 
reform (Administrative Reform Office, ERA, in MINIPLAN). 
Legal developments of Law-by-decree 200 were preceded by 
intensive doctrination, most mid and high ranked officials 
in universities, schools and the MEC's bodies attending
short courses on the basic concepts and administrative 
techniques. It was established that a certificate of
these courses would thereafter be required for access to 
managerial positions. One by one all administrative units 
of universities, schools and the central agencies and 
bodies of MEC had their organizational structure and 
positions as well as their manning tables, freshly 
established.
Rationalizing policies, however, had a quite wider scope 
than that of the administrative reform. A basic economic 
rationality guided the government policy. Dr JoSo Paulo
91, BRASIL/MINIPLAN, Diretrizes de 6ov6rno. Proqrana Estratiqico de PesenvQlvimento. 
J u 1ho, 1967, Cap,V, Sec?So I, p.95.
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dos R. Velloso, former IPEA's President and Minister of 
Planning, the most long-staying top government official 
<1964-78) begins its explanation of the government policy 
on education funding with these words:
"The administrative structure in the area of education was not 
prepared for a change to a modern educational sector. It was 
run by individuals with humanistic background, by teachers, the 
professionals of the area. They had little knowledge of
economic issues and modern planning techniques. This element
had to be brought into the system in order to have a better 
profit from invested resources. MS,:S
Furthermore, obtaining the best combination from the 
various elements of the educational process and not 
risking the possibility of surplus human resources from 
the educational system were priority issues. The latter 
turned out to be a key issue in the decisions on the
expansion of higher education (see Section 3.3. 1 and 
footnote 63 of Chapter Three). The former was expressed 
by the insistence of the reforms of university and of
secondary education in "the principle of avoiding the 
duplication of means for the same end" particularly in the 
case of similar subjects, specialized staff (teachers) and 
equipment in different academic units of the same or 
nearly placed universities and schools (Law 5692, of 
1 1 / 8 / 7 1 ,  Articles 2 and 3, and Law 5540, of 28/11/68, 
Article 1 1 ) .
The report of the task-force for the 1968 university 
reform — probably the most decisive fact for the 
development of the university system since the 1931 first 
Statut of the Brazilian Universities — is perfectly clear 
on the intentions of the project. So .it starts:
92, Interview with the author,
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"The decree which set up the Task-Force (D. 62937, of 2/7/68)
entrusted it the mission of ‘studying the reform of Brazilian 
university aiming its efficiency, modernization, administrative 
flexibility and formation of high-level human resources for the 
development of the country' . The terms of the decree are 
explicit enough and define a concrete and objective task. It is 
not a question, therefore, of formulating a diagnosis of the 
current university crisis or even drawing the guidelines of a 
reform but bring up a collection of realistic solutions and 
operational measures to rationalize the organization of 
university activities and give them greater efficiency and 
productivity. "33
The most striking feature of the regime's administrative 
strategy was the emphasis on planning. Planning — a 
comprehensive, economic and social planning — appeared as 
an expression of strength and will of the new political 
power. Combined with the practice of power, planning was 
believed to bring efficacy and ultimately political 
legitimacy. Close to order and rationality, planning was 
among the values of the military culture. Rationally, the 
economic and social planning was entrusted by them to 
civilians — government technicians, not politicians, since 
the political control had to be retained. Planning, 
therefore, conferred authority on emerging
technobureaucrats and implied the control of financial 
means, giving planners a feeling of their possession. 
Planners, spoke a special, sometimes esoteric language and 
shared the glamour of modernity. Planning appeared as a 
value in itself, and, for all these reasons, working in a 
planning body was a symbol of superior bureaucratic status 
which meant privileged salary conditions and often
93. BRASIL/MEC, Relat6rio do Grupo de Trabalho para a Reforms Universit&ria. Brasilia, 
agdsto 1968, p. 15.
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determined the top position of this body or the 
verticality of the relationship within bureaucracy.
This political meaning of planning is crucial in
understanding the context of policies and relations in
which education funding was dealt with inasmuch as
planning was actually identified with economic planning, 
the prevailing approach to the issue.
Following the creation of the Ministry of Planning in 
1964, the administrative reform attributed to it three 
more important functions: provision of statistical
information, budgeting and "administrative modernization" 
(improvement of management and organization of the federal 
bureaucracy), taking the last two from DASP whose area was 
restricted to personnel administration. Planning was seen 
as a macro-function in the government stucture and was 
organized as a "system" in itself. General secretariats 
were thereupon created in 1967 in each ministry as sector 
planning bodies, in charge of financial and budgetary 
matters, Chiefly, the general secretary was the second 
constituted authority in the ministry, replacing the 
minister in his absence or incapacity. This change 
brought about conflicts in MEC, where the role was 
performed by the minister's Chief of Office and the head 
of the National Education Department (DNE).3'*
94, The M i n i s t e r1 s Chief of Office was number 2 in NEC and the position had gained 
prestige since it was held during the long tenure of Minister Gustavo Capanema (1934- 
45) by one of the most eminent figures of Brazilian literature, the poet Carlos 
Drummond de Andrade, Even at the end of 1967 (so after the Law-by-decree 200) the 
minister's Chief of Office, Mr Favorino B, M6rcio temporarily replaced Minister Tarso 
Dutra, In such circumstances, the competition for power always came to light, The 
first M E C 1s general secretary, Mr Edson Franco (who came from a MINIPLAN body, 
incidently), had difficulty in fully exerting his function as his rival's position, 
head of ONE, had not been abolished, Even in 1969-71, the group close to
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The "planning system" has never ceased expanding. In 1968 
it increased internally: EPEA (therafter IPEA, Institute
of Applied Economic Research, headed by the general 
secretary of MINIPLAN on behalf of the minister) unfolded 
into two other institutes: the Institute of Planning
(IPLAN) and Institute of the Budget (INOR), each one with 
several internal units, CNRH being the one in charge of 
the education planning and even, initially, budgeting.
EPEA (IPEA) was institued as a foundation. As such, it 
did not belong to the federal system of personnel
administration, under DASP jurisdiction, and so it was 
immune to normal staffing restrictions and salary 
constraints in force for all civil servants. In 1972 the 
planning system was reinforced externally (Decree 71353, 
of 9/11/72) beyond the federal government to establish 
organizational links with similar bodies in the states 
and municipios, particularly for the control of the
voluminous financial transfers, constitutionally due to 
them. In 1974, in a major structural change (Law 6036, of 
1/5/74, Arts. 6 to 8), the Ministry of Planning, taking 
IPEA with it, was raised above other ministries and made 
an integral part of the Presidency of the Republic as 
Secretariat of Planning (SEPLAN), whose "Chief-Minister" 
had daily meetings with the President, sharing the same 
building. There are unexplained circunstances in this 
organizational arrangement to reinforce the planning 
body.
94, (cont,) the minister's Office did not get on well with the new general secretary, 
A position of "secretary of administrative support" was created (1971) in parallel to 
the general secretary, (Information by Mrs Ecilda Ramos, who was a high-positioned 
official of ONE and later head of the National Fund for the Development of Education 
(FNDE); interview with the author,
95, The procedures in which the reform of MINIPLAN1 s took place were the legally 
deficient, In the last weeks of the Medici's government MINIPLAN had been
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A move of centralization followed the expansion of 
planning bodies. An increasing share of the federal 
budget was directly assigned to MINIPLAN (SEPLAN). In
1979, these trends peaked to tackle the government's
financial crisis. Then, the para-governmental system of 
state-owned companies and foundations — until then under 
supervision of sector ministries — was put under SEPLAN's 
direct control, a Secretariat for the Control of State 
Companies (SEST/SEPLAN) being created, and two other 
important functions were moved from the Ministry of
Finance to SEPLAN: the control of all expenditure
throughout the entire federal government structure, and 
the control of prices in the whole economy.
The overwhelming influence of the "planning philosophy" 
was not only exerted by the planning system and its al­
mighty central body. It passed on down through all
technical bodies and autonomous agencies, including those
95. (cont.) reestructured (Decree 73627, of 13/2/74), Only the general functions and 
position of SEPLAN were defined by the reforming Law 6036/74, two months later. The 
internal structure of SEPLAN was never established by law or decree, as required, in 
spite of the considerable administrative implications for the legal competence of the 
several authorities in the new body and their special salary condition (see note 200, 
page 260, of; Senado Federal/Subsecretaria de Edi$8es T6cnicas, Reforma Administrative 
- Organiza^go da Adm in i s t r a t e Direta. 4 ed., Brasilia, 1984, This odd legal 
circunstances could be related to the tricky way in which the bodies of IPEA (a 
foundation) accompanied the change of MINIPLAN into SEPLAN, Their units and staff 
turned out to work under the formal cover of some SEPLAN's "secretariats", which were 
created in correspondence to IPEA's internal structure, so that the special foundation 
status (and therefore salaries) could be preserved; in this way, there was a 
Secretariat of the Budget (SOF/SEPLAN), headed by the Superintendent of INOR and fully 
staffed by INOR1s personnel, A section of SOF/SEPLAN dealt specifically with budgetary 
and financial matters of MEC, and MEC's own Coordinatory (later Secretariat) of Budget 
and Finance (C0DE0R/S6, later SQF/SGl in MEC's General Secretariat (SG/MEC) reported to 
this unit,
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of MEC, reproducing the same standards of administrative 
behaviour on a different scale. On the other hand, the 
official line encouraged the introduction of new planning- 
related administrative techniques in MEC, among which the 
"administration through projects" (already induced by the 
1967 and 1968 plans) and the "administration on 
objectives".
A consequence of the position of planning in the govern­
ment's administrative strategy was the direct interference 
of CNRH and later SOF/SEPLAN with the allocation of funds 
to particular education programmes, universities and MEC's 
agencies, replacing the ministry's specific competence. 
Officials of these MINIPLAN (SEPLAN) bodies often 
discussed the details of the programme-budget of 
individual universities, making final decisions on them. 37
The political importance of the rational approach in the 
allocation of finance caused one of the most radical 
decisions of the 1964 regime, when the constitutional 
competence of the Congress in this matter was virtually 
suppressed. Moreover, the concept of planning gave birth 
to the principle of the "universal and free budget", 
attachments of revenues to particular programmes, 
including education, being abolished and forbidden. These 
issues will be studied in sections 5. 1 and 5.2.
The major instrument of planning for the achievement of
96, In an interview with the author Col, Mauro Rodrigues, MEC's general secretary 
(1969-71) recounted the enthusiastic indoctrination he fostered in MEC's central bodies 
for the re-structuring of services on the basis of the "administration on objectives", 
Between 1970 and 1979 priority policies gave rise to independently administrated 
projects,
97, Information given the authorx  by Mr A r U n d o  Correa, head of CNRH, and other 
officials of MEC's S0F/S6, including the head of this body, Mrs Odete Lapa,
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targets was undoubtedly the technique of the programme- 
budget, developed in the USA in a sophisticated and 
integrated scheme called "Planning, Programming, Budgeting 
System (PPBS)". Brazil did not take it so far but, since 
the early sixties, and specially after the reform of the 
public financial system (Law 4320, of 17/3/64), planning 
bodies took upon themselves the task of superseding the 
"old roll of revenues and expenditure", simply classified 
from its nature in which the budget had been traditionally 
moulded. The 1967 administrative reform stressed the 
programme-budget as the definitive way to establish the 
crucial link between plans and allocation of funds (Law- 
by-decree 200, of 25/2/67, Articles 16-18). All
governmental annual and pluriannual programmes of 
permanent services or temporary projects were to have 
their aims and targets financially expressed. Indeed, the 
effectiveness of policies and the credibility of the 
planning rested on the programme-budget. Most officials 
working in the area were intensively trained and some were 
selected for special mid- and long-duration courses in 
foreign centres (USA and CEPAL, Chile). In MEC, where the 
budget was broken up in almost a hundred units, scattered 
all over the country, this was certainly the area in which 
modernizing efforts were more intensive.
2. 5. CONCLUSIONS
From the early sixties to the late seventies, education 
was predominantly conceived in the official policy as a 
capital investment in human resources, an infra-structure 
of economic development.
In Brazil the economic approach to education had a 
markedly external influence — particularly through
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"technical assistance" to government planning bodies. 
However, its effective introduction in the government 
policies was actually due to the fact that, from 1966, it 
met a strong, ambitious political project of fast economic 
development by the military which was entrusted to an 
elite of civil technicians, most of them with a background 
in economics.
The authoritarian feature of the regime was also decisive 
for the implementation of the new approach in a short 
period in the cultural context of the education 
organizations, particularly the Ministry of Education and 
Culture and its Federal Education Council, following the 
liberal stance of the recently passed Law of Directives 
and Bases of Education which really pointed to another, 
humanistic direction.
The concept of education as an economically valuable 
investment formed a common basis on which conflicting 
groups compromised and settled. Economic and educational 
targets met, and humanists were able to trust economists 
because these had direct concerns about education!
As far as the investment in federal organizations was 
concerned —  particularly universities — the prevailing 
stance was that the country needed to spend well. Without 
rationalizing expenditure through planning, control and 
modern administration principles it was not possible to 
increase investments, as desired. The blame for the 
regrettable situation of education should firstly be 
placed on the irrationality of the investment.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE MILITARY AND EDUCATION: AN INCIDENTAL INVOLVEMENT
This chapter is a research into the attitudes and direct 
involvements of the military with education. Seldom does 
the issue of education funding come to light, but the 
stance is that, given the political circumstances at the 
time, the decision-making process in the bureaucracy 
closely followed "the direction of the winds" on the 
military area. The views of the military on education in 
general or the importance attributed by them to particular 
educational programmes would be a ponderable reason for a 
careful consideration by the budgetary authorities. This 
approach expresses the author's convictions on the 
decisive role of the political factor in the allocation of 
finance in technical bureaucracy and the fact that the 
issue of education funding is largely that of the 
political significance of education.
3. 1. MARKS OF ORIGIN: THE STANDPOINT OF STATE SECURITY
Looking at society from the professional point of view of 
security, the Brazilian military of the 1964's regime had 
their idea of education indelibly marked by some 
activities of students and teachers which could generate 
political action. The more internal security became the 
focus of attention 1 the more such idea was reinforced.
1, This tendency corresponds to Stepan's "new professionalism", as discribed in: The
New Professionalism of Internal Welfare and Military Role Expansion. In Stepan, A, 
(org) Authoritarian Brazil. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1973, pp.47-58,
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To them, student tended to be rebels or troublesome 
people and teachers tended to preach new or destabilizing 
ideas, mostly from abroad. So, education was the area 
which always presented "problems", finally requiring 
intervention of force. For the same reasons, education 
was identified with higher education. This is the level 
of education whose members had an active presence in 
movements of the political scene. Moreover, they adopted 
the role of the progressive, innovating section of 
society. The first eight or ten years of the regime were 
deeply marked by repression. Such marks were passed on, 
inhibiting further attempts at involvement.
3. 1. 1. Ant ecedent s
A picture of the antecedents of the miliary's disputatious 
interactions with students and teachers could help the 
understanding of the extent of military government 
repression from 1964.
Goulart's government found an active pole of support for 
its "mass politics" and in particular for its basic 
reforms in the universities. Besides a general
participation in politics, including mass demonstrations, 
students and teachers used their institutional resources 
to act in and out of universities, through the press or 
the promotion of cultural programmes in public places, 
poor or rural areas. The organization and mobilization of 
students through the National. Student Union (UNE), was the 
main institutional vehicle of aggressive activities, and, 
consequently, they attracted the - most intransigent 
policies of repression.
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UNE had its origin in 1937 in a government-aided, philan- 
thopic society for sheltering and assisting students of 
all levels, the Casa do Estudante do Brasil.- It broke 
away in 1938, and defined itself as an association for the 
participation of students in the political life of the 
country, following a century-old tradition of struggles 
for civil rights and political freedom, including the 
independence from Portugal, the abolition of slavery and 
the formation of the republic.
UNE is integrated with state or local student associations 
but always keeps its direct line of communication with the 
student in the school. Apart from its annual, nationwide 
congress to decide on policies, strategies and ruling 
committee, UNE's activities have been specific campaigns 
on political current affairs. Only from 1960 to 1964 were 
cultural activities undertaken. UNE has been financialy 
supported by student contributions, government (except for 
the period 1964-1984) and funds from other bodies. As 
early as 1939 UNE was restricted to higher education 
students. Later, secondary school students created their 
own national association, the Brazilian Union of Secondary 
Students-UBES, mostly following UNE's lead.
After its banishment in 1947, the communist party turned 
to UNE, took it over between 1948 and 1950 and since then
2, Original information about UNE or facts connected with its activities are the 
reports and other documents of its annual congresses, During special demonstrations, 
the newspapers of Rio de Janeiro, mainly Di&rio de Noticias and Correio da ManhS, are 
detailed sources, For the period 1962-64 see also Cadernos da UNE (series), Editora 
Universitiria, Rio de Janeiro, Books, in a free chronicle style, were written by former 
members of UNE; covering the period before 1968: PoernerK. A, J, Q Poder Jovem. Histbria 
da par tic ipaggo politica dos estudantes brasileiros. Rio, CivilizagSo Brasileira, 1968; 
for the period 1968 to 1978: Gonsalves, T, & Romagnoli, L, H. A Volta da UNE - De 
IbiCina a Salvador. S, Paulo, Alfa-Omega, 1979,
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has always had a part in UNE* s internal groups. Liberals 
prevailed from 1951 to 1955 and left-wing groups have been 
in control of the organization since then. All through 
the 1960's the Popular Action <AP), a dissident, marxist 
branch of the Catholic University Youth-JUC, had its
members in ruling positions in UNE, The body was legally 
abolished in June of 1964 but the organization managed to 
survive, although it had periods of virtual paralysis. 
This happened, for example, in mid-1965, after a split-up 
into two wings over the issue of participation in the
elections of the new government-created bodies for student 
representation: to participate (communists) or not (some
radical dissidents of the Communist Party, and the AP). 
The "no"s prevailed, but the division weakened the 
movement. UNE found new grounds for action during the
violent repressions from late 1966 onwards and in the 
particularly troubled year of 1968. Then, with the arrest 
of 719 students, mostly leaders, at UNE*s congress in 
Ibiuna (October 1968), S. Paulo, activities were 
drastically reduced. 3
UNE managed to assume the role of a vanguard opposition
political movement and aggressively created its place in 
the political scene of the country, always playing on the 
full-time availability of their members, mostly idealist 
middle or upper— class youth. Until 1945 UNE had memorable 
campaigns against nazism and its Brazilian admirers, and
3, After 1968 many militants of UNE shifted their field of activity to armed 
underground groups or left the country, although the body had not been extinguished. 
6y 1978 onwards, a tendency had consolidated for the explicit affiliation of militant 
students to political parties (even when they were not yet legalized), in which 
students have been assigned relevant functions, Groups are clearly identified in 
school life by these affiliations which weakens the image of UNE itself, On the other 
hand, as political parties began exercizing their mediative function, demonstrations 
and other pressure actions have been pursued in their own names,
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for the entry of Brazil in World War II. It supported the 
nationalist campaign for oil and from the mid-fifties its 
discourse and campaigns were strongly marked by anti- 
American nationalism or anti-capitalism. Between 1960 and 
1964 UNE held four nationwide seminars on university 
reform which gave room for the discussion of the broader 
topic of the role of the university in the envisaged 
Brazilian people's revolution. UNE tried to set uplinks 
with labour and lower levels of the population. They 
organized a nationwide strike of buses in May 1956, 
followed by a common society against rising prices. This 
aim of penetrating the poorer social classes moved UNE, 
together with young or progressive artists and intellec­
tuals, to the creation of the People's Culture Centres 
(CPC's). CPC's travelled over the country with "street 
theatres," initiated the production and exhibition of 
films, and then put out some adult literacy courses, using 
a literacy primer produced by the Basic Education Movement 
(MEB).*
Other activities of UNE in the early sixties also
attracted the attention of the right-wing or anti­
communist groups and the Army. Leaving its early
affiliation to Confederation Internationale des £tudiants 
(Brussels), UNE joined the Student International Union
(Praga), ±n< 1949; they stood together for most of the 
following period, which brought UNE into a clash with the 
right-wing Cardinal J. C&mara, of Rio de Janeiro. UNE
visited China in 1952, Cuba in 1959, and Moscow in 1960, 
receiving some scholarships from Russia. Public
demonstrations were held in 1960 and 1961 in support of 
Cuba and against dictatorships in Portugal and Spain. UNE 
joined Leonel Brizola in his "Legality. Campaign" to
4, On the CPC's end MEB (later referred) see Paiva, V, P, E d u c a ^ o  Popular e E d u c a t e  
de ftdultOL, Contflbuiclo ta E atudfldil duucacltt Bm ilftiri, S, Paulo, Loyola, 1973,
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support Goulart' s rise to power in 1961. "A significant 
section of the university sector was committed to 
Brizola's armed fight". s Finally, four large student 
unions <UNE, UME, UBES, AMES) helped the organization of 
the big demonstration in Rio de Janeiro on the 13th of May 
of 1964, one of the last straws in encouraging the 
military intervention... After a frustrated attempt at 
armed resistance in the National Faculty of Philosophy, by 
April the 1st, UNE*s headquarters in Praia do Flamengo, 
Rio, were stormed, sacked and set on fire.
In 1960, a People's Culture Movement (MCP) was created in 
Recife, capital of the noth-eastern state of Pernambuco, 
under the Administration of the left-wing mayor Miguel 
Arraes, later elected governor of Pernambuco and deposed 
by the 1964 coup. MCP, despite its short, five year life, 
had a strong influence among young, progressive artists 
and intellectuals and would have repercussions for the two 
following decades. Its aim was " conscientizagao", a rise 
of the political awareness of the masses through the 
language of the arts and literacy. The leit motiv was 
that poor, ordinary people were to believe in their own 
value and strength and struggle for a better standard of 
living. Popular artists were gathered together,
stimulated to produce work using themes from their 
cultural roots and to become involved in a climate of 
concern over social problems. The first-reader book of 
MEB was adopted by the CPCs of UNE.
Almost parallel to MCP, another movement arose 
specifically directed towards literacy programmes, the 
Movement for Basic Education (MEB). Actually, MEB was 
created in early 1961 by the National Council of Brazilian
5, Poerner, J, A, Q Poder Jovem. HistOria da p ar t ic i p a t e  polltica dos estudantes 
brasileiroa, Op, Cit., p, 210,
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Bishops (CNBB) of the Roman Catholic Church, as a radio 
broadcast programme for rural areas of north-eastern 
Brazil. From broad conceptions of man and the process of 
his socialization and participation in social changes, the 
sociologist Prof. Paulo Freire developed a literacy method 
in MEB based on his previous experience in MCP which was 
eventually known and applied in several other developing 
countries of Latin-America. ^  Paulo Freire' s method was 
rapidly accepted and MEB was officialy adopted within the 
year by the federal government through the Ministry of 
Education and Culture (MEC) . Secondary and university
students largely acted in MEB and often used it as a means 
to approach the lower classes and there be in a position 
to preach their ideological convictions. MEB was consi­
dered subversive by the right-wing supporters of the coup 
of 1964. The government stopped official support for the 
institution which was reformulated by having some leaders 
changed by ecclesiastic authorities and its activities 
drastically reduced. Paulo Freire himself had to leave 
the country and their books were placed on a banned list.
The military were attentive to student and teacher 
activities and, from 1964 they extended their information- 
gathering and repressive activities to CPC's, MCP and MEB 
(®), to the extent that the Goulart government had looked 
for the support of these movements for his so-called
6, For a substantial study of MEB and the applications of the "Paulo Freire Method", 
see Manfredi, S. M, Politica e Educa^So Popular (Experidncias de Alfabetiza?3o no 
Brasil com o M6todo Paulo Freire, 1960-1964), 2 ed, S, Paulo, Cdrtez, 1981,
7, The National Programme of Literacy, created by Dec, 50370, of 21/3/61, Article 1 
of the decree institued "the National Programme of Literacy using the Paulo Freire 
System", The radio broadcast classes of CNBB in the north-east were also made official 
by MEC's regulation iPortaria 4-BR, of 26/9/61),
8, See Ministry of the Army, Q Comunismo no Brasil. Inqu6rito Policial-Mi1itar n2 
709, vol.3, Rio, Biblioteca do Ex6rcito Ed,, 1967, pp, 565-584,
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"mass politics".
A general climate of disorder and maladministration in 
federal universities was commonly admitted in the early
sixties,'3 UNE secured the support of left-wing members 
of the parliament close to Goulart and exerted a direct
influence on MEC itself and its funds. 10 In 1963/64 UNE's 
freedom from restraint irritated those who remained
concerned about the evolution of political events. The 
premises of MEC in Rio de Janeiro - it only began to move 
to Brasilia in 1967 - were occupied by UNE for several 
weeks of February and March 1964. Civil servants
complained of the damage and dirt left by the students.11
3. 1, 2. Features of the earlv repression
9, The declaration by Goulart's progressive minister of education, the well known 
anthopologist Darcy Ribeiro, briefed by students and the press in Curitiba, Parana, 
1963, is a good indicator of this situation, Asked to remove the conservative, 
chancellor of the University of Parani, Prof, F, Suplicy de Lacerda, a firm opponent of 
UNE, he said; "He cannot be sacked , He is one of the few chancellors who administer 
their universities, among this mess of Brazilian universities,1 (M r . Divonzir A, 6usso, 
then present at the meeting, Interview with the author),
10, UNE was then normally funded by MEC. In February of 1964, the minister of 
education JCilio F. Sambaqui was forced to change the legal destination of budgetary 
appropriations of the National Department of Education (DNE) to a training programme 
for unqualified teachers of primary education (PAflP) and divert the funds to UNE, (firs 
Ecilda R, de Souza, who was assistant of the head of DNE, Interview with the author), 
In another example of that, on the 10th of March of 1964 Goulart approved a budgetary 
supplement of nearly Cr$ 2,0 thousand million for the University of Rio de Janeiro to 
simply double its places, agreeing with a claim of UNE for Rio's candidates to the 
university,
11, Interview with firs Souza, expressing the feelings of civil servants of MEC.
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These antecedents can help to understand the particular 
way in which the military approached the world of 
education. The military's answer to them essentially 
involved the cooperation of an auxiliary line of civilians 
representing a variety of trends from the "status quo", 
from the old groupings of semi-fascist thought and the 
right-wing press to a majority who, above all, wanted the 
restoration of order in schools and students to apply 
themselves to study. The repression could be said to have 
been aimed at two main targets: first, a "shock treatment"
against riots and extremism, to intimidate a supposed 
majority of "bona fide" students who were just influenced 
by radical leaders; second, a demobilization of student 
militant organizations involved in political matters.
This section features three main points which could make 
clear the early repressive policy and the "marks of 
origin": the choice of ministers of education, the new
legislation on student organizations, and the exemplary 
treatment of the University of Brasilia <UnB>.
Gen. Castello Branco had the clear intention of leaving 
the Ministry of Education to a civilian, and he resisted 
requests by the military to intervene directly in 
universities to change the rules of appointment of 
chancellors by the government and the internal structure 
of power within the universities, 1:2 The choice of the 
chancellor of the University of Parang, Prof. Fl£vio 
Suplicy de Lacerda, was actually due to his nationally 
known profile of a teacher with a very definite, firm 
position against student involvement in politics,
12, Interview with Gen, Bina Machado, who was one of the officers close to Castello in 
the high-level military education system, Sections 3,3,2, and 3,4,2,, will refer to 
Gen, Bina Machado's important role ir> that area,
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particularly UNE's proposals for a university reform. The 
University of Parana enjoyed a reputation of an orderly 
and well administered university. Suplicy's image of a 
right-wing leader among his peers and military supporters 
(13) was proved during the twenty months he remained as 
minister. 1*'■ However, there are indications that this 
reason was rather the legitimization of Prof. Suplicy for 
the position. Final reasons for the choice could have 
been the close relationship of Castello and Gen. Ernesto 
Geisel (who had served with the army in Parang) with Mr. 
Ney Braga, former militaryman and governor of Parang, who 
might have suggested Suplicy's name. Ney Braga was
himself sounded out to be the minister of education but 
preferred the Ministry of Agriculture. 1® Suplicy gave a 
clue as to what his attitude to university movements would 
be as early as in his short speech of taking office: "And
now," he concluded, "let us finish chatting: students get
studying and teachers get teaching". 1 *=• He was hard in his 
dealings with other chancellors to implement the new law 
in the Universities (following paragraph) and did not 
spare harder words for students in public, 17
13, "He was a chancellor, say, possibly very accessible to some atitudes of control 
from the military area (,,,,) a bit of 'a scout1,,," (Gen, Golbery do Couto e Silva, 
interview with the. author),
14, The early end of Suplicy's tenure is attributed to some lack of political skill, 
raising pressure from some sectors of the government against him because of his very 
bad image with the public, but several well informed people said that his leavig was 
directly connected to a mental illness he was said to have suffered a short time later,
15, Interview with Mr Edson Machado who is Paran4-born and reported this information 
from his close friend Prof. David Carneiro Junior, nephew and assistant of Minister 
Suplicy,
16, Interview with Mrs Ecilda Ramos de Souza, senior official of MEC, The phrase was 
often repeated by the press as a good synthesis of the policy of the new government,
17, Some samples from a newspaper of Rio de Janeiro: "I found universities dominated 
by trouble-makers, and little robbers turned into leaders (,,,) colonies of viruses
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Law 4464, of 9/11/64, brought the first legal instrument
of the policy of student demobilization. Individual votes 
for unions in university units, the traditional Diret6rios 
AcadSmicos (DA) (for each school) or Diret6rio Central dos 
Estudantes (DCE) (for each university) were to be
obligatory. Any demonstration for the purpose of strikes
or political propaganda was prohibited to student 
representative bodies. A national organization, the
Diret 6rio Nacional dos Estudantes (DNE) was created - 
evidently to replace the newly abolished UNE - as well as 
similar bodies at state level, the Diret6rios Estaduais 
dos Estudantes (DEE* s), The structure of student
representation bodies kept some links with governmental 
education authorities. UNE gained the greatest political 
advantage from Suplicy’s law, organizing a nationwide 
campaign against it. 92. 5% of the voters in an opinion 
poll which UNE held among students, were against the law. 
The leadership of the organization, however, found itself 
divided at UNE's congress of 1965, as previously 
mentioned. UNE survived through parallel, independent
organizations called "free unions" (DA*s Livres and DCE* s 
Livres') t developing active, radical minorities, despite 
large sections of old and new students becoming 
indifferent and absent from university life. The idea of 
the "free unions" was appealing. DA* s and DCE*s livres 
were set up in many schools and UNE'S 1966 congress (July) 
was attended by 313 of the 450 higher education schools or 
universities. The following September was a month
particularly marked by violent conflicts between students 
and the police 1 *\
17, (cont,) anong students, Menacing the future of a whole nation" (Diirio de Noticias, 
13/8/65); and sose days later, \,.scorpions!" (Dttrio de Notic ias, 20/8/65),
18, Impressive reports of events in the U N E 1s headquarters, in Rio de Janeiro, can be 
found in the newspaper Correio da ManhJ, editions of 15, 16 and 23/9/1966,
- 162 -
Meanwhile, Suplicy stepped down (10/1/1966). After a 
colourless six-month tenure by Mr Pedro Aleixo, he was 
substituted by his Director of Higher Education, Prof. 
Raymundo Moniz de AragSo, who was selected either for his 
recognized personal competence among chancellors (he was 
himself chancellor of University of Rio de Janeiro) or for 
his brother's prestige among the high-ranking military 
(Gen. Augusto Cesar Muniz de AragSo, then commandant of 
the most important unit of the 1st Army, the Division of 
Artillery of Villa-Militar, in Rio de Janeiro). 
Ideologically conservative, trusted by the regime, 
Minister AragSo tackled the problem through the stuctural 
reform of the universities (Law-by-decrees 53, of 
18/11/66, and 252, of 28/2/67), but the hardening of the 
military government after its intervention in the 
parliament in October 1966, induced him to revise the 
regulations on the organization of students. Thus,
following the newly passed Institutional Act n. 4, of 
7/12/66, Law-by-decree 228, of 28/2/67, went further than 
Law 4464. It clearly set up its objectives: to prevent
the infiltration of political agents from outside the 
student milieu and the manipulation of student by 
agitating minorities (Art. 6), and to draw up the limits 
and the modes of action of DA'S and DCE's (Art. 1 to 4). 
The new law suppressed previous student representative 
bodies at national and state levels, reduced the mandates 
of presidents of the DA's and DCE's to one year, without 
recourse to a second mandate. Principals and chancellors 
were made directly responsible for compliance with the law 
and the imposition of penalties in their area of 
competence.
Minister AragSo left the government with Castello Branco 
in March of 1967 without achieving success, and his 
policies were discontinued. The banner of the excess 
candidates for the limited vacancies at the university,
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waving democratic appeals and counting on the close 
involvement of President Costa e Silva's wife <13), 
nourished massive student mobilization during 1967 and 
1968. The watchword, "freedom", sounded everywhere in 
slogans and songs to be repeated in meetings and 
demonstrations. Other popular claims to the government 
were added: lower prices or free meals in university
restaurants, more finance for education, lower fees in 
private schools. UNE, then a clandestine organization, 
found new grounds to expand its influence.
1968 was a year strongly marked by student unrest 
throughout the West. Taking the existence of
international political links between student movements 
for granted characteristics of this social
phenomenon abroad probably rather stimulated worries and 
aims of control in the Brazilian government, than boosted 
special student political activities during that year.
A student movement affecting ten or twelve state capitals 
was part of a wider political setting for the 
radicalization of opposition groups, including the rise of 
urban and rural violence. Students were well organized - 
their leaders visiting each other's local activities - and 
came to feel the taste of a looming debacle for the
19, The subject* narking sone important decisions on education natters, well recalled 
in Section-3,3.1,
20, Sone years later, in a session of the Federal Senate on 4/8/76, Senator Benedito 
Ferreira of the governnent party, ARENA, reported that he had in his hands "from a 
qualified person" a nap fron France, "a sort of flow diagramme", on how a movement 
called "sweetheart" ( "Namorada") could be transplanted to Brazil, Senador Jarbas 
Passarinho, Q Decreto-lei 477: o Hi to e a Realidade. Brasilia, Senado Federal, 1976, 
p . 14,
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regime. --1 They believed themselves to be the vanguard of 
the people's reaction against the dictatorship, able to 
expose themselves and precipitate mass mobilization. Some 
events of the student movement during 1968 are mentioned 
later (Section 3. 3. 2. ), As far as the government policy 
of demobilization was concerned, a new "wave" had actually 
arrived in early 1969, following the drastic political 
changes of December 1968 which marked a new cycle in the 
evolution of the military regime (see Section 2. 1. 1>.
The Law-by-decree 477, of 26/2/69 "was a corollary of the 
Institutional Act 5" as its predecessor Law-by-
decree 228 had flowed from the Institutional Act 4. 
Actually, it did not originate from MEC but was then 
regulated by this ministry (Port aria MEC 149-A, of
28/3/69). The "477 decree", reaching not only students
but also teachers and any employees of educational
institutions from then on became the major symbol of the 
repressive features of the regime regarding education and 
stood as such until 1979. It deals with the disciplinary 
action within university limits. Offences were specified 
to prevent any kind of activity with political implica­
tions. Penalties were banishment from university (or 
school) for 3 to 5 years (so the punished student would be 
definitely detached from his school group). The
prosecution was to be carried out in the university itself 
within 20 days and the authority (chancellor or principal) 
had then to decide on the liability within 48 hours, or
21, The author expresses here his own experience, He participated intensively in 
student activities in Recife, as president of a DA at the Catholic University of 
Pernambuco throughout the year of 1968,
22, Expression by Senator Jarbas Gonsalves Passarinho, Minister of Education and 
Culture (1970*74), who was then Minister of Labour and thereby a menber of the National 
Security Council (Interview with the author),
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the delay itself would incur penalties. It removed the 
right of appeal at the level of the punishing authority 
but, in the case of acquittal, the university authority 
had to submi t its decision to the scrutiny of the minister 
of education. Acts punished by "decree 477" remained
liable to prosecution by civil or military courts. The 
decisive involvement of university authorities was the 
most effective and new element of this law. After this, a 
polarization in the internal contention for positions in 
university bodies occurred: candidates had to be prepared
for a considerable degree of submission to the federal 
government as well as some isolation from the university 
community. Official source reckoned the number of 
punishments by "decree 477" at 263, from which 215 in 1969 
and 48 between 1970 and 1974; since then the law-by-decree 
was not used any more. -z:3 It must be remarked, however, 
that most facts of the repression against students and 
teachers, including kidnappings, depredation of private 
property and torture occurred within the ordinary activity 
of the police and the bodies of the security system <C0DI, 
through the DOI's, of the regional unities of the Army).
The physical, coercive presence of troops in university 
premises had intensive repercussions on the few occasions 
it occurred. From a long tradition, rooted in the
European concept of university autonomy, university 
premises’ were considered a sort of "sacrosanct ground". 
TheFe, academic freedom would be saved. The University of
23, MEC, Educargo em debate. (Prounciamento do Ministro da Educa?3o e Cultura, Jarbas 
Gonsalves Passarinho na reuniSo conjunta das ComissSes de Educa$3o e Cultura do Senado 
Federal e da CSmara dos Deputados em 25/10/73), Brasilia, 1973, p ,57; This source 
must be completed by later corrections of the minister himself, referring to more 
recent data from the Division of Security and Information (DSI) of MEC; Senador Jarbas 
Passarinho, Q Decreto-lei 477: o Mito e a Realidade. Discuso pronunciado na SessSo do 
dia 4/8/76, Brasilia, Senado Federal, 1976, p,23,
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Brasilia (UnB), in particular, was born under the spell of 
the freedom for thinking of new directions for the
country. An elite of liberal intellectuals, adapting the
German model of a university to some ideas of the so-
called "New School" <Dewey> and initially successful 
Brazilian experiences of the thirties (University of S. 
Paulo and University of Distrito Federal), in the late 
fifties had launched the idea of a new university in the 
newly built capital of the country. Presented as a 
flexible organization, endowed with a large land patrimony 
in the urban area of the capital, and gathering many 
renowned professionals and scientists, even from abroad, 
the University of Brasilia attracted intense interest.2’3 
It aimed to be a pluralistic "stimulus-university" 
replacing the old "reflex-university"
The mythical space of the University of Brasilia was
"profaned" when it was invaded in the first days of April 
1964, by 400 police. 11 teachers and many students were 
arrested. Soon afterwards, the Minister of Justice, who 
assumed the education portfolio for the first fortnight of 
the new government, decreed the intervention in the 
university (.Fort aria 224, of 14/4/64). The chancellor, 
Prof. Almir de Castro, and the board of directors were
23, The original project of the UnB can be seen in: UnB, Plano Qrientador da 
Universidade de Brasilia. Brasilia, Editora Universidade de Brasilia, 1962,
24, Two books on the uthpia of a university for a developing Latin American country 
and the experience of UnB, have exalted its originality and helped to prolong a sort of 
myth about it, They were printed in Brazil some years after being written outside the 
country by one of UnB's founders, the anthropologist Darcy Ribeiro who was also 
minister of education for a short period in the first year after the university was 
created (1961): Ribeiro, D, A Universidade Necess&ria. -Rio, Paz e Terra, 1969, Idem, 
UnB: i n v e n ^ o  e descaminho. Rio, Avenir, 1978, The concept of "stimulus-university" x 
'reflex-university" can be found in the first of these works, pp,9-12,
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expelled. During the following strongly contested purge, 
a deep crisis disturbed the activities of the university 
which had not actually had its Directive Plan fully
brought about a strong reaction in the university 
community. The new chancellor, Prof. Zeferino Vaz, vainly 
asked the Ministry of Education to leave investigations 
and dismissals to the discretion of the university itself. 
He left the university to create a flourishing university 
in Campinas, S. Paulo. The teachers in charge of courses 
applied for discharge, student held strikes, some eminent 
founders moved to other universities abroad. President 
Castello Branco was booed before the diplomatic corps when 
he came to the university to give the solemn inaugural 
lecture of the academic year of 1965. In a new invasion, 
on 10/10/65, scenes of violence occurred as the police 
stormed classes and other premises to make arrests. For 
several days the police occupied the campus and controlled 
its entrances. 200 teachers resigned en masse in protest 
against the dismissal of 12 of their fellows. After some 
years, UnB was recomposed but not in its previous academic 
and political climate.
From 1968 a vice-chancellor, then chancellor, Prof, Jos6 
Carlos Azev6do, who was a naval captain with links to the 
government information system, rebuilt UnB's organization, 
developed its campus, expanded its courses and external 
activities, relying on the full support of the federal 
government, and controlled internal politics and the 
trends among the staff with an iron fist. Azevedo only 
left the chancellorship in 1985.
This complete change of image was not achieved without 
resistance. In August 1968, at the peak of nationwide
student demonstrations, UnB was invaded for the third time
with a display of ^---; military force, repeating the
implemented. Successive cases of dismissal of teachers
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scenario of arrests and breach of the university life. 
Minor incidents and long periods of student strikes,
certainly amplified by physical proximity to the seat of 
federal power — UnB's students frequently demonstrated: 
gathering or even camping in front of the MEC or Congress 
buildings — punctuated the history of the university 
throughout the military regime.
The constitutional background of civil rights related to 
teachers and students suffered some considerable changes 
from 1967, offering the legal basis for the application of 
the Law of Security by the governmental system of
security, including the regional military courts. The 
final terms of the declaration of the freedom of thought 
(Art. 141, § 5, of the Constitution of 1946) left a more
imprecise qualification of "order", in the specification
of the limits of that right (Art. 150, § 8, of the
Constitution of 1967, and Art. 153, § 8, of the
Constitutional Amendment of 1969). At the same time, a
law (5250, of 9/2/67) regulated that right of
manifestation of thought and information, specifying what 
did not constitute an abuse of the right. Some months 
later a decree (61527, of 13/10/67) had to provide more 
details of the area covered by the right of expression to 
supply more precise guidelines for the work of the 
military or civil judges, The traditional "academic
freedom",. free speech for teachers, always simply 
expressed in the phrase "liberty of seat is guaranteed" 
was changed to: "the liberty of communicating of
knowledge in the exercise of the teaching is guaranteed, 
with the reservations covered in article 154", which 
referred to "the abuse of political or civil rights with 
the purpose of subversion of the democratic regime or
corruption" (Art. 176, § 3, item VII of the Constitutional
Amendment of 1969). The application of this restriction 
could be enforced by an official of the Executive Power,
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the General Prosecutor of the Republic, and sentences of 
two to ten years could be pronounced by the Supreme Court 
(the only one dealing with constitutional matters). 
Finally, the Constitutional Amendment of 1969 added — as a 
typical vestige of some right-wing groups — to the 
principle of liberty for the sciences, letters and arts 
the restriction: "with reservation made for publications
and expositions opposed to morals and good habits" 
(Art. 179). . . .
Such were the salient features of the first years of the 
regime in the field of Education. They remained firm to 
both the top military . and those who suffered the 
repression. UNE remained a sort of "damned acronym" until 
the end of the regime in 1985. Even when the
liberalization, the "Abertura'\ brought the dialogue or 
the negotiation of the government with opposition groups, 
UNE never did manage to meet the ministers of education. 
Signs of sympathy and good will towards the body caused 
stumbling blocks for the Minister Eduardo Portela in his 
relationship with the military, ending with his 
dismissal. :2S His successor, Gen. Rubem Ludwig, in spite 
of being very well backed by Paldclo do Planalto> had to 
go back in his public intention of receiving UNE's 
Directory in March 1981. Some days later, he agreed to 
receive members of UNE in a group of students, providing 
no identification of the group with the students 
organization was made. 31 *
The Minister of Education Jarbas Passarinho tried to have 
Law-by-decree 477 abolished. Despite his good position in
25, This was just part of a larger affair involving the minister and top figures of 
the cabinet, This affair well be treated later, in Section 5,3,1,
26, This fact was confirmed by Col Pasquali, General Secretary of NEC under Ninister 
Ludwig's tenure (Interview with the author),
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the government as a former military, a senator of the 
governmental party and former powerful minister of labour, 
he did not succeed. The Secretariat of the National 
Security Council, then headed by Gen. Jo&o Batista de 
Figueiredo, opposed the move. Passarinho went to
President Medici three times to ask for the suppression of 
some draconian aspects of the law-by-decree, especially 
the banning of the right of appeal and the ex-officio 
referral by the university authority to the ministry 
should a student be found innocent. 27 Finally, the
President approved a formal address (.ExposigBo de
Motivos> of the Minister with the assessment of the 
General Consellor of the Republic by which the ministry 
was to be the upper statutory jurisdiction for all the 
cases judged at the university level iParecer 1-049, of 
2/7/70, published in the Didrio Oficial da UniBo of 
21/7/70). In fact, the reason for the strictness of the 
government on Law-by-decree 477 was the fight against 
communist activity among the young.
The way in which the chancellor Azevedo, always regarded 
as a caretaker for the regime, was kept in his position at 
the University of Brasilia despite the rejection of the 
majority of the university community and, moreover, 
without the. support of the Minister of Education, Eduardo 
Portelar was also a clear indication of the persistence of
2 7 . ^  Interview of Senator Passarinho with the author,
28, "The Law-by-decree 477 arose as a reply, It was a reaction to the conquering 
action of the Communist Party, It is actually able to conquer - for it has a vocation 
of catechism, a messianic appeal - just that range of the populations of the world 
which are full of romantism and capacity for self sacrifice: the juvenals," Senador 
Jarbas Passarinho, Q Decreto-lei 477. Op, Cit., p , 13, See also pages 6-11, 24, 31-2 of 
this same speech.
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the old scars. 29 Repressive intervention in UnB
certainly had an exemplary intention. As the banishment 
of UNE and the Law-by-decree 477, it deeply blemished the 
regime's standing in the area of education,
3. 1. 3. The main system of control; the SNI. the DSI's and
the ASI* s
Dispite the military seizure of power in April 1964, it 
was not so easy for the newly created National Information 
Service-SNI (Law-by-decree 5341, of 13/6/64) to set up an 
efficient network of agencies and penetrate civil
ministries as it had opened its own area in what had
previously been the territory of the National Security
Council (CSN).3° Formally, the SNI only consists of a 
Central Agency in Brasilia, regional agencies in most
29. In 1979 Palicio do Planalto inserted an article in the Law 6733 to render the 
appointment of the chancellors of all federal foundations subject to the direct and 
exclusive will of the President of the Republic, regardless of the board of directors 
or any other similar collegiate body, In spite of having 24 of the 42 federal 
foundations, and mostly universities including UnB, the Ministry of Education was not 
even consulted, on the matter, This happened just when the coming expiration of 
Azevedo's second mandate raised the issue of a change of "political winds" in UNB, See 
Braga, Ronald, "MEC e Poder", E d u c a t e  Brasileira. n, 13, 2 sem,, 1984, p.90,
30, Asked about the organization of SNI in the federal education system, Gen, Golbery 
do Couto e Silva, the organizer and first head of this body, said: "I had a hard and 
delicate job in not to create problems for Castello while still carrying out the 
implementation of the Servigo in the ministries. Each of those ministers felt himself 
to be as a Grand Seigneur," (Interview with the author), For an analysis of the 
institutional and political features of SNI in the context of the "new professionalism" 
of the Brazilian military, see Stepan, A, Qs Mi 1itares: da Abertura k Nova Reptiblica. 
Op, cit,, pp.21-39,
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states, and, since 1971, a National School of Information 
(EsNI) (D. 68448, of 31/3/710). However, the body dealing 
with security information and mobilization in the 
organizational structure of each ministry, the Division of 
Security and Information (DSI) is defined as being 
"technically linked" to SNI, under its guidance and 
supervision. DSI also has to cooperate directly with CSN.
This organizational structure has been clearly defined 
since 1967 (articles 29 and 43 of the Law-by-decree 200, 
of 25/2/67). The DSI of the Ministry of Education 
(DSI/MEC) is, therefore, the outstanding aspect of the 
policies of security for education institutions. In its 
first complete organization of 1967 (Decree 60940, of 
4/7/67, and Law-by-decree 346, of 4/1/68) , DSI/MEC had
only a representative or agent in each university, college 
and other autonomous body linked to the ministry.
Political events of 1968 and 1969 brought about an 
expansion of the system at a national level and so MEC's 
DSI was reinforced (Decrees 67325, of 2/10/70, and 68060, 
of 14/1/71): instead of a single agent, each establishment
was given a Special Advisory Body for Security and 
Information (AESI) (Assessoria Especial de Seguranga e 
Informag&es"), which was then able to take its place among 
other internal bodies of the university, college, etc., 
and have external relations in the name of that
inst itut ion«
This structure was again reformed under Geisel's tenure to 
give the system of information and security a more stable 
and permanent place in the federal bureaucracy (Decrees 
75524, of 24/3/75, and 75640, of 22/4/750), The direct 
responsibility of ministries and heads of autonomous 
bodies (including universities and any federal schools) 
for matters of state security, chiefly security
information, was stressed. The staff of all bodies of the
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system were to be qualified for their positions in three 
years and were to be integrated, as a specific group, 
within the regular staffing system of the government with 
a career structure like any other civil servant <D. 75639,
of 22/4/75). The DSI's and their branches - now called 
the Advisory Body for Security and Information (ASI) 
(instead of AESI) - were classified according to their 
importance. DSI/MEC and its ASI's belonged to Group 3, 
the highest level of staffing. Although DSI could be 
headed either by a civilian or a military, DSI/MEC was 
often run by the military. Civilians (teachers) were most 
in charge of AESI's and ASI's.
The first insertion, in federal universities, of a 
permanent, institutional network of bodies reporting 
directly to a Division of Information and Security (DSI) 
in the Ministry of Education — albeit also having the 
statutory function of providing advice to university 
hierarchy — was a blow to the traditional sense of 
"university autonomy". It was always seen by the
university community as an intruder inserted by force into 
its internal statutes. Such bodies were always accused of 
being the preserve of right-wing extremist teachers 
responsible for purges and expulsions in the university 
and of acting as an auxiliary of the repression system 
(officially linked to the Army). Under pressure, the 
government abolished these bodies in the universities in 
1981, but some of their functions were transferred to the 
local offices of the ministry.
Despite the activities of DSI, AESI's and ASI's in 
educational matters such as the promotion of civic values 
and the curricular school subject. "Moral and Civic 
Education", their main task, which characterised its 
image for members of MEC and uni-versities, was the control 
of staff appointments.3 '1 Special forms to be completed
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with personal details, and possible vet os from the central 
records of SNI through DSI created sometimes embarrassing 
situations for the authorities who had invited individuals 
to take up positions in the ministry or on the teaching 
staff of a college. Similar screening applied to civil 
servants (including teachers at federal universities and 
colleges) who asked for permission to travel abroad to 
carry out their duties. During particularly repressive 
periods, AESI'S or ASI's were accused of having sheltered 
right-wing radical teachers who had led "witch hunts" in 
many universities.3 "" The fact that AESI's and then ASI's 
were not particularly designed for the universities by the 
military, but for all federal agencies, still does not 
excuse an element of ideological bias in their activities.
3. 1. 4. Subsequent developments
The military usually overreacted to student 
demonstrations. Officers or even sergeants in charge of 
the direct repressive operations were particularly angered
31, Asked about the means by which the military exerted their influence in MEC, senior 
civil servants and teachers who were interviewed by the author immediately emphasized 
this point,
32, Although these facts were frequently commented on in universities, documentary 
records are not easily found, One of the few is: ADUSP, Q Livro Negro da USP - o
contrflle ideolbqico na universidade. S, Paulo, ADUSP, 1978, There were indeniable 
abuses by opportunist people and teachers willing to settle old scores; "There were 
groups of 'military collaborators', We knew them, Some had deformations of character, 
The ‘anti-communist professionals' took profit from the situation," (Col Mauro 
Rodrigues, an officer invvolved in the early days of. the regime and later (1970) 
General Secretary of MEC, Interview with the author), In other interview with the 
author, Gen, Golbery also recognized and regretted these facts,
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by the insults and the irreverence of the student's 
langage towards the authorities. The student's unexpected 
moves, boldness and inventive fighting tactics, confused 
and sometimes humiliated them. Moreover, police men (the 
ones who were usually charged with public repressive 
operations against students) were sometimes incited by 
their superiors. 33
This psychological component of the street violence must 
be mentioned because the excesses it certainly caused in 
the repression had serious repercussions both among the 
majority of the Army not involved with those actions and 
the public. Many of the top military were increasingly 
uneasy with the image of the regime in the area of 
education. The security of the state, the actual
intention of the repression, was not to be misunderstood 
— they thought — in all those events. The Revolution 
could not afford to lose ground in public opinion and a 
rejection by the world of the schools and intellectuals 
would not do justice to the democratic purposes of the 
Movement of March. President Castello Branco had been a 
top figure in the army education system and had shown 
special feelings of sympathy for the education tasks of 
his government. After all, systematic education had 
always been highly valued in military culture for decades. 
The military also shared the concern of the country 
regarding education.
33, "Stand by" orders - cancelling leave - were frequently issued by the army and 
police headquarters for periods actually longer than they would be necessary, just to 
maintain, among the troops, a mood of anger against students and other demonstrators, 
(Conversation of the author in early 1970 in Recife with a sergeant of the army who 
worked in the University of Pernambuco as a part-time typist),
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3.2. "INTERVENTIONS"
From late 1965, at least, to 1974 it is possible to 
identify trends which reversed the position of the 
military, without prejudice for the activities of the 
systems of information gathering and repression. After 
three years limiting educational concerns to security, the 
military reacted to recurrent unrest in the area by 
intervening with a more direct presence in the Ministry of 
Education. At the same time, attitudes of compensation, 
concession or tactical set-back appeared in the regime's 
relationship with the area of education or the students 
themselves, even if this cost the military some conflict 
with civil technicians to whom education policies had been 
committed. From 1975 onwards, with the " distensSo" and 
then the "abertura'\ views of again leaving the matter to 
civilians and, furthermore, of using the ministry to 
reinforce the general liberalizing purposes of the regime 
came to prevail. This line of evolution does not exclude 
some simultaneity and recurrence of typical events. Such 
phases of the involvement of the military with the 
education will be featured in this Section 3.2. and the 
following <3. 3>, respectively.
3. 2. 1. The "mission" of Gen. Meira Mattos;
^ Origins and features
When Colonel Carlos de Meira Mattos, a member of the 
permanent teaching staff of Escola Superior de Guerra, 
received an unexpected phone call from the Chief of the 
Military House of the Presidency of the Republic, Gen. 
J ayme Portela, in November 1967, the scene of higher 
education in Brazil, sharply coloured by recurrent student
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unrest, was really worrying. Nobody could, however, 
expect particular and direct interference from the 
military beyond the aspects of security as the new 
minister of education, a civilian like his three
predecessors since the coup of March 1964, had been 
appointed some months before. The colonel, who had been
recently called upon by the Presidency for special 
missions — he had commanded the siege and closure of the 
Congress (20/10/66) and led the Brazilian Task Force to 
Dominican Republic the year before — was only filled in on 
the new mission some weeks later, when he was appointed 
general.33
Decree 62024, of 29/12/67, created a ''Special Commission" 
in the Ministry of Education to "propose measures 
concerning student problems", "considering the necessity 
of coordinating governmental directives to solve student 
problems". Beside laying down a conclusive assessment of 
the crisis and planning the decisions, the original 
purpose of the Special Commission would be to supervise 
and coordinate the execution of these policies (letter c_ 
of the article 1). No fixed period was ascribed to the 
Commission, whose attributes exactly matched the legal 
competences of MEC bodies. Together with Gen. Meira 
Mattos as president, the Commission had four other 
members: two teachers, one of them the principal of the
traditional Faculty of Law at the University of Rio de 
Janeiro and the other the head of a first-rank body of MEC 
(later a teacher at Escola Superior de Guerra), a lawyer
34. "We've got a hard pill ( "urn abacaxi”) for you, joked the minister. What this will 
be we'll tell you later", (Interview of Gen, Meira Mattos with the author),
35, "Meira Mattos was one of the so called 'hawks' or. hard-liners, but he was very 
close to Gastello", (Minister Jarbas Passarinho, a former colonel of the Army and 
Minister of Labour at the time, Interview with the author,)
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and a air-force colonel of the National Security Council 
(CSN), who was appointed as its general secretary shortly 
afterwards and eventually Minister of the Air Force, 
Waldir de Vasconcelos. The presence of a high-hanking 
member of CSN1 s staff, where the idea of the Special 
Commission may have been developed, should be stressed.
The obvious necessity for change in the structure and 
supply of higher education was the leit-motiv of a 
nationwide political mobilization of students between 1961 
and 1964, following a widespread debate on the bill of
Directives and Bases of National Education (LDB) and the 
creation of the UnB as a new model for a developing 
country. UNE had regularly held conventions on the so
called university reform, most of them raising broader 
political issues as their context of analysis. 36 The II
Seminar on studies of the Northeast (Recife, March 1961), 
the I National Seminar for University Reform (Salvador, 
May 1961), the I University Meeting of the South (Porto 
Alegre, June 1961), the II National Seminar for the 
University Reform (Curitiba, March 1962) and the third of 
these "national seminars" in Belo Horizonte, 1963, all 
left manifestos and activities behind them. Even before 
1964, MEC had set out to find ways to change, as in the
National Symposium of Chancellors (1961) and in the strong 
support given to the University of Brasilia experiment.
36, For instance: "University Reform will be a superficial end unless it is seen as a 
moment in the wider process which is the Brazilian Revolution", UNE, 12 Semin&rio 
Nacional de Reforma Universit&ria - DeclaratSo da Bahia. Salvador, 1961, p.26. A 
description of the particular moment when the aspirations for changes in the pattern of 
higher education in Brazil developed, in: Gusso, 0, "A Pds-GraduagSo e o
Desemvolvimento da EducagSo Superior", In: Gusso, D, ■ et alii, A Pbs-GraduatSo na 
America Latina. Q Caso do Brazil. Brasilia, CAPES/MEC, 1985, pp. 136-44,
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The regime of 1964 felt compelled to answer the demands 
and criticisms of teachers and students and, after a 
hesitant recourse to international aid (MEC s agreement 
with the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) for the Planning of Higher Education 
in Brazil, June 1965), it had laid down two law-by-decrees 
(53, of 18/11/66, and 252, of 28/2/67). The structural 
reform of the university was declared to have begun. No 
real change, however, seemed to have occurred as there 
were still complaints, criticisms and excuses for student 
unrest. Only involved with the accidental consequences in 
the area of security, the military were impatient.
" A t  l e a s t ,  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  w a n t e d  t o  k n o w ,  w h a t  w a s  g o i n g  on, 
w h a t  w e r e  t h e  c a u s e s  o f  t h e s e  t r o u b l e s " . 3 ^
A formal ceremony of swearing-in on 11/1/68 began three- 
months work, during which the Commission was physically 
installed in the premises of MEC (then still in Rio de 
Janeiro) and was given the support of civil servants, to 
whom some extra payment was given. The members had 33 
formal meetings but they each carried out individual 
tasks, travelling around when necessary. From the reports 
and messages issued by the commission (seven official 
letters, of£ciost and a general report in two parts), 
comments of the press and some testimonies, it is possible 
to see two different trends: first to go directly to the
fire and devise a strategy to extinguish it, in a typical 
military style, and to get involved with the demands which 
were generated by the high status and image attributed to 
the Commission by the public and the clientele of the 
education system. Without a systematic approach, the 
matters dealt with in the official letters and the first 
part of its report range from the . politically crucial 
issue of the payment of annual fees in federal public 
universities and colleges by students in a better
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economical position, to an individual disciplinary affair 
in a college in the state of Minas Gerais.
The explosive problems of the qualified but unplaced 
candidates for the limited vacancies in higher education 
institutions (the so-called excedentes') and a crowded 
student restaurant in Rio de Janeiro, the " Calabougo", 
where the students used to meet and start street actions, 
were fought concurrently. The Commission sometimes worked 
as a bureau of direct apeal for suggestions and complaints 
by student associations or individuals, and its president 
had to travel in order to work out a wage dispute for a 
local teachers association. It was felt to be invested 
with a sort of overall powei^s) covering all bureaucratic 
ranks and the institutional competences of the bodies of 
MEC 3e. In a first evaluation of the system, the Law of 
Directives and Bases of Education was re-examined as was 
the relevant section of the National Strategic Plan for
Education, of the Ministry of the Planning (MINIPLAN). 
Gen. Meira Mattos had independent contacts at ministerial 
level. He met the Minister of Planning to discuss 
organizational aspects of university reform and the 
Minister of the Exchequer to release grants or to get
agreement to a loan from the Rockfeller Foundation. 
Discovering the role of the head of the Department of
Higher Education in MEC, Mr Epilogo de Campos, during the
investigations of government's policies for the expansion 
of vacancies, Meira Mattos was displeased by the 
"demagogic" behaviour and incompetence of Mr. Campos. "I
37. Gen, Meira Mattos, interview with the author,
38, "The general feeling of people in MEC was that Meira Mattos was installed as a 
parallel minister", (Mrs Ecilda Ramos, a senior official in MEC, then holding an 
important position in the National Departament of Education, Interview with the 
author,)
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asked for his dismissal", he said
The position of the Minister of Education, Deputy Tasso 
Dutra, vis-a-vis the Special Commission was both delicate 
and uncomfortable. He obviously knew what was happening 
in his house, but preferred not to cross swords with the 
well-supported general, understanding the nature of the 
situation. /to Mr Tasso Dutra' s good relationship with
President Costa e Silva were only useful enough to keep
him as a minister. dl Asked about the rumours that his
"mission" would have actually been a "white intervention" 
in the Ministry of Education, Gen. Meira Mattos replied: 
"At the time, the press insistently said this. Well. . . ,
It could have been a ' bypass' , yes. "■4:2
3. 2. 2. The "mission" of Gen. Meira Mattos:
the end and results
During the sixties, particularly 1967 and 1968 the City of
39. Interview with the author.
40, "Tasso Dutra was a good man, But he had not the vocation for minister of 
education, His concern was the politics of Rio Grande do Sul, his state, This problem 
could have caused the creation of the Commission", (Gen, Meira Mattos, interview with 
the author),
41, Deputy Tasso de Moraes Dutra was probably chosen for the Ministry of Education 
"for his personal relationship with Costa e Silva, from Rio 6rande do Sul, their native 
land, (...) People generally thought he was not a man for such a high position. " ( 
Gen. Golbery, interview with the author). His name was associated with education 
through the federal budget for education: he had reported about it for several years 
in the Congress Budget Commission, The military "knew he kept a personal relationship 
with Costa e Silva", (Col Mauro Rodrigues, interview with the author),
42. Interview with the author,
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Rio de Janeiro was a leading focus of student left-wing 
activities. There, the leadership developed of the
radical Popular Action <AP> which took control of UNE 
throughout that decade and the majority of which became 
the Marxist and Leninist Popular Action (APML). It was 
also there, in 1966, that some radical factions of the 
Communist Party's Youth Commission broke with Prestes' 
directives for participation in the new government-created 
bodies for student representation. These so-called
"Guanabara dissidents" either joined a dissidence of the 
Communist Party (PC), the Brazilian Communist 
Revolutionary Party (PCBR) or helped to set up other 
organizations: the Revolutionary Eighth of October
Movement (date of Guevara's death), the MR8, and the 
National Revolutionary Movement which counted among its 
members with many military banned from the Army in 
previous years . All these groups believed that only 
force in the form of urban or rural guerillas would 
overthrow the military regime. "33 As a well trained 
minority they had a leading role in student activities, 
managing not only to provide the political image of the 
students in public opinion but to create political 
demonstrations which actually brought thousands of young 
people onto the streets. 44
Just when the government had taken the initiative through
43, According to Senator Passarinho in a speech to the Federal Senate, on 4/8/76, 
General Murici, Chief of the Staff of the Army during Medici's tenure, said that 80X of 
the terrorists arrested in 1971 were university students and more than 70% of these 
studied social sciences,
44, Item 2,8, in the Second Part of the final report of the Special Commission quotes 
a survey of IBOPE in Rio de Janeiro and S,Paulo on • the self-declared political 
tendency of students. Only 23X declared themselves to be left-wing, and again only 1 OX 
of these showed a clear political stance,
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the Special Commission and the radical trends among youth
needed a new political event to recover from the
consequences of the splitting in the movement and the long 
holidays (December— February), the first death of a young 
man killed on the street by the army ocurred. The
students made the best political milege from the confused 
circunstances of the incident which ocurred on 28/3/1968 
in the student restaurant " Cal abougo". 'IS The press gave a 
wide publicity to the incident, covering the student
demonstrations (where they carried the body of the young 
man, covered by the national flag, and sang the national 
anthem among their usual slogans). This event, which
moved the general public, raised a strong feeling of
sympathy among the students throughout the country and
brought about bitter criticisms of the opposition, soon 
extended to further themes. Following the large
mobilization for the funeral, a massive demonstration in 
Rio de Janeiro on the 1st of April (coinciding with the
official celebrations of the fourth anniversary of the 
coup) was brutally repressed by the police with hundreds 
of arrests and three deaths. This triggered popular 
reactions, heralded a long sequel of unrest in the area of 
higher education and had sharp repercussions in the 
delicate political climate of
45, The incident was described by student leaders and then the press as a siege and 
then an invasion of Calaboufo by the Military Police, which fired on the students 
killing one of them, Edson Luis de Lima Souto, 18, In fact, from the registers of the 
colleges and schools, it became known that the young man was not exactly a student, He 
was a poor immigrant from the state of Bahia who was given a job by students as an 
assistant in the restaurant and who attended some literacy classes provided by the 
students in the evening, Interviewed by the author, Gen, Miera Mattos gave a different 
version of the military's involvement in the event. He denied siege or invasion by the 
Military Police, attributing the shot to a sentry at a Navy Headquarters opposite the 
Calabougo, after "provocations",
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the country.
In an official letter (n. 28) to the Minister of Education
on the 8th April, the Special Commission declared that the 
fundamental part of its studies was concluded and that it 
considered its research and advice finished, leaving only 
the main report to be presented in 60 days (actually 
handed to the minister on the 13th of May). Moving a 
litle away from the terms which the decree had set as the 
purposes of the Commission, without any fixed period, Gen, 
Meira Mattos, when interviewed about his mission started 
his first answer by explaining that the Commission was 
created to give suggestions only about the hindrances 
which were preventing the government's broader policies 
for the university reform from succeeding. This was the 
limit of the Commission, which would not deal with the 
overall policy for education. Indeed, the political
context created by all those events recommended the 
suppression of yet one more reason for unrest in this 
area. Minister Tasso Dutra handed over the report of the 
Special Commission to the President of the Republic with 
a laconic . note, and for some months the subject was not 
officially referred to, as the report was only published
46, Actually, big demonstrations were organized in the main state capitals in the 
following three months, reaching their climax with the ones of 26/6 and 4/7 in Rio de 
Janeiro, the so-called "Demonstrations of the Hundred Thousands", The mobilization of 
students who were trying to get the support of workers in strikes continued, and gained 
ground in S, Paulo, The University of Brasilia was invaded on 28/8 (as already 
mentioned), The mounting political pressure of students was only restrained by the 
massive arrests of 719 student leaders, . who were surprised by the police at a 
nationwide congress of UNE in IbiGna, in the interior of S, Paulo, in October, and the 
issuing of the Institutional Act n2 5 (AI-5), by 13/12,- followed by the Law-by-decree 
477, of 26/2/69,
47, Interview with Sen, Meira Mattos.
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by the 25th of August. dS
The so-called "Meira Mattos Commission" and its report was 
highly controversial, as may be easily understood. 
However, in spite of a general refusal to quote its
recommendations, it seems to have influenced the ensuing 
decisions of the government to a greater extent than the 
studies usually suggest. Two years later, in a speech 
given in the Escola Superior de Guerra on the 26 of May,
1970, the Minister of Education, Jarbas Passarinho, 
commenting on the work of the commission, said;
" T h e  u n m i s t a k a b l e  f a c t  i s  t h a t  t h e  r i o t s  o f  1 9 6 8  p r o v o k e d  a 
s p e e d i n g - u p  o f  t h e  M E C  m a c h i n e .  T h e r e ,  i n i t i a l l y  t h e  p r e s e n c e  
a n d  t h e n  t h e  r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s  o f  t h e  M e i r a  M a t t o s  C o m m i s s i o n  
p r o d u c e d ,  at t h e  l e a s t ,  a c a t a l y t i c  e f f e c t . "
Then he specified:
" S o m e  o f  i t s  f r u i t s  m a y  b e  i d e n t i f i e d  i n  t h e  d e c i s i o n  t o
i m p l e m e n t  t h e  u n i v e r s i t y  r e f o r m s ,  i n  t h e  c h a n g e  of t h e  c r i t e r i o n  
f o r  c h o o s i n g  c h a n c e l l o r s ,  i n  t h e  s t r e s s  p l a c e d  o n  a d o p t i n g  t h e  
f u l l - t i m e  s y s t e m  f o r  t h e  t e a c h i n g ,  i n  t h e  s h a r p  i n c r e a s e  i n  t h e  
o f f e r  o f  p l a c e s  i n  t h e  i n i t i a l  g r a d e s  o f  h i g h e r  e d u c a t i o n
c o u r s e s ,  a n d  e v e n  i n  t h e  d r a s t i c  r e i n f o r c e m e n t  o f  a u t h o r i t y  i n  
s c h o o l s  t h r o u g h  t h e  d r a c o n i a n  L a w - b y - d e c r e e  n. 477, o f  
2 6 / 2 / 6 9 .
As early as the 2nd of July 1968, a high level Commission 
consisting of eleven members, including the General 
Secretary of the Ministry of the Planning and General
48, Gen, Meira Mattos himself recognized the troubles that the political climate 
brought to his work: "The Minister compromised over the situation (pds panes quentes) 
so as not to exacerbate the students, They preferred not to manifest they gave 
importance to the report," (Interview with the author),
49, Passarinho, J, G, Q MinistSrio da E d u c a t e  e Cultura (flspectos Essentials da 
Atualidade). ENFA/ESG, 1970, p.36,
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Co-ordination (MINIPLAN), the president of the Federal 
Council of Education (CFE), and some well-known scholars 
who had collected or explored Brazilian experiences and 
reflections on university problems (E’°), was appointed by 
the Decree 62397, "to study the reform of Brazilian 
universities". This commission was given only 30 days "to 
propose realistic solutions and operative measures". It
worked full-time and, within that period, produced a set
consisting of one bill for a major law regulating higher 
education and all its organizations — not only the federal 
ones as the law-by-decrees of 1966 and 1967 had done — , 
five other bills of special laws, two of which were later 
passed, seven drafts of presidential decrees, all signed 
by the President, and four formal recommendations. &1 
Especially remarkable is that several budgetary decisions 
were taken for the then current year and for the two
following ones. The Law 5540, of 28/11/68, the main work
of this commission, was changed or complemented in some 
aspects by a law-by-decree (464, of 11/2/69), made under 
the exceptional regime of the AI-5, urging the 
implementation of the reforms.
A comparison of the "nine points" of the report of the 
Meira Mattos Commission with the subsequent (1968-9) 
legislation would yield more about its results. 52
50, At least two of these, the ones who reported for the commission, had been 
consulted by the Meira Mattos Commission, Professors Newton Sucupira and Walnir Chagas, 
(Gen, Meira Mattos, interview with the author),
51, See BRASIL/MEC, Relatbrio Geral do Grupo de Trabalho para a Reforma
Universit&ria. Brasilia, 1968,
52, The "Meira Mattos Report" was first published by the newspaper Correia da Manhl 
edition of 25/8/68, It was officially published in the Diirio Oficial da UniSo, 
edition of 30/8/68, Suplem, n, 168, The edition hereby quoted is that published in 
the magazine Paz e Terra, n, 9, Sept, 1968, pp, 199-241,
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Matching the Commission’s hard criticisms (pp. 211-13), 
from June 196S a Task Group directly supported by MINIPLAN 
began working a Mdeep change of the administrative
structures of MEC which had remained basically the same 
since the early fifties, whilst the number.of bodies under 
its supervision had doubled. Rationalization of the
administration became one of the regime's strategic 
policies for education during its two decades (Section
2. 4). Specific comments on a "crisis of authority in the 
educational system" (pp. 213-16) became law some months 
later, embodied in articles 4, 6, 7 and 16 of the Law
5540, of 28/11/68, and articles 12 and 14 of the Law-by- 
decree 464, of 11/12/69. The suggestions for a special 
regime of payment for teachers in hi g^)er education, 
extending their weekly number of hours in schools (then 
only twelve hours) and the adoption of a legal status 
different to that of the ordinary civil service (pp. 216- 
19) initiated deep changes in the system since 1968. The 
concerns about abuses of the "freedom of cathedra" in the 
teaching situation (pp. 219-21), appearing for the first 
time in official MEC documents, passed into the new terms 
of the Constitutional Amendment n^ 1, of 30/10/69. Other 
examples were to be found in the new policies for 
assisting the student and the exceptional measures for the 
expansion of the enrolment in universities, to be 
specifically studied (Section 3.3.1. in this chapter).
3. 2. 3. Other aspects of the military presence in MEC
Although the choice of the Senator Jarbas Passarinho, a 
colonel in the army until 1966, for the portfolio of 
education after Deputy Tasso Dutra could be described as 
an attempt at dialogue rather than as an additional proof
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of an intention to intervene (Section 3.3.2* , below), his
tenure left a strong mark of the military presence in the 
bodies of the Ministry. '"3 It would be a mistake, however, 
to interpret this fact as being caused by a wish to 
control. Actually, the military were motivated by
assumptions of their own superior competence in 
administration — mainly where reforms were to be
undertaken — , regretting the civilian lack of discipline 
and ability to command. In those circumstances, the 
military thought, they had an important contribution to 
make. (In passing, teachers and intellectuals were not 
really concerned with the organizational side of 
educational problems; their ministry, always growing, was 
not a "tidy house" and contrasted with the traditional 
military view of the importance of administration . . )
From this point of view, a different sort of 
"intervention" was still to be found after the "Meira
Mattos Commission" and might be mentioned in order to 
complete the picture of the period.
The military in MEC were mostly former officers of the 
army appointed to run administrative bodies, special 
decentralized programmes, support agencies for students 
and technical bodies. The basic consideration of
trustworthiness stimulated the appointments from the top, 
when the minister or his general secretary was a military 
man himmself. Col. Mauro Rodrigues then Col. Confucio 
Pamplona were Minister Passarinho's general secretaries,
53, Answering current comments about a "colonelization" of MEC during the period 1970- 
74, Passarinho agreed he had brought "several colonels into the administration of MEC, 
a natural consequence of my restricted knowledge of staff", (Interview with the 
author),
54. Medici told Passarinho: "Go over to MEC and tidy that thing up!", (Col, Mauro 
Rodrigues, Passarinho1s first general secretary,- charged with an administrative reform 
of the ministry, Interview with the author,)
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Col, Gontijo was the Secretary of Administrative Support 
and Col. Abudibe was the head of the Department of Student 
Assistence. The Department (then Secretariat) of Physical 
Education and Sport and the National Programme for 
Improvement of Installations for the Secondary Schools 
(PREMEN) were always run by military. The Department of 
Materials, the Brazilian Centre of Educational Television, 
the Programme for the Development of University Campuses, 
the Council of Moral and Civic Education and some others 
were also headed by the military at some time. Col. 
Sergio Pasquali who was the general secretary of the 
Minister Ludwig stayed in that position until the end of 
Gen. Figueiredo's government. His Chief of Office for 
some time was Col. Pericles and Col. Brochado was for a 
couple of years the Executive Director of the Foundation 
for Student Assistance, Other military were also invited 
to help their fellows who headed ministerial bodies such 
as those mentioned.
The tenure of the four militarymen as ministers or general 
secretaries of MEC (ministers Passarinho and Ludwig and 
general secretaries Panplona and Pasquali) is generally 
considered by most universities and civil servants of the 
bureaucracy to be the best in the recent decades. Despite 
this fact, which deserves a more thorough analysis, the 
presence of many retired officers in high positions of 
MEC, just for the period of military intervention in 
politics, continued to be seen as an exceptional 
sit uat ion.
At the peak of a serious crisis in the Ministry of 
Education in 1980, when the minister himself resigned, 
another circumstancial decision of the military could also 
be placed in the same context of this analysis. Minister 
Eduardo Portela was induced to resign, mainly for a 
specific political reason but also as a result of some
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dissatisfaction on the part of the government for a 
hesitant or lax administration of MEC's large range of 
programmes and institutions. A newly appointed general, 
Rubem Ludwig, was called upon to take over the largest and 
most sensitive ministry. The decision was taken in a 
couple of hours in typical military style, at the 
suggestion of Gen. Golbery to the President and his close 
assistants.33 Gen. Ludwig entrusted a general
administrative reform of MEC to a particularly gifted 
administrator, Col. Pasquali. 34 decrees or MEC
regulations < Port arias') completely changed the
organizational profile of the ministry within eighteen 
months. The number of internal bodies was reduced and 
several buildings vacated, all the auxiliary bodies being 
concentrated in the ministry's central building. The new 
image of MEC' s once heavy bureaucratic machine was 
acknowledged by the ministries of Planning and
Administration and the ministry itself began using a large
data processing system in its every-day operations. 
Ludwig was a general on active duty and was not supposed 
to remain in a civil position for more than two years 
without resigning from the army, In a move which included 
some unexplained elements (see footnote 12 of Chapter Two) 
Ludwig left MEC and was appointed Minister for Military 
Affairs <Ministro Chefe da Casa Mllitar'). He said he had
55, "I feel responsible - in the good sense of the word - for having recalled the name
of Ludwig", (Sen, Golbery, interviewed by the auctor), Col, Sergio Pasquali, a very
close friend of Ludwig's and always well informed about movements in Palicio do 
Planalto described the event: "The government was looking for a quick solution for the 
crisis and a new name for MEC, The problem was brought up in a meeting of the "group 
of PJanaJtd' (the President, Gen, Figueiredo, and usually the four ministers with a 
seat in the same building: at the time, Gen,Golbery, Gen, Venturini, Gen, Medeiros and 
Mr Delfim Netto, Minister of the Planning), Then somebody suggested: 'why not RubSo?' 
(nickname of Gen, Ludwig among the military of his generation), Everybody agreed," 
(Interview with the author),
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finished his "mission” in MEC, as if a period of
intervention were corning- to an end.
3. 3. CONCESSIONS AND ATTEMPTS AT DIALOGUE
" T o  us, w o r k i n g  i n  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t a l  p o l i c i e s  o f  
e d u c a t i o n ,  t h e  f e e l i n g  w a s  t h a t  t h e  m i l i t a r y  w e r e  w i l l i n g  
t o  m a k e  c o n c e s s i o n s  t o  c o m p e n s a t e  f o r  t h e  s t r o n g
r e p r e s s i o n  e x e r t e d  b y  o t h e r  s e c t o r s  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t
e x c l u s i v e l y  i n v o l v e d  w i t h  s e c u r i t y " . 1^
This statement by a senior official who was, for a long 
time, close to the internal policy-making process of the
government gives an important clue to properly
understanding a major intention of the military in the 
government with regard to education during the period 
1967-74. The most relevant consequence of such an
attitude was the expansion of higher education in some
impulsive way. The government of Gen. Medici, attempting 
to ameliorate its public image, aimed for a dialogue with
opinions in education, particularly the university 
population. In the succeeding period, Generals Geisel and
Figueiredo, in their chief political target of the
" Dist ensScf* and then " Abert ura", had the same liberalizing
purpose as in their first stance regarding the area of
educat ion.
56, Speech at his farewell meeting with the staff of the ministry on 23/8/82,
(Records of the autor who was present at the event), Yet in an interview with the
author, Gen, Ludwig remembered about his short stay at MEC: ”1 was appointed in 
exceptional circumstances, That was a manoevre of some hours,*
57. hr Edson Machado, economist specializing in educational plannig, who was a member 
of the small team of technicians responsible for studies and policies for education in 
MINIPLAN, from late 1966, He came to hold important positions in the area of education 
in MINIPLAN and MEC, Interview with the author,
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3. 3. 1. The expansion of higher education
The expansion of higher education in Brazil is one of the 
most outstanding facets of education in recent decades. 
The number of students multiplied tenfold in fifteen years 
with enormous consequences in the balance of the 
educational system and political events involving 
education. This section does not hold that the expansion 
of higher education in Brazil was a concession of the 
military but that a concessive and compensatory attitude 
on the part of the military regarding this issue did 
actually exist and was important at a decisive moment 
(1968-69) in the governmental policies for the reform of 
the universities.
When the military came to power, the boom in the demand 
for university places was already a fact. The expansion 
of vacancies had been rallying cry for student movements 
during the two last years of Goulart's government. The 
trend had its roots in the rapid process of urbanization 
and industrial development in the country during the 
1950' s when the aspirations of social mobility met a 
flourishing job market and the traditional view of the 
university diploma as the first key to open the doors for 
privileged wages or marriages. 5,3 While higher education 
was still conceived as an appendage of social elites, the 
stress on policies for promoting secondary education 
during the two previous decades and even in the period 
1965-68 had formed a permanent basis for further 
education. Mention should be also made of the so-called
58, See Cunha, L, A. A ExpansSo do Ensino Superior : Causas e Consequdncias, Debate e 
Critica, n, 5, S, Paulo, Mar, 1975; Horta, J, S, B, "ExpansSo do Ensino Superior no 
Brasil", Revista de Cultura Vozes. n,6, Petrdpolis, Aug, 1975,
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"repressed demand": people able but unwilling to compete
for a restrictive access to higher education.sa
The restriction of that access came from both a rigorous 
selective process in each school involving dissertations 
and interviews, and a limited expansion in the number of 
places which were regulated by the availability of 
teachers and material. e,° As far as the pressures of 
increasing demand undermined the resistance of the 
selective process, the system generated the figure of the 
" excedente", the candidate who had been approved but was
not enrolled because he exceeded the number of places. 
The number of places was not subject to the discretion of 
the universities or colleges but that of the Federal 
Council of Education (CFE) (for federal and independent 
schools) or the state councils of education (CEE's) (for 
state and municipal schools). These bodies issued
individual licences after inspecting teaching conditions . 
Once the new team of education economists at MINIPLAN 
began participating in the decisions on this matter, 
another criterion was to be added to the policy: the
limits and requirements of the job market. The two
59, Actually, the increase in the number of secondary school students completing their 
courses, about 8 or 10% in the period 1954-64, would not be enough to explain the 
higher figures for the demand to enter university from I960,
60, The "limit of places" for higher education, instituted by the decrees 19851 (1931)
and 24297 (1934) and the Law-by-decree 421 (1938), vas a constitutional rule for some 
years (Constitution of 1934, Art, 150, letter e.), It was consolidated by the tradition 
(Regulation 97 (1949) of the (then) National Council of Education), The Law of 
Directives and Bases of Education (LD6) of 1961 (Art, 69) repeated those rules, The 
principle of admission examinations being a matter for each school was repeatedly 
confirmed by CFE in 1962 (Regulation 58), 1963 (regulations 53, 321 and 324), 1964 
(regulation 166 and 367), 1965 (Regulation 18) and evem in 1968, July (Regulation, 
452),
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sources of federal ’policies for education, MEC, including 
the CFE, and MINIPLAN, therefore, took a cautious, 
restrictive and rational approach to the demand to expand 
the system.
Actually, the element which first weakened the resistence 
to student pressures for an increase on places came from 
an unexpected source: the wife of President Costa e Silva,
Mrs Yolanda Costa e Silva, well-known for her active, 
willful character.61 Mrs Costa e Silva agreed to hold 
meetings with the students to discuss their demands. This 
fact became public and demonstrations by students in 
Brasilia cheered her name. She did not refuse the image 
of "godmother of the Excedendes?', as she was called by the 
press, and attended a Mass with the students, held in her 
honour. She exerted a direct influence in the Ministry of 
Education through the head of the Department of Higher 
Education (DESU), Mr Epilogo de Campos, her proteg<§. ':V,:;n: 
Soon the movement was to reach the institutional level. 
Technical bodies of MINIPLAN were concerned about the 
budgetary consequences of a sharp increase of enrolment in 
federal public institutions, and strongly resisted ideas 
of indiscriminate expansion. 153 The Commission for
61, "At a certain point during Costa e Silva's time, Dona Yolanda took on the role of 
the godmother of the students, the great p a t r o n e s s (Gen, Golbery do C, e Silva, 
interview with the author),
62, hr Campos, a colourless deputy of the state of Piaui, liked to mention his good 
relationship with the wife of the President and had two large pictures of his patroness 
hung on the wall of his office, (Gen heira hattos, interviewed by the author), The 
special edition of the magazine "Brasil Universtiritf', n,76, January 1968, which was 
supported and prefaced by Mr Campos, published a dedication of Mrs Costa e Silva in a 
facsimile of her handwriting: "To beloved, studious youth of my Brazil, my word of 
faith and trust",
63, Among other testimonies, that of Dr J, P, Veloso, General Secretary of MINIPLAN 
and President of the Commission for University Reform, is typical and relevant: "I
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University Reform which was rapidly set up after the 
troublesome events of the first half of 1968, gathered 
outstanding names from CFE, MEC, MINIPLAN and the Ministry 
of the Exchequer (MINIFAZ) and tried to mantain a position 
of compromise. It reaffirmed the traditional and rational 
principles of access to higher education which would keep 
its quality and its relation to the job market. 6/1 But it 
repeated that a solution for the "problem of the 
E x e d e n t . e s had to be found and suggested an increase of
places, of not less than 110,000, in 1969 (an increase of
32 % from 1968), to be "rationally" planned by another
special commission, immediately.
Such commission, appointed by the Decree 63422 and 
installed on 18/11/1968, was to find out, within one 
month, the ways of achieving this. . . It became clear that 
pressure came from the nucleus of the government, 
notwithstanding the position of most of its technical, 
second rank bodies. Actually, when this second
commission was suggested some of the urgent "solutions"
which would be taken by it had already been prepared in
MEC. Before the regular assessment of CFE over the
63, (cont.) said in the Commission that we risked exchanging excess number of 
candidates to the university for excess number of professionals in the job market 
within some years, And this actually happened", (Interview with the author),
64, MEC/MINIPLAN/MINIFAZ, Reforma Universit&ria - Relatdrio do Qrupo de Trabalho. 
Brasilia, Augr 1968, pp,45-48, A specific decree was issued just to establish the 
principles and criteria for the expected expansion of higher education (D, 63341, of 
1/10/1968),
65, "Continuous pressure came through the Office of the Minister of Education to make 
things easier", said one member of this commission, Mr E, Machado, (Interview with the 
author),
66, In the first half of 1968, the Minister of Education forwarded a formal query 
about the legality of the unification of the admission examinations to the General
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findings of the commission, the Law-by-decree 405, of 
31/12/1968, made under the exceptional powers of AI-5, 
changed some of the basic rules on which the system
worked. The provision of places was now to depend merely 
on the schools themselves, simply through publication in
a current newspaper, if before the date of the 
examinations or even without publication, if after it. In 
case any places remained, they were to be filled, even if 
a new examination would have to be made. Special grants
were assured for at least three years to any school
proportional to the number of new places. The impact of
this measure on the expansion of private (independent)
colleges was important. This was the first time it had 
been applied. A few months later another law-by-decree on 
the same grounds of AI-5 (Law-by-decree 547, of 8/5/69) 
prevented universities and colleges from reducing the 
number of places from the level of the previous year.
However, this was not enough. A new set of revolut ionary 
measures completed the government's scheme to get rid of 
the uncomfortable figure of the "Excedentes". In addition 
to providing for new places, changes were now to extend to 
the examinations procedure itself. The major new law of 
university reform, Law 5540, of 28/11/68, in its article 
21 provided that, in three years, admission examinations 
would be unified per areas of knowledge and carried out 
simultaneously in each university or college. However, 
two months later, the Law-by-decree 464, of 11/2/69, still 
based on the AI-5 powers, abolished the three years delay
66, (cont,) Counsellor of the Republic, The Counsellor returned the query to CFE, a
body of the ministry itself, legally competent to pronouce on the subject but
technically in disagreement with other bodies of MEC over it, See Paracer CFE 452, of 
4/7/1968, The reporter, Prof, Valnir Chagas, was a member of the main commission for 
university reform,
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and encouraged the unification at regional level by 
agreement among institutions, the federal ones being the 
first to join. In this way, the criteria and policy for 
admission were removed from the schools and given to 
centrally organized bodies. The implementation of this
policy was left to the following government' regulations 
(Port aria/MEC 3585, of 27/10/1970, and Portaria/MEC/DAU 
38-GB, of 17/2/71). Then, a nationwide governmental effort 
completed the change of the old system: universities and
colleges were unified in large sets, examinations adopted 
standardized syllabuses and methods, the majority based on 
multiple choice, the results being processed by computers. 
The system failed almost nobody, as candidates were called 
for enrolment by their score, in descending order. Nobody 
could claim any longer to have been formally approved by 
the school and not enrolled, as there were only candidates 
with better average scores then others who got the 
vacancy. Politically, the "ghost" of the "Excedentes" had 
been ruled out. Following this reform, expensive, short 
term, intensive courses (the cursinhos') sprang up 
everywhere with a restricted programme for cramming 
candidates, as a standardized training for the well- 
defined contents and procedures of the university entrance 
examinat ions.
Another side of the issue of places in the university is 
that of permission for new courses or colleges to be set 
up. Here, the rules were not, in themselves, changed. 
Constitutionally, the field of education is free and open 
to private initiative, depending only on the fulfilment of
67, There was one more strategic reason for the unification at regional level: many 
students registered for more than one examination at- different institutions which 
distorted the interpretation of figures for the real demand, with political and 
practical consequences,
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some conditions, independent of its status as a public 
service to satisfy the requirements of the demand. 
Although the legal constitution of an educational 
enterprise is a matter of commercial law, since the LDB 
(1961), the authority for setting a course — the 
educational activity itself — is given by CFE (federal 
and private colleges) or CEE's (state or municipal 
colleges). Exceptionally, universities are entitled to 
set their courses, subject to previous conditions defined 
by CFE. During the period of this study, the assessment 
of CFE and CEE's on the fulfilment of legal conditions for 
the authority directly followed the expansionist policies 
discribed above, mainly for private schools which were 
well represented in CFE. From 1962 to 1973 (the peak-year 
of the conceding authorizations)
" . . . f r o m  a t o t a l  o f  1 , 1 3 6  r e q u e s t s  o f  a u t h o r i t y  f o r  t h e  c r e a t i o n  
o f  n e w  h i g h e r  e d u c a t i o n  c o u r s e s  8 9 7  ( 7 9 % )  w e r e  g r a n t e d  a n d  2 3 9
( 2 1 % )  r e f u s e d .  A b o u t  5 5 %  o f  t o t a l  r e q u e s t s  w e r e  p r e s e n t e d  t o  C F E  
i n  t h e  t r i e n n i a l  1 9 7 0 - 7 2 ,  a p e r i o d  i n  w h i c h  6 0 %  o f  t o t a l  
a u t h o r i z a t i o n s  o c c u r r e d .
The new system faced enormous resistance, and was always 
seen as being imposed for political reasons by the 
military regime. It was bitterly criticised and
identified as the main cause of the uncontrolled expansion 
of Brazilian higher education and the sharp fall in its 
quality, in spite of the deployment of many other 
important programmes in an attempt to hold or improve its 
level. It must be remarked, however, that the
vertiginous escalation in the figures for the enrolment
68, Horta, J, S, B, "ExpansSo do Ensino Superior no Brasil", Op, Cit,, p, 35,
69, See Brasil/Presid6ncia da Reptiblica, Metas e Bases para a ft;liQ do GovSrno. 
Brasilia, Sept, 1970, p, 63; Brasil/MEC. 112 Plano Setorial de Educa»;So e Cultura. 
Brasilia, 1975, pp. 40, 54-58,
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started a little before the governmental reform of the 
system. It occurred chiefly in the private sector,
probably because of the booming economy and middle 
classes rather than the support of some policies of the 
federal government, mostly from 1974. In addition to 
this, the way it came about in a few developed areas of 
the country differed greatly from its course in others. 
In 1975, under the pressure of some sectors of the 
academic community dealing with post-graduate studies, 
Geisel's government began to apply a policy of restraining 
the authority given by CFE for setting up new courses. 
The demand for higher education, however, only began to 
drop later, from. 1980. Also in 1981 and 1982, under the 
tenure of Minister Ludwig, a decree stopped the concession 
of authorities for new courses by CFE, by then a body 
largely controlled, on this issue, by organized groups of 
private enterprise interests in education, 70
Table 5, below, traces some variables of the expansion of 
higher education in Brazil during the period 1960-84, 
breaking this up into sections according to the analysis 
of the preceding pages.
70, This fact came to be recognised more recently in an official document: MEC/ComissSo 
Nacional para Reformula$So do Ensino Superior, Uma Nova Politica para a E d u c a ^ o  
Superior - Relatdrio Final. Brasilia, Nov, 1985, pp,48-9,
TABLE 5
BRAZIL: THE EXPANSION OF HIGHER EDUCATION, 1960-1984
ACCESS ENROLMENT**
Applications (A) Places (P) A/P Total Public Independ,
Annual % Change Annual % Change =100* % %
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ACCESS ENROLMENT*#
Applications (A) Places (P) A/P Total Public Independ,
Annual % Change Annual % Change = 100fl % %
I960-i 13,2 0,8 142,386 61,5 38,4
1965-6
1967-9
1970-4
1975-9
1980-4*
12.5
31.5
17.5 
20,7
3,0
2,6 4,8 180,109 54,7 45,3
25,4 1,2 342,886 54,0 46,0
21,8 0,8 937,593 36,4 63,6
5,5 3,8 1,311,799 35,2 64,
1,3 2,3 1,436,000 39,0 61,0
it At the end of each period 
* Figures estimated for 1984
Sources
Brasil/MEC, Estatisticas da E d u c a t e  Nacional. 1960-71. vol. 1, Rio, 1972,
Brasil/MEC, Retrato Brasil, EducagSo-Cultura-Desporto, 1970-1990. vol.1. Brasilia, 
1985,
3. 3. 2. Attempts at dialogue
His capacity for negotiation and dialogue in the face of 
difficult relations was the main reason for the choice of
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the Minister of Labour, senator and former colonel Jarbas 
Passarinho, for the Ministry of Education and Culture. 71 
However, in explaining his choice by Medici, Passarinho 
himself went deeper and touched on a strategic 
governmental reason:
"Medici repeated to me what he had said at a meeting of the Army 
High Command, that he wanted to popularize the Revolution, to 
reduce the resistance to the Revolution. I had just come from a 
sensitive area and I had managed to work out most problems not 
through violence but through dialogue". -7'a:
The intention to "popularize" the regime was probably due 
to a policy which had started during Costa e Silva's 
tenure with the creation of a Special Agency for Public 
Relations <Assessoria Especial de Relag&es Publicas, 
AERP), reporting directly to the President. AERP was run 
by the military and re-structured into a larger body, the 
Secretariat of Press and Public Relations, during Geisel*s 
tenure. It became well known for its nationwide campaigns 
to raise civic feelings and to create a good image for 
Medici's government among the population. The campaigns, 
largely supported by TV propaganda, popular songs and a 
busy programme of events with students from government 
schools, involved members of AERP with educational 
institutions and the collaboration of some intellectuals. 
There are important links between AERP and the involvement
71, "Passarinho vas the personal choice of Medici for his ability in negotiation and 
leadership” (Col, Mauro Rodrigues); "Undoubtedly) Passarinho did well in the Ministry 
of Labour during a difficult period and for this reason was moved to Education" (Sen, 
Golbery), interviews with the author, Passarinho had a reputation of a cultured man 
among the military, an author of books and member of academies of letters, He was 
appointed governor of his state (Pari) by the new government in 1964 and then elected 
senator in 1966, leaving the Army to enter politics,
72, Interview with the author,
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of the military in education, either in the decisions of
the Presidency of the Republic or through some common
origins.
The idea of a permanent ’’open window” for the military on 
civilian society and matters predated that of an 
institutional use of the media as an auxiliary line of 
attack by the government. The former was developed when 
the latter was not a particular political need, before the 
regime changed its direction from the views of Castelo
Branco, leading to the direct takeover of the government
by the military under Costa e Silva.
The systematic introduction into the awareness of the 
military establishment in Brazil of the idea that some 
civilian sensitivity and skill was an essential 
requirement of the new forms of the military presence in 
the life of the country (the "new professionalism” ) must 
be credited to the pioneer work of Gen. Jo&o Bina Machado, 
a man whose career had been largely involved with the Army 
educational system. 73 In an innovative initiative, Bina 
Machado sent ten officers from the Army Staff and Command 
School (ECEME) to take a course in Public Relations at the 
Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro in 1965. That 
discipline was then introduced into ECEME's curriculum
73, Gen, Bina Machado had taught for fifteen years in military schools before and 
after he served in World War II, He was trained at military academies abroad and came 
to command the highest schools of the Brazilian Army; the Army Staff and Command 
School, ECEME, (1962-66) and the EscoJe Superior de Suer re, ESQ, (1973-74), In 1968 
he headed the Teaching Directory of the Army and there created the Centre of Studies 
for the Staff to develop advanced techniques in military training, Even when on active 
duty with the Army, he was a member of the High Counci 1 of the Catholic University of 
Rio de Janeiro and, when he retired was invited to teach at the three largest 
universities in that state,
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together with Sociology, International Law and Civil Law. 
This group of officers (teachers of ECEME) worked at AERP 
or ran it from 1967. In this year, Costa e Silva created 
this new agency within the structure of the Presidency of 
the Republic, following a suggestion of Col. D'Aguiar, one 
of the members of ECEME's. '’'L
In 1970, when he was second-in-command of the Army Staff, 
Bina Machado created the so-called "Area 5" or "Civilian 
Matters" in that body "aiming towards integration with 
civil society".'7'1* Following this initiative, most of the 
Army's regional commands created their own "5th Section" 
with that purpose, in addition to the four traditional 
sections which composed the Staff of the commands. These 
bodies, besides helping in the psychological aspects of 
military operations, were committed to the study of 
current social problems, the good image of the armed 
forces through the knowledge of their social role and the 
diffusion of principles and practices of civics, 
particularly in co-operation with educational authorities. 
A former head of "Area 5" in the Armed Forces Staff 
(ENFA), Gen. Paula Couto, was president for several years 
of the National Council for Moral and Civic Education 
(CNMC), a body created in the Ministry of Education. The 
proposal of a new school subject, nationally co-ordinated 
by CNMC, the Study of Brazilian Problems, was sent to Gen. 
Bina Machado for his collaboration and assessment, before 
being submitted to the Presidency of the Republic 
(September 1969).
The direct involvement of Gen. Bina Machado's group in
74, This was reported to the author by Col, Pasquali who was a teacher in ECEME in 
1965-67, then moving to AERP where he became its deputy chief in 1966,
75, Recurrent expression used by the general, when interviewed by the author,
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ECEME — from which two general secretaries of MEC would 
come — with education will be discussed in the following 
Section 3. 4. For the moment it is enough to mention the 
close links of three men in that group with Gen. Medici: 
Col. Otavio Costa and Col. Pasquali, who worked with the 
future President in the Paldcio do Planalto when the
general was the chief of SNI and the colonels were the
head and deputy head of AERP (1968-69), respectively, 
and Col. Manso Neto who was President Medici's influential 
and active head of the Special Advisory Office <Assessoria 
Especial') of the Presidency of the Republic. Note should 
also be made that the head of AERP (then re-structured 
into Press Secretariat) under Geisel's government, Col. 
Rubem Ludwig, became Minister of Education in 1980 and
Col. Pasquali was appointed as his General Secretary.
The Minister and former colonel Jarbas Passarinho was
Medici's major weapon in improving relations with the 
students, teachers and educational bodies. The name of 
Col. Mauro da Costa Rodrigues, an officer of Gen. Bina 
Machado's group in ECEME in 1966, was suggested to 
Passarinho for the General Secretariat of MEC. 77
In his inaugural speech, Passarinho professed faith in 
teachers' "freedom of cathedra". Within the month, he
76, Later, in 1971, when Rio de Janeiro still was a scene of activity by clandestine 
organizations whose eenbership was basecally drown from left-wing ex-students, Medici 
moved Sen, Bina Machado from his command of the 4th Army in Recife before he had 
completed his posting and gave him the command of the 1st Army in Rio de Janeiro, In 
this same command, in 1975, Col, Pasquali ran the 2nd Section of the Army, the one 
responsible for intelligence and counter intelligence, including that for the so-called 
'anti-subversion war",
77, "1 did not know Col, Mauro, He had just come from Projeto Rondon where he showed 
exceptional qualities of relating with students, His name was suggested to me just for 
that reason,” (Minister Passarinho, interview with the author),
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began action in the government with the initial intention 
of abolishing the Law-by-decree 477 of 26/2/69 or, in the 
face of the hard line taken by the General Secretary of 
the National Security Council <CSN>, to at least modify 
its more draconian aspects.7S The minister then began to 
criticise the law-by-decree in interviews with 
magazines.73 Section 3. 1.2. of this chapter has already 
described the limited success of his campaign. 
Notwithstanding resistance from the security branches, 
Passarinho overturned 199 sentences passed by lower 
authorities and confirmed only 48 during the four years of 
his tenure.
The minister used a tactic of making the first approach to 
students or teachers wherever a crisis was about to give 
rise to strikes and unrest. He called upon the protesters 
for an open discussion of the problem and often attended 
these meetings personally. eo Counting on the flexibi
78, Three weeks after the new Ministers took over their positions (November 1969), the 
ministers of justice and education received a formal expository document, the Exposig3o 
de Motives n, 400, of 28/11/69, issued by CSN and approved by the President, 
recommending that they did not forward appeals from people punished by AI-5 or the Law- 
by-decree 477 to any governmental jurisdiction, "The law-by-decree, according to CSN, 
is fully accomplishing its targets of fighting subversion in the student area, and, for 
the moment, possible results of any sort of amnesty are uncertain,1 (Quoted by Senator 
Passarinho in a speech in the Senate, by 4/8/76),
79, A Defesa National, January 1970, a magazine for the armed forces, and another, 
Realidade, March 1970, with a wide readership among the middle class,
80, During the first two years, students from the University of Brasilia or other 
delegations frequently gathered right in front of the ministry's main building in 
Brasilia, shouting their slogans or demands, "I soon became used", Col, Mauro 
Rodrigues, the General Secretary recalled wittily, "to going down from my office, with 
a footstool to stand on so I could be better seen, and chatting," (Interview with the 
author),
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lity of a reformed ministerial bureaucracy, an emergency 
solution (money, supplies or other administrave decisions) 
was provided immediately and the basis for the protests 
was removed. The possibility of a direct dialogue with 
the highest education authority silenced arguments for 
radical forms of demand or weakened criticism in the area 
against the dictatorship of the regime. For a broader 
discussion of current problems or matters, three-day 
seminars were set up. The minister, on several occasions 
during disputes, offered to open the ministry to his 
opponents for a free investigation of charges regarding 
the honesty of his arguments.
It is curious that these attempts at dialogue came about 
in exactly the period of the most violent political 
repression in the two decades of the military regime, 
under a complete disruption of democratic institutions. 
One could assume a certain dichotomy between the two 
functions of the military in the government: the system of
repression acting autonomously while the major strategy of 
the "High Command of the Revolution" was already directed 
to a wider project of "Brazil, the emerging power" through 
growing economic development. In the latter, some room 
could be found for a specific policy in the area of 
education. Passarinho was not without support in his 
audacious style of ministry, as the issue of the Law-by- 
decree 477 proved. Indeed, the search for a good image 
(AERP), requiring a posture of dialogue within the area of 
education, coincided with a need for political legitimiza­
tion and was already on the lines of the policy of 
" DistensScf* enbraced in later years.
3.3.3. Ministers of education and the era of
liberalization
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“ T h e r e  w a s  n o  c o n c e r n  w i t h  a n  e d u c a t i o n a l  p o l i c y  i n  t h e  c h o i c e  
o f  t h e  m i n i s t e r s  o f  e d u c a t i o n .  N a m e s  a r e  n o t  a t t a c h e d  t o  a 
p r o g r a m m e " . Sl 1
This harsh assessment of the crucial issue of the choice 
of ministers of education by the military was made by a 
deputy of the government party who was president of the 
Commission of Education of the House of Deputies for the 
period 1974-84. It serves to introduce a review of that 
issue in the period and raises the use of some 
appointments to serve the political purposes of the 
" DistensSo" and "Abertura" of generals Geisel and 
F igueiredo.
Despite a definite policy on the part of Geisel's 
government to seek a better image and relationship with 
the intellectuals and scientific elites of the country, 
the choice of Mr Ney Braga for the Ministry of Education 
can give an example of the actual position of the 
government vis-A-vis the area of education. Mr Ney Braga 
had retired from the Army twenty years previously with the 
rank of captain and had become a professional politician 
with a large following in the state of ParanA. He had 
solid links with Castello Branco's group <he had been
his minister of agriculture), Geisel and Golbery. s:a In
81, Deputy Rdmulo GalvSo, interview with the author,
82, Explaining the choice of Ney Braga for NEC, Golbery said: "Ney was an old mate, We 
were frying meat patties with Geisel in a friend's apartment in "Montese" (a well known 
appartment building for the military in Leme, Rio de Janeiro) when we were warned that 
Lott (Gen, Teixeira Lott, Minister of the War, for the acting President Carlos Luz) was 
going to attempt his coup (Gen, Lott's intervention by 11/11/1954, to prevent a 
supposed coup by other military groups and so to secure the elected President Juscelino 
Kubitschek to take over his office), We said: Ney, go back to Parani quickly (Mr Ney 
Braga was then the mayor of Curitiba, the capital of the state), But he followed us to 
Palicio do Catete (the Presidential Palace). Yes, Geisel liked him very much, and then 
he was a civilian rather than a militaryman," (Interview with the acthor),
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1974, because of such links and as a part of political* 
calculations (so), Mr Ney Braga was sure he would be 
minister, even he did not know for which ministry. In
fact, he wanted to became Mayor of the Federal District, 
not minister of education. His appointment to MEC was a
last-minute decision of Geisel, who could not disappoint 
his old f r lend3'* Minister Ney Braga chose a teacher of 
engineering of the University of Parand, Prof. Euro
BrandSo, to be his general secretary in a manoeuvre to 
reinforce the situation of Braga's brother, candidate for 
the office of chancellor of the university. 13:7 In MEC 
BrandSo is said to have been a general secretary without 
any special appetite for administrative activities. Even 
so, he replaced Mr Ney Braga as minister for a year, when 
the latter had to resign to stand as a candidate for the 
governorship of Parand <for the second time).
Despite the hesitant choice of Mr Ney Braga for the
Ministry of Education, the government was decisive in
taking a policy fairly consonant with the political 
strategy of uDistens8ct% and the policies of reinforcing
the basic industrial and technologial development of the
83, Col, Pasquali, interview with the author,
84, During the days leading up to the government of Gen, Geisel, who had been already 
selected, Senator Ney Braga entered his (Braga's) office joyously and said: "I am going 
to be einister, I do not know what of." Reported to the acthor by Hr, Divonzir Gusso, 
who had a close relative as fir Braga's secretary at the time,
85, He said this openly at his first meeting with MEC department heads, This was 
reported to the author by Col, Pamplona, General Secretary of MEC under the previous 
administration who remained in MEC for some days helping the new general secretary,
86, Col, Mauro Rodrigues, interview with the author, Col, Mauro, Secretary of 
Education of the state of Rio Grande do Sul at the time, was specifically interviewed 
by Geisel in order to chose his minister of education,
87, Mr, Divonzir Gusso, himself of Parani, interviewed by the author,
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country. MEC launched the 1st National Plan of Post- 
Graduation <12 PNPG) and called for the co-operation of 
the scientific community in universities and academies of 
science. Mr Ney Braga, himsef without a previous transit 
in this institutional area was to make the PNPG MEC's 
outstanding flagship for the period 1974-79. The plan 
brought generous investments in research centres, grants 
for post-graduate training at home and abroad and boosted 
the existing programme of full-time regimes for university 
teachers. Si,a Decree 73411, of 4/1/74, still under
Medici's government but already influenced by Geisel's 
plan, created the National Council of Post-Graduation 
CNPG), a high administrative structure to coordinate the 
efforts of MEC with those of related bodies of the 
Secretariat of Planning of the Presidency of the Republic 
(SEPLAN, previously MINIPLAN). Ney Braga created an
opening for intellectuals and artists, establishing a 
foundation for the promotion of arts, the National Art 
Foundation <FUNARTE>. A special programme for the
restoration of historic towns and places was set up with 
the direct support of SEPLAN, in addition to the extension 
of the activities of the reformulated Institute of the 
National Historic and Cultural Patrimony (SPHAN). Support 
for the Brazilian Film Enterprise (EMBRAFILME), a 
government agency to control and promote the national film 
industry, FUNARTE and SPHAN also helped to compensate for 
the censorship of plays and films, still practised in the 
country. Meeting a demand of the academic elites, Ney 
Braga recommended that the Federal Council of Education 
should make its conditions for approving new higher 
education courses more rigorous. The indiscriminate
88. See Brasil/MEC, 12 Plano Nacional de P6s-6raduatgo.- Brasilia, 1975.
89, Portarii 122, of 13/5/74, and Aviso Ministerial 1033, of 18/11/74, Prof, Newton 
Sucupira explained M E C 1s position at this turning-point of the policy of expanding
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expansion of these courses was highlighted as being 
responsible for the low standard of graduate students.
The choice of minister of education for Gen. Figueiredo's 
government had some personal elements, but was inspired to 
a far greater extent by the leading political strategy of 
the "Abertura". According to Gen. Golbery, who presided 
over the transition from the previous government, and 
other accredited testimonies, Professor Eduardo Portella, 
of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, a well known 
writer and literary critic, was chosen through family 
pressure. 90 However, he perfectly conformed to the figure 
of the liberal intellectual in government, just suiting 
the politically desired image of the " Abert ura,% and 
voicing governmental policy in the social area. Fluent 
and cultivated in speech, he preached the superior 
efficiency of social participation over bureaucratic 
controls, and the necessary relaxing of some forms of 
social and cultural censorship. He attracted frequent 
press coverage and Figueiredo himself was said to have
89, (cont,) higher education in an address to iscoia Superior de Suerra, See 
Sucupira, N, Q Ensino Universitirio. ESQ, September, 1976,
90, "He vas selected after family interference, Quilherme Figueiredo (brother of 
Qen, Figueiredo, writer and literary critic like Prof, Portella) put forward his 
(Portella's) name, He hoped to control the area of education through Portella," (Qen, 
Qolbery, interview with the author), Indeed, some first appointments to HEC bodies had 
name* suggested by Hr Figueiredo, Speaking to a close friend (Col, Hauro Rodrigues), 
about the choice of Prof, Portella for the Hinistry of Education, Qen, Costa 
Cavalcante, one of the most influential military of the generation of 1964, former 
Minister of Hines and Energy under Costa e Silva and Hinister of the Interior under 
Hedici, President of ItaipCi and EletrobrAs companies, said; “Figueiredo (the President) 
told me he had come to an agreement with his brother, and he (Hr Q, Figueiredo) had 
suggested the name of Portella, This was to be the price of the reconciliation
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admired and discreetly encouraged his outspoken 
minist er.31
Portella led the amnesty in universities and ordered the 
revision of all punishments imposed on students and 
teachers by the Law-by-decree 477, which had just been 
abolished, together with the AI-5. He formulated a new, 
broad policy on culture, beyond the limits of a simple 
view of the arts, the folk-lore and the historic 
patrimony, conceiving it as a complete social process in 
which education itself was seen as being both a product 
and an instrument. The new Secretariat of the Culture 
(SEAC) was to co-ordinate this policy. The Third National 
Plan for Education <1112 PNE) highlighted the priority of 
the education for children of the large unassisted 
majority of the population as an elementary civil right 
for all. Even after Portella's resignation in November 
1980 (an issue to be discussed later, Section 5.3. 1> his 
successor Gen. Ludwig retained the plan untouched
The appointment of Gen. Rubem Ludwig to the Ministry of 
Education, following the crisis involving the resignation 
of Prof. Portella, featured in Section 3.2.4. as a form 
of special "intervention". After twenty two months Ludwig 
left MEC and his replacement by Ms Esther de Figueiredo 
Ferraz still revealed a clear intention of using the 
appointment of education ministers as facts of the
90, (cont,) between thee," (Col, Mauro Rodrigues, interview with the acthor), The 
breach between the two brothers was public knownledge, as was their reconciliation 
after the appointment of Portella,
91, Reported by Minister Portella to Dr, Tarcisio Della Senta, who was his close 
assistant in MEC, (Interview of Dr, Della Senta with the acthor),
92, See Brasil/MEC, III Plano Setorial de Educate, Cultura e Desporto, 1980-1985. 
Brasilia, 1982, particularly the foreword.of the second edition, p,9,
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liberalizing policies of the regime. Ms Esther Ferraz had 
a national reputation as an educator. She was a professor 
of law at the Catholic University of SSo Paulo. She had 
held important positions as chancellor, secretary of 
education for the state of SSo Paulo, head of the 
Department of Higher Education of MEC and was then, for 
the second time, a member of the Federal Council of 
Education <CFE>. However, her choice by Palacio do 
Planalto did not chiefly refer to these posts but was 
presented in different terms. She was the first primary 
teacher and the first woman to have ever been appointed as 
minister in the whole history of the country!
3. 4. ROOTS AND LINKS
3. 4. 1. The men of the Armv education system
There is a link among the instances of personal 
involvement by the military in educational institutions 
under the 1964 regime: all of them were experienced
teachers i" inst rut ores? ' i n  the regular education system 
of the Army. Despite being quite evident, this fact is 
ignored in many studies explaining the origins of the 
education policies in the period -*3 .
The Brazilian military has a tradition of cultivating the 
quality of its own schools. As a social elite in the 
XlXth century, officers were provided with a special
93, During interviews and talks, the author was first struck by the frequent way most
military started the report from their own or other collegues's role in the military
education system, They spoke in terms of "a man of the area",
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system of education after high school. Training became 
deeply associated with the basic values of the 
institution, the necessary pre-condi t.ion for any career
progression.
"A key factor in shaping officers' attitudes has been the 
military education system. Unlike the American army with its 
multiple entries into the officer corps, all Brazilian regular 
officers are graduates of the military school, and since the 
1920's promotion has been tied to completion of various service 
schools.
Furthermore, class rank in academic results is also a
decisive factor in promotions. The three successive, 
graduate and post-graduate schools are the major element
in the formation of the internal groups which eventually
determine institutional and, by extension, political 
movements. 35 During its three-year residential course, a 
high degree of professional and personal intimacy is
developed among the young members of each class-group
94. McCann, F, D, The Military Elite, In Conniff, M. & McCann, F, D., eds, Elites and 
Masses in Modern Brazil. University of New Hampshire, To be printed, p.5 (quoted from a 
separata),
95, As far as the army is concerned, since World War II the basic (graduate) training 
of officers was unified in the Academia Nilitar das Agulhas Negras (AMAN) in the state 
of Rio de Janeiro (RJ), after being in Rio Grande do Sul (RG) for a long time (the 
generation of colonels and generals involved in the 1964 coup was formed in the two 
military schools in RG), After 1950 attendance at two other schools became obligatory 
for further career advancement: the Escola de Aperfeigoamento de Oficiais (ESAO) for a 
eight-month advanced course, and the 3-year course at the Escola de Comando e Estado 
Maior do Exercito (ECEME) required for a staff-officer to reach the rank of colonel, 
The regular course of the Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG), a ten-month course of 
research and political studies, has recently also become a requirement to reach the top 
flight as a four-star general, For a better view of military education see Peregrino, 
H, Histbria e Proietgo das I n s t i t u t e s  Culturais do Ex&rcito. Rio, Biblioteca do 
Exbrcito, 1967; and Motta, J, F o r m a ^ o  d o Q f i c i a l  do Exbrcito. Rio, Companhia 
Brasileira de Artes Grificas, 1976,
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iturma') of the Military Academy. A particular
relationship also links them to their full-time teachers 
< ins t rut ores'). These come to enjoy some special prestige 
even after being moved from that job. They are respected 
and they are considered to be qualified professionals, 
many of them being sent abroad for further training. 
Although they do not constitute a specific institutional 
group, they are frequently identified as the "men of the 
area of education".
President Castello Branco was a respected leader among the 
military due to his long service in their education 
system. He taught in all of the Army’s four higher 
education schools. He was commandant (principal) of 
ECEME, director of Studies of ESG and commander in chief 
of Staff of the Army, the top body of the system. As 
President, he first encouraged the organizing of the 
National Conference of Education, in Brasilia, a three-day 
event to discuss the problems and a policy for education 
at the highest level. Leaving the decision on activities 
to the proper institutional bodies, he then gave voice to 
his thoughts on the matter in a speech which became a 
policy guide for the principals of the federal system of 
educational organizations during the first years of the 
new regime. He created the National Council of Culture 
<CFC> and provided for MEC to set up a Foundation for 
Brazilian Educational TV Centre (FCBTVE) together with the 
British-inspired Open University’36S.
96, The personal involvement of President Castello Branco in FCBTVE, for which he 
provided a grant of Treasury Bonds for the initial endowment of a foundation's 
patrimony, was reported to the author by Col, Pamplona who was the general secretary of 
MEC under Minister Passarinho, The two officers implemented Castello's idea, which had 
remained merely a formal creation, and regretted the covert opposition to the Open 
University, which was never implemented in spite of the favourable assessment of CFE 
(Psrecer 499), The University of Brasilia, under the long governorship of the
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The presence of instrut ores in the military involvement 
with the federal educational system during the period is 
not accidental. After a long passage through the military 
regular schools, Gen. Meira Mattos was a inst rut or in ESG 
when he was called upon to head the Special Commission. 
Commenting on the so-called "colonelization" of MEC during 
his tenure as minister, Passarinho, himself a former 
military inst rut or, said;
"We had the care of finding people concerned with education.
(...) We brought in teacher-colonels. They had been instrutores
either in the military high schools or in AMAN". 3'7 
Colonel Confucio Pamplona, one of the most distinguished 
officers in MEC in the 1970-74 period, had served more 
than half of his career in military schools. He was 
amazed at the poor level of didactic skills and school 
organization among the federal education institutions he 
supervised as MEC's General Secretary. He thought the 
military indeed had something to teach the civilians in 
the area of teaching technology. He promoted a programme 
of intensive training at the advanced Centre of Studies 
for the Army's Staff (in Leme, Rio de Janeiro) for 
selected volunteers among teachers in technical schools 
and universities . He thought these professionals would 
then create Teaching Sections in thir own institutions. 
Although the programme was selective, Col. Pamplona felt 
disappointed with the results: except for a few cases, the
mere 40 teachers trained in three years were not 
successful in making further use of their experience. -,Q
The four year experiment of using military teachers in
36, (cont,) chancellor Azevedo, himself a military man, adopted a similar programme of 
university study extension to the community,
97, Interview with the author,
98, Interview with the author,
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MEC's administration was applauded and the military came 
to think of continuing. On two occasions, early in Geisel 
and Figueiredo's governments, Col. Mauro Rodrigues, a 
former instrut or of ECEME who had been General Secretary 
of MEC for two years and then Secretary of Education for 
the important state of Rio Grande do Sul, was encouraged 
by his fellows to stand for the post of minister of 
education, although, in the event, circumstances had not 
been favourable.'33 Some years later, just after Gen. 
Ludwig had been appointed to command the military graduate 
academy (AMAN) his name was raised as being the best 
emergency solution to a MEC in crisis, after a "civilian" 
administration. Then, there was a new influx of former 
military instrut ores at MEC, led by Col. S6rgio Pasquali, 
a former teacher of AMAN, ECEME, and recently (1978) 
invited to be a member of the permanent staff of ESG. For 
five years Pasquali pursued a strenuous round of visits to 
universities, colleges and state secretariats of 
education, inspecting services and tackling problems where 
they arose in the place of events. He frequently
contacted local authorities, seeking links and support for 
educational programmes, and gathered students and teachers 
to discuss demands or protests in the presence of local 
representatives. When Ludwig left MEC in September 1982, 
there was intensive lobbying for Pasquali in PalScio do 
Planalto and he was named by the press as the "natural 
successor", his name being openly supported by the Council 
of Chancellors of Brazilian Universities.
Following the presence of military instrut ores in MEC, a 
feeling of sympathy could also be perceived among the
99, Interview with the author, As already referred to, passim, in footnotes 86 and 
90, important military figures were involved in these contacts, "I spoke personally 
with Figueiredo", Sen, Costa Cavalcanti told Col, Hauro, "but there is no way it can be 
done because he has already committed himself with his brother,1
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military themselves towards education administration. 
Apart from the logistic support of local military units 
for special educational events, mainly related to sports 
and civic education, these feelings were manifested at 
higher levels of the military hierarchy by events such as 
the frequent invitations to Minister Passarinho to give 
speeches at higher military schools and clubs or the award 
of military honours (.Medalha do P a d  f icador) to a group of 
MEC's senior officials on June 1982, the solemnities 
taking place on military premises some months later. 100
The search for the roots of both the increasing desire of 
some military, the instrutores% to work in federal 
educational organizations and the changing reaction on the 
part of the military hierarchy would lead us back to the 
innovative period of 1962-67 in ECEME, a "hotbed" for the 
formation of attitudes for staff officers. There, a new 
approach to the civilian world was sought. The lessons of 
the impressive figure of Gen. Bina Machado regarding the 
relationship with students and teachers resounded among 
the young captains and majors:
"The day we have to pull the trigger against a 
student", he summarised, "we've already lost the battle"; 
or, trying to prepare his pupils for the difficult 
military-student dialogue, he reminded them of a popular 
football skill:
"Don't react immediately! Deaden the ball on your
breast, drop it to your foot and get control of it before
replying!"1 01
Seminars and meetings brought university teachers and the 
military of ECEME together in the second half of 1966. 
The first seminar, a initiative by the- ECEME command —
100, Portarii n, 414, of 2/6/82, of the Ministry of the Army,
101, Interviews with Col, Pasquali and Sen, Bina Machado,
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although circumstances recommended that the formal
invitations came from the University of Guanabara (UEG, 
later University of the State of Rio de Janeiro, UERJ) — , 
discussed the theme: "Education and National Security:
correlations and interdependencies" over several weeks. 
They found some common ground on the propositions that 
Brazilian society was changing quickly; the country had
new horizons of development; a place among the great 
nations and its chances had to be ensured. The climate of 
frankness pleased participants and it was during this
seminar that the idea of the "Rondon Operation", later 
institutionalized as " Projeto Rondon" (Decree 62927, of 
11/6/1968) arose. 10:2 A day-long meeting between the ECEME
command and the chancellors of the three universities with 
seats in Rio de Janeiro, including the Federal University
102, Projeto Rondon was an original idea, University students were invited to trips 
to distant regions of the country to assist local communities and participate in their 
lives for four to ten weeks during school holidays, Counting on official support 
(initially hesitant), these so-called "operations", carefully organized by Army 
officers and university teachers, boomed between 1967 and 1975 under nationalist ideals 
and evolved to include permanent activities in which institutional links were 
established between university and local government so that senior students had their 
technical assistance counted as regular academic training iCenpus Rvanfado), Projeto 
Rondon, an extremily rich personal experience, provided an alternative engagement to 
student political activites and was accused by some left-wing university sectors as 
having de-mobilizing purposes, Following the political changes in the country from 
1975, the initially idealistic movement increasingly presented symptoms of having 
reached a turning-point; defining its own institutional characteristics or becoming a 
simple auxiliary line for special governmental programmes, Projeto Rondon, whose 
permanent staff was nerly 500 people in 1984, seemed not to have succesfully overcome 
this dilema and declined with the regime, being completely re-structured from 1985, An 
introductory, descriptive view of Projeto Rondon is given in; Projeto Rondon/MINTER, Q. 
Projeto Rondon. Rio, INL/Bloch ed., 1972; Projeto Rondon/MINTER, Projeto Rondon e Sua 
Dimensgo Atual. Brasilia, julho de 1974,
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of Rio de Janeiro, prepared the way for a wider seminar 
gathering a hundred selected university teachers and many 
officers in order to develop aspects of that same theme. 
The seminar was held some weeks later.103
The ECEME initiatives were controversial and had 
repercussions in Brasilia. Gen. Aurelio Lyra Tavares, 
commandant of ESG (later minister of the Army and member 
of the junta which ruled the country when Costa e Silva
became ill) was angry. Apart from his own reservations 
regarding the idea, he thought that these matters should 
not be the concern of ECEME, but of ESG. The former ought
to be limited to military professional subjects. The
Minister of Education, Moniz de Arag&o (brother of Gen. A. 
C. Moniz de AragSo, then a influential member of the
military) also evinced his disagreement as he had not been 
sounded out beforehand. The Ministry of the Army showed 
his disagreement but the commander of ECEME was not 
removed for this cause. 1 °‘et
103, "We wanted to sell the idea of the new horizons of the Revolution which they did 
not have", (6en, Bina Machado, interview with the author),
104, "Gen. Bina Machado suffered a great deal because of his ideas, not only in this 
episode", said Col, Pasquali referring to the seminars with civilians in ECEME, 
Besides other events in this paragraph, Col, Mauro reports that, on the following year, 
when the Ministry of the Army was asked to provide a plane and accommodation for the 
first group of teachers and students on the 'QpsrafSo Rondorf trip to a remote 
Amazonian border, Gen, Lyra Tavares, the then minister, refused, at the last moment, to 
give any kind of support, when he was informed that the activity was related to "that 
fabrication of ECEME's",,, When Gen, Bina Machado, then in command of ESG in 1973, 
instituted an open course of “Studies of Brazilian Problems" at post-graduate level, 
the Minister Chief of the Armed Forces Staff (EMFA), to whom ESG was accountable, asked 
for the course to be closed, even after the formal approval of the Federal Council of 
Education (CFE), on the grounds that the initiative, although praiseworthy, did not fit 
the military education system, (Interviews with the author, On being reminded of 
these episodes, Gen, Bina Machado refrained from making any kind of complaint),
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Gen. Bina Machado, however, went on. Together with hie 
officer instrutores he carefully planned an invitation to 
a group of university left-wing students to visit ECEME 
and openly debate about any matter they wished. After 
preliminary contacts at the restaurant which was the
traditional meeting place for the Students Union of the
Faculty of Law (known as CACO) and required guarantees of
freedom and security for the unusual visitors had been
given, 34 students stayed for a full day — including lunch 
— with the officers. The general described the experience 
as a complete success.
3. 4. 2. Has ESG interferred with MEC?
This section is not intended to provide an analysis of 
this important military-civilian centre of studies and 
research on national security and strategies of defence of 
the state. 1os The context of this chapter limits the
105, Escola Superior de Suerra (ESG) was created in the early fifties (Law 786, of 
20/8/1949, the first regular course starting in 1951) to be a centre of "studies and 
planning on national security", Its more recent regulation was made by the Decree 
72699, of 27/8/73 and Portaria 002 ENFA-6-244, of 24/12/73, by which ESG became linked 
to the Armed Forces Staff (ENFA), Its main course, the Curso Superior de Suerra is 
annually offered to a 120 selected candidates, 1/3 of them civilians, in full-time 
regime, The doctrine of ESG is also extended through the courses of its linked 
National Association of ESG Graduates (ADESG), Basic sources for the study of ESG1 g 
doctrine, beside its Manual B&sico (ed, ESG, 1986), are: the work of Antdnio de Arruda 
ESQ: Histbria de sua Doutrina, Rio, GRD/INL/MEC, 1980; a summary in Alves, M, H, M, 
State and Opposition in Militry Brazil. Austin, Univ. of Texas, 1975, pp.13-28, 
Alfred Stepan in his Qs Militares: da Abertura i Nova- Republics (Rio, Paz e Terra, 
1986, pp,57-64) summarise his research on the role of ESG in the Brazilian political 
Abertura, Gen. Golbery's Coniuntura Politica National. Q Poder Executivo e Geopolitica 
do Brasil. Rio, Jos6 Olympio, 1981, is a current influence on ESG's thought,
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approach to the question of a possible interference by ESG 
in the policies of education during the period, 
politically backed by military involvements in the area.
A general or indirect influence of ESG's doctrine is 
supposed through the participation of the National 
Security Council (CSN) - which is usually supplied with 
ESG's papers coer.) _ some of the government's top
decisions affecting education, or the active presence of 
former students iestagi trios') in bodies dealing with 
policies for education, 1 ov' Further, the specific
influence of ESG, as an institution, in the political or 
policy-making process of MEC could be investigated. 
During the interviews for this work, eight military and 
three civilians who held key-positions in that process 
during the period 64-84 were questioned on this, but they 
were unanimous in denying any interference by ESG in MEC. 
"ESG was a centre for the formulation of doctrine, not 
policies. Papers produced by estag!6rios (students of ESG's 
courses) on problems of education were mere final qualifying 
academic exercises", 
assured Gen. Golbery 1 oea; and Stepan says:
106, Col, Pasquali, interview with the author,
107, As with other Ministries and state administrations, NEC is offered two places 
every year on E S Q 1s sain course, Senior officials are selected and the opportunity is 
seen with particular interest for reasons of both the chance it nay offer of access to 
positions of leadership and a ten month break from bureaucratic activities, with full 
pay and extra financial support for accomodation and other daily expenses in Rio 
(Parecer C6R/PR 981/69, n, H-798, of 7/3/69), Until 1985, 2,500 people had graduated 
from that course of ESG, according to its official publication Cat&loqo dos Diplomados 
da ESG, 1986, The part-time extension courses of AOESG each year enrol between 1,000 
and 1,300 participants in most states of the country,
108, Interview with the author, who also looked through those academic exercises 
related to education at ESG's Library without finding anything special, They tended to 
be more frequent in the periods of 1968-72 and 1981-2, when political conflicts
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"Specifically, no study of ESG was sent directly to the 
ministries, although it was sent to the Armed Forces Staff". 1 °'-s
Tracing the events referred to here as the "involvements" 
of the military with education, some scattered elements 
seem to indicate that there problably were ESG-MEC 
specific approaches in the period 1967-70. Minister Tasso 
Dutra in his first speech at ESG in the last quarter of 
1967, quoting a directive of President Costa e Silva to 
ESG's estagidrios about the team-work in his government, 
insisted on the full understanding and co-operation 
between MEC and ESG, as he had already ordered MEC bodies 
to offer for the implementation of Moral and Civic 
Education. He stated that he was going to arrange with 
the general commander of ESG to set up a mixed study 
group, aiming at a closer co-operation. 110 No details 
were found about this group but the design of the national 
programme of Moral and Civic Education was certainly due 
to ESG's direct participation. 111
CSN and the Military House of the Presidency of the 
Republic were to have contacts with ESG before appointing
108, (cont,) occurred in the area of education with frequent press coverage, and to 
natch ideas and data issued by MEC ,
109, Stepan, A, Os Hi 1itares: da Abertura A Nova RepOblica, Op, Cit., p,58.
110, Tasso Dutra, Q Panorama Educacional. ENFA/ESG, Doc. Cl-32-67, p . 1-3,
111, The draft of Law-by-decree 869, of 12/9/69, which instituted the subject of 
"Moral and Civic Education" in schools at national level (in university courses it was 
called "Study of Brazilian Problens") was elaborated outside MEC by General Moacyr de 
Aratijo Lopes, well-known in the army for his ideas and championing of the issue, with a 
group of former esUgiSrios of ESG, closely following the syllabuses of courses of this 
school, This information was given the author by Gen, Bina Machado (who also co­
operated in the final version of the text) and completed by Col, Pasquali who 
emphasized that Gen, Lopes was not acting in his capacity of member of the Armed Forces 
Staff but as a studious individual of the matter,
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two teachers of its permanent staff to head or form a 
Special Commission (the "Meira Mattos Commission") to 
carry out important reformative tasks in the Ministry of 
Education, in late 1967, as described in Section 3.2. 1.
These events of 1967-69 were followed by the most
significant fact to be reported. At the end of 1969 
Medici was strongly lobbied to appoint a senior civilian 
member of ESG’s teaching staff, Prof. Jorge Boaventura, as 
minister of education. 1 1 :a The attempt failed but a few 
months later Prof. Boaventura went to the Minister of 
Education, Jarbas Passarinho, with a set of ideas and
proposals for the new administration. They did not agree 
on them, and the minister was not visited again, although 
his annual and much applauded speech to ESG — where he was 
decorated for his "worthy contribution for three 
consecutive years to the activities of the School" —
attest to the good relations between himself and ESG.
If the assumption of particular links between MEC and ESG, 
as proposed above, is correct, then it should be noted 
that education entered the concerns of ESG just at the 
point that this institution is supposed to have begun its 
period of decline. 113
112, The information was disclosed to the author by Senator Jarbas Passarinho ,
113, Barros, A, de S, C. The Brazilian Military: Professional Socialization, Political 
Perforaance and State Building. PhD thesis, Oepartaent of Political Science, University 
of Chicago, 1978, pp.168-91, quoted and supported by Stepan ( Op, Cit,, p ,58), Gen, 
Golbery expressed a siailar point of view as he referred to the "distortion after 1964, 
when some people rushed to the School's courses as a key to open the doors of the 
ministries to them, or aiming to sell their ideas to the government, Though, the 
Revolution disturbed the goals of the School a little", (Interview with the author).
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3. 5. CONCLUSIONS
Four general remarks emerge from the overall view of this 
chapt er.
1) The military lasted two decades ruling the country but 
they had no coherent design for education. This happened 
simply because education was not their concern. They did 
not come to power for that. 1 1A It is opportune to remark 
that they came as professionals, with initially limited 
expectations of staying. At the crucial instant of 1967, 
they continued by extending their conceptions of security 
to a development project, chiefly committed to civilians . 
And then, from 1974, when the progress of this project 
prove to require different political internal conditions, 
and external economic circumstances also forced a change 
of direction in economic strategy, they failed to find a 
way out or a resolution for the conflict. Political 
liberalization proved to be a partial solution. As 
economic policies wavered, no room appeared possible for 
social investments such as education. The redemption of a 
huge educational debt, which was not a purpose at the 
origins of military intervention, later became omitted 
from their strategy for leaving.
114, Asked about a possible scheme for education of the 1964 movement, some military 
deeply involved in the vhole issue gave the same answer, Gen, Golbery was clear; 
"There was not a plan for education nor was there to be, The Revolution was not made 
for this, Even the document of basic social reforms issued by IPES in 1963 only had 
the purpose of opposing a similar document from ISEB," Gen, Ludwig went further; 
"Actually, the Revolution was not even planned; it was plotted," Colonels Pasquali and 
Mauro Rodrigues, early enrolled as revolutionaries, confessed they had never known any 
kind a plan as such; “everything came after, in different circunstances", (Interviews 
with the author),
- 225 -
2) All through the period of the regime, the military 
related to the subject of education in two different, 
parallel roles: the military as the security system and 
the military linked to governmental bodies, including MEC. 
There was a dichotomy and lack of agreement between the 
two tendencies over policy towards the same subject. The 
security system policies seemed to exist above any 
contest. This has deeply damaged the credibility of some 
genuine efforts by the military instrutores for education 
at certain periods.
3) The military undoubtedly held the power in the country 
for twenty one years. They are supposed to have had 
political views about some governmental areas. The proof 
that education was seen by them to have no strategic 
political meaning such as they always attributed to
the policies for communications, energy and self- 
sufficiency in arms supply, is a distinctive feature which 
gives a consistent background to the analysis of the 
struggle for finance for education (chapters Five and 
Six), in the case of Brazil. 1 16\
4) Above all, as a consequence of this stance, the issue 
of education financing was seen by the military on the 
level of general instrumentality; it was to be dealt with 
technically by the federal bureaucracy ("the civilians"),
115, Interviewed by the author, Senator Jarbas Passarinho said that during his eight 
years as ninister (1957-74) he knew of a document of the National Security Council 
(CSN) entitled "Policy of National Strategy" and classified as "confidential" which had 
been approved by CSN (so by the President) and given to ministers, "Nothing was said 
in this document about education",
116, Atypically (if the two decades of the regime are considered), Sen,Ludwig in late 
1981 had a discourse on the political meaning of elementary education as the provision 
of a basic right and the instrument of access to citizenship,
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as they did all governmental programmes. Moreover, in 
most situations where education issues brought political 
conflicts, the military endeavoured to take them out of 
the political stage and give them a "technical" treatment. 
This tendency meets perfectly the government's prevailing 
approach to education funding which the main argument of 
the thesis deals with.
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CHAPTER FOUR
FROM THE DEVELOPMENTALIST STATE TO THE EDUCATION FUNDING
This chapter aims at putting the issue of funding 
education against the broader, decisive context of the 
country's economy in its wildly fluctuating moves from the 
1968-73 boom to the exhaustion of the model in the 1979-84 
critical period.
Indeed, taking for granted the immense gap between the 
country's resources and social demands for better 
standards of living in the early sixties, the roots of a 
particular shortage of financial resources to cope with 
the targets of social programmes, as defined by the major 
1967 and 1970 governmental plans of development 
themselves, should be sought in the economic project of 
the regime.
This chapter does not relate the whole story of the 
regime's economic policies. Although referring to the 
expansion cycle, it stresses the "post-miracle" economic 
linkages which explain specifically the shortage of 
resources from the federal Treasury, those upon which the 
funding of education was most dependent.
4. 1. A GENERAL VIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT FINANCIAL CRISIS
4. 1. 1. The Brazilian public deficit: the crisis' fulcrum
When the Minister of Finance, Mr. Francisco Dornellas,
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attended a crowded meeting of the Plenary of the Congress 
on 8 May 1985, a few weeks after the end of the two decade
military regime, to make a full account of the financial
situation of the government, the expectation of the 
country's political classes was at its height. He had 
promised to disclose the real figures which were only 
partially known by politicians and the public. His 
speech, however, exceeded all expectations and became a 
landmark representing the beginning of a two year period 
when economic issues completely absorbed the political 
life of the country. The minister made a long, technical 
report of the government's financial deficit in didactical 
terms. To an astonished audience he said that the current 
estimated deficit of the government — the one which was to 
be covered until the end of the year — mounted to Cr$ 84,9 
thousand billion, 70% of all its expected revenues or 6% 
of the GDP. He added the explosive position of both the 
external and internal registered debt, the former 
amounting to USS 103 thousand million and the latter — Cr$ 
82,3 thousand billion, more directly connected with the 
current deficit — exceeding three times the 1985 existing 
Treasury Budget. Dornelles' accounts took into conside­
ration a new, higher estimate for the government's tax 
revenues and a rate of inflation limited to 200% a year.
Such was the composition of the current deficit which the
minister explained item by item C1 > : In CrS thousand
billion:
from the Treasury Budget 4.9
from the so-called "Monetary Budget" 80.0
of which:
from the state owned enterprises 22.3
from the Welfare System 4,5
from subsidies to agricultural products
1, 0 Eatado de SSo Paulo, 9/5/85, p.34,
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and other special programmes 14. 4
from state and municipios' current
deficits under federal responsibiity 8.0 
from the debt service 39.0
less transfers from the Treasury -8.2
Total 84. 9
There is a consensus among economists from the early 
eighties about the fulcral point of the Brazilian economic 
crisis: the deficit of the public sector. It could be
described as stemming from two cumulative processes: the
external imbalance and the state over— expansion in the 
economy beyond its classical function of providing 
justice, security and welfare. The two trends — the first 
being the mainstream of the whole process — are directly 
related with the rapid development policies and involve 
top priority political decisions (Section 2. 1.2). The 
analyses in the next section intend to provide a broad 
view of the roots and extension of the problem to which 
the education funding has been connected.
4. 1. 2. The main process behind the deficit
Facing the needs of foreign capital to set economic 
development going faster with massive imports, ruling — 
often nationalist — groups have been inclined to borrow 
rather than welcome direct investment by foreign companies 
(venture capital) since the early fifties. The assumption 
was that loan capitals would bring about far less 
interference in the country's economic policy than venture 
capitals did. 52
2, Rosseti, J, P, Economia Brasileira: retrospect, situatfa atuali prognostics. S, 
Paulo, Atlas, 1984, p.20,
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Table 6 show clearly the developments of these policies 
reflecting on Brazilian foreign accounts. Except for the 
recessive purge period 1964-67, massive imports of basic 
industry inputs, oil and technology accumulated constant 
deficits in the trade balance, notwithstanding the 
restrictions on importing direct consumption goods. Trade 
deficits (first column on the left) multiplied ten times 
in less than ten years, and only slowed down at the end of 
the cycle when the correlative accounts of interests from 
loans and an aggressive policy of exports put pressure on 
imports or balanced them, On the other hand, the ratio 
loans/foreign investments ("external capital movement" 
column) is always positive and peaking in the 1968-73 
period of fast growth. Venture capital, although better 
flowing into the country after 1964, did not reach the 
levels of the previous decade until the early seventies, 
and, even increasing up to 800% from 1971 to the crisis of 
the early eighties, they were at least five times less 
than the loan capital.
TABLE 6
BRAZILIAN FOREIGN ACCOUNTS - SOME ELEMENTS, 1956-84
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE 
(USt current li11 ion) EXTERNAL
CAPITAL
MOVEMENT
LATER CONDITIONS OF TRADE 
Indices 1977 * 100
TRADE+SERVICES INTEREST TOTAL 
less INTEREST I 
8 PROFITS PROFITS LOANS/INVEST
OIL QUANTUM TERMS PRIME
PRICE EXP IMP TRADE RATE
1956/63 -140
1964/67 +200
1968 -302
-114 -254
-190 +10
-228 -530
-263 -312
-353 -583
-420 -1,321
-520 -1,494
3.0
5.2
15,5
5.9 
9.7
14.9 
12,3
1969
1970
1971
-49
-230
-901
1972 -974 22 76 70 87 61
231 -
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE LATER CONDITIONS OF TRADE
(US$ current ai11 ion) EXTERNAL
CAPITAL
MOVEMENT
LOANS/INVEST
Indices 1977 = 100
TRADE+SERVICES 
less INTEREST 
& PROFITS
INTEREST
&
PROFITS
TOTAL OIL
PRICE
QUANTUM 
EXP IMP
TERMS
TRADE
PRIME
RATE
1973 -1,003 -712 -1,715 4.2 28 88 85 95 106
1974 -6,222 -900 -7,122 7.3 93 89 115 78 132
1975 -5,077 -1,674 -6,751 6,4 94 98 109 76 93
1976 -3,829 -2,189 -6,018 6.5 96 99 108 85 81
1977 -1,364 -2,559 -3,923 7.8 100 100 100 100 100
1978 -2,828 -4,232 -7,060 6.6 101 113 105 86 152
1979 -5,218 -5,542 -10,760 4.5 135 124 115 79 193
1980 -6,009 -7,032 -13,041 5.8 226 152 115 65 277
1981 -1,661 -11,633 -13,294 7.2 270 183 99 55 203
1982 -2,816 -13,494 -16,310 4,8 260 167 91 54 188
1983 +4,171 -11,008 -6,837 6.0 235 191 76 53 139
1984 +11,401 -11,235 +166 5.6 229 228 70 58 139
Sources.
Rossetti, J, P, Econoaii Brasilein. S,Paulo, Atlas, 1984, pp,25, 28; BRASIL/Banco Central,
Relat6rio 1984. Brasilia, 1985, pp,76, 77; FBV, Coniuntura Econfleiea. July, 1986, p.82; US Dept,
of Couerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of USA. 1975, p.xvii,
The 1970's were the period when the foreign borrowing for 
the big development projects had its decisive take off, 
either boosted by the optimism of a booming economy or by 
credit facilities. The debt jumped from US$ 5 to 70
bilion and rose from 12 to 30% of Brazilian Gross National
Product <GNP>. The counterpart repayment service,
however, moved faster from the late seventies and
maintained its mounting course until 1982, while the debt
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was fed mainly by the accumulation of high interests which 
were rolled over. The final result in 1984 was an 
overwhelming total debt of US$ 103 billion, equivalent to 
52% of a GNP affected by the previous four years of 
recession. Table 7 shows up the figures of the foreign 
debt and indicators related to it.
TABLE 7
BRAZILIAN FOREIGN DEBT, 1970-84 (SOME YEARS)
YEAR
TOTAL 
DEBT 
US* Million
DEBT 
SERVICE 
US$ Million
IMF 
CREDITS 
US$ Million
INDICATORS (*>
QEBI
PNB
DEBT
EXPORTS
DEBT SEF 
PNB
1970 5,138,2 679.9 - 12.2 164,8 1.6
1975 23,725.2 4,297.5 - 19,4
i i •
238,5 3,5
1980 70,236.7 13,141,2 - 29,0 301,6
t i i
5,4
1981 79,978.4 15,332,4 - 30,3 296,3 5,8
1982 91,304.2 16,830.4 550,0 34,0 388,7 6,2
1983 97,854,8 11,259,1 2,644,3 49,8 401,6 5,7
1984 103,520.4 10,313,7 2,166.8 52,4 342,1 5,2
Note. Data for 1970 and 1975 do not include short-tern debt 
SfiUKi. THE WORLD BANK. World Debt Tables. 1986-87, pp.286-89.
The long term feasibility of the model, however, depended 
on the capacity of the economy to produce enough external 
trade current surpluses to cope with the service of the 
debt and to go beyond in order to hold on to investment
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programmes without resorting to inflationary means. In
other words* to overcome the so-called "resource hiatus". 
On the other hand, current surpluses depend on a complex 
timing of the maturity of investments vis-6-vis the 
decrease in the need of imported goods and technology. 
The more the even-break point of these equations become 
critical and its positive results minute, the more the 
dependency on the international market conditions turn out 
to be crucial. There lies the risk or the hazard of the 
exterior— dependent model. Brazil was too slow in passing 
that equilibrium point, either by taking governmental 
investment activity <so borrowing and importing) too far 
or by failing to keep the rationality of this activity. 
It was, therefore, caught by the harsh international trade 
and financial conditions which followed the "second <1979- 
80) oil shock".
International trade conditions are expressed by the 
indices in the columns on right side of Table 6, short 
above. When the crisis broke out in 1979, the country had 
already sustained an expansion in the quantum of its 
exports by 63% since 1971 and imposed a slower increase in 
its imports. Nevertheless, the oil price —  to which half 
of the total imports was due — had become six times higher 
than it was in 1971 and would soon take this difference 
quite further (twelve times in 1981/82). As a consequence 
of the recession in international markets, commodity 
prices collapsed and custom restrictions were adopted by 
the largest buyers. Generally, the terms of trade
deteriorated against Brazil, falling continuously since 
the levels of 1977 (after the international recovery from 
the 1974-76 recession). They reached dramatic levels in 
1983 when Brazilian goods were worth- only half of their 
value of 1977 or even 1973. The biggest blow, however, 
came from the international financial markets which raised 
interest rates to recover the economies of the major
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industrialized capitalist countries. Together with the 
savings available in these, the income of debtor countries 
was implacably drained. Interest rates tripled from 1977 
to 1980 or double their levels if compared with the worst 
position in the previous recession. Brazil paid USS 2.5 
billion interest in 1977 (against USS 0. 9 billion in 1974) 
and soon had to pay USS 5.5 billion in 1979, 11.6 in 1981,
and USS 13. 5 billion in 1982, the last year of OECD 
recession. Such external conditions caved in on the 
Brazilian developing economy, aggravated imbalance 
symptoms existing as from 1974 and determined the 
collapse of the economic model. Table 8 presents an
overview of what could be properly called "the rise and 
crisis of Brazilian economy".
TABLE 8.
THE RISE AND CRISIS OF BRAZILIAN ECONOMY, 1964-84
6DP
REAL ANNUAL 6R0SS FIXED 
6R0VTH RATES CAPITAL
of GDP FORMATION
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES
EXPENDITURE NET REAL 
TAXATION
INTERNAL
CURRENT
DEFICIT
US» Million (X)(X of GDP) (X of GDP)* (X of GDP) (X of REVENUE)
1964/67 27,991 3.7
1968 36,009 11.0 22,1
1969 39,779 10,2 22,8
1970 42,020 8.3 22,5 16,4 15,8
1971 46295 12,0 23,1 17,0 16,3
1972 55,466 11.1 23,2 17,5 16,8
1973 77,707 14,0 23,5 16,6 17,0
1974 95,158 9.5 24,9 16,5 16,6
1975 111,320 5,6 26,9 20,0 15,2 2.5
1976 131,590 9,7 27,8 20,0 15,1 0.9
1977 154,939 5.4 26,3 23,5 14,9 3.7
1978 179,917 4,8 25.7 23,8 13,1 7,6
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REAL ANNUAL 6R0SS FIXED FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES
GROWTH RATES CAPITAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
GDP of GDP FORMATION EXPENDITURE NET REAL 
TAXATION
INTERNAL
CURRENT
DEFICIT
USI Million (XXX of GDP) (X of 6DP)* (X of GDP) (X of REVENi
1979 148,407 6,8 22,7 22,2 12,2 2,5
1980 200,974 7,9 23,2 23,5 10.7 10,9
1981 200,562 -1.9 22,1 26,0 11.0 9,9
1982 201,113 1.4 22,4 27,7 10,8 10,1
1983 122,223 -3,3 18,0 29,5 9,8 13,2
1984 121,535 4,5 17,3 27,8 6.4 17,4
Note, (t) Figures of goverment expenditure do not include the balance of goverment's subsidized 
lending until 1974 and all expenditure of state-owned coipanies which do not depend upon public 
funds,
Sources
INF, Governeent Finance Statistics Yearbook. 1986. p,188; FGV, CQniuniurt.lMllDliCi, vol. 32, n. 10, 
1987, p,81; BRASIL, Central Bank's Annual Reports; 1984. pp,19, 26; 12SL p.25; Rossetti, J, P, 
Econoiia Brasileira. S, Paulo, Atlas, 1984, p.48; Castro, A, B, e Souza, F, E, P, A Econoeia 
Brasileira ei Harcha For^ada. Rio, Paz e Terra, 1985, p, 205; F6V, Projeto Aries, Reports 315011 
(for the Crf/USI conversion rates) and 001104,
Since the heavy foreign debt was almost doubled in five 
years by the increase of international interest rates, the 
so-called mechanism of its "conversion to internal debt" 
became the feeding centre of the crisis: the government
bought foreign currency proceeds from the private sector's 
massive exports by issuing public securities (in 
Cruzeiros) and so making it possible to pay the service of 
its own foreign debt. The dizzy devaluation of the 
Cruzeiro to stimulate exports — from an average exchange
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rate of USS 1.00/CrS 18,08 in 1978 it reached USS 1.00/CrS
1.868,64 in 1984 - made this mechanism extremely
expensive. The accumulation of this ••special" internal 
debt with the usual policy of raising internal savings to 
provide for governmental investment or repay previous
deals resulted in the rapid enlargement of the total 
government internal debt. From 1968 to 1973 domestic 
federal securities debt increased at an astonishing
average of 38% p. a. , proving its close linkage with the 
strategy of fast economic growth. The amount of public 
securities in the market was reduced in the following 
period, contracting or expanding between 1979 and 1984, 
either as a consequence of the governmental efforts to 
reduce its financial needs or the pressures from the 
private financial sector to prevent further drainage of 
savings available in the economy, The general course of 
the internal debt was mounting, however, if compared with 
GDP. It approached 10% of GDP in 1976-78 and exceeded 
this in 1984.
The government provided for its needs and alternated its 
active participation in the securities market with an 
increasing money supply over 30% p. a. until 1978 and could 
not avoid resorting to this inflationary procedure during 
the crisis, when its increase hit 100% on an annual 
average. The constant pressure of attractive offers of 
public securities in the financial market, in its turn, 
brought about a soaring trend in commercial interest rates 
which reached the unbearable levels of 90% p. a. in the 
period 1979-84, pushing prices violently up in an economy 
living on credit, and driving hundreds of firms to 
bankrupt cy.
In its turn, inflation increased steadily, as a consquence 
of three aspects of the financial crisis: the rapid
devaluation of the national currency, massive internal
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money supply, and high interest rates. 3 Brazilian high 
historical rates of inflation accelerated: the 1977 39%
inflation had doubled two years later, 1980/82 touched the 
barrier of 100% and 1983/84 featured an hyperinflation 
above 200%.
The tragic side of the process, however, was that first, 
the huge amount of the internal debt was conversely 
affected by high interest rates and, second, the devalu­
ation of the Cruzeiro had to be kept above the internal 
prices, the two phenomena setting up vicious circles. 
Data for this and the previous paragraphs are in Table 9.
3, The approach of this section only leads to the connections between the public 
deficit and inflation, Inflation in Brazil has deep roots and complex - including 
psychological - causes, having remained at the two-digit level for three decades, On 
this matter, see: Pastore, Celso, 1 Inf la? So e Polltica Honet&ria no Brasil", Revista
Brasileira de Economia. vol,23, 1969; Lara-Resende, A, e Lopes, Francisco, "SObre as 
Causas da Recente Acelera^So InflacionAria", Pesquisa e Planeimento EconQmico. n, 11, 
1981; Arida, P6rsio, "Economic Stabilization in Brazil", Working Paper n . 149. Woodrow 
Wilson International Center for Scholars, Nov,, 1984,
TABLE 9
FINANCIAL VARIABLES RELATED TO THE RISE AND CRISIS OF BRAZILIAN ECONOMY 
1964/1984 (Average of periods)
DOMESTIC PUBLIC PRICE INDEX MONEY SUPPLY EXCHANGE RATE INTEREST RATE
FED, SECURITIES DEBT Annual Av, at 31/12 Annual Av, (COMMER, BANKS
------------- Annual Av,
REAL P6I (DS)
X CHAN6E X of 6DP X X CHAN6E Cr$/US$ X
1964/67 - 1.9 47,4 55,2 2,00 -
1968/73 37,9 6,5 19,3 35,8 4,90 20,0
1974/78 19,2 8.4 38,0 38,6 11,56 21,8
1979/84 28,8 11.1 136,2 99,1 470,46 90,5
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Mil
1) Until 1979 Public Securities of the federal government were registered by the Central Bank in 
their accounted value. As from 1980 only the noeinal value was used, bringing down the registered 
debt, The difference can be seen through comparison with the curve of the internal current 
deficit, Table 8,
2) *PGI (DS)" stands for Price General Index (Domestic Supply),
3) During 1982 interest rates were "frozen* by the government, keeping approximately the same 
level as for 1981 (491), Figures do not count the monetary correction,
Sources
BRASIL/Banco Central. Relatbrio Anual 1985. p.66; Idem, 1979. p,89; Idem, 1972. p,131;
FGV, Coniuntura Econbmica. July, 1986, p,69; Idem, November,1972, p.34; Rossetti, J, P, Economia 
Brasileira. S.Paulo, Atlas, 1984, p,71; F6V, Projeto Aries, Reports D010006 and 315011; INF, 
International Financial Statistics. Yearbook 1986, pp,236-7.
Mr Roberto Campos the first Minister of Planning of the
regime and the mastermind of all its economic model 
assessed the declining cycle of the Brazilian economy:
" T h e n . . .  w e  m a d e  a t i m i d  a n d  i n a d e q u a t e  a d a p t a t i o n  t o  t h e  f i r s t
o i l  c r i s i s ;  w e  d e p l o y e d  o v e r e s t i m a t e d  p r o g r a m m e s  i n  s o m e  s e c t o r s  
( n u c l e a r  e n e r g y ,  s t e e l ,  etc. ), n o t  s u p p o r t e d  b y  i n t e r n a l  
s a v i n g s ,  a n d  t h e  p r e s e n c e  o f  t h e  s t a t e  i n  t h e  e c o n o m y  h a s  g r o w n  
m o r b i d l y .  B u t  t h e  f a t a l  m i s t a k e  w a s  n o t  t o  h a v e ,  i n  g o o d  time,  
p e r c e i v e d  t h e  s e r i o u s n e s s  o f  t h e  s e c o n d  o i l  c r i s i s  a n d  t h e  b l a s t
o f  t h e  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ,  a n d  t h e i r  r e c e s s i v e  s e q u e l s  i n  t h e  w o r l d
e c o n o m y .  W e  w e n t  o n  e x p a n d i n g ,  e v e n  i n  1 9 7 9  a n d  1980, w h e n  w e  
s h o u l d  h a v e  e n t e r e d  a  v i g o r o u s  a u s t e r i t y  p r o g r a m m e ,  a s  o t h e r
c o u n t r i e s  w e r e  d o i n g .  T h e  r e f u s a l -  t o  a d j u s t  w h i c h  w a s
f a c i l i t a t e d  b y  e a s y  a c c e s s  t o  t h e  e u r o - d o l l a r  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t ,  
i s  at  t h e  r o o t s  o f  t h e  d e c a y  o f  o u r  d r e a m  o f  b e i n g  a  g r e a t  
p o w e r .
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4. 2 THE TREASURY BUDGET: A NARROWING SPACE FOR EDUCATION
Public overall deficit and financial crisis began to 
affect the allocation of finance to education through 
their connections with the federal Treasury. Two
particular points could adequately demonstrate those 
connections and make clear the true extent of the 
government's argument about "lack" of resources, which 
caused political conflicts (Chapter Six) and can link the 
funding of education to the whole political 
developmentalist strategy of the regime.
The first point is the consequences ("the aftermath") of 
the expansion of state activity in the economy, fostering 
it by several policies which finally resulted in the 
reduction of taxation capability or directly burdened 
Treasury's accounts. Among these consequences a
particular aspect is stressed: the growth of the
government decentralized structure through which that 
state activity was executed. The proportions of this 
organizational apparatus became a problem itself when many 
corporations appeared inefficient or redundant. The fact 
was that the special, development-promoting policies and 
organizations were originally meant to be implemented by 
means of extra-budget sources but eventually came to drain 
tax-originated resources. This was a major fact
increasing scarcity and the competition for finance in the 
government with direct reflexes on programmes basically 
depending on the Treasury, such as education.
In a second point, the MEC's internal budget is examined 
and an accentuated reduction in r e a l ■values for ordinary 
maintenance from the Treasury is focused, contrasting with
4. Jornal do Brasil, 1/4/84,
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significant extra-budget capital expenditure (university 
campuses installations, school buildings and equipment).
4.2.1. The federal Treasury and the aftermath of the 
expansion of state economic activity
The expansion of the presence of the state in the economy 
occurred in many ways which range from the participation 
in the production and markets though state-owned 
companies, often suplied by loans and non-tax compulsory 
"contributions" to subsidies and incentives to private 
investors. The overall result was a complete change in 
the profile of the presence of the state in the economy. 
Table 10 shows the major components and general figures 
of the governmental decentralized system. The federal 
government alone became directly responsible for nearly 
43% of total GDP. In this context, however, the federal 
Treasury became comparatively weaker with 20% of the total 
financial resources under direct control of the federal 
government.
TABLE 10 
BRAZIL: TOTAL FINANCES UNDER DIRECT CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
(December 1984)
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Cr* Million Percentages
EXCHEQUER BUDGET (ministries and
transfers to local governments) 33,817 20,3
TOTAL DECENTRALIZED AGENCIES 145,913 87,5
Transfers from the Treasury (-) -12,993 -7,8
STATE-OWNED COMPANIES 89,193 61,1
"PRODUCTIVE SECTOR" 80,138 89,8
TYPICAL PUBLIC SERVICES 9,055 10,2
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM 19,467 13,3
FEDERAL BANKS 40,846 28,0
EXPENDITURE AND SUBSIDIES 18,956 46,4
LENDING 21,890 53,6
Intragovern, transfers (-) -3,593 -2.4
TOTAL FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 166.737 100.0
Memoranda
gdp
Total tax and other compulsory
6RASIL/CDE (SEPLAN), Exposi$So de Motivos n, 33, of 19/12/1984, Anexo I; Idem, 
ExposifSo de Motivos n, 34, of 19/12/1984, Anexoi Idem, Exposi?3o de Motivos n, 35, of 
19/12/1984, Anexo; BRASIL/IBGE, AnuSrio Estatistico. 1986, p,469; IMF, Government
4.2. 1. 1. The organizational instruments of the expansion
Sources
Financial Statistics Yearbook. 1986, p , 188,
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Chapter Two remarked the importance of the 1967 
administrative reform (Law-by-decree 200, of 25/2/67) 
which defined the legal status of decentralized 
governmental organizations — Autarquias, Public
Enterprises, Joint Venture Societies (with private 
capital) and Foundations. Public Enterprises and Joint 
Venture Societies (or generally the state-owned companies) 
were the administrative structure used for activities of 
the government in the economy and had the largest share in 
the expansion. Aims at a rapid implementation of
developing policies often led to the option of
straightforwardly undertaking a project through a public 
corporation, without waiting for private national or 
foreign initiative. Foundations became the favourite
structure for typical governmental activities, sometimes 
replacing Autarquias which actually were no longer
created. The military supported the scheme directly and
even set up several state-owned companies linked to the 
military ministries, some of them becoming powerful
industries. s Many of the military were given jobs in 
these organizations, frequently in the top running
positions. More than three quarters of the total foreign 
debt was directly or indirectly due to state-owned 
companies as in 1979 or 1984 (Table 11, below).
5, According to the 1994/85 Report of the Secretariat of Control of State Enterprises 
(SEST), auxiliary table B, the three military ministries, the Army, the Air Force and 
the Navy, had twelve state-owned companies, all created after 1964, and three 
foundations, their total investments being planned at US$ 812,5 million in 1985, The 
biggest of them were the Brazilian Corporation of Aeronautics (EMBRAER), Brazilian 
Corporation of Airport Infra-structure (INFRAERO), Ordnance Industry of Brazil (IMBEL) 
and Management Corporation of Navy Projects (ENGEPRQN) which were responsible for 88X 
of that investment figure,
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TABLE 11 
BRAZILIAN FOREIGN DEBT 
COMPOSITION OF PRINCIPAL* PER LIABILITIES, 1979, 1984, (Percentages)
DEBTOR or GUARANTOR 1979 1984
TOTAL 100.0 100.0
PRIVATE SECTOR 17.8 22.0
PUBLIC SECTOR 72. 2 78.0
FEDERAL UNION 68. 8 79.8
DIRECT 76. 6 78.7
GUARANTEED 23.4 21.3
STATES AND MUNIClPIOS 1.5 0.7
DIRECT 70. 9 88. 5
GUARANTEED 29.1 11.5
PUBLIC DECENTR. AGENCIES 29. 7 19. 5
DIRECT 73.8 84.7
GUARANTEED 26.2 15.3
TOTAL 100. 0 100.0
Involving Public Decentr. Agencies ** 76. 3 77. 4
Otherwise 23.7 22. 6
Notes
(*) Excludes interest and fees.
<**) As debtor, guarantor or direct beneficiary
Sources
BRASIL/Banco Central. Relatdrlo 1984. p. 88; THE WORLD BANK. World 
Debt Tables. 1985-86. p. 158, 160; 1986-87. pp. 286.
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The political and administrative control of this system 
became a major threefold government problem: the
unwillingness of state-owned companies and foundations to 
comply with the government's policies of rational 
operation, particularly relating to expenditure on 
personnel from 1979; the autarchical reinvestment of their 
profits which should have been handed over to the federal 
Budget according to the law (Art. 108, I of Law 4320, of
17/3/1964), and their powerful lobbying activity at the 
ministry's top echelons to have their projects approved. 
Ministerial relations with them were decisively affected 
by the fact that most high-ranking officials at the
ministries were employed and paid by these state-owned 
companies and foundations who were put at the disposal of 
the ministry as a means to by-pass the inferior salary
levels of the central government.
Figures of Table 12 show the mounting course of the 
government decentralised system. This universe of
organizations is quite diverse and the biggest public 
corporations have themselves diversified their objectives 
or decentralized their activities, creating several
subsidiary companies and becoming powerful groups or 
holdings (PETROBRAs has 22 subsidiaries, CVRD 11, 
SIDERBRAS 13, TELEBRAS 29 in conjunction with the states, 
ELETROBRAS 8 and PORTOBRAS 10, among others). The whole 
set features meritorious companies and hides others 
abusively created or absorbed by the government, the 
overall deficit of its financial results not doing some of 
them j ust ice. ®
6. At least seven groups should be distinguished;- the leading groups of oil, 
chemicals, mining and metallurgy; the large holdings either for sector-monopoly 
(electricity, nuclear energy, tele-comunications, ports, airports) or market balance 
and control (food supply and storage, urban planning, transport and other services);
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6, (con t,) official banks and financial organizations; the organizations which compose 
the National Welfare System; a variety of companies created to implement particular 
policies or even routine activities of the authority (eletronic data processing, 
regional development, colonization, planning, project and financial administration, 
control of radio and television broadcasting, tourism and film, official press, 
printing and coinage, etc,); ordinary social services such as education, housing, 
medical or sanitary assistance; and a number of companies created or absorbed from the 
private sector for circumstantial, not always sufficient reasons. Among some 30 state- 
owned companies in this marginal group, the following could be found; hotels, hospitals 
(not linked to the public national health system, INAMPS), bookshops, stockbrookers, 
insurance, travel agencies and handcraft firms.
TABLE 12
BRAZIL: TOTAL STATE-OWNED COMPANIES AND OTHER DECENTRALIZED AGENCIES, 1984
Data from previous years i i.a 4
1949 1959 1969 1976 1982
S T A T E - 0 W N E D C 0 M P A N I E S OTHER TOTAL
Federal 30 45 84 154 217 189 233 422
State and municipal 34 83 258 318 482 >.. i i i 1,007
TOTAL 64 128 342 472 699 ... ... 1,422
Sources
BRASIL/CDE (SEPLAN), Exposi-;Io de Motivos n, 33, of 19/12/84, p,5; BRASIL/I6GE,
Qicamaatfls de Uni3o, Estados e Municipios, 1982. vol. 1, t, 7, p.xxiv;
BRASIL/SEPLAN/SEST, Relatdrio Anual 1982. (Annexes 1 and 2); Idem, 1984 (Annex 5); 
Resende, F, "A EvolugSo das Fungdes do GovSrno e a ExpansSo do Setor Publico Brasi- 
leiro", Pesquisa e Planeiamento Econdmico. vol.l, n.2, 1971; GuimarSes, C, et alii, 
"Perfil da ExpansSo do Estado Brasileiro na Esfera Econdmica; 1945-1975*, IUPERJ, 1977,
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4. 2. 1. 2. Consequences for the Treasury
This section explains the consequences of the overall 
expanding activity of the government to the federal 
Treasury, in terms of indirect financial implications and 
then direct effects on the annual Treasury Budget.
Exemptions, deductions and reductions from due taxes were 
awarded to individuals and firms to encourage them to 
invest in priority projects, particularly those of less 
developed regions or colonization areas (the Northeast 
Investment Fund - FINOR, the Amaz6nia Investment Fund - 
FINAM, the Sectoral Investment Fund - FISET, the Programme 
of National Integration - PIN, the Programme of Land 
Redistribution and Incentives to the Agro-Industry of the 
North and North-east - PROTERRA). 7
Trusting the implementation of a policy or project to a
decentralized agency and legally designing it to rely on 
its own operational revenues, subject to tax and market 
conditions, as any private enterprise, did not always mean 
that the federal revenue system would not eventually be 
af f ected.
"Truly, the assignment of a state-owned company to implement a 
project hardly occurred without the claim by this company to 
some (or all) of the following privileges: exemption from
customs duties, compulsory deposits on imports and measures
7, "Between 1970 and 1974 the share of incentives which were deducted from income tax
of individuals increased from 9,8X to 13,9%. As relates to firms, such share moved
from 49, IX to 51,6X" Oliveira, A.F, "A Reforma Tributiria de 1965 e a Acumula;3o de 
Capital no Brasil", Estudos. n,3, 1982, apurf, INQR/IPEA, "Retrospecto das Finan?as da 
UniSo, Tesouro - Brasil, 1970/1981", "Capitulo I, Aspectos da Economia Brasileira", 
Revista ABQP. n.20, 1984, p,25,
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protecting similar national products; authority and public 
guarantee for foreign loans; special tax conditions for the sale 
of its products in the home market, including facilities 
exclusively granted to export goods; blockage of private 
competitor projects or products, and so on. (...) That is why 
the statment that such project by the state-owned company is to 
be carried out without onus to the federal Treasury is not 
true. 1,3
Some large, new programmes, most of them created during 
the sixties, could not be suddenly financed by the 
ordinary tax system without inopportune political cost. 
The government intended to circumvent the problem by 
giving them a special political and budgetary status 
calling them "special programmes" to be funded by non-tax 
compulsory contributions, attached to them, most of them 
registered outside the Treasury Budget. In 1984 they 
amounted to CrS 10.5 billion (the constitutionally defined 
tax revenue was then CrS 26.4 billion). Besides, the 
contributions for the Welfare System more than doubled in 
the period 1964-84 (and the system still suffered a CrS 
1.9 billion deficit in 1984). 3
Obviously, these contributions — some applied on the 
payroll —  were passed on to prices by firms and worked as 
real taxes. So, since the early seventies, the capability
8, Reis, F, A, R, "A Administra$So Federal Direta e as Enprdsas PCiblicas: An&lise de 
suas Rel ates, Recomenda?8es e Alternativas para seu Aprimoramento", Revista ABQP. 
n. 18, 1983, p.68. This author lists in detail administrative privileges by which 
state-owned companies could expand, including the use of public-originated funds in its 
own benefit,
9, Figures in this paragraph are based on data from: IMF, Government Finance
Statist U s  Yearbook. 1986, p, 188-190, and completed by: BRASIL/IB6E, Anu&EiQ.
Estatlstico, 1986, pp,465-68,
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for taxation of the economy or taxpayers was severely 
engaged, making a new tax increase politically unwise. 
The argument about the impossibility of imposing new or 
increased taxes on firms and citizens was used as a 
political parameter by Medici and Geisel (see quotation at 
the beginning of Section 5. 1. 1.2).
Finally, a medium or long term financial implication for 
the Treasury came from a steady direct subsidising 
activity by public financial institutions to the private 
sector, particularly the Banco do Brasil and the National 
Bank of Economic and Social Investment, BNDES. This was 
carried out either as low interest rates for loans — those 
financial institutions having their assets compensated for 
by the monetary authorities — or through the direct 
undertaking of part of the cost of some products, mainly 
food and petrol, by those authorities themselves, the two 
forms finally resulting in a debit entry against the 
federal Treasury's account with them. 10
An assertion by the President of the Central Bank of 
Brazil in a speech at Escola Superior de Guerra, 
adequately sums up the previous paragraphs:
"In 1980, the incentives by tax deductions plus subsidies 
equalled 99.2% of actual tax revenue and 7.6 of GDP. 1,1 '
For all these consequences of the policies towards fast
10, In 1983, when the government brought in measures to reduce subsidies, the Central 
Bank of Brazil supplied money to more than twenty funds or programmes, going to Cr$ 4,0 
thousand billion (the total tax revenue was then Cr$ 7.8 thousand billion), Central 
Bank of Brazil, Annual Report 1983. Vol.20, 1984, pp,44-5, 63,
11, Langoni, C, 6,, speech at Escola Superior de Suerre in 1982, quoted by: INOR/IPEA, 
'Retrospecto das Finanfas da UniSo, Tesouro - Brasil, 1970/1981", "Capitulo I, Aspectos 
da Economia Brasileira", Revista ABQP, Op, Cit,,'p,25, footnote 2,
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economic growth, the room for a sounder federal Treasury 
did not widen to meet increasing demands from its 
traditional activities, mainly those which were carried 
out by the government's direct administration or its 
Autarquias. The levels of net real taxation have fallen 
continuously since 1970/72 (Table 8).
Notwithstanding the early intentions of achieving the 
take-off and soaring of economic growth without a straight 
charge on tax revenues, the ultimate result was a large 
and perhaps premature resort to the federal Treasury.
Apart from the transfers to states and municipalities, the 
resources of the Treasury's Annual Budget were directly 
burdened by three kinds of outlay: first, the repayment of
loans directly contracted by the ministries; second, the 
current deficit of state-owned companies which could not 
be postponed O 2 ); third, transfers of tax-originated 
finance to monetary authorities (The Central Bank) to 
reduce the Treasury's deficit account in extra-budgetary 
operations (subsidies, internal borrowing, purchase of 
foreign currency, etc. ), when such a deficit could not be 
rolled over by means of new loans or currency issue.
Table 13 gives the declining position of the net finance 
of the Treasury. Direct transfers to reduce the huge 
deficit of the extra-budgetary operations came to drain 
off almost 10% of tax revenues in the 1979-84 period of 
crisis. In 1984, when these transfers accumulated with a 
large debt repayment, the finance actually free to fund 
government ordinary activities did not reach 60% of the 
Treasury's total outlay!
12, State-owned companies composed their 1984 budget with Crt 3,2 thousand billion 
from the federal Treasury and Cr$ 19,7 thousand billion from external and internal 
borrowing, the two figures making up 1/4 of their total revenue, In the same year, the
- 250 -
12, (cont,) whole decentralized system depended upon the Treasury in \2% (Cr$ 13,0 
thousand bi 11 ion)> not counting the federal banks, which generate their own resources, 
BRASIL/CDE, Exposipio de Motives n, 35, of 19/12/84, Annex 1,
TABLE 13
BRAZIL: THE FEDERAL TREASURY's BUDGET AND NET EXPENDITURE ON FEDERAL 
PUBLIC SERVICES, 1977-84 (Percentages)
TOTAL
BUDGET
TRANSFERS 
TO STATES 
AND MUNICfPIOS
TRANSFERS 
TO MONETARY 
AUTHORITIES
DEBT
REPAY
GENERAL
EXPENDITU
1977 100. 0 17. 6 5. 0 2. 7 74. 7
1978 100. 0 18. 8 4. 6 2. 9 73. 7
1979 100. 0 20. 2 10. 6 4. 4 64. 8
1980 100. 0 20. 4 14. 7 3. 6 61. 3
1981 100. 0 19. 1 6. 9 1. 0 73. 0
1982 100. 0 19. 9 5. 2 4. 8 70. 1
1983 100. 0 18. 6 12. 8 7. 0 61. 6
1984 100. 0 20. 2 8. 8 12. 2 58. 8
Sources
Revlsta Brasilelra de Or9amento Publico. ABOP, n. 20, 1984, pp.73-5
(General Balance Sheets of the Federal Union, Brazil, 1977-79); 
BRASIL/Banco Central. Relatdrio Anual 1979. p.37; BRASIL/SEPLAN. I_ 
Plano Naclonal de Desenvolvimento da Nova Reptiblica. 1986-89. 
(Projeto). Brasilia, 1985, p. 28.
4. 2.2. Specific consequences on MEC1 s budget
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The access of education, chiefly higher education, to this 
kind of special or extra-budgetary funds according to the 
concept of education as investment for the economic 
development. This feature will receive specific study in 
Chapter Five. For the moment it is relevant to refer to 
its particular link with the Treasury's vicissitudes.
By means of loans, all three dozen Brazilian federal 
universities have had their campuses completely re-built, 
since 1968, or partially developed to meet a vertical 
increase in the number of students, researchers, 
laboratories, academic departaments and libraries.
The natural consequence of the enlargement of the capital 
expenditure, was unavoidably a sharp increase in the 
budgetary pressure for current expenditure. Money for 
current expenditure was to be supplied by the federal 
Treasury both to personnel and ordinary maintenance, and 
their curves would normally be ascending in real terms 
until the capacity of the system or the demand for it 
approached their limits. Expediture on personnel had 
always had its own particular decision-making process — 
specially examined in Section 6.2. —  and increased in real
terms. Current expenditure on maintenance, in its turn, 
suffered the effects of the general pressure on the 
federal Treasury, as described above.
Table 14 compares the levels of the ordinary 
appropriations from the federal Treasury for capital 
(equipment) and current expenditure — personnel excluded — 
(OCC) in the early seventies with those some years later. 
The curve is not ascendant as supposed. On the contrary, 
it goes through deep dives in some years of Geisel's 
government and at the end of the regime (only half of 1970 
levels). Small rallies occurred even during the 1979-84 
period of crisis particularly the 1981/82 peak which was
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due to the personal influence of Gen. Ruben Ludwig, then 
minister of education, in a contentious event (Section 
5.3.2 "The Ludwig affair").
TABLE 14
BRAZIL: ORDINARY APPROPRIATIONS FROM THE FEDERAL TREASURY
FOR CAPITAL AND CURRENT EXPENDITURE, PERSONNEL EXCEPTED, 
(OCC) OF THE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, 1970-84
TOTAL OCC REPAYMENT OF DEBT
Cr$ Million % Cr$ Million % of
of 1975 1970 = 100 of 1975
1970 1. 799, 5 100
1971 1. 476, 5 82
1975 877, 1 49 181, 0 21
1976 796, 3 44 153, 6 19
1977 1. 113, 2 66 149, 0 13
1978 1. 536, 8 85 163, 3 11
1979 1. 769, 2 98 200, 9 11
1980 1. 295, 0 72 206, 8 16
1981 1. 441, 2 80 113, 5 8
1982 1. 857, 8 103 189, 1 10
1983 904, 5 50 190, 0 21
1984 804, 7 45 205, 3 26
Sources
BRASIL/IBGE. Anuario Estatistico 1975; BRASIL/MEC/SG. 
Retrato Brasil: Educa9§io. Cultura. Desporto. 1970-1990.
- 253 -
Ccont. ) Brasilia, 1985, pp. 152-54, 153-65; BRASIL/MEC/SG.
Report T08L003T, of 8/10/86.
The impact of inflation on current expenditure is of 
particular note and the budgetary device by which it was 
done must be explained.
In the first quarter of each year an estimate of the tax 
revenue was made for the following year's Budget. 
Volatile economic and political conditions required a 
cautious planning of future tax revenues. Forecasts about 
the maintenance of the existing level of inflation could 
renew expectations of high prices, boosting a harmful 
psychological factor against anti-inflationary policies. 
As a consequence, levels of programmed expenditure in the 
budget were compressed to meet this cautious view of 
revenues. However, if expenditure is fairly contained 
within the planned levels during the two or three first 
quarters of the year and the inflation is not, revisions 
of the early estimate of revenues should be made — tax 
levy follows the real course of prices — during the year 
and readjustments in appropriations for the programmes 
should be carried out, accordingly. This was,
intentionally, not done, as if the budgetary (social) 
programmes were to pay for the inflationary effect of 
other governmental policies or mistakes.
Mr Delfim Netto took over the Secretariat of Planning of 
the Presidency of the Republic in late 1979 and soon 
promoted some changes in the budgetary law to suit a clear 
policy in this matter which continued during the following 
years. One of his early directives said:
"H) (...) In this transition stage the following measures shall
be taken up to the preparation and execution of the Budget:
H. 1. The estimate of revenues will be very conservative,
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particularly relating to attached revenues.
H. 2. As a consequence, a significant excess of levy is to 
be expected for 1980. It will be ‘sterilized* and its 
proceeds will be destined to the service of the public 
debt.”
Indeed, the nominal difference between the revenue 
underestimated in the Treasury Budget and that actually 
levied, the "excess of levy", was diverted to the monetary 
authorities (Table 13) which operated extra-budgetary 
accounts of public borrowing and subsidizing, as already 
explained.
As budgetary appropriations did not benefit from new 
prospects of revenue, current expenditure had to be 
severely restricted whilst prices of goods and services
did not stop a rising course. From a legal or formal
point of view, the government had complied with its duties 
towards the maintenance of public schools, as funds were 
transferred monthly according to the Congress-approved 
Budget, the dispute being moved first to economic and
statistic fields and so having its political sequels 
diluted. In the last quarter of the year, after
conflicts, pressure and even strikes at universities
13, Quoted fro* a conference given by the Director of the Budget, Mr JoSo Baptista 
Lengruber, at the annual seminar of the lnter-governmental Committee of Technicians of 
Economy and Finance (COCITEF), held in Cuiabi, MT, 1982, These directives were never 
published, In spite of facts, official documents repeatedly described the estimates of 
revenue as "realistic, as inflation was in decline". See Item I - Receita in the first 
page of the annexes to the following expos if des de motives (EM) from SEPLAN to the 
President, presenting the directives for the preparation of the annual Budget: EM n2 
128, of 11/1981J EM n2 151, of 04/5/1982) EM n2 154, of 1.4/5/1984,
14, Even official letters came from the President's Chief of Staff to MEC asking it to
"avoid requesting budgetary supplements, particularly to expenditure of OCC" (letter c. 
of Aviso Circular n2 003, of 15/5/1981),
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(Section 5.4), some supplements were finally granted to 
MEC, when the tactics of compressing routine decisions on 
spending had already produced the desired effects. 1s
Inflation was therefore used to restrain current 
expenditure and so cut down on the public deficit without 
an explicit — politically undesirable — declaration by the 
government about which programme had to be the first to 
pay the bill. The ruthless or unfair aspect of this 
budgetary policy was that, unlike state-owned companies 
and other autonomous agencies which had their revenues 
registered outside the Treasury Budget, the Aut arquias and 
foundations (most of them universities and technical 
schools), ministerial bodies and agencies were not legally 
allowed to apply their financial assets in the open 
market, particularly in "over— night" deals, to maintain 
their real value. They were prohibited by Law-by-decree 
1290, of 3/12/1973. The inflationary practice of state- 
owned companies was always tolerated and justified by the 
necessity of maintaining the value of their assets.
4. 3. EXPANSION, DEFICIT AND AUTHORITARIANISM
In this chapter the economic background of the federal 
policies of financing education, particularly during the
15, NEC's officials at the General Secretariat, explaining these budgetary tactics of 
delaying needed supplements, did not cover up their mood calling them "to push (the 
decision of supplementing the real costs) with the tummy", in a joke allusive to Nr 
Delfim Netto's physical profile, The delaying tactics also brought about bitter 
political thrusts: when SEPLAN, in 1982, delayed for- nine months the decision to 
provide for an increase in the school meal service from four to five days a week and a 
provision of 15X of daily needed calories (Cf, NEC's EN n2 76, of 26/7/1982), Nr Delfim 
Netto was told to be saving money on children's tummies,,,
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crisis which had its epicentre in the public deficit, has 
to be complemented by a political approach: a reference to
the link between the administrative mechanisms of the fast 
economic expansion (and eventually the deficit) and the 
authoritarian feature of the regime.
Literature is divided over the interpretation of the 
causes and developments of the expansion of the state in 
the economy. Martins (IUPERJ, 1977), Coutinho and
Reichstul (1977 and 1983) stood for a marxist ideological 
approach: the state organized itself to lead a fast
accumulation of capital and serve the interests of 
dominant international and national economic groups which 
acted from the National Monetary Council (CNM) ♦ 1 Baer, 
Kerstenetzky and Villela (1973), Suzigan (1976) and Dain 
(1980) insist that the study of the facts leads us to 
conclude that there was no clearly pre-conceived scheme 
and that the government acted circumstantially, moved only 
by the major objective of fast development; nationalist 
views of both the military and some politicians as well as 
the interest of economic groups converge. 1^ Without the 
intention of judging between these positions — which in 
fact firstly diverge from their methodological approach —
16, Martins, L, "A ExpansSo Recente do Estado no Brasil, Seus Problemas e Atores", 
IUPERJ, nimeo, 1977; Coutinho, L, e Reichstul, H, “0 Setor Privado Estatal e o Ciclo", 
In; Martins, C, E, (ed,) Estado e Capitalismo no Brasil. S, Paulo, Hucitec/Cebrap, 
1977; Reichstul, H, Coutinho, L, "Investimento Estatal 1974-80; Ciclo e Crise", In; 
Belluzo, L, 6, and Coutinho, L, Oesenvolvimento Capitalists no Brasil, Ensaios sObre a 
Crise. S, Paulo, Brasiliense, 1983,
17, Baer, W , , Kerstenetzky, I, and Villela, A, "As Modifica;Ses do Papel do Estado na 
Economia Brasileira", P esq u isa  e P U D fliaflfiP ttt.E m iA iikflj vol.3, n,4, 1973; Suzigan, V. 
"As Emprdsas do 6ov£rno e o Papel do Estado na Econonia Brasileira”, Aspectos da 
P a r t i c i p a t e  do 6ov6rno na Ecomoffiia. Rio, IPEA/INPES, S6rie Monogrifica n,26, 1976; 
Dain, S, Estatizaggo - Mi to e Realidade. Alguns Ensinamentos de AnAlise Comparada. 
Doctoral Thesis, UNICAMP, 1980,
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the scope of the present study would rather draw attention 
to the background stance of the decision-making process. 1 i:ii 
The authoritarian rule of the government played a large 
part in the results of both fast economic growth and 
uncontrolled enlargement of the public deficit.
The course from the expansion to the deficit could be 
described as a dangerous combination in the governmental 
system between autonomous proliferation of internal demand 
for public funds and the mechanisms of its supply. In 
both of them the fulcral point is the failure of an 
alleged technical self-control, in spite of the creation 
of dozens of committees of co-ordination and control.13
Indeed, the suppression or weakening of some basic 
democratic links by which the state politically depends on 
society had the immediate effect of placing the control 
centre of the government's activity in the government 
itself.
This point turned out to be very sensitive when 
development-promoting policies gave rise to new functions 
for the technical bureaucracy which made up the executive 
body of the acting political power. Autonomous forms of 
association between governmental agencies and economic 
interest groups built up over the creation, appraisal or
19, From this point of view, see: Resende, F, "0 Crescimento (descontrolado) da 
Interven?3o Gov ernme ntal na Economia Brasileira", Revista ABQP. n,18, 1983,
19, Wahr1ich, B, ("Controle Politico das Empresas Estatais Federais no Brasil, Uma 
Contribui?3o ao seu Estudo", Revista de A d m i n i s t r a t e  Ptiblica. vol. 14, n,2, 1980) 
analizes the activity of 30 councils at high ministerial levels, Brasil, 0, 
("Autonomia Organizacional, Recursos e Policentrismo Decisdrio", IUPERJ, 1983) 
describes a situation where the general acknowledgement of several, changing decision 
centers at the federal government in the early eighties gave origin to a sort of 
"access policentrism",
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disbursement of innumerable programmes of investment of 
public resources. -:::C> It was by means of such lobbies — 
which were later reinforced by the co-operation of 
deputies — that subsidies to many agricultural sectors, 
particularly the agro-industry of sugar— cane in the north­
east and the production, processing and distribution of 
wheat in the south, consolidated and could not be 
eradicated in the early eighties when the government 
endeavoured to change these policies. The continuous 
expansion of public civil works by thousands of federal, 
state and municipal bodies gave birth and shelter to 
powerful groups of industry which did not develop 
strategies of survival and growth based on the market 
rules; they laid deep .roots in public agencies, adapted to 
bureaucrats' behaviour and stood firm for the policies of 
keeping up high rates of public investment, regardless of 
the exhaustion of public borrowing.
Typical authoritarian behaviour in the management of 
public affairs passed down through the chain of government 
bodies, where many managers "took the law and the policies 
into their own hands"... In principle, compliance with 
limits of expenditure would have to be found in the 
budget, the final instance where the balance between aims 
of expanding and real resources had to meet. Analysing
20, Interesting studies on the relationship between Brazilian businessmen and 
bureaucrats of federal agencies have been made by E, D, Cerqueira and R, R, Boshi of 
the University Institute of Rio de Janeiro - IUPERJ ("Burocracia, Clientela e R e l a t e s  
de Poder; Aplica^So de urn hodelo Tedrico ao Estudo das R e l a t e s  entre o Empresariado e 
o Setor PCiblico (0 Caso do Conselho Interministerial de Pre?os)'\ IUPERJ, 1983; 
"Empresariado Nacional e Estado no Brasil", IUPERJ, 1976), The authors stress the 
importance of the informal arrangements between the two sides and the rise of some 
specific patterns diverging from the classic bureaucratic behaviour as a 
"fragmentation" of public interests occurred,
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the poor situation to which the Treasury Budget was 
reduced at the end of the military regime, the Director of 
the Budget (1974-84), Mr JoSo Baptista Lengruber 
complained about the autonomous generation of financial 
commitments, from the over— staffing to the engagement of 
new loans by state-owned companies and other agencies
without previous assessment of the financial repercussions 
by the budgetary authorities of the federal Treasury (the 
Secretariat of Budget and Finance - SOF of SEPLAN). There 
was always some decentralized agency bypassing them and
obtaining a “provisional" “go ahead" for a new project, 
"which could not have been planned the previous year" when 
the budget was made.
"The Budget always came after to the scene. Things happened as 
they (the decentralized agencies) had a special licence to spend 
and we were responsible for providing the money. n:‘:1
Finally, the only real control of the expenditure was to 
be the sole existence of available money. But,
politically, money had to be provided and this stance was 
legally established, even at the constitutional level. 
The Constitution of 1967 and particularly the military
Amendment n. 1 in 1969 introduced some decisive changes in 
the traditional "Section VI, The Budget". The mechanisms 
of money supply soon stemmed from them.
Changes aimed at freeing the Executive Power (the 
government) from dependence on the Legislative Power (the 
Congress) and securing "flexibility" for governmental 
agencies to implement policies. As for other major 
political strategies of the regime, some place was to be 
preserved for parliamentary representation in budgetary 
matters in order to keep a sort of subsidiary legitimacy 
and lawfulness. Chiefly, the spending of tax-originated
21, Mr ,Lengruber, interview with the author,
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resources could not be taken out from the formal (at 
least) approval of Congress and so the federal Budget 
became increasingly a budget of the Treasury alone, all 
other sources being decided apart. A need appeared 
afterwards to have similar means of planning and control 
for the public financial activities which developed 
outside that Budget and then, from the late seventies, a 
"budget of the state-owned companies" and a "monetary 
budget", actually bigger than the Treasury Budget itself, 
already had independent existence.
Four points would summarize the new constitutional 
provisions which were introduced between 1967 and 1969.
1) Public organizations which did not depend on funds 
from the Treasury Budget had not to be part of it (Arts. 
65/1967 and 62/1969). Most state-owned companies were
then expanded without Congress' knowledge of their 
operations, including those of foreign borrowing with the 
guarantee of the federal Treasury. Those in deficit were 
often helped by transfers from the federal Treasury 
through the ministries to which they were formally linked, 
funds being registered in some broader programme of the 
minist ry.
2) The 1969 Amendment abolished some provisions of the 
1967 Constitution (Art. 66) which aimed to prevent a 
deficit situation in the Treasury Budget because of 
government overspending. In the 1967 version special 
permission was to be asked from the Senate if real 
revenues estimate appeared insufficient to meet the 
desired level of expenditure, and a specific programme of 
adjustment was to be approved if the imbalance reached 10% 
of the Budget. This was omitted in 1969. Besides, the 
new version left for complementary laws to decide, an 
existing limit for personnel expenditure at 50% of current 
revenues.
3) The participation of Congress in the Budget was to
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be strictly limited to acknowledging it and giving it 
approval and legitimacy. Only some small changes of form 
would be possible, not affecting contents and figures both 
of revenues and expenditure <Arts. 67/1967 and 65/1969).
4) As from 1969 the operations with public securities 
in the market (issues or redemptions) were given a special 
legal status and set outside the Budget (Arts. 67§ and 
69/1969). The Constitution left the matter to be detailed 
by the law.
This last point lead to the analysis of a major 
institutional mechanism: The National Monetary Council
(CMN). The understanding of its role is crucial for this 
sect ion.
As early as in 1964 the newly inaugurated government set 
up a basic organizational scheme to run economic and 
monetary policies, initially to organize a modern 
financial market in the country and then to preside over 
the financial aspects of the major aims of development. 
CNM was created by Law 4595, of 31/12/1964, before the 
regime's Administrative Reform and enjoyed a privileged 
position in federal bureaucracy, being even reinforced by 
later changes (laws 6045, of 15/5/1974, Art. 32, and 6385, 
of 7/12/76, Art. 5, §2). CNM was a collegiate body of
eleven members appointed by the President of the Republic, 
eight of them linked to the federal government and the 
others belonging to the private sector, often the chairmen 
of the Federation of Brazilian Private Banks, the National 
Council of the Industry and the Federation of the 
Industries of the State of SSo Paulo, Three ministries 
(Planning, Finance, and Industry and Commerce) and the 
chairmen of the four main federal banks had seats at CNM 
which was headed by the Ministry of Finance. The Minister 
of Agriculture is usualy also appointed.
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CNM had the complete authority in regulating money supply, 
monetary indexes, credit, financial markets and the 
organization and operation of all financial institutions 
in the country. Crucially, CNM was in charge of the 
administration of the Balance of Payments, public internal 
borrowing, credit concession to agriculture and the major 
decisions on the balance of food supply (purchase of
harvest and import of food by the government). In spite 
of having been supported by four autonomous technical
commissions <71 members), CNM was always closely 
controlled by the highest level of the government and 
gravitated round the strongest minister of the area (Mr 
Roberto Campos, 1964-67, Mr Delfim Netto, 1967-73 and 
1979-84, and Mr Mdrio Simonsen, 1974-78). This trend came 
to a sort of virtual absorption of CNM by SEPLAN during 
the years of the financial crisis when Mr Delfim Netto was 
said to have held several meetings and taken joint 
decisions by telephone calls to CNM's members.
Article 96 of the 1969 Constitution Amendment — the 
management of public debt —  was detailed by a law of the 
highest legal status below the Constitution itself,
Complementary Law n2 12, of 8/11/1971, when the country 
was under a dictatorial rule. This law became the 
definitive mechanism of the supply of money for the 
expansion of the public sector throughout the 1970's, 
although some important aspects related to the matter, 
such as foreign financial loans were already in practice 
by means of Decision (Resolu$8o> n2 63, of 21/8/1967, and 
older regulations (Law 4131, of 3/9/1962). Its main 
points were:
1) The Executive Power through CNM had full authority 
to contract and roll over public debt, including its 
service, independently of the Congress,
2) The Central Bank of Brazil (BACEN) implemented 
CNM1 s policies and had the authority to secure the
- 263 -
repayment of the debt. A later decision of CNM ordered 
BACEN to carry out any repayment of debt not punctually 
honoured by a public body or state-owned company.
3) The Ministry of Finance was enabled to use 
resources of the federal Treasury to equalize the deficit 
of public debt account.
Soon the major part of the public economic sector had 
developed in parallel to the Treasury Budget, either under 
the exclusive control of an executive agency (the Central 
Bank) or completely without control until late 1979 (the 
state-owned companies). The "unification of the budgets" 
has been what the government needed and intended to do 
since 1980 but it clashed with the whole authoritarian 
system and did not come into effect until 1987,
4. 4. CONCLUSIONS
Generally, the story of lack of funds for social 
programmes, including education, began with the policies 
of rapid development, although the assumption was that 
they would directly benefit from the economic growth or, 
at least, they would not be affected.
Specifically, some federal government policies towards 
fast economic growth —  subsidies, tax exemptions and 
mainly the internal and external borrowing — had 
undesirable reverberations on social programmes, despite 
the intention of financing the "take-off" of the 
development by sources independent of the federal Treasury 
(tax revenues). It could not be expected from most state 
owned companies or other public agencies which were 
granted loans that they would repay their own large debts 
by a real increase in productivity or even return net
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proceeds to social programmes. Soon the burden passed on 
to monetary authorities or other areas of the government, 
and finally to the Treasury. This means that those 
expanding sectors — with access to easy, special financial 
sources — were actually privileged and the real priorities 
of the model were revealed. Moreover, the consequences of 
the borrowing in the following years spread all over the 
economy and the country's real resources were drained by 
internal and external creditors, when the economy itself 
had not yet matured sufficiently to generate substantial 
additional income or face harsh conditions from the 
international market during the recession periods of 1974- 
76 and 1980-82.
The federal government was caught in such a deficit 
situation that it had increasingly less to invest further 
and had to spend less than it levied from the only 
definitive source, the taxes, in order to make up for the 
deficit which had originated from other sources. Strictly 
speaking, the government's stance towards funding 
education programmes stemmed from this point, at least as 
f rom 1979.
When the government manipulated the effects of the 
inflation to increase surpluses and preserve economic 
programmes and the Ministry of Education had its 
appropriations from the federal Treasury for current 
expenditure gradually reduced, an essential political 
decision was definitely revealed.
The crack of the economic model prematurely victimized 
the continuation of the investments in equipment for 
education, particularly higher education, as they were not 
met by corresponding funds for current expenditure from 
the federal Treasury.
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Developments of the authoritarian rule in budgetary 
institutions and the managerial behaviour of public 
bureaucracy prevented a timely control of the process of 
expansion and investment. As the final instance of that 
control tended to be the existence of resources itself, 
the bureaucracy of the planning and financial agencies of 
the government adopted the role of ’’generating resources" 
in parallel to the federal Treasury but finally resorting 
to it.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE STRUGGLE FOR FINANCE FOR EDUCATION
In Chapter Four a picture has been drawn of the economic 
context and main economic policies and problems of the 
1964 regime, generally explaining the decisions in the
education funding otherwise reflected in the figures of 
tables 2, 3 and 4, in the Introduction. This chapter goes
further, beyond the figures, to understand the develop­
ments and role of the government's policy on this issue.
The main reason for the financing of education and even 
its special place in the government strategy was the
concept of education as an important investment for the 
development in which money had to be planned and spent 
rationally (the economic approach). This idea came to 
prevail over humanistic views of the political 
significance of education and fully dominated the official 
discourse in the development plans, elaborated in the 
1966-74 period (Chapter Two).
Our first purpose is, therefore, to examine what the
resilience of such a motive was when other interests or 
economic policies were involved, or, indeed, whether it 
was used at all, (One could even question the extent to 
which the government approach to education gave the 
Ministry of Planning, MINIPLAN, later Secretariat of 
Planning of the Presidency of the Republic, SEPLAN, an 
easier position vis-&-vis the Ministry of Education and 
Culture, MEC, in frequent disputes over the merit of 
funding particular educational programmes, and thereby 
turned out to be a disadvantage for education adminis­
trators in political terms). The research goes further, 
however, into other justifications to give or deny a
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special budgetary treatment to education, a theme which 
the events in the struggle for finance for education 
especially exposes.
In the first sequence of events, education is distingui­
shed by some new financial sources — often outside the
Treasury Budget — earmarked in the same fashion as the
government did to other special economic priority 
programmes. Table 4 in the Introduction has featured the 
large proportion which this kind of funds, all created 
from 1964, reached in the total education finance. The 
accidental course of these sources is quite revealing.
A second trend, starting some decades before 1964 and 
receiving a persistent, adverse governmental reaction from 
1967, is the effort of some liberal groups outside federal 
financial bureaucracy to have minimum percentages of 
federal taxes secured for education by setting up special 
legal provisions in the Constitution. This ammount would 
be above annual competition in the budgetary process which 
was conducted by the central planning body. If the
percentages actually allocated to education and the use of 
similar devices elsewhere by the government are collated 
with the terms of the dispute, the true nature of the 
question appears, highlighting the falseness of a 
contention between "technical" and "political" arguments, 
as the situation appeared.
Still dealing with this false contention but also bringing 
about the fundamental issue of the motive for giving or 
refusing education a privileged budgetary treatment, two
major conflicts (even clashes) are studied, involving 
ministries of education and the nucleus of the government 
over funds for education in the peak of the financial 
crisis (1979-84), a context which strained the decision­
making process and revealed its meaning.
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In this same context, the 1980-85 industrial actions by 
university staff broke away with the previous, techno- 
bureaucratic process of dealing with the demand for funds 
and represents a major recall to the political nature of 
the issue.
Each of the four sets of events raises a particular aspect 
of the whole purpose of the chapter, as above declared. 
The text, however, makes a special feature of providing 
details of events, not only for the sake of coherence in a 
general descriptive characteristic of the thesis, but also 
to allow for the government's alleged and real stance to 
appear in some detail or crucial aspect of the events.
5. 1. THE VICISSITUDES OF EARMARKED FINANCIAL SOURCES FOR
EDUCATION
Chapter Four has mentioned the regime's typical policy of 
creating special programmes which were granted with new 
financial sources and run outside the Treasury Budget 
("extra-budgetary" sources). The government's general
justification for this was the policy of giving a special 
administrative status to investment projects and thus 
protecting their expansion and managerial flexibility from 
the procedural controls and routines which Budget expen­
ditures are legally subject to. This section analyses the 
main cases in which this policy was applied to education.
5. 1. 1, The early period. 1964-73
5. 1. 1. 1. The Sal6rio-Educa$3o: origins and development
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The first experience of en earmarked source in the 
education area did not arise from the central planning 
body. Although later finding a suitable institutional 
place in similar extra-budgetary schemes and being 
inspired by the same concepts, the Salario-Educagao has 
always carried a sort of slur for not having been created 
under the aegis of an economic policy, which was the case 
of loans, lotteries, etc. Besides, it has t he not oriet y 
of having been born from an old-fashioned concept of the 
relationship between the state and private entrepreneurs 
in the time of the Vargas' Estado Novo. Nevertheless, it 
proved useful and realistic.
The " SalSrio-EducagSo" was a legal contribution —  fixed at 
2.5% of the pay-roll <1984) —  paid by private or public
enterprises to the state as an alternative way of 
accomplishing their constitutional obligation of supplying 
elementary education to employees and their children. The 
whole system generated two large financial flows: the
first, at this fixed percentage, from the enterprises to 
the federal government which returned a share — 2/3 <1984)
— to the states where the money had been levied by a 
federal agent <the Levy Institute of the Welfare, IAPAS), 
and programmed the rest for transfers to states and 
municipios <25%) in an important redistributive function, 
retaining a fraction for direct expenses. All revenue was 
strictly dedicated to primary education. This was the 
Sal Sri o-EducagSo.
The second flow, also originating from the same 
obligation, related to the individual support of education 
of employees or their children by the firms. The amount 
of this support had not to be less than the total 
contribution which otherwise had to be paid as SalSrio- 
Educag&o, and the scheme admited option for one of three 
forms: direct spending in the enterprise's own school,
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reinbursement of employees* expenses and full scholarship 
provided at local private schools. This last option was 
called the Sistema de Manut engSo do Ensino, SMU, and its 
flow went into the private school network although, from 
1982, all SMU payments had to be made through a federal 
agency of MEC, the National Fund for the Development of 
Education <FNDE) which was also the governmental body 
responsible for the whole system and particularly by the 
control and handling of the Salario-Educagao.
The Salario-Educagao, which in 1985 collected Cr$ 2. 670 
thousand million (US$ 401.6 million) and was among the 
seven largest revenue sources of the federal government, 
performed a vital role in the financing of the country's 
education, covering 42% of all public expenditure on 
primary education. The public services and private
enterprise in education shared the funds, a situation 
which was always about to give rise to the traditional 
polemic between public and private education.
The origins of the Saldrio-EducagSio go back to the 
Constitution of 1946 (Article 168, III), although some 
traits of a similar scheme can be recognized in Article 
149 of the previous 1934' text. Inspired by Vargas' 
corporativism, the commitment of such a basic state duty 
to firms was unrealistic and never worked, in spite of the 
Ministry of Education and Culture's repeated regulations, 
or was accused of having distorted results on the few 
occasions when it was applied. 1 In the early sixties, 
governmental pressures and frustrated efforts by the
1, The high standard primary schools of Volta Redonda, the industrial town built up 
around the first flourishing state metallurgy centre, with all facilities including 
full daily board for children and sport equipment with marble swimming pools, shocked 
neighbouring towns with poor school facilities,
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Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC) for the compliance 
with the law, were followed by the acknowledgement that 
the targets of the National Plan of Education (PNE, Table 
22) for elementary education would not be achieved. The 
MEC's National Institute of Pedagogy Studies <INEP>, under 
the leadership of Professor Carlos Pasquale, studied the 
experience of 80 countries and began working on an 
alternative project for firms to comply with their legal 
obligation. INEP's efforts were boosted at the time by 
the new wave of the importance of education for develop­
ment, intensively spread out by international meetings 
(see Section 2. 2. 3. 3 and footnote 55 in Chapter Two).
A primary formula was found to overcome the basic problems 
of collection and control. The SalSri o-Educag3o was then 
created by Law 4440, of 27/10/1964, and soon regulated by 
Decree 55551, of 12/1/65. The levy was to be made through 
several, independent unities of the welfare system, based 
on a fraction of the actuarial standard cost of education 
per pupil <7% of the region's minimum salary). The 
revenue from the SalSrio~Educag3o was to be shared in 
equal parts by the states where the collection had been 
made and the Federal Union was in charge of the 
redistributive transfers. One year later, a new, decisive 
step was taken: the contribution was to be based on the
payroll, at the rate of 1.5%, which was also to be the 
minimum amount for any form of accomplishment of the 
constitutional requirement (Decree 58093, of 28/3/1966). 
The standard individual cost was kept only to help in
2, In 1961 the eccentric President J&nio Quadros sent the Minister of Education, 
Brigido TinAco, one of his famous hand-written small messages with the words; "How long 
will Article 168 of the Constitution remain a dead letter?", This brought a series of 
actions from NEC's National Department of Education (ONE), often followed by 
embarassing acquittals, (Facts reported to the author by Mrs Ecilda Souza, who was 
then a senior DNE's assistant and to whom information in this paragraph is also due),
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defining possible differences between the minimum and the 
cost of the direct provision for the service by the firm, 
according to its accounting. In 1982 it was replaced by 
specific annual standards defined by FNDE 3.
From 1968, with the administrative reform of the several 
welfare institutions (which were unified under the
National Institute for Welfare, INPS) and the end of the
purging recession, which give place to a cycle of economic 
prosperity, raising the employment and so the payrolls, 
the levy of the Salario-EducagSo was made feasible and its 
revenues blossomed. From the initial CrS 56 million
(1966-68) they sprang to CrS 257 million in 1969. The new 
financial source was consolidated and its success was 
celebrated in the 1968-70 plan of education.
Three points must be noted regarding this early stage of 
the Saldrio-EducagSo. The time of its institution,
simultaneous to the elaboration of the regime's first plan 
(the "Ten-Year Development Plan" of 1966), its initiative 
and efforts outside MINIPLAN, where economist planners 
were sceptical about its success ('*), and its financial 
definition. The Saldrio-Educag&o was defined in the terms 
of the Law 4440/64 as a special source to supplement the
ordinary resources of the Exchequer for the Primary 
Education Fund, which still existed by the Law 4024, of
3, A study of the SaJJrio-Educafio, including all the legislation of its early years 
can be found in: Castro, L. F, heira de. "Fundamentos do SaUrio-Educa?3o", Forum 
Educacional. Oct/Dec, 1983,
4, Interviewed by the author, hr Arlindo Lopes Correa, who gathered and led the first 
team of MINIPLAN for the area of education from 1965, said; "Truly, the merit for the 
Salirio-EducafSo belongs entirely to Carlos Pasquale, We did not participate," The 
same comment was made by hr Edson hachado, who joined CNRH/MINIPLAN in 1967, hrs E, 
Ramos also referred to the atitude of hINIPLAN's team towards M E C 1s new financial 
device: "They did not believe that it would work", (Interview with the author),
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20/12/1961, to supply the National Plan of Education, in 
force until 1970.
A few years later, however, this supplementary feature of 
the Salario-EducagSo was forgotten. From 1968 the
appropriations of ordinary Exchequer resources to primary 
education were drastically reduced which was understood as 
a reaction from the prevailing higher education sectors 
within MEC itself to the increase of the Salario- 
Educagao. >B This occurred just when pressures and
disturbances related to the expansion of higher education 
precipitated governmental intervention and university 
reform (see Sections 3. 2. 2 and 3. 3. 1).
Stronger barriers to the implementation of the new 
financial source should be attested to in the federal 
government. They came from sectors better represented in 
the top financial bureaucracy. According to the law, the 
Saldrio-EducagSo was to be drawn from agricultural 
enterprises and the fixed earnings of the owners and 
specially contracted executive managers of firms. This 
never happened. Technical difficulties in the collection 
were always alleged when FNDE set out to implement the 
provision, even after the body began accounting on modern 
computer services. FNDE, which had the control and
5, firs E, Ratios, who was the Executive Director of FNDE for the whole period of the 
nilitary regime and one of the most prestigious senior civil servants of NEC, reports: 
"They said: you already have a booming Saldrio-EducafSo, MEC needs finance for 
secondary and higher education which are areas more specifically linked to it," 
(Interview with the author), The weaker position of primary education programmes also 
reflected in the fact that MEC's National Council of Social Service (CNSS), which was 
legally charged with declaring the public utility feature of organizations and 
exempting them from paying the Salirio-Educaf5ot always had a prodigal view about the 
exemptions and did not consult FNDE on the matter,
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administration of the Salario-EducagSo as one of its more 
important legal tasks, was denied effective means to 
access the amounts of revenue actually collected by INPS 
<later IAPAS). Strangely, this body had the right to 
define how much it could transfer from the monthly levy, 
although it was being paid 1% of all revenues for this 
collection service. Financial crisis of the welfare 
system had repercussions directly on the regularity of the 
transfers of the Salario-Educag&o by INPS (IAPAS) to 
FNDE. s
Finance was retained to alleviate cash shortages of the 
welfare system, indeed, even on a large scale <1971/72 and 
1980/82). In 1972 the financial flow of the SalSrio- 
EducagSo was simply stopped by INPS. This caused
immediate disturbance across the country because the wages 
of thousands of primary school teachers of the municipios 
depended on that financial souce. In spite of happening 
just when an extensive reform of primary and secondary 
education <L, 5692, of 11/8/71) was to be implemented, 
there was no prompt solution for the crisis and the state 
secretaries of education had to present a joint petition 
to President Medici to protest against the abuse.
The flow was again suddenly suspended in November and 
December, 1980, and then for a longer period (February to 
June, 1981), raising the debts to Cr$ 21.8 thousand 
million (USS 237 million) which was more than 2/3 the 
minimum programme of Cr$ 30 thousand million for the year. 
In early May the Minister of Education, Gen. Rubem Ludwig, 
went for the second time to President Figueiredo, who 
simply advised him to apply pressure directly to the 
Minister of the Welfare, Dep. Jair Soares. The flow was
6, Information on the two following paragraphs are from talks with MEC's civil servants 
(General Secretariat and FNDE),
- 275 -
permanently restored due to the political position of Gen. 
Ludwig, who obtained new regulations from the Minister of 
the Exchequer, Ernani Galveas C^), but a considerable part 
of the debt had not been paid off when Dep. Soares left 
the ministry. The problem remained unsolved for most 
1982, under the tenure of Minister Jarbas Passarinho <a 
former minister of education, himself). Of particular 
note is that MINIPLAN (SEPLAN), the central body of the 
government programme-budget, has never intervened in any 
of these crises leaving the problem for MEC alone.
The uneasy position of the Sal6rio-Educag3o in the
government's financial system was attributed to the fact
that it was anachronistic in its origins (why should 
primary education be a concern of firms?) and it ended up 
as one more form of indirect taxation (firms transferred 
the cost to the consumer). This economist-minded argument 
resented a Sal£rio-Educag8o out of the control of the 
economy policy-makers. The technical bureaucrats of the 
government's planning system have never understood why,
after the changes of the 1967 Constitution in this field, 
Article 178 which provided about the "obsolete" obligation 
of firms to maintain primary education was retained, 
against their proposal, in the large military 
Constitutional Amendment of 1969 and even extended by 
explicit mention of the Sal6rio-Educag8o\
In fact, supporters of the Saldrio-EducagSo had never felt
7, "Jair Soares retreated at Ludwig's first attack, He was politically weak at the 
time, but the problem was only solved by the Portaria of Galveas", (Col, Sdrgio
Pasquali, who was MEC's General Secretary at the time, Interview with the author,)
Minister Ludwig had a special relationship with Minister Galvdas, who took the 
initiative of issuing the internal regulation (Portaria) ordering the Banco do Brasil 
automatically to set aside the previously agreed values, from IAPAS1 deposits of 
monthly collections to MEC1s account,
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secure since t he Const i t ut ion of 1967 est ablished t he 
principle of not tying revenues and so the planning. This 
fear drove the government party's (ARENA) Senator Aderbal 
Jurema, who had built his political career on educational 
issues and clientele, to align himself with the issuers of 
the Amendment and be able to secure Article 178 and 
introduce the new version.'7,
5. 1. 1.2. Lotteries' proceeds, loans, contributions to 
MOBRAL, percentages of FPE/FPM.
The main set of special, earmarked sources for the 
education funding was created from 1967. The story of 
their origin and that of the majority of extra-budgetary 
sources which were created to implement major development 
policies have something in common. A statement by a high- 
placed government officer from 1964 who was later twice 
Minister of Planning (1970-78), Dr J oSo Paulo dos R. 
Velloso may properly introduce the subject:
"Between 1968 and 1978 there was no change in the structure of 
the tax system of the country. I was personally asked by the 
presidents M6dici and Geisel, at the beginning of their tenure 
to not propose any increases of taxes, as they thought these 
were already too high. Areas such as education and health 
lacked any means of generating a substantial part of their own 
financial resources as did some other areas of the government 
dealing with production. As there was no more room available in 
the Exchequer revenues, we had to think of some
7, This fact was disclosed to the author by Mrs E Ramos: "I've the honour and the 
privilege to say that this article was written at my house, Senator Aderbal Jurema 
came personally to discuss the terms of the amendment he wanted to propose, By 
inserting these explicit terms, we were fully aware of saving the SaUrio-EducagSo for 
the time being,"
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kind of extra-budgetary sources such as lotteries and loans to 
expand investments in education. ,,s
LOTTERIES. Federal and state governments in Brazil took 
to the control and exploiatat ion of lotteries during the 
fifties and have always justified this policy by the 
dedication of funds raised to social programmes. 
Lotteries were also part of the policies of the 1964 
regime for that area, particularlyto supplement the
Welfare System.
The oldest federal lottery, the Loteria Federal had its 
"Special Fund" reorganized by the Law-by-decree 204, of 
27/2/67, and altered shortly after by Law 5525, of 
5/11/68. The reform kept the previous dedication of part 
of their revenues to education, but only 5% of the total 
was to be directly handed to the National Campaign for 
School Meals <CNAE>; the largest share of 20% was to be 
given to FNDE for that or other educational purposes.
The Sports Lottery <Loteria Esportiva') was a new
initiative of the 1964 regime in this field. It was 
created by the Law-by-decree 594, of 27/5/69, and
regulated by Decree 66118, of 26/1/1970, when Brazil 
prepared for the Mexico 1970 Football World Cup and soon 
proved to be a complete success, marking the decline of 
Loteria Federal. It originated from talks between
MINIPLAN's Social Development Sector (later CNRH), headed 
by Mr Arlindo Lopes Correa, and the President of the 
Brazilian Football Confederation (CBD), Mr JoSo Havelange 
(later twice President of FIFA). Mr Correa was seeking 
financial souces for a large literacy programme (the 
Brazilian Literacy Movement, MOBRAL, was about to be 
formally created), but the personal interference of
8, Dr Velloso, interview with the author,
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President Costa e Silva's active wife, Mrs Yolanda Costa e 
Silva, who needed money for her Brazilian League of As­
sistance <LBA>, was politically decisive in breaking re­
sistances and encouraging the organization arrangements, ":j
The Brazilian Savings Bank <CEF> was given the management 
of the new lottery. 40% of net revenues were dedicated to 
LBA, 30% to Sport Education and 30% to MOBRAL. CBD and
Brazilian Olympic Committee (COB) were to benefit from 
special draws matching major international sports events. 
Loteria Esportiva boomed with Brazil's third win of 
Football World Cup (Mexico, 1970) and yet in 1972 its
annual revenue reached Cr$ 2, 0 thousand million (US$ 340
mi 11 ion).
LOANS. Going to loans for educational programmes — often 
available from international development banks — was 
initially seen as a dynamic managerial attitude from the 
federal authorities and encouraged by central planning 
bodies. This became a trend which eventually left its
developmental charateristic to enter the financial crisis 
stage when loans were sought chiefly to re-store foreign 
currency reserves (Section 5. 2. 3. 2).
From the late sixties, MEC or its bodies received loans 
from external financial agencies and, from 1976, from the 
National Savings Bank (Caixa Econdmica Federal, CEF) 
adapting their structure to this policy. 10
9, Information on the origins of Loteria Esportiva are from author's interview with Mr 
Corr6a,
10, MEC used some of its decentralized units to control and run the borrowing 
programmes mainly; FNDE. the Programme for the Expansion and Improvement of Education 
(PREMEN), 1972, later associated with the Programme for the Development of Secondary 
Educatiom (PROOEM), 1974, the Brazilian Centre of School Equipment (CEBRACE), 1973, the 
bodies which successively dealt with higher education campuses and equipment - the
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The events which led directly to the borrowing strategy - 
then starting a decisive cycle in Brazilian economy - were 
the two major educational reforms of the military regime: 
the reform of primary and secondary education (L. 5692, of
11/8/71) which emphasized technical, professional 
education, requiring the re-equipment of federal secondary 
schools and that of higher education <L. 5540, of
28/ 11/68). 1 1
Two programme-1oans with USAID, replacing free technical 
assistance, were contracted by the Brazilian government to 
implement the primary and secondary school reform and were 
soon followed by three others from the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the Inter—
American Development Bank (BID), giving birth to specific 
bodies in MEC and totalling USS 133 million. 1 ^
10, (cont,) Special Commission for the Implementation of the Plan for the Improvement 
and Expansion of Higher Education (CEPES), 1967, reformed and renamed as PREIiESU, 1974 - 
and finally the Centre for the Development and Technical Support of Education (CEDATE), 
which replaced PRQDEM, CEBRACE and PREIIESU, 1982,
11, Mr Edson Machado, head of MINIPLAN1s CNRH (1971-74) and then of MEC's Department
of Higher Education, DAU, (1975-78) is explicit on the matter;
"During the seventies there was a deliberate government policy not to finance 
the consequences of the expansion of higher education, chiefly the campuses, at 
the expense of the Treasury, Loans and even other sources were discussed in 
meetings of SOF/SEPLAN (the Secretariat of Budget and Finance of MINIPLAN, later 
SEPLAN), DAU/MEC and PREMESU," (Interview with the author),
12, Information from the Centre for the Development and Technical Support of Education 
(CEDATE), The loans and MEC's bodies were; with USAID; agreements numbers 512/L-079, 
of 13/11/69 (US* 32 million), and 512/L-081, of 17/6/71 (US* 50 million), implemented 
by PREMEN and, from 1973 by CEBRACE, Decree 72532, of 26/7/73); with IBRD; agreements 
numbers 755/SF-BR, of 21/6/71 (US* 8,4 million), which were run by PRODEM and 1067/BR 
(US* 23,5 million), of 27/12/74, whose implementation by PREMEN dragged on quite beyond 
its accorded time until 1982; with BID, the agreement n2 379/SF-BR, of 28/2/74 (US* 16
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From 1967, when the policy began, to March 1985, USS 721. 7 
million were borrowed to implement the university reform, 
chiefly the instalation or re-equipment of university 
campuses; 47.5% of this total came from foreign agencies 
and 16.8% was directed to 50 university hospitals. 13
CONTRIBUTIONS TO MOBRAL. In 1970 another dedicated source 
was created specifically to support a large programme of 
literacy which had been conceived in 1967 — when the
Executive was already authorised to create a foundation 
for that purpose: the Brazilian Movement for Literacy
(MOBRAL). The economic approach to education clearly 
marked its origins.
Private enterprises were allowed to deduct 1% of the 
income tax they owed, provided they had already made' a 
corresponding donation to MOBRAL. Besides restricting 
dedication of finance to special cases which were 
constitutionally established or approved by the law in 
some special circumstances, the Constitution strictly 
forbade the alloting of public revenues before they were 
formally accounted. In MOBRAL's case a stratagem was 
deliberately invented to make the contribution possible:
12, (cont,) Billion), by PRODEM; with CEF, the agreement 1783/76, of 17/6/82 (US* 3,1 
million) by the Federal Technical School of Pernambuco,
13, Information from the Centre for the Development and Technical Support of Education 
(CEDATE), The major external lender was BID, in five agreements, US* 170 million, 
Seven agreements with Hungary and the German Democratic Republic in the amount of US* 
133 million for the supply of laboratory equipment and other machinery, composing a 
broader deal in which Brazil was paid off a previous debt from coffee sale, were often 
criticised as buy of "scrap"; the material, hastily ordered by schools from poor 
catalogues, rested unpacked in school common areas for years or became useless for lack 
of instructions or replacement parts, Firms specializing in hospital equipment 
financed a US* 59,4 million purchase, The larger part of loans for university campuses 
came from the CEF's Social Development Support Fund (FAS) ; US* 379,1 million,
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since the handing of the money to MOBRAL occurred before 
any formal accounting, the law had, literally, not been 
broken. 1 *
The programme had just been given a share of Sports 
Lottery revenues, but its decisive financial source was 
provided after the Minister of Education, Jarbas 
Passarinho, took a firm stand on implementing the project. 
The point to remark in the creation of this financial 
source and the definite launch of MOBRAL is the idea which 
led the minister to choose the first President of the 
Foundation, Professor M£rio Henrique Simonsen:
"We saw that the illiterate was somebody discarded by 
industry and the modern economy; and then we fetched 
Simonsen to head MOBRAL. " <. . . ) "He had the idea of
the device of the 1% deduction from the due income tax 
bill. " 1 s
Simonsen is a well-known economist and professor at the 
Institute of Economy of the Getulio Vargas Foundation, who 
had been very close to the leading figures of the regime's 
economic policies <he had been a partner of the economics 
consultancy firm CONSULTEC, together with Mr Roberto 
Campos, the powerful President Castelo's minister of 
planning, and Mr Arlindo Corr6a>. Later, when Simonsen 
became President Geisel's Minister of the Treasury <1974), 
MOBRAL extended the income tax deductions in its favour 
from 1 to 2%. The Foundation had always had a comfortable 
financial life, independent of MEC's funds.
14, This feature of the allowance in favour of MOBRAL was reported to the author with 
a good humour by Senator Passarinho, Since then, the "deduction of donations" to 
public programmes from the due income tax has became a device authorised in several 
cases,
15, Senator Passarinho (Minister of Education, 1970-73), interviewed by the author,
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PORTIONS OF FPE/FPM. Education had percent portions of 
the State Participation Fund <FPE) and the Municipios 
Participation Fund (FPM), financial mechanisms directly 
linked to the regime's basic strategy of concentrating- 
public finance at the central government and then 
redistributing them according to developing policies. ''& 
Education shares which came to the impressive figure of 
Cr$ 770.722 million (USS 2,891 million) during the period 
1970-84'  ^ were always affected by the moves in this 
broader policy (Section 5. 1.2).
The portions were created by the Law-by-decree 835, of 
8/9/69, when the reform of primary and secondary education 
had already been designed at MINIPLAN. The dedication of 
20% to primary and secondary education was imposed 
together with the obligation of a corresponding 
counterpart of funds by the recipient governments and 
expressed the worries of the federal government regarding 
securing finance for the two year extension of the former 
and the massive introduction of the technical courses in 
the latter. According to early regulations, all FPE/FPM' 
transfers should be conditioned to projects, formally
16, FPE and FPtl were created by the Constitutional Amendment n, 18 of 1965, which laid 
down the regime's major tax reform and consisted of a share of 10% in the two largest 
federal taxes, Half of their assets were intended for capital expenditure, Since 
then, their percentages have varied following the movements of centralization or the 
necessary political compromises of the federal government with the states and 
municipios,
17, Calculations were made from annual revenues of the Income Tax and Tax on 
Industrial Products, taking into consideration the eight changes of percentages of 
FPE/FPM occurred in the period and the annual average of the rate Cr$/US$,
18, Interviewed by the author on this matter, Mr Paulo Sotero, a senior MINIPLAN1s 
economist, who worked for several years on FPE/FPM1s transfers, explained the practice 
as unfeasible: projects came from approximately 4,000 states and municipios and the 
transfers came to be delayed for three years,
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presented by the states and municipios, so that the
central planning body could control their developmental 
purpose. MEC was to examine those related to the
education share, but no traces were found of any project 
appraised by MEC's bodies from 1972, Good intentions 
clashed against the budgetary treatment given by MINIPLAN 
to the funds.* they were all classified as "Regional 
Development" and allocated to the budget of the Ministry 
of the Treasury. Furthermore, at the end of Geisel's 
tenure the practice of conditioning transfers to projects 
was abandoned as dilatory and exposed to abuses.1e No
other means to secure the correct application of FPE/FPM' 
shares was found and the resources were increasingly 
treated as "state and municipios' money" — although the 
MINIPLAN/SEPLAN's Secretariat for Liaison with the States 
and the Municipios <SAREM> had made a large political use 
of the transfers.
THE SHARE OF THE PETROBRAS DEVELOPMENT FUND. During the 
last months of President Costa e Silva's tenure, FNDE was 
granted half of the Fund for development projects which 
was raised from 5% of the product of the exploitation of 
oil and gas from the Brazilian continental shelf. The 
money was exclusively dedicated to improve university 
laboratories and geology courses <Law-by-decree 523, of 
8/4/69). The idea was to use the institutional network
and technical experience already available in public
universities to expand the PETROBRAS' technical 
development support.
In late 1973, when the planning office of the president- 
elected Gen. Geisel, until recently President of 
PETROBRAS, already had influence on the government's 
decisions, a sudden change in that policy occurred. 
Without any negotiation with MEC or even notification from
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the Presidency of the Republic, the Law-by-decree 1288, of 
1/12/73, simply abolished the grant. 13
5. 1. 2. The changes in 1974-76
The sudden abolition of grants from PETROBRAS' Fund is a 
clear indication of the end of a period. This section 
analyses a sequence of events which features revealing 
changes in the governmental policy towards earmarked 
finance to education. -20 Of special note is that existing
IS, "We simply stumbled upon the law-by-decree when we opened the Official Daily 
Newspaper (Diirio OficiaJ)*, (Mrs E, Ramos, interview with the author), It was not 
possible to find out the details behind the facts, The laws-by-decree of the 
concession and the abolition of the PETROBRAS1 revenue share were the result of a short 
decision-making process, involving the Ministry of Mines and Energy (MME), MME's 
minister in the two cases was Mr Antbnio Dias Leite Junior, Without doubt, however, is 
the fact that education authorities were kept out of the decisions,
20, Would President Geisel's personal views have made a difference or somehow 
influenced his ministerial team? The position of the general in the following episode, 
reported to the author by Col, Mauro Rodrigues, former MEC's General Secretary (1970- 
71), is curious, Recently appointed President, Gen, Geisel worked in the preparation 
for his government, During a visit to the State of Rio Grande do Sul, at early 1974, 
he talked with Col, Rodrigues who was the State Secretary of Education and was 
supported by the State Governor as a candidate to become the new minister of education 
(in a good temper, the colonel recalled the episode as "a disastrous interview which 
eliminated my chances"), Gen Geisel started the conversation abruptly: "I was told you 
spend too much on education," "No, I scarcely managed to spend It over the legal 20X 
minimum limit," "But the Secretary of Finance told me that it had been quite more, 
something round 30t!" "Maybe this is the figure if he adds other education-related 
expenditure and those out of my control as the school of the Military Brigade; for me 
is still 21%," "Then - relates the colonel - he began criticizing the legal provision, 
'But this is the law', I said", "We can change the law", replyed the general, finishing 
the interview (and the colonel's chances of becoming minister),
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prospects of economic decline and international financial 
crisis had not still induced any policy to curtail extra- 
budget sources which expanded until 1979.
5. 1.2. 1. A blow to the SalSrio-EducagSo
After Law 5692, of 11/8/71, extended primary education 
from four (six, in some cases) years to eight years, FNDE 
and other MEC's bodies began studying a profound change in 
the Salario-EducagSo to match the additional costs caused 
by that reform, also taking into consideration the changes 
which had occurred in the level of the work-force in 
enterprises since 1966, an element which composed the 
contribution's percentage of 1.4%. Minister Passarinho 
encouraged the studies which were aimed at returning the 
SalSrio-EducagSo to its original relation with the cost of 
primary education, but faced persistent resistance from 
MINIPLAN's National Centre of Human Resources (CNRH), the 
reformed body then responsible for the ministry's policies 
in education. Departing from MEC in March 1974, he barely 
managed to leave a draft bill for changes in the SalSrio- 
EducagSo on the President's desk. 21
The efforts to raise the aliquot of the SalSri o-EducagSo 
were re-activated under MEC's new administration. The 
bodies interested in updating the financial source planned 
to implement the legally-established inclusion of 
agricultural firms in the scheme by requiring them to pay 
0.8% their total production. The percentage on the pay­
roll of all other private or public enterprises was to be 
increased from 1.4% to 4.8%, according to studies
21, "tile were defeated in that battle to raise the aliquot of the SalArio-Educa?3o, 
yes," (Senator Passarinho, interview with the author),
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specifically hired by FNDE. The controversy of the
previous years over the repercussions of this increase on 
the economy were raised again by MINIPLAN (then
transformed into Secretariat of Planning of the Presidency 
of the Republic, SEPLAN) . SEPLAN's resistence, still
presented under economic reasons, appeared to be 
political, since the government, at the time, faced a 
movement by powerful businessmen's groups against the 
excessive interference of the state in the economy, 22
A new facet was added to the dispute, at this time, 
complicating FNDE's negotiations: some states (Rio de
Janeiro, Guanabara, Matto-Grosso) were also imposing a 
sort of "state Saldrio-Educag&o" on firms, taking 
advantage of undefined aspects in the original law. As 
the experience proved highly controversial other states 
were discouraged from doing the same but began to put 
pressure on the federal government to obtain a substantial 
increase in the Salario-EducagSo or, at least in their 
share in its revenue to deal with new duties following the 
primary education reform. The group of states was led by 
S. Paulo, whose secretary of education was Mrs Ester Ferraz 
(later minister of education, herself).
At a certain point in the event, the Minister of 
Education, Mr Ney Braga, took up personally the
negotiations with SEPLAN and other interested sectors. 
The result (Law-by-decree 1422, of 23/10/75) was a 
compromise where the aliquot was fixed at 2.5%, the states
22, A study then made by a respected Professor of University of Brasilia, economist 
Edmar Bacha, concluded that the question should be set on political grounds, as, from a 
purely economic point of view, no significant change in' the Out-put as a whole would 
occur, considering the increase in the flow of the public expenditure on the programmes 
of the Salir io-Edue a f So,
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gained a larger share of the gross revenue of the Salario- 
Educagaot having their portion increased from 1/2 to 2/3, 
so causing a reduction in the redistributive function of 
the federal government's transfers. The charge on
agricultural firms was "temporarily suspended". Minister 
Ney Braga, who had been President Castelo's minister of 
agriculture and had political commitments in his highly 
agriculture-productive state of Parand (of which he became 
governor in the following elections), explained the odd 
"suspension" - the obligation had never been applied - as 
due to the financial difficulties of the sector.23 
Furthermore, the base for the calculation of the standard 
cost of a pupil changed from the minimum wage to a more 
rigid parameter of governmental expenditures (."valor de 
referencia"').
At the end of the affair, FNDE had twice been defeated, 
and an irreparable damage had affected the Saldrio- 
Educagao because the principle of its correspondence to 
the cost of primary education had been broken. After 
this, all attempts to change the terms of the contribution 
to increase its revenues were frustated and the charge on 
agricultural firms remained suspended. The increase in 
the Saldrlo-EducagSo from 1975 to 1976 was 22% in real 
terms, whereas FNDE's calculations required it to multiply 
three times in order to secure the full financial support 
necessary to the achievement of the governmental targets 
which had been defined in the 1st National Plan of 
Development for primary education. The constitutionally 
established full supply of primary education between 7 and 
14 years of age was not reached in 1980, and the 1974 
schooling rates remained nearly the same (Table 22).
23, Mrs E, Ramos, Director-Qeneral of FNDE, interview with the author,
24, These results are highly related to the redistributive function of the federal 
government's share in the Salirio-EducafSo which had only a St real increase with the
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5. 1. 2. 2. The cut down on proceeds from lotteries with the
creation of FAS,
From the end of 1974 radical changes took place in the
scheme of lottery proceeds with the institution of the
Fund for Support of Social Development (FAS) - Law 6168, 
of 8/12/74 - which was set up by a special grant of CrS
1.0 thousand million and operated by the National Savings 
Bank (.Caixa Economica Federal, CEF), the true beneficiary 
of the policy, albeit FAS was legally defined as the
financial instrument of the newly created Social
Development Council (CDS).':;:S Although there had been 
variation in the rules (laws-by-decree. 1405, of 20/6/75, 
and 1923, of 20/1/82), the final position was a cut in
more than half the whole flow of lottery funds to MEC. ^  
Dedication to particular ministerial programmes
24, (cont,) timid changes, The evolution of the federal share of the Saldrio-Educafio 
from 1970 is shown in tables 16 and 17 at th end of the Section 5,1,3,
25, Information from Mr Gil Macieira, who was the first Executive Director of FAS and 
then apppointed Chairman of CEF (interview with the author), CDS was created by the 
Law 6118, of 9/10/74, again modifying the structure of the Presidency of the Republic 
(an Economic Development Council had been created five months earlier) with loud 
political fanfares, to co-ordinate the government's policies towards the social areas, 
whose ministers compose the Council, headed by the President himself, CDS's activities
declined after its two first years and it never had a meeting under Figuiredo's
presidency, formal decisions - inclusive on the approval of FAS's annual budget - being 
taken through the isolated collection of ministers signatures by Minister Delfim 
Net to1s SEPLAN, which prepared all documents in its capacity of secretariat to the 
Council,
26, Under the new rules, from the gross revenue 20X (Federal Lottery) and 17.3* (Sport 
Lottery) were to be due to the National Savings Bank (Caixa Econdatica Federal CEF), in 
its capacity as C D S1s financial agency and for its services in the administration of 
the lotteries, besides other continuing portions to brokers, the income tax and Social 
Security Fund, 8,125% (Federal Lottery) and 2%% (Sport Lottery), still from the gross
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was abolished, the funds being freely allocated by the 
ministries. Later, two more deductions from the gross 
revenue of lotteries were introduced: 1% of the Federal
Lottery (Law 64-30, of 7/7/77) and 5.2% of Sport Lottery 
(Law-by-decree 1923, of 20/1/82), which went to football
clubs. This scheme was to be gradually implemented 
between 1975 and 1978, as far as the basic reduction of 
50% of net revenues was concerned.
The final financial success of the new policy, however, 
came in 1979 with Law 6717, of 12/11/79 which created a 
new lottery (commonly called L0T0 and formally instituted 
as "special numerical forecast draw" of the existing 
Federal Lottery). L0T0 took advantage of the popular,
traditional relationship between numbers (tens) and 
animals, largely exploited by an illegal but highly 
profitable gambling organization ("J6go do Bicho"'), It
was approved by the President after an arduous and complex 
series of negotiations with the opposing Roman Catholic 
Church, after which opportune help from FAS was decisive
for the dificult financial situation of the Catholic 
universities, run by the Jesuits, '2'7'
26, (cont,) revenue, and all net revenue of lotteries were incorporated to FAS, 50% of 
this net revenue, however, was to be automatically handed over to MEC and the Ministry 
of the Welfare, which shared then in the same ratio as previously, The remaining half 
was to be distributed directly to social programmes by FAS, under the co-ordination of 
SEPLAN.
27, President Giesel, then looking for a political compromise with the Church for a 
peaceful transition from his government to that of Gen, Figueiredo, made the approval 
of CEF's plans for LOTO conditional on the agreement of the Brazilian bishops, who had 
reservations about the initiative due to Catholic precepts opposing "games of chance", 
Mr Gil M a d e i r a  reported on an arduous "tour" of individual meetings at several 
dioceses to persuade the most reluctant bishops of the advantages Catholic schools 
could gain from the subsidized loans of FAS, The issue was decided in a final meeting 
in Rio, in the presence of the cardinals and heads of religious orders, "0, Eugdnio
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FAS enjoyed 30% (the entire net revenue) of L0T0 which 
grew quickly. Its participation in the total FAS revenues 
climbed from a 3. 4% budgetary estimate of 1980 to a 53. 9% 
final balance of 1985, reaching the impressive figure of 
Cr$ 1.389,2 thousand million <US$ 209 million) net 
revenue, far overtaking all other lotteries.1-3 Indeed, 
L0T0 determined the definitive decline of the Federal and 
Sports Lottery, and, with them, a sharp and final drop in 
education grants through FAS (Tables 16 and 17).
Citing the traditional purpose of lotteries to support 
education, the Minister of Education, Eduardo Portella, 
made an insistent but vain attempt to obtain a share in 
this new source. 33
At the same time that the creation of FAS brought about' a 
significant reduction in MEC's revenues from lotteries, it 
instigated a high volume of loans to public and private 
educational organizations. From 1975 to 1985, Cr$ 4.030, 1 
thousand million (US$ 606.2 million), at prices of 
December 1985 were effectively disbursed in loans to 
education. Approximately 2/3 of them were taken up by
public organizations (linked to the states, the municipios 
and even the Federal Union, to which FAS/CEF itself
27. (cont,) Salts vas the first to agree and D, Evaristo Arns the last", The Jesuit- 
adainistrated pontifical Catholic universities (PUCs), then in serious financial 
difficulties, vert soon being assisted by FAS with subsidized loans, Hr Hacieira 
remembered CEF "turned a blind eye" to some PUCs, such as that of S,Paulo, which did 
not repay their loans "to show solidarity" with the defauting PUC of Rio de Janeiro and 
to press for privileged solutions for their group, (Interview with the author),
28, ExposigSo de Motives n2 002/80-C0S, of 5/3/80, and CEF/DIRFAS, Fundo de Apoio ao 
Desenivolviffiento Social - FAS.Relat6rio 1985. Chapter I, Section 6,2,
28, Hrs E, Ramos, interviewed by the author,
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belonged).30 449 out of 1779 applications by educational 
organizations for loans turned into contracts. Although 
all applications have to be given an appraisal by MEC, the 
final decision about financial conditions and the 
concession itself were made by three representative 
officers from CEF, SEPLAN, and the Ministry of Finance 
(.Portaria Int erminist erial 48, of 30/4/75). Technical 
bodies of CEF execute and control financial aspects of the 
loan.
In association with public funds from MEC, Banco do Brasil 
and some private banks, FAS/CEF also run a strongly 
subsidized programme of loans (chiefly for school fees) 
for needy higher education students, the Educational Loan 
Programme (PCE). PCE was created in 1975 (ExposigSo de 
Motivos 393, of 18/8/75, and ResolugSo of the Central Bank 
of Brazil n^ 356, of 12/1/76) and profoundly restructured 
in 1983 <ExposigSo de Motivos 10, of 27/12/83) as the
effects of inflation, which were not passed on to the 
students, jeopardized its survival. From 1976, when it 
peaked, to 1985, PCE supported 581,290 students, 331,821 
of them with full school fees (roughly about US$ 350 per 
student/year), and total loans mounted to Cr$ 148,3 
thousand millions at current prices, of which FAS/CEF was 
responsible for 78%. The refusal to repay PCE's loans was 
an object of student political campaigns - default reached 
53% in 1985 and had been worse - and the threat to the 
existence of the programme mobilized private college 
owners, to whom PCE represented about 15% (1982) of their 
clientele in national terms but quite a lot more than that
30, CEF/OIRFAS, Fundo de Apoio at? Deseflivolvimento Social - FflS.Relatbrio 1985. Chapter 
I, Tables 3.1, 4,1 and 4,4, Data about loans to public and private educational 
organization were given by the Office of FAS/GTE at MEC, 1985 annual average rate 
Crl/US$ was used,
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in some poorer regions. 31
The impact of the creation of FAS on the financing of 
education, either in reducing MEC's lottery revenues or 
increasing the volume of loans to educational institutions 
or individuals, raises the question of its actual origins. 
FAS was the result of a definite policy of reinforcing the 
National Savings Bank (CEF), whose new chairman, Mr Karlos 
Rischbieter, later Minister of the Treasury, was very 
close to the Minister of Education, Mr Ney Braga, himself 
an old friend of President Geisel and interested in 
promoting Mr Rischbieter (they were both from the state of 
Parang) in federal government. 32 CEF was defined as "the 
Social Bank" of the government and given the status of a 
subsidiary financial agent of the Treasury for some public 
revenues related to the ministries or federal bodies of 
the social area, even for the ordinary payment of staff. 
CEF offered special personal loans to any civil servant to 
encourage MEC bodies - nearly a hundred, including all 
federal universities - to shift their assets from Banco do 
Brasil, the traditional financial agent of the Treasury, 
to its branches.
Favouring CEF also served some governmental views of 
of f ering^ar' bet ter support to private initiative in higher 
education. 33 As direct grants of public finance to
31, Data of this paragraph ara from CEF/DIRFAS, Fundo da flpoio ao DesemvolvimentQ 
Social - FAS.RelatOrio 1985. Chapter IV,
32, "FAS was virtually born in NEC, so close was the relationship beetween Ney Braga 
and Rischbieter and so decisive was the co-operation of the minister," (Nr Edson 
Nachado, then Braga's Director of Higher Education and himself Parani-born, Interview 
with the author), Changing the plans of his predecessor Ninister Passarinho, Nr Ney 
Braga give PCE to CEF, not FNDE, to run, (Nrs E, Ramos, interview with the author),
33, "The federal government did not plan to expand higher education by its own system, 
But some decisive events passed its controls and, since the expansion was a fact and
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private universities were subject to some legal conditions 
and would attract angry reactions from some sectors of the 
federal universities, the ideal solution appeared to be 
subsidized loans and the PCE through a financial source 
outside the Treasury, as FAS/CEF in fact was.
FAS/CEF's lending on a grand scale to other public bodies 
raises questions, although the majority are out of the 
scope of this work. For the whole period 1976-85, the 
additional benefits in the new system —  the difference 
between the public subsidies granted in the loans to 
educational organizations and the revenues of which MEC 
was deprived — was about 39% or 2.2% if the calculations 
were limited to loans to public institutions 3-A. These 
two figures match the original purposes of the creation of 
FAS as explained above: the intention of benefiting CEF,
which retained the whole money in its lending fund (the 
FAS), and the support of the private educational system. 
This does not seem to be enough to justify the movement of 
such finance to a system where the decisions relating to 
the allocation of finance to educational projects have, at 
the end, been made under political or financial grounds by
33, (cont,) the demand could not be contained, private education was the solution.11 (Dr 
Tarcisio Dela Senta, who was special adviser to the Minister of Education for some 
years and N E C  Secretary of Higher Education (1980-82), Interview with the author,)
34, Calculations were based on data of sources quoted in footnote 27 and records of 
FNDE, Subsidies were almost always 40X of the monetary correction, less the 6X annual 
interest paid to CEF) their amount for 1976-85 was estimated as being Cr$ 1,370,2 
thousand million (1985 prices) for all loans and Cr$ 1,014,0 for loans to public 
institutions, Lottery proceeds which would have been given to HEC and immedately 
applied if the reductions of Law 6182/74 had not come about were reckoned up and 
annually converted into the official monetary standard'used by CEF to update their 
monetary assets and records (Obrigagdes ReajusUveis do Tesouro Nacionalt ORTN); their 
amount for the same period was estimated as being 14,061,2 thousand ORTN, or Cr$ 986,6 
thousand million of December 1985,
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ministries other than MEC and subject to the demands of 
individual cases, without any control over the educational 
results achieved.
5. 1. 2. 3. Changes in the FPE/FPM
Section 5.1.1.2 referred to the earmarking of 20% of the 
Fund of Participation of the States (FPE) and its similar 
of the municipios (FPM) to education. The earmarked 
portion of the FPE/FPM became the second largest special 
financial source for education, closely following the 
Saldri o-EducagHo. This new source was to be indirectly 
benefited from Geisel's policies of DistensSio and Abertura 
which brought about federal efforts to obtain legitimacy 
and support from the state and local politicians. The 
Constitutional Amendment n. 5, of 28/6/75, gradually 
restored the percentage <10%) of major federal taxes to be 
allocated to the FPE/FPM after they had been cut in half 
by the military junta in 1969. In 1981, a new rise to 
10.5% and shortly afterwards (Constitutional Amendment 
n. 23, of 1/12/83) to 12.5% (1983), reaching 16% in 1985.
The 20% special allocation to education, however, was 
abolished for FPE in 1979 <D. 83556, of 7/6/79), only
remaining for the municipios. The changes had started the 
year before when the restriction to apply the funds at 
primary and secondary schools was relieved to allow for 
applications to any educational or cultural activity <L. 
6536, of 16/6/78).
5. 1. 3. The moves related with the financial crisis 
5. 1. 3. 1. Loans for dollars
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From the late seventies, seeking for dollars to balance 
the country's foreign currency stock was increasingly the 
first reason to think of loans. Periodically, the minis­
ters of Planning or the Treasury made a tour among inter—  
national bankers, often The World Bank and came back with 
lump sums or even specific programmes already agreed to 
become loans. 3S The "money" then was offered to minis­
tries which rushed to make up a programme suitable to the 
lender's general conditions and meet the deadlines SEPLAN 
had fixed to have the first transfers cashed. 3S The 
situation was that the loan had to be carried out anyway; 
a secondary question was, for which programme, and this 
was made clear to the top MEC's officials by SEPLAN. 37
Obviously, the Bank's officials stood in a stronger 
position for the negotiations. They stuck to details 
related to the Bank's internal procedures, often difficult 
for Brazilians to adapt to; they created financial 
conditions which turned out to be disadvantageous, given 
the accelerated devaluation of the national currency to 
the dollar. The most important of these was the scheme of
35, In 1983 the World Bank introduced the scheme of "sub-sector loans" to meet this 
situation, Targets and activities of programmes might be defined during later nego­
tiations and t h r l o a n  itself was agreed, provided an area of education was defined,
36t., Yet in 1979 this sort of "putting the cart before the horse" amazed the NEC's 
General Secretary, Professor Armando Mendes, who relates; "The Ministry of the Treasury 
took the-lead and negotiated external loans without consulting us, One day they phoned 
me as bringing good news; 'We have got US* 300 million for you! Be prepared to 
spend!'", (Interview with the author)
37, "If you do not take it other ministries will do," (Talks with the author), This 
was also the framework of the final decision by NEC in relation to the loan agreements 
with the World Bank for technical and agricultural education (IBRD V) and primary 
education in the North and Centre-West (IBRD VI), during the official missions to the 
headquarters of that agency in Washington, November 1983 and April 1984, where other 
ministers, particularly that of Nines and Energy were also represented,
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payments in dollars only as re-imbursements of 
corresponding amounts spent on the programme in cruzeiros 
(irrespective of the accomplishment of the schedules for 
the counterpart of MEC in the programme). Since the 
exchange rate for dollars between 1980 and 1983 increased 
729%, MEC had to spend several times more from its budget 
to be able to cash the loans. This brought a sharp 
imbalance to MEC's budget which was at the same time 
pressed by internal inflation. Other programmes were 
sacrificed; the loan-supported programme was highly
privileged — the expenditure standards required by 
external lenders were far above the national ones — 
extending well over its original targets and times, and,
in the end, the much-desired foreign currency was delayed! 
Moreover, Brazil (MEC) was charged a 1.7% "commitment fee" 
on the dollars retained with the bankers against the 
original schedule of disbursements. 3,3 From 1976 to 1985, 
USS 196.2 million were borrowed from which, after all
efforts, only US$ 117.9 actually entered the country.33
Indeed, the same programmes could have been carried out 
with the same national money alone or even less.
Meanwhile, the share of general loan repayments in the 
MEC's funds from the Treasury sprang from 3.4% in 1980 to 
9% in 1984 ; (Table 14). From 1982, authorities in MEC's 
General Secretariat were convinced about the burden 
foreign loans represented to education, the true reason 
for the continuation of the policy being a major financial 
need of the federal government.'40 Loan agreements with
38, Explanation of this and other disadvantages of foreign loans was given by MEC's 
Deputy General Secretary in interview to Q Estado de S. Paulo, edition of 15/7/84, 
p. 17, in which the official held that this policy was unsuitable for social programmes 
in the conditions of the time,
39, Informations from the records of MEC's General Secretariat,
40, Col, S6rgio Pasquali, MEC's General Secretary, talks with the author,
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IBRD and BID, particularly the former, generated new 
sections in MEC's bureaucracy, specially paid by loan 
revenues, to support negotiations and control the 
implementation of the programmes. These oficials
naturally became one additional reason for the borrowing 
policy to be part of the ordinary financial supply of 
educat ion.
5. 1.3.2. The turning against extra-budgetary sources
A turning against the widespread use of earmarked sources 
in the federal government, most of them outside the 
Budget, took place between 1979 and 1982, when the
economic crisis, postponed once during Geisel's tenure, 
finally forced the government to face the problem of
uncontrolled public expenditure. The policy was to
gradually reduce "the Central Bank's function of foster—  
bank" (subsidizing the economy) and the issue of
government security bonds to alleviate the public deficit. 
Instead, room had to be made in the Treasury Budget to 
liberate the surplus which could effectively cut down this 
deficit.^1 The government turned its batteries against 
earmarked financal sources which reduced the options of 
the planning bodies and might not refer to priority 
programme^ any more.
The most significant change was brought about by the Law- 
by-decree 1754, of 31/12/79, which, in a single blow, 
provided for the inclusion of hundreds of small federal 
Funds of earmarked finance into a National Development 
Fund (FND) within two years, the immediate control and 
approval of all of them by the Secretariat of Finance and
41, Source quoted at footnote 13 in Chapter Four,
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Budget (SOF) of SEPLAN, and finally the extinction of FND 
itself in 1983, with the entire absorption of all its 
accounts into the ordinary finance of the Treasury. One 
year afterwards, a new 1aw-by-decree (DL 1859, of 17/2/81) 
extinguished FND prematurely, saving some dedicated 
sources as such but including them in the Budget and sub­
jecting them to its procedures and SOF/SEPLAN's control.
From the point of view of MEC, the changes initially came 
from an unusual visit by the SOF/SEPLAN's Director of the 
Budget, Mr Jo§o Baptista Lengruber, to a conference and 
debate on the new policy of "disengagement of sources", in 
a sort of reform crusade which SEPLAN carried out in the 
ministries. Mr Lengruber flourished a small table showing 
the 1975-79 mounting ratios of the earmarked resources in 
the Treasury finance "as weeds preventing the budget from 
breathing" and driving financial authorities to a deadlock 
between the imposition of further taxes on an overburdened 
population or finding themselves without the budget as an 
instrument of economic policy.
Actually, those were assumptive figures, reckoning on some 
earmarked finance which did not belong to the Budget until 
1980. Furthermore, the problem was presented as a
shrinkage of the available revenue due to the high number 
of small funds, whereas it was the result of several 
causes, particularly the increase in expenditure on 
personnel (from 43% in 1974 to 60% of the Budget in 1979)
42. Figures of the table (headlined: "Evolution of the Dedicated Revenues in the 
Federal Budget") were; 1975 34,3
1976 41,6
1977 44,9
1978 46,7
1979 47,8
Table and facts reported to the author by Mrs E Ramos,
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and the Geisel's Constitutional Amendment n. 5,' of
28/6/75, changing the shares of the states and the
municipi os from 5 to 10% of the two largest taxes of the 
federal government (the income tax and the tax on
industrial products) which were responsible for more than 
half the Treasury revenue.
All MEC's dedicated sources were put under the new scheme. 
The requirement of submission to SEPLAN' s approval 
sometimes brought about lower authorised revenue for
Funds, draining surplus income directly into the general 
Treasury account. This mainly happened to the funds 
directly collected by the so-called "autonomous bodies" of 
MEC such as CAPES (post-graduation support), INEP 
(research into educational planning), PREMESU and CEBRACE 
(planning of installations for schools and university 
campuses, later merged into CEDATE), COAGRI (a network of 
33 agricultural secondary schools), CENESP (administration 
of institutes for education of disabled people) and CNSA 
(author's copyright administration). Saldrio-Educag3o and 
the programmes entirely supported by loans remained as 
earmarked sources, under the approval of SOF/SEPLAN. 
Namely, Lottery revenues were merged into the ordinary 
appropriations of the Treasury for MEC, although 
SOF/SEPLAN had to inform MEC of the lottery amounts 
contained within those appropriations to comply with the 
destination of lottery funds established by Law 6168, of 
9/12/74. From 1982 on, MEC is reported to have actually 
lost additional revenues from lotteries.
43, Mrs Odete Lapa, MEC's Secretary of Finance and Budget, who completed: "I gave to 
SOF/SEPLAN a small table which demonstrated that they had reduced either the inflation- 
corrective increment on MEC's ordinary appropriations of the Treasury or the estimate 
of the lotteries to our budgetary 'ceiling' for 1982“. (Interview with the author),
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5. 1. 3. 3. The FINSOCIAL
Lately, in 1982, special political and financial 
circumstances caused the appearance of a final extra­
budgetary, earmarked source. Law-by-decree 1940, of
25/5/82, created a "social contribution to fund invest­
ments with characteristics offering assistance such as 
nutrition, popular housing, health, education and support 
to the small farmer" (Art. 1). The compulsory contribution 
— whose proceeds constituted the Fund to Support Social 
Investment (FINSOCIAL) — was to be 0. 5% of gross revenue 
of public or private enterprises dealing with goods or 
finances and 5% of the value due to the income tax by 
firms dealing with services. FINSOCIAL, obviously a new 
tax imposed at the peak of the economic crisis through a 
law-by-decree, had to face a court contention moved by en­
trepreneurs before being implemented several months later.
FINSOCIAL rose from talks between ministers Delfim Netto 
(SEPLAN) and LeitSo de Abreu (Casa Civil of the Presidency 
of the Republic) and was intended to have a double 
purpose: first to provide extra-budgetary, copious funds
for the federal government to use in support of political 
campaign for the approaching crucial elections of November 
1982, in which the electoral college of the next president 
of the republic was to be elected. The Minister of Casa 
Civil, then the political co-ordinator of the government, 
was eager to find flexible and adequate sources of 
financing popular, programmes of assistance. On the other 
hand, SEPLAN's Minister Delfim Netto already had a huge 
public deficit to be covered somehow, preferably without 
currency or public stock issues. Therefore, the second 
purpose for the revenues of FINSOCIAL was to alleviate the 
government's cash shortage while the final payments for 
relevant programmes of assistance were being delayed.
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FINSOCIAL increased sharply from 1983, when it was 
partially included in the Budget, and exceeded CrS 3,000 
thousand million (USS 1.6 thousand million) in 1984. The 
control of the funds was given to SEPLAN through the 
National Bank for the Economic and Social Development 
(BNDES) which was re-structured for this purpose.
The Minister of Education, Gen. Ludwig, became aware of
the government’s intention before the creation of 
FINSOCIAL and as early as June he rushed to claim CrS 11,4 
thousand million (.ExposigSfo de Motivos n. 39, of 18/6/82) 
shortly followed by other CrS 12.8 thousand million 
<Exposig&o de Motivos n. 76, of 26/7/82), the two to be 
applied to the National Programme of School Meals (CNAE). 
Although the minister had been assured about the money,
this was not transferred by BNDES until the third quarter
of 1983, when four times that value was still to be 
formally agreed for this year. Between 1982 and 1984 CrS 
369. 6 thousand million of FINSOCIAL came to be promised 
MEC and programmed by state secretariats of education but 
only CrS 241,3 (65%) were actually transferred.
Except for a grant in 1983 for primary education in 
special circumstances (namely, education in prisons, 
health education, school books for poor children and 
education in rural areas), only the National School Meal
Programme — a service with particular features offering 
assistance —  was supported by FINSOCIAL. This clearly 
distinguish FINSOCIAL from the ordinary funds for 
educational programmes and place it among the government 
programmes aiming at short-term political yields. It did 
not alter the declining trend in special, earmarked 
sources for education from 1974.
44, All data on FINSOCIAL were collected at NEC's General Secretariat,
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5. 1. 3. 4. General results
Tables 15 and 16 below, give financial statistics of
federal special sources in a way to show their position in
the whole federal ' finance for education or variations
during the period, matching the changes in the policies,
as described in previous sections.
TABLE 15
BRAZIL: GENERAL FIGURES OF FEDERAL SPECIAL SOURCES OF FINANCE FOR EDUCATION 
AS COMPARED WITH BUDGET ORDINARY EXPENDITURE, 1970-84
S. Q .U. R C E S 1970-72 1973-75 1976-82 1983-84 ALL PERIODS.
ORDINARY (Cr$ million) 4,737 11,058 882,952 3,428,416 4,327,163
SPECIAL
Cr$ million 2,958 8,767 380,962 1,902,395 2,295,163
US$ million 327 1,228 6,080 1,577 9,212
Special/Ordinary (X) 6 L I 78.8 4 2 J l 5L I 57.5
Sal, -EducafSo - Federal 14,4 16,2 8.3 8,9 12,1
Sal, -EducafSo - State 14,4 16,2 15,5 17,8 17,3
Lotteries 10,0 9,7 1.2 0.7 0,8
FPE/FPM 23,7 25,6 11.9 19,3 17,8
MOBRAL - 6,7 4.1 0,9 2,0
External Loans - 4,4 0,9 0,2 0,3
Internal Loans - - 0,6 0,1 0,2
FINSOCIAL - - - 7,0 7.0
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mm
1) "ORDINARY" sources refer to expenditures included in the federal Budget under the 
denomination of "Education and Culture" UurtfSo EducafSo e Cultura),
2) Although most special financial sources have been introduced in the ordinary Budget 
after 1979, they were excluded from "ORDINARY" sources to make possible comparisons 
over the time series,
3) FPE/FPM were counted in this table by the amounts annually due, according to the 
law, In fact, long delays occurred in transfers, mainly during the seventies, which 
carried differences in figures from one to another year/period,
4) Annual averages of official Cr$/US» conversion rates were used,
SQUCES
Financial records of the FNDE's Planning Office (DIPLAN); Financial records of the 
Secretariat of Budget and Finance (SOF) of MEC/SQ; A s s o c i a t e  Brasileira de Or;amento 
PCiblico, Revista ABQP. vOL.20, pp.61-3; MEC/SQ. EducafSo, Cultura, Desporto, 1970- 
123SL Brasilia, 1985, pp, 559, 572, 579; BRASIL/IBGE, AnuArio Estatistico do Brasil 
(AEB), 1984, pp, 968-82, and 1985, pp, 682-97; FundagSo Gettilio Vargas, Projeto Aries, 
1987, Report A0112588 (for currency equivalents Cr$/US$),
TABLE 16
BRAZIL; FEDERAL TAXES and SPECIAL FINANCIAL SOURCES FOR EDUCATION 
PER CENT AVERAGE OF ANNUAL CHANGES, 1970-84,
(Constant prices of 1970)
PERIOD FEDERAL SALARIO- EDUCA^O SALARIO-EDUCACfiO LOTTERIES FPE/FPM
TAXES Federal Share State Share
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FEDERAL SALARIO-EDUCAgAO SALARIO-EDUCACAO LOTTERIES FPE/FPM
TAXES Federal Share 
1370-75 12, S 13,4
1976-78 S,S 37. 7
1979-84 -8,2 -14,2
State Share
13,4 143,2 10,8
101.5 -16,7 19,9
-14,2 -18,2 -4,6
SOURCES
The same of Table 16, plus:
FundafSo SetOlio Vargas, Projeto Aries, 1987, Report A0126147 (for inflation annual 
rates, based on the FGV's Price General Index, Domestic Supply (IGP/DI),
Tables 16 and 17 suggest some general notes besides other 
possible observations on each particular financial source:
1) Compared with the ordinary appropriations of the 
Treasury for education, the high proportion of the 
special, dedicated sources (over 50%, in the average) 
highlights their importance, hence the significance of the 
policies which are analysed in last sections. It must be 
noted that the policy-makers did not necessarily face 
these figures because the formal programming system, 
chiefly before 1980, was intended only to treat the 
•'ordinary sources".
2) In the curve of the special, earmarked sources over 
the whole period, 1975 separates a section of rise from a 
following cycle of rapid decline which began before the 
emergence of the government's financial crisis, making 
evident the impact of the policies described in Section 
5. 1. 2.
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THE ISSUE OF "MINIMUM PERCENTAGES" FOR EDUCATION
The true reason for the reservation of minimum percentages 
of tax revenues (the main source of the Treasury Budget) 
for funding educational programmes has been the covert 
mistrust of some liberal groups, inside and outside the 
federal bureaucracy, towards the actual political position 
of education regarding other governmental programmes, 
chiefly those involving economic interests. To the
technical bureaucracy, responsible for the economy and the 
budget, dedication of minimum percentages was actually 
anticipation of the political decision on finance 
allocation, limiting their room for manoeuvre and, in 
their words, tightening planning and "bringing sclerosis" 
to the budget. This is an issue which has been source of 
contention for the last half century and was brought into 
light in the most important legislative moments marking 
the prevalence of one or the other tendency.
These legislative moves are the first aspect which this 
section studies in a collation with the actual budgetary 
allocations to education during the corresponding periods, 
including 1967-83, when the military-backed planning 
bureaucracy obtained the abolition of the minimum 
percentages from tax revenues for education. The struggle 
for the reconstitution of the legal provision, obstinately 
led by the liberal Senator Jo§o Calmon, is scanned next in 
its 1975 frustrated attempt and the successful one in late 
1983, in different political circumstances. The blocking 
of the effects of the legal changes for the rest of the 
military regime, however, was the conflicting experience 
analysed in the last part of this section, to make clear 
the full extent of the contention.
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Nevertheless, it is vital for the perception of the true 
nature of the issue to bear in mind the government's 
simultaneous, intensive policies of creating extra-
budgetary financial devices to implement particular 
programmes of economic development (see specificly Section
4. 2. 1. 2), later resulting in an overwhelming public 
def icit.
Besides, another consideration can raise interest in the 
issue. From the late sixties to the early seventies a new 
element was brought into the debate, undermining the main 
argument of the liberal tradition of securing minimum 
percentages for education. It was the resolution of the 
conflict through the concept of education as an important 
investment in the economy, as it was assumed to be. 
Interests in an expanding economy and education met and 
were reconciled as complementary variables, giving a new 
status to the latter. Technicians and economic planners 
could be trusted because education, viewed as the 
development of a basic economic resource, was their 
concern, no less than that of teachers and liberal 
politicians. So there was no need to avoid general 
rational planning by legal preventive devices.
5.2.1. Constitutional provisions versus figures
A nationwide movement among liberal intellectuals,
education professionals, part of the press linked to them 
(such as the influential "0 Estado de S&o Paulo") and the 
Roman Catholic Church during the Twenties (Section 1.3), 
resulted in some important laws in the area in the years 
from 1927 to 1936, the first part of the Vargas tenure, as 
many leaders of the movement were influential government 
appointees to educational bodies. Under the movement's
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direct influence, the Constitution of 1934 - the draft of 
which was prepared between 1930 and 1933 by a special 
commission appointed by Vargas - for the first time 
required a ten per cent minimum expenditure of federal 
and municipal tax income "on the maintenance and 
development of education systems", one-fifth of which was 
to be spent in rural areas (Article 156). The states were 
to apply a twenty per cent minimum, as the authorities 
charged with major education responsibilities.
Three years later, Vargas' dictatorial Estado Novo 
abolished these provisions under the increasingly influen­
tial principles of rational (then called "scientific") 
administration which were to be implemented by a specific 
high-ranking body, the Administrative Department of Public 
Service (DASP, Section 1. 4. 3). At the same time, the 1937
constitutional text also introduced a section on the
Budget to be technically run by DASP. After the fall of 
the Vargas dictatorship, the Constitution of 1946, which 
was strongly influenced by liberal views and had a middle- 
class majority in the constitutional assembly, returned to 
the terms of 1934. The stress on budget preparation was 
reduced and Article 169 reinstituted the same ten per cent 
minimum of federal taxes to be spent on the "maintenance 
and development of education". A twenty per cent minimum 
was fixed for states and municfpios. The Law of
Directives and Bases of National Education (L. 4024, of
20/12/1961), a bill which entered the parliament shortly 
after the Constitution was approved, extended the minimum 
percentage of the Federal Union's tax revenue for 
education from 10 to 12% (Article 92).
The Constitution of 1967, in following a stategy which 
featured the centralization of political and financial 
resources in the federal government's hands and the
predominance of economic criteria for public spending
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(Section 2. 1. 2 in Chapter Two), made a marked change in 
these matters, again approaching the terms of the 1937
text. The section on budget was reinforced and, for the
first time in general terms, the earmarking of financial
sources was forbidden, although with several exceptions.4'1-3 
In particular, the provision on minimum percentages of
federal tax income for education was eliminated from the 
text, as happened to the 3% set aside for fighting north­
eastern droughts and for the Fund for the Valorization of 
the Amazon.
The terms in which the constitution set the issue — some 
situations excluded and others allowed for the sake of 
priority investment — is of particlar note. The
"technical" principle of non-earmarking of revenues was 
subject to higher values related to investment for 
development, in which education did not appear as 
involved. This clearly sets the practical limits of the 
concept of education as investment, so expressively put 
forth in the official discourse and plans.
The Constitutional Amendment n. 1 of 1969, dictated by the 
military junta, retained the changes introduced by the 
Constitution of 1967 in this field. Nevertheless, in the 
Section dealing with possible reasons for state 
intervention in a municlpio, one of those cited was a drop 
in expenditure on education below 20% of the municipal tax
45, Article 65, paragraph 3, said; "No taxation shall have its proceeds attached to a 
particular body, fund or expenditure", Exceptions were made for lubricants, fuels, 
electricity and minerals - the taxes from which were reinvested in the sector - besides 
other cases specifically defined in the Constitution itself or in complementary laws, 
Other laws could also create dedication of sources, provided they were intended for 
"capital expenditure" only, This side-door was later thrown wide open, when this 
concept gave grounds for many autonomous funds to be set up as "investment programmes",
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revenue (Art. 15, II, §3,
The actual significance of the political devices of tax 
minimum percentages for education may be easily understood 
from their budgetary results over a period covering the 
last three constitutions. . The oscillation of the law on 
this matter is not reproduced in figures and the general 
results could be revealing.
There are no statistics available to make possible a 
specific or completely homogeneous comparison over a long 
period between year— end tax revenues and expenditure on 
education (which do not coincide 100% with the expenses of 
MEC). However, data shown in Table 17 would seem to be 
sufficient to indicate the main trends of the issue. On 
the other hand, it is quite relevant to remark that the 
complete lack of control over the accomplishment of the 
constitutional mandate is the first indicator in properly 
understanding the position of Congress and the actual 
power of the federal financial bureaucracy.
TABLE 17
BRAZIL: ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR MINIMUM EXPENDITURE ON
EDUCATION: 1930-1984
I FEDERAL GOVERNMENT I STATES I MUNICIPIOS
GOVERNMENT I I I
YEAR I LMX _£_* A RX I LMX _£_* A RY I LM* _£_« A R*
I TxR I TxR I TxR
(continues)
Symbols used: LMX stands for Legal Minimum Percentage;
E % stands for Percentage Ratio of Education in Total Tax Revenue,
TxR
A R% stands for Percentage Increase of Tax Revenue from previous year,
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1
GOVERNMENT 1 
YEAR 1 
1
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT I
1
LMX 1 3  A RX 1
TxR 1
LMX
STATES
_L.X
TxR
1
1
A RX 1
1
1
l m x
UNICIPI0S
1 3
TxR
A RX
*VARGAS (I)
1930 n, a, 28,2
1931 8,6 31,6
1932 10,2 30,3
1933 6,7 31,1
1934 10 7,6 26 35,2
1935 10 7,0 13 34,5
1336 10 7,9 -1 26,8
1937 10,5 26,3
1938 10,8 23,5
1939 11,5 26,2
1940 11.4 20,4 13,6
1941 10,4 22,1 14,4
1942 10,1 21,3 14,7
1943 8,8 18,2 14, 9
1944 10,8 18,7 16,7
*DUTRA
1945 10 7,8 26 20 19,8 12 20 17,4 16
1946 10 8,2 32 20 18,9 39 20 18,4 16
1947 10 9,2 25 20 18,6 15 20 19,0 26
1948 10 12,2 20 22,3 20 21,4
1949 10 14,9 20 18,6 30 20 22, 3
*VARGAS (II)
1950 10 16,0 20 22,4 20 23, 4
1951 10 10,4 20 18,7 40 20 24, 3
1952 10 11,4 20 22,0 20 21,1
1953 10 14,8 20 24,2 20 24,9
^Transition
1954 10 8.7 34 20 20,7 20 23,1
1955 10 7,4 30 20 19,8 26 20 21,6
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i FEDERAL GOVERNMENT I STATES I MUNIC1PIOS
GOVERNMENT I I I
YEAR I LMX _E_X A RX i LMX _E_X A RX I LMX _£_X A RX 
i TxR I TxR I TxR
*KUBITSCHEK
1956 10 6,8 25 20 18,8 31 20 20,8
1957 10 8,8 20 20 20,2 20 21,4
1958 10 5.2 35 20 19,8 26 20 23,5
1959 10 9,4 42 20 18,3 48 20 22,9
*QVADROS
1960 10 9,2 41 20 19,9 43 20 22,1
*GOVLART
1961 12 9,6 44 20 22,4 20 22,1
1962 12 11,2 57 20 25,0 20 18,6
1963 12 8.3 91 20 24,8 20 19,1
*CASTELO
1964 12 9,4 103 20 20,2 20 15,8
1965 12 12,9 20 24,7 20 n, a,
1966 12 11.8 58 20 24,3 20 20,5
*C, E SILVA
1967 11,6 25,4 60,1
1968 8.4 22,2 76,7
1969 8,1 25,0 20 75,0
*ii£d i c i
1970 8,2 24,9 20 72,8
1971 7,2 27,7 20 76,2
1972 7,5 29,0 20 77,9
1973 6,9 28,4 20 76,1
*GEISEL
1974 6,5 29,4 20 80,7
1975 7,3 30,9 20 79,7
1976 7,8 31,4 20 91,2
1977 10,8 30,3 20 80,1
1978 12,4 30,3 20 78,0
72
98
132
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1
GOVERNMENT 1 
YEAR 1
1
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 1 
1
LMX _£_X A RX 1 
- TxR 1
LMX
STATES 1 
1
JL.X A RX 1 
TxR 1
MUNICIPIO'
LMX _E_X 
TxR
*FIGUEIRED0
1979 12,8 32,6 20 83,6
1980 9,0 30,0 20 89,9
1981 13,0 32,9 20 90,6
1982 14,2 33,5 20 89,6
1983 13 12,1 133 25 32,6 25 65,9
1984 13 <11,4) (212) 25 29,6 25 (62,4)
NOTES.
1) Symbols used : LUX stands for Legal Minimum Percentage;
E X stands for Percentage Ratio of Education in Total Tax Revenue,
TxR
A RX stands for Percentage Increase of Tax Revenue from previous year,
2) "Tax Revenue1' is understood as Receita de Impostos not Receita Tributiria which is a 
a broader category in the jargon of Brazilian public accounting, and also includes 
direct payment for governmental services ( taxes) and other revenues from financial 
compensation for increased value of private property close to public works 
(ContribuigSo de Helhoria), When making provisions for minimum percentages of 
expenditure on education, the Constitutions refer to Receita de Iepostos,
3) Figures are from final Balances but do not include finance running outside the 
Budget, Where these were not available, the initial approved Budget was used and 
figures are printed in italic, This is the case of the sunicipios for some years 
before 1954, The Budget was then usually overestimated in about 2 to 10X,
4) From 1931 to 1953 the figures of the Federal Government's expenditure on education 
are those of the old "Ministry of Education and Health", which were the only ones 
available, For this reason they are overestimated by about 10 to 15X, However, this 
fact is approximately balanced by some expenditure of other ministries on education 
which are not included, From 1954 to 1970 the same kind of figures refer to the
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Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC) alone, From 1971 onwards only the expenditure 
on education and culture is included {FunfSo Educa$io e Cultura), so excluding some by 
the administration of the central bodies of MEC and the contributions of the federal 
schools for the Welfare System, but including the expenditure of all ministries on 
education, which makes up a balance and gives figures as high as 10 to 25% above those 
of the previous period, in proportional terms,
5) Expenditures on education by funds other than Tax revenues were not counted, due to 
the special purpose of the table (the constitutional provision refer to Tax revenues).
6) Tax revenues which were collected at one level of government and transferred to 
another were counted at the transferer level, irrespective of any special flow of 
resources, as no restriction is made by the Constitution,
SOURCES
BRASIL/IBQE, SefiAra.ta.do ftnu&rio Estatistico do Brasil, 1939/4Q. 1941, pp, 12, 120-3, 
127-8; BRASIL, Ministerio das R e l a t e s  Exteriores, BRASIL. 1940-41. Rio, 1941, p,446; 
BRASIL/IBGE, Anuirio Estatistico do B r a s i K AEB), 1949. p. 556; AEB, 1951, p. 496; 
AEB,1956, pp,542-44; AEB,1979, p.765; Ludwig, A, K, Brazil, a Handbook of Historical 
Statistics. G. K, Hall & Co,, Boston, 1981, p.354; BRASIL, Ministerio da Fazenda,
Finangas do Brasil. Vol, XXI, pp.55, 119-23, 143, 191, 223; Idem, Vol. XXII, pp. 11, 
16, 43, 215, 254, 345, 381; BRASIL/MEC/SG, Retrato Brasil: Educa^o. Cultura. 
Desporto. 1970-1990. Brasilia, 1985, pp.551, 559; MEC/SG/S0F, Report T08L003T, of
08/10/86; MEC/SEPS, Records on states and municipios1 expenditure on education,
Some remarks directly based on data of Table 17 are:
1> The constitutional obligation to set aside minimum 
percentages of tax revenues to be applied to education was 
not observed by the Federal Union for 2/3 of the period of 
24 years during which the provision was in force! The 
same is true of the states for almost a half of the 21 
year corresponding period. The municipios failed their
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obligation for half-a-dozen out of 35 years but the fact 
must be taken into account that, following the 1966 
constitutional reform of the tax system, the municipios' 
own financial sources were drastically reduced and they 
began relying heavily on federal and state transfers for 
most local services.
2) Regarding the Federal Union over the period preceding 
the Constitutions under the military regime, short moves 
of rising percentage expenditure on education were 
followed by longer periods when it again dropped. The 
1935 to 1939 gains were lost between 1940 and 1945 under 
the effects of the 1937 changes. The levels reached 
between 1946 and 1950 under the initial impact of the 1946 
Constitution were never recovered in the folowing years 
although between 1950 and 1965, when the minimum 
percentage was finally attained, the section 1956-62 
showed some positive movement.
3> The immediate decline of the curve for nine successive 
years from 1967, when the provisions were suppressed, is 
also significant, mainly if it is remembered that this was 
exactly the period of the country's economic boom, the so- 
called "economic miracle". The new career plan for the 
civil service in the highly-manned Ministry of Education 
and particularly the expansion of university foundations 
forced up the expenditure curve from 1975 until the years 
of economic crisis. For the Federal Government the 
declining sequences prevail over the period 1931-84 as a 
whole.
4) Tax revenues always showed an increase from the 
previous year, except for 1936, contrasting with the 
instability of the expenditure on education.
- 315 -
5) The curve usually dropped against education at periods 
of political crisis or instability: as happens in 1945/46,
1950/51, 1953-56, 1963.
The above remarks provide evidence that the issue of 
defining budgets for education is essentially political 
since the results are related to current political moves 
rather than to special moments in the history, when the 
significance of education was politically asserted. The 
trend is so definite that Constitutional provisions 
themselves were overwhelmed. This point provides a good 
basis for the approach of events later in this chapter, 
focusing on a misleading "economic argument" in the making 
of decisions on the matter,
5.2.2. Congress and the education budgets
The results of Table 17 in the last section also draw the 
attention to the position of Congress on the matter, 
seeing that the law was repeatedly overlooked. Although 
it has been used in politicians' discourse, the 
development-related concept of education and the ensuing 
policies have never been absorbed by Congress. Building 
and cheerfully inaugurating schools or giving them grants 
was, indeed, the prevailing, electorate-addressed aim of 
politicians as regards education.
Congress had complete power over the approval of budgetary 
appropriations and made thousands of amendments to the 
budget bill, practically defacing it; the Executive, 
however retained a strong bargainnig power because, 
through the Ministry of Finance, it had the final word 
when, during the year, it controlled the implementation of 
the programmes by funding them at its convenience. This
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potential, however, was capitalized by individual 
ministries of the Executive. Mainly after the Vargas' 
tenure, the planning body, the Administrative Department 
of Public Service (DASP) drafted the budget bill but, as 
it did not want to be involved in the subsequent quarrels, 
it left the bill to its fate. Hence, for decades,
generations of Congressmen were used to conceiving and 
treating the annual budget as a major instrument for their 
traditional way of conducting politics, not as an opportu­
nity to discuss education problems and plan solutions
(this was a matter for the specific educational bills and 
fell upon the initiative of federal or local authorities).
MEC intensively used the pattern of relationship between 
the Executive and Congress. MEC's officials in budgetary 
bodies, representing the interests of chancellors,
principals and heads of important agencies took part in
intensive bargains with Congress, particularly the 
Congressman reporter for the education section of budget 
bill, during the discussion and approval of the budget.
It is easy, therefore, to understand the Congressmen's 
reaction to the new rules which had almost completely
prevented them from introducing changes in the Executive 
budgetary bill since 1967. The general course of the
activities of Congress related to education from 1963 to
1985 could be followed through the data of Table 18. The
table compares the education-related amendments to the 
budget bill which were proposed by Congressmen (whether 
they had been passed or not) with other amendments to
46, "Before 1967 Congress called upon the Ministry directly to discuss the amounts for 
the programmes and bodies, I was myself taken many times from home in the evening to 
provide them with information," (Mrs Odete Lapa, head, for many years, of MEC's section 
in charge of the budget, interview with the author), To Mrs Lapa other information in 
this paragraph is also due,
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bills related to education in general. After a paradox­
ical reaction during the adjustment period (1968-74), a 
move is clearly shown: the interest is shifted from the
former to the latter which peaked abnormally when 
political liberalization began.
TABLE 18
BRAZIL; PARLIAMENTARY ACTIVITIES RELATED TO EDUCATION, 1963-1984
EDUCATION-RELATED AMENDMENTS 
TO THE BUDGET BILL
OTHER EDUCATION-RELATED 
BILLS
PERIOD PROPOSED PASSED TOTAL ORIGINATED FROM THE 
CONGRESS EXECUTIVE
N, Av N, Av N, Av 1 N, Av N, Av
1963 1,452 1,264 7 7
1964-67 341 107 218 73 27 7 21 5 6 2
1968-69 3,599 - 1,039 - 37 18 15 8 22 11
1970-73 11,128 2,782 10 3 187 48 176 44 9 2
1974-78 616 123 2 , 616 123 602 120 14 3
1979-84 95 16 2 1,001 167 991 165 10 2
Notes
1) For each year/period, the budget which is discussed and voted is that of the 
following year,
2) "Av"; short for Annual Average,
3) In 1964 and 1969 the Budget was decreed by the Executive alone so no Amendments to 
the Budget bill are counted,
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Sources
Sub-Secretariat for Budget and Finance of Brazilian Senate;
BRAZIL/IMPRENSA OFICIAL, C o l e ^ o  de Leis, 1963-84,
Relevant details to remark on Table 18 are:
a) The year of 1963, when the Budget of 1964 was 
approved, reflects the situation preceding the military 
coup-d'etat: 1452 proposed amendments difaced the original 
bill of the Executive, as 87% of them were approved.
b) Then <1964-67), the clientelistic trend receded, 
since it was felt that traditional practices opposed the 
planning policies of the new regime, although they had not 
been legally banned until then.
c) Strong reaction against the 1967 Constitutional 
rule came the following year: the number of proposals for
amendments to the 1969 Budget bill more than doubled those 
of 1963 and took the government leadership in the Congress 
by surprise, before full regulations could be provided to 
decide on individual cases. Some 30% of the amendments 
still managed to be passed. The climate of rebellion 
intensified only in the following months, preceding Insti­
tutional Act n. 5 and the closure of Congress. In 1969, 
the Budget <1970) was approved by decree of the Executive
d) In the period 1970-73 the huge increase in the 
number of proposed amendments <5, 442 in 1970) against 
almost no approvals — proposals were preliminarly rejected 
as being unconstitutional —  reflected tactics of charging 
the military government with the rejections, causing its 
political wear and tear in local electorates.
e) After 1974 the adjustment was completed and the
47, This was the interpretation given to the 1968-73 peak of amendment proposals by hr 
Jos& Carlos Alves dos Santos, Senate's Secretary for Budget and Finance, who directly 
assisted the Congress Joint Commission for Budget, (Interview with the author),
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number of amendment proposals fell sharply. On the other 
hand, the number of bills concerning other matters related 
to education began soaring. Only 3% of the bills which 
were examined by Congress between 1974 and 1978 and 2% of 
those in the period 1979-84 originated from the Executive, 
the remaining large majority of bills being the initiative 
of Congressmen themselves. /U5 Some of these bills related 
to changes aiming at improving the educational system but 
in most cases the old trend of electorate politics re- 
emerged. They refer to attempts at transferring the 
responsibilities of maintenance of educational 
institutions to the federal government, the so-called 
federalization of state, municipal and even private 
technical or higher education schools (See Section 1.5). 
In many cases the proposals depended on Congress authority 
for the Executive to create cultural or educational 
foundations, a formality suitable for political purposes. 
The end result of most of these proposals was a long, 
unsuccessful course through MEC and SEPLAN for technical 
assessment until clientele pressure was weakened. The 
bureaucracy had to share the blame for the refusals and 
the annoyance of pressing local visitors.
Another political aspect of the 1967 changes in the 
participation of Congress in education financial matters 
must be mentioned on the side of the Executive, the 
exclusive controller of the matter ever since. From 1969, 
a cooptation mechanism was efficiently developed in the 
federal budget: lump appropriation sums were allocated to
the budget of some ministries (usually MEC, the Ministry 
of Health and Social Security, the Ministry of Justice and 
the Presidency of the Republic under a budgetary general
48, Complementary information obtained from the summaries of: BRASIL, Cole^So de Leis. 
Imprensa Oficial, (Series),
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account, Encargos Gerais da UniSo') to be freely disposed 
of by Congress. The leadership in Congress organized the 
access to the funds or distributed them, referring to the 
ministry concerned when administrative ministerial 
regulations were needed. In MEC a large twofold scheme of 
thousands of scholarships was set up one from Salario- 
EducagSo funds for primary school pupils only and the 
other, more flexible, from ordinary funds of the 
Treasury. 49 MEC's authorities had their own policies and 
budgetary programmes of student assistance which was run 
by a large specific department (later a foundation). The 
so-called "parliamentary appropriations" have always 
worked even when Congress was closed — for ten months from 
13/12/68 and for two weeks from 1/4/77.
The contents of this section are at least indicative of 
the political stance of Congress beyond its occasional 
generosity of discourse: education was never something
special for it but was used for other political purposes. 
This remark also introduces the next section which returns 
to the theme of the minimum percentages of tax revenues 
for education.
5. 2. 3. The bills of Senator Calmon
In the wake of Geisel's policy of "DistensSo" some 
movements occurred in the Senate, two of them involving 
education: the Projeto EducagBo <so ) and two bills
49, Information given the author by officials from FNDE and the Secretariat for 
Internal Control (CISET),
50, Projeto EducagSo was an initiative (May 1977) of a group of government and 
opposition Senate members to create a nationwide movement of interest in the 
educational problem, aiming at the elaboration of an ambitious long-term project of
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intended to restore the constitutional provisions for 
minimum percentages from tax revenues for education. The 
movements were led by Senator Jo§o Calmon, a liberal 
politician with a history of struggles for education 
programmes. He followed the steps of his promoter and 
mentor, Mr Assis Chateaubrian, a well-known businessman 
and former Brazilian ambassador to Great Britain, who 
built up the first nationwide newspaper and radio 
broadcast network, the Di£rios Associados, and highly 
contributed to the diffusion of liberal thought as well as 
professional journalism. Calmon headed Diarios Associados 
and was elected deputy and then senator for his state of 
Esplrito Santo. He took up the education issue as his 
outstanding political platform and used DiSrios Associados 
as an effective means of giving political resonance to his 
campaigns.
Twice in succession, Senator Calmon presented his bills of 
constitutional amendments, confronting one of the most 
notable policies of the so-called government technocracy 
which had been firmly established by the 1967
50, (cont,) education development with the participation of large sectors of Brazilian 
Society, to be implemented from the next government in 1979, With the support of the 
press and the educational sector, the iniciative had favourable repercussions in its 
initial months of national seminars held in the Senate but suddenly collapsed, 
following a clash in October 1988 with the government over the invitation of well-known 
and politically banned writers, with large academic or administrative experience, 
Professors Paulo de Tasso Santos (President Goulart's Minister of Education), Lauro de 
0, Lima and another Goulart's former Minister of Education and Chancellor of the 
University of Brasilia, Darcy Ribeiro, At the last minute the invitations were 
cancelled without clear explanation and Projeto EducafSo fell into discredit, It was 
abandoned some months later in 1978, overwhelmed by the major political interest in the 
1978 presidential elections, See Calmon, J, (ed,), Proieto Educe{So. Senado Federal, 
1978; on the affair of the cancellation of invitations see Jornal do Brasil, edition of 
12/10/77,
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Constitution: that of the permanent non-attachment oT
Exchequer revenues to particular purposes or programmes. 
Calmon was always celebrated by his peers and the press 
for his obstinacy in pursuing the approval of his bills. 
He was seen as a lonely fighter, a champion of a neglected 
crusade, as if his cause were not actually momentous 
enough to rise the enthusiasm of Congresmen. In such 
recurrent expressions, the intention of praising the old 
senator is without doubt. Calmon1 s first attempt in 1976 
to have his bill approved was unsuccessful just when he 
was a member of the Alianga Renovadora Nacional (ARENA), 
the government-supporting party. Some years later, in 
1983, after having shifted to the opposition, Calmon would 
finally see his bill passed through a Congress where the 
government still held a majority of seats.
Before presenting his bill for the first time at the 
Senate session of 25/5/76, Calmon consulted the President 
of his party, ARENA, Sen. Petrdnio Portella, who arranged 
for a meeting of Calmon with President Geisel. A
fortnight later the "nihil obstat" came from Geisel 
through Portella. "=>1 Quite confident that no veto would 
originate from the Executive, Calmon proceeded with his 
work. In the document of bill justification his arguments 
were specifically oriented to the political sensitivity of
51, "I took cars to talking with the leader of ARENA before everything else, He 
considered my initiative was very happy and made a point of me bringing the matter up 
with the President of the Republic, General Geisel, 1 met the President indeed and 
summarised my project to him, He showed his sympathy to the issue but asked for 15 
days for the examination by the relevant areas of the Executive, At that time I was 
told by Senator Portella that the President had approved my idea, and that 1 could 
collect the necessary signatures of the senators to formally present the bill, The 
government would not object to the amendment," Report of Senator Calmon in Jornal do 
ComSrcio, 15 and 16 of September, 1985,
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ordinary Congressman. He related the bill with financial 
grants to municipios, the restoration of the provision of 
Law 4024 <1961) about a minimum percentage of 12% of
federal and 20% of state and municipios1 tax revenues to 
be applied to educat ion and the precarious sit uat i on of 
the country's elementary education The report of the
twenty-five-member Joint Commission of the two Houses of 
the Congress on the matter was based upon the same reasons 
and statistics as Calmon's justification and led the 
reasoning to a candid argument: who could be against
creating resources for education? 85 3 The bill was 
unanimously approved by the Commission. Outside the 
Congress, public opinion was mobilized and there was a 
special convention of all State Education Councils (SEE's) 
together with the Education Federal Council <CFE> in 
support of the bill.
When the time came for the two decisive voting sessions, 
ARENA'S leader left the matter to the individual dis­
cretion of the members of his party; this sounded a little 
different from the original talks. Following laudatory 
speeches of members at the first ful1-Congress session of 
debates on the bill (9/7/1976), the festive climate was
52. Calmon, JoSo, ttistdria de uroa Proposta de Emenda * ConstituigSQ. Brasilia, Srafica 
do Senado, 1976, pp.5-9, Later, when the bill came to the vote, Calmon pushed the 
argument to its sentimental limits: "The present Minister of the Treasury, Professor 
H£rio Henrique Simonsen, said that 'the increase in the number of vacancies in our 
universities is due to the extraordinary power of expression of youth who took to the 
streets, demonstrated and requested a larger enrolment', But now, what voice do four 
million Brazilian children out of primary schools have? They cannot demonstrate, shout 
and claim more school rooms, adequate salaries for their teachers, wider distribution 
of school meals! We, the people's elected representatives, have to speak on behalf of 
these voiceless children!" (p.95).
53. Calmon, JoSo. Histdria de urna Proposta de Emenda & ConstituitSo. Op. Cit., p.60.
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suddenly broken up in the final session of discussion and
voting, five days later. ARENA'S leader, Senator
Porteila, was not there. In his place the vice-leader, 
Senator Eurico Resende, was the first to speak. He said 
that the arguments in favour of the amendment were half- 
true and started reading a document which he afterwards 
confessed to have been handed to him by the government and 
had originated in MEC. He quoted a number of financial 
statistics to prove that the federal government was 
already spending more than 12% on education, all things 
considered. Deputy Peixoto Filho (ARENA), spoke after 
Sen. Resende to support the bill, "although sensing and 
regretting the government's directive behind Senator 
Resende's speech". ARENA'S Congressmen started to leave 
the room discretely, a fact which Deputy Alceu Collares 
<MDB> publicly noted. sd In the end, the leader of the 
opposition, Senator Franco Montoro, said that once more 
the Executive had decided on the position of the Congress, 
because "the technicians do not want finance to be 
limited, alleging that this restricts the freedom for 
better applications". The President of the Congress, 
ARENA'S Senator MagalhSes Pinto, still attempted in vain
to prevent the embarrassment of the final vote by 
declaring the non-existence of a legal quorum (283 "yes" 
votes would be necessary for the approval, 2/3 of the 
Congress). But the voting was carried out: 180 senators
and deputies were present and all voted "yes", the 
majority of them being members of MDB, the opposition 
minority party.
54, Four days before this decisive session of the Congress, a well-informed journalist 
of the newspaper 0 Estado de SSo Paulo, Ros&ngela Bittar, had published a note 
revealing the government's intention of withdrawing from the previous commitment and 
commanding ARENA'S Congresmen not to attend the final session,
55, Details of the session in Calmon, JoSo, Histdria de uma Proposta de Emenda k 
C o n s t i t u t e .  Op, Cit,, pp,91-105, and from a report of Correio Brasiliense, 21/9/76,
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"I felt most indignant with Geisel because he had 
personally promised me ", commmented Calmon on the outcome 
of the episode, afterwards. SG
Two other constitutional amendment bills with terms 
similar to those of Calmon' s were also presented by the 
MDB' s deputies, Celso Pe<janha and Junia Marise. Only 
nineteen Congressmen attended the voting session.
Senator Calmon himself was quite outspoken when making 
public the circumstances which, seven years later, 
encouraged him to re-present the same bill with a slight 
change in percentages <13% instead of 12% for the Federal 
Union and 25% instead of 20% for the states and 
municipios).
"I had learned a bitter lesson from the previous 
attempts. In order to attract more than two thirds of 
deputies and senators to the plenary of Congress it 
was desirable for my amendment bill to be presented 
for vote together with another one of major impact and 
more immediate political interest. "s"7
On 9th of November 1983 Calmon' s bill was presented to 
Congressional vote at the same session during which an 
important salary bill was also scheduled for approval. 
But after this bill, at the exact moment Calmon's text was 
to be submitted, the session was unfortunately suspended 
with the news that the President of the Congress, Senator 
Nilo Coelho, had just died in a hospital in S&o Paulo, 
where he was ill. sss
56, Talks of the author with Senator Calmon in April 1984,
57, Jornal do Cont&rcio, Op, Cit,
58, "Even death conspired against education", the senator would joke some time later, 
Jornal do ConnSrcio, Op, Cit,
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The new president- of the Congress, Senator Moacyr Dal la, 
was elected amidst a climate of rebellion against the 
guardianship of the Executive. An important
Constitutional Amendment bill widening the share of the 
states and municipios in federal-collected taxes was to be 
voted in a few weeks (Emenda Passos P&rto), defying the 
government. This bill would represent a hard blow to the 
federal Budget - percentages would be raised from 10. 5% to 
14% (for states) and 16% (for municipios) - but would 
certainly warrant a massive attendance of Congressmen to 
the plenary.
Calmon went to Dalla, an old friend, asking for his 
educational bill to be voted in the same session with the 
final voting of Passos Pdrto's. He succeeded but did 
observe careful treatment of every detail, not being 
confident in the laudatory speeches by which his bill had 
been praised at the first attempt, He contacted every 
speaker, asking him to give up speaking in support of the 
education bill so that the session would not be prolonged. 
The afternoon session was indeed very tiring and dragged 
through the evening by debates, the leadership of the 
government trying to postpone the voting by provoking the 
departure of tired Congressmen. There was also another 
matter scheduled for that night (a bill of Deputy Celso 
Pe^anha) whith had precedence over Calmon's. He hardly 
managed to invert the position of the bills on schedule. 
It was dawn when the presidency of the session announced 
the final voting of Calmon's bill to an exhausted plenary. 
Calmon himself gave up speaking to present the bill which 
was finally approved by a simplified procedure of 
consensual vote by party leaders-"'3
59, "For the first time ever in the history of the Congress a Constitutional Amendment 
was approved without any speeches at all", commented Calmon later, Jornal do ComSrcio. 
15 and 15 of September, 1985,
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The constitutional Amendment n. 24, approved by the 
Brazilian Congress on the 25th of November 1983, was 
solemnly promulgated on December the 1st, becoming 
paragraph 4 of Article 176 of the Constitution and 
bringing back into force a provision which had been 
abolished by the 1967 Constitution, Its terms were:
"Article 176 of the Federal Constitution comes into force with
the addition of the following paragraph: § 4 - Annually, the
Federal Union will apply not less than thirteen per cent of tax 
revenues and the States and Municipios not less than twenty five 
per cent for the maintenance and development of education."60
The singular circumstances of the two episodes highlight: 
first, the fragility of the education cause itself as a 
motive to define the position of Congressmen, including 
the stance of opposition members in 1975, when, given the 
background of the parliamentary activity at the time and 
the result of the first session, the full attendance at 
the final session rather revealed a main goal of imposing
a defeat on the government. Second, the concept of
"education for development" did not seem to be the right 
one to move Congressmen. Third, the technically-minded 
argument against the attachment of percentages from the 
budget to particular programmes sheltered the government's 
position —  victorious in 1975 and defeated in 1983 — as if 
the conflict were between particular political views or 
banners and a rational approach to preserve a general 
interest.
This last point clearly appeared in the sole manifestation 
of the Secretariat of Planning of the Presidency of the 
Republic, SEPLAN, over the approval of the Amendment 24. 
As early as four days after the promulgation of the new § 
4 of Article 176, SEPLAN's Minister Delfim Netto attacked
60, BRASIL, Diirio Oficial da UniSo, Monday, 5/12/83, pp,20455/6,
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publicly the new law, provoking- Senator Calmon's 
indignation, One must bear in mind how hard this blow
was to Mr Delfim Netto's policy of cutting down on the 
public deficit by saving on Treasury's tax revenues, or, 
in other words, keeping programmes essentially supported 
by this source, such as education under prices/revenue 
level (see Section 4. 2. 2 and Table 13). Of course this 
strategy was not brought into the debate and remained 
covered by the general "technical argument" (to deal 
rationally with the decision-making process for a balanced 
allocation of scarce resources). The issue developed 
through the following year in the conflicting events of 
the implementation of the provision, which is studied in 
the next section.
5. 2. 4. The regulations of the Constitutional Amendment 24
Constitutional Amendment 24, in late 1983, came at a 
particularly delicate political and economic moment. The 
government, committed to an institutional political 
transition and in evident decline, needed to consolidate 
its parliamentary support and that was why it had just 
painfully compromised in the approval of the Passos P6rto 
Amendment, transferring needed shares of its revenues to 
states and municipios. Under extreme pressure from the 
economic front — the crisis was at its peak — , the
61, In a national TV broadcast interview with the well-known journalist J, Betting of 
Ride Bandeirantas by 29/11/83, Delfim said that the Amendment was "inocuous" because 
the government already dedicated more than 13X to education and "the Congress had only 
'sclerosed' the Budget by approving it", The following week Calmon appeared at the 
same interview programme to reply to what he called a "shameless lie", (Jornal do 
Com^rcio. 15/7/85),
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practical way out was to accept the changes but to 
circumvent or delay its implementation. At this stage, at 
least, the task could be easier since the government would 
be dealing with its own internal bodies. In this context, 
the necessary regulations in order to implement the 
Amendment became a conflicting political issue which 
brought federal authorities of education and economic 
planning on a course of collision. Indeed, new implied 
sums - quite sufficient to double the MEC's disputed 
budget for current expenditure - precipitated the 
involvement of ministerial first ranks, recalling the 
arguments and recent clashes involving Minister Delfim and 
MEC*s ministers Portella and Ludwig (next sections).
At the beginning of January 1984 MEC brought up the issue 
of the regulation of the new constitutional provision, 
fearing that the broad legal terms used for an essentially 
technical matter, would render it ineffective, given 
SEPLAN's position. A discussion panel was held on the 
subject at the National Institute for Educational Research 
(INEP), a MEC affiliated body, by 10 January 1984 and Sen. 
Calmon was one of the panellists. The following week the 
Minister of Education, Ms Esther Ferraz, touched upon the 
subject in a meeting with President Figueiredo and asked 
for a provision on it. A Joint Commission SEPLAN/MEC, 
composed of a special group from each ministry, was 
appointed following negotiations at ministerial l e v e l . ^
62, NEC's special group was composed by a Deputy General Secretary of the NEC's 
General Secretariat, the Director of the National Fund for the Development of Education 
(FNDE), Nrs Ecilda Ramos de Souza and the Director of the National Institute for 
Educational Research (INEP), Prof, Lena Castello Branco, Nost information for this 
section was obtained by the author from these officials,- Talks were also held with Nr 
Frederico Bastos, SEPLAN's Secretary for Finance and Budget (SOF/SEPLAN), who was the 
chairman of the Joinned Commission and a member of SEPLAN's special group, together
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Soon opposing views made the meetings of this commission 
tense and infrequent. MEC and SEPLAN adopted different 
strategies to tackle the regulation. The latter wanted 
the broadest possible interpretation of legal terms so 
that the largest number of budgetary appropriations could 
be reckoned to make up the 13% required level, keeping the 
existing situation virtually unchanged. The former,
stemmed from the fact that the Constitution has been 
altered to bring a real change in financing education by 
referring to a minimum percentage of tax revenue for a 
specific expenditure group, those with "maintenance and 
development of education" (.manut engSo e desenvol viment o do 
ensi no). e;3 MEC t ried, t heref ore, to interpret legal terms 
in the narrowest possible way so that the ministry would 
be entitled to additional funds from the Treasury 
(financial sources outside Budget being preliminarily 
excluded from all calculations). MEC stated that the 
technical interpretation of the key-terms "maintenance and 
development of education" was part of its legal 
competence, and granted SEPLAN the right to define "tax 
revenues". But SEPLAN stood as a politically stronger 
ministry. It did not make concessions and called upon 
other ministries with some kind of educational activity in 
their programme-budgets to be present at the meetings of 
the Commission, counting on their support for a broader
62, (cont,) with Mr JoSo Baptista Lengruber, SOF/SEPLAN's Director of the Budget, and 
Mr Percy Rigotto, Co-ordinator of Education Area at SOF/SEPLAN,
63, Explanatory note, The word which was used in the text is "snsino", not 
"educaflif, Although these vocables, translated into English as "education11, have the 
same meaning in the vernacular, in the technical Portuguese jargon of the area 
*&duca$3& has a broader meaning, that of any systematic transmission of knowledge or 
development of life attitudes aiming at the formation of' a mature personality, whereas 
"ensino" means a kind of regular education usually obtained in schools, As the 
Constitution used the two terms for different aspects of the matter, MEC stood for a 
technical interpretation of "ensint? which better suited its interests,
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interpretation of the legal terms. The use of this tactic 
inhibited MEC* s will to have frequent meetings and the 
decision-making process soon concentrated at ministry 
level.
MEC's standpoints and cause of disagreement with SEPLAN 
were:
a) only expenditure on regular schools of the public 
or private network, or those directly benefiting the
schools, should be counted in for the constitutional 
minimum percentage, priority being given to primary shools 
which dealt with the 7-14 year compulsory schooling;
b) all other courses or institutions aiming at special 
training should not be counted in, although deserving 
public finance support;
c) pensions of retired teachers or former school 
employees should not be included;
d> the same went for institutions dealing only with
p r s c h o o l i n g ;
e) expenditure with MEC repaying of loans should only 
be counted in as for new programmes classifiable in the
group a. above;
f) budgetary procedures of classification and control 
of these expenditures should be adapted under MEC's advice 
in order to obtain proper identification;
g) the regulations urged that, because the new 
constitutional text, approved the year before, was in
force, the Budget should be amended during 1984 to conform 
to it (alterations to the Budget for several reasons were 
habitually made by SEPLAN during the year);
Presenting her hopes for a quick decision on the matter, 
Minister Ferraz wrote a letter to the President dated 
1 7 / 4 / 8 4 . She included an study of the additional
64, It is noted the way Us Ferraz sometimes addressed the President, through letters
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resources MEC would be entitled to receive from the 
Treasury for the current year <1984) as a result of the 
Constitutional Amendment and given the prospects of tax 
revenues. The figure was CrS 602 billion from which about 
CrS 300 billion would be set aside for a substantial im­
provement of MEC' s chronically insufficient appropriations 
for current expenditure, personnel excepted, and capital 
expenditure <0CC>. This would be enough to recover all 
devaluation caused by the inflation to the CrS 121 billion 
OCC existing annual budget and to develop a large 
programme of repairs or modernization of equipment in 
federal universities and technical schools. These CrS 300 
billion "of MEC's dreams" became the real stumbling block
in the settlement of the matter since then, and preci­
pitated a definitive reply from Minister Delfim ("This is 
impossible", would have been all he had said to Ms Ferraz 
and the President). There Ms Ferraz's retreat began.
The work of the MEC' special group was conducted between 
January and April 1984. At the request of the National
Information Service <SNI) through the MEC1 s Division of 
Information and Security (DSI), the group reported about 
the matter. A preliminary draft of a regulating law was 
handed to the minister. She praised the group's results 
but decided to make her personal alterations on the text,
as an experienced lawyer and law university professor. In 
May she handed a new letter to the President with a draft
64, (cont,) instead of personal talks, unlike her predecessors, She adjusted herself 
in discussing with and entrusting to Prof, LeitSo de Abreu, The Minister of the Civil 
Staff and an old collegue in the teaching of Law in S,Paulo, the subjects which 
depended on Presidential decision, Referring to the top people of Pattcio do Planalto, 
Col, Pasquali, Ms Ferraz' general secretary, said about her; "She was 'new' in that 
group, She had difficulty in positioning herself at the same level and sometimes she 
even felt like a stranger," (Interview with the author),
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of law in which she relinquished points c, d, e. and gave a 
broad formulation to f_. She wrote:
"We made all necessary concessions which seemed 
rightful to the Secretariat of the Planning, as far as 
adopting its document as our basic text. I think we can 
not go beyond these concessions as we would not be 
complying with the terms and the spirit of the new 
constitutional text". ss As the following paragraph shows, 
however, she weakened her position even more when she said 
she thought her document should be sent to ministers 
Delfim and Leitao (Chief of Civil Staff). Delfim simply 
sent her a new text advancing SEPLAN*s requirements 
further: all expenditure on education administrative
bodies, as those of MEC's headquarters, should be counted 
in for the minimum 13%, a point which had already been 
given in by SEPLAN. The process seemed to start all over 
again.
Meanwhile, pressure mounted from Congressmen to see the 
new legal provisions implemented. Deputy Rdmulo GalvSo, 
Chairman of the Congressional Commission for Education and 
Culture, often visited the Office of the Minister of 
Education and promoted a well attended seminar on the 
matter in. Congress with large press coverage. Senator 
Calmon went further, holding that the Amendment was self­
executive and did not need regulation, and required its 
immediate implementation from the date it was pub1ished.
After that, Minister Esther Ferraz did not request the
65, From the files of the MEC's General Secretariat,
66, Later on, in a speech at the Pedroso Horta Foundation by 27 February 1987, he 
said: "This text is fully in force from the date of its' promulgation, although it had 
suffered the most overt sabotage by the ministers of the economic area of Figueiredo's 
government," (Text of the speech given to the author by Senator Calmon),
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MEC’s special group to study or discuss the matter with 
SEPLAN any more and conducted the decision-making process 
personally. She asked for the direct advice of an old 
friend, Prof, Valnir Chagas, a well-known writer of legal 
texts of major educational reforms since the sixties, and 
suppressed the restriction of funds to schools (letters a_ 
and b ). Any lawful education-related activities under any 
ministry's supervision could be granted and this shel­
tered a large range of training governmental programmes, 
meeting SEPLAN's original request. Looking for support 
for her new positions, she resorted to her close friends 
of the Federal Education Council (CFE), Prof. Lafayette 
Ponde (CFE's chairman) and Prof. Caio T6cito, wel- 
established reporter of CFE1 s commissions for legal 
financial subjects. Ministerial letter (.Aviso 569, of 
4/6/84) asked for an advice with restricted publication 
(Parecer Reservado') from CFE on the last version of the 
draft. The covered advice was written by Prof. T&cito and 
handed over to the minister shortly after (Parecer PL 73, 
of 7/6/84). In its short, hesitant advice CFE finally 
agreed with the draft. It suggested some minor changes 
and touched the point which was raised by the Delfim's 
latest version. It defined that administrative activities 
should not be counted in for the minimum 13% "except for 
those linked to education", a feature which was actually 
difficult to avoid in organizations of the area...
One by one, all points of disagreement with SEPLAN had 
been withdrawn, except for the Constitutional Amendment's 
condition of already being in force in 1984, the basic 
exigency of the Congressmen. In August, the final touches 
were given to the text in the PalScio do Planalto and the 
bill was forwarded to the Congress. But the Executive did 
not ask for special or urgent legal processing through the 
houses of the Congress and the bill was not voted for the 
rest of Figueiredo's tenure.
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On the 5th of September, a formal representation was made 
to the Congress against President Figueiredo who was 
accused of failure to comply with the Constitution,G7 The 
trial, however, did not take place. It would have to wait 
until February 1985 for the definitive Federal Union's 
Financial Balance to substantiate the charge and 
Figueiredo would be leaving the Presidency in March, after 
a major political change. The House of Deputies judged 
the accusation inconsistent and terminated the 
proceedings. The regulations finally came one year later 
(L 4378, of 24/7/85), its terms remaining nearly the same.
The details of this episode clearly show that the matter 
was worked out politically, the relative positions of the
ministers in the nucleus of power being the almost
exclusive factor in the decision-making process.
Technical elements, which initially divided the
contenders, proved absolutely irrelevant. SEPLAN' s
political goal finally prevailed to accomplish economic 
priority. No room was found for arguments from the
education-development concepts.
5. 3. OTHER CONFLICTS IN TIME OF FINANCIAL CRISIS
Following the theme of the arguments raised in the compe­
tition for funds for education, the following sections 
analyse conflicts at the top levels of federal government 
over this issue, still in the forefront of the country's 
deep financial crisis as an especially revealing context,
67, The representation, a criminal legal procedure regulated by Law 1079/1950, was 
actually moved by Senator Calmon and Deputy Zanetti, although signed, due to legal 
formalities, by a group of teacher unions, Details in Qltima Hora and Correio 
Brasiliense. Brasilia's newspapers, of 6/9/84,
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The next two sections report on major clashes between 
ministers of education and the powerful Minister of 
Planning, Mr Delfim Netto, who had been the minister of 
finance (1967-1973) during the seven decisive years of the 
regime's consolidation. Mr Delfim Netto, together with 
planning ministers Roberto Campos (1964-66) and Reis 
Velloso (19670-78), was a leading figure among the
civilian policy-makers who made up the image of a 
developrnentalist technobureaucracy acting on behalf of the 
military. It is significant to point out that the events
happened in the high echelons of the long government of
Gen. Figueiredo, when the liberalizing policy of 
uAberturau made possible a full coverage of the facts by 
the press which was also interested in exploiting the
internal conflicts and cracks of the declining
authoritarian regime. For this reason the facts assumed 
the dimension of important political affairs at the time.
Two education ministers endeavoured to avert from their 
budgets the effects of the ruthless policies on cutting 
down on the public deficit, particularly that of reducing 
the real values from tax revenues in the Treasury Budget 
to compensate for the red-tape position of the extra- 
budgetary accounts, as already mentioned.
The unique feature of these two affairs is that political
reasons — not mainly economic ones, as in the typical
1967-73 period — were raised for funding education
especially and had repercusssions. In the case of
Minister Portella (1979-80), the political element was the 
idea of cultural and social development through education 
which benefited from the momentum of President 
Figueiredo's political Abertura, In the case of Minister 
Ludwig (1981-82) approximately the same idea was retained 
this time, however, supported by his personal political 
weight. Their public clash with Minister Delfim who
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wielded his "technical argument", the need of balancing 
the budget, actually happened at another level, since 
neither the financial crisis nor the low efficiency of 
federal educational organizations in spending was ever 
accepted as a sufficient reason for refusing a better 
budgetary treatment to the evidential needs of education. 
In terms of the decision-making process of public finance 
alloction, education and economic targets contended for 
political priority. Here, as for the previous episodes, 
the "technical argument" covered economic targets.
5.3.1. The " Port el la affair"
When the Minister of Education, Professor Eduardo 
Portella, resigned - following a suggestion by the 
Minister Chief of Staff, General Golbery - in the peak of 
a crisis which was followed step by step by the press, the 
impression remained with the public that a liberal 
intellectual with new, democratic ideas did not manage to 
survive the pressure of a bitter, truculent techno- 
bureaucratic stucture, led by Mr Delfim Netto. The same 
authoritarian face of the government - the public could 
deduce - still remained. However, alongside this image 
through which most of the press showed its mistrust of 
government's policy of Abertura, one can focus on the main 
reasons of the profound dissent which caused Professor 
Portella to declare his uneasiness in the government when, 
proving his mastery in Portuguese linguistics, he used 
publicly a phrase which has become proverbial in Brazil in 
order to express the feeling of being or not being in the 
real course of political power. " Eu nSo sou minist ro, eu 
estou minist ro" <"I am not a minister, he said, I stand as
- 338 -
a minister"). ^ ;n:i
The reasons for Portella's difficulties had a definite 
origin:
"In spite of his leftish discourse in the last months of his 
tenure to gain the support of some areas of the opposition, 
Portella was never a left wing man and the military government 
knew that perfectly well. He was not dangerous to the 
government. The affair involving Portella rose from problems of 
funding education and he finally clashed with Delfim. This was 
the point because MEC was completely autonomous for policies 
towards education and culture. (...) In the bosom of the
government he felt a stranger because his reasons were not
understood by the bureaucrats who had another form of logic".
For the first months of Figueiredo's government, Portella 
seemed to be a leading minister in the social area of the 
Cabinet and his cultivated discourse, presenting a good 
image of the new government, was welcomed in Pal&cio do 
Planalto. Later, he had to look for money for his plans
and to face the technical structure responsible for the 
allocation of finance. Then, his troubles began. The
intermediate bodies of the ministry did not help much, 
since the centralization of the decision-making process on 
the matter brought to him personally the task of
68, Closely following its Latin origin, Portuguese has two different verbs, "ser" and 
'estar*, either to express the essence of the subject ("sf/’"), what somebody or 
something is, or its current situation ("estar"), whereas English can express the two 
meanings through the verb "to be" alone, Portella used the verb "estar" in a context 
where people would normally use the verb " ser", and so highlighted the transitoriness 
and even unsuitability of his status as minister,
63, Interview of Dr, Pedro Demo with the author, Dr Demo was a close adviser of 
Minister Portella, and problably the most influential one, as far as the minister's 
ideas and proposals about the social functions of the state were concerned, In a 
collection under Portel la's directorship (Biblioteca Tempo UniversitArio) Dr Demo 
published his Desenvolvimento e Politica Social no Brasil (Rio, Editdra UmB, 1978),
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advocating- better budgets. He argued politically, playing 
on the social relevance of education and culture and the 
innovative policies of his plan.
"I think", he said afterwards, "that a budget of a little more
than 4% in 1980 for education and culture is going to leave this
area virtually abandoned. The degree of development of the
state and of the country as a whole, facing all this cultural 
and educational demand, should not allow such a level of
budgetary ommission. ” 70
He expressed the difficulty of dialogue with Mr Delfim 
Netto since he perceived the real position of his cause 
within the framework of governmental strategy:
"In the stockmarket of the Cabinet my shares have never had the
same rate as those of the minister of planning, for example. 
Over and above that, we differed a lot as persons. He is a
technocrat, enclosed in his world. We have different views of 
the world. In mine the social predominates; in his , the 
economic, and this makes it difficult to find a common
denominator, mainly in a system where education and culture are 
placed at an accessory level while economy is placed at a 
decision-making level. To use a language of the cinema, he was 
the star and I was one of the extras. Yes, sometimes I felt as 
an ’extra' in a play which was performed regardless of myself. 
(...) When the Economic Development Council (a high-level body
of the federal government which congregates ministers with the
President of the Republic) met, prevailing decisions were based 
on economic reasons, which was quite fair. But I found that, 
when the Social Development Concil met, at the moment of final 
decisions the prevailing reasons were economic..."71
70, A few months after he left MEC, Prof, Portella gave to the magazine PLAYBOY
(September 1981, n, 74), a long, frank interview about his experience in the
government, This interview, perhaps the most authentic and publicly available, will be 
frequently used in this section, 
71, Playboy, Sept, 1981, n, 74, pp,26,30.
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Then he pointed to what he saw as the root of the issue:
. . . "bureaucratic expansionism. This leads the state to make 
decisions narrowly technical, some apertures being left to let 
out few decisions really political. The technocratic state 
slights or underestimates the capabilities of a political
decision-making.
The reasons for SEPLAN1s technicians were problably not
unknown to Minister Portella: the limits imposed by the
policy of reducing public spending and the mistrust 
concerning the cost-effectiveness of money invested in his 
ministry, particularly in its "power— house" of
expenditure: the universities. It is of particular
significance to quote a SEPLAN's senior official:
"Minister Delfim has always thought that what good could come
from the univesities would come any way, since some good groups
were individually stimulated. For the rest, it was money thrown
away. "
The following paragraphs attempt to reconstruct the con­
text and the course of events which brought to a conflic­
ting end Prof. Portela's twenty months in the government.
Portella had been away from administrative milieux for 
twenty years (he had been Chief of Office of the President 
J&nio Quadros). He was not familiar with Brasilia's 
technical staff from which he had to chose most of his 
direct assistants. He looked for support and strongly 
relied on a small group of the SEPLAN's National Centre of 
Human Resouces <CNRH> which had just profoundly revised 
the previous policies of the federal government on
72, Playboy. Sept, 1981, n, 74, p,35,
73, Mr Divonzir Gusso, interview with the author,
74, Should be named: Dr, Antdnio Cabral de Andrade, the head of CNRH, Dr, Pedro Demo
and Messers Divonzir Gusso and Raulino Tramontin,
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education and whose ideas met those of Portella. To this 
group was entrusted the preparation of the Third National 
Plan of Education and Culture (PSEC, 1979). Priority
was given to sectors which had not benefited from the
investments of the last decades: public primary education,
particularly in city outskirts and rural areas. Cultural 
institutions were to be intensively fostered. Portella 
preached that education was not only an instrument for
economic development. Education, particularly elementary 
education, should not be seen merely as a technical matter 
c oncerning educators but as a social responsibi1i t y 
closely linked to the broader rights of citizenship. An 
important role was then expected from education in the
political development of the country. The indiscriminate 
growth of higher education was to be controlled. These 
lines sounded new to the prevailing sectors in MEC's 
bureaucracy which also heard the new minister insist that 
the principle of participation was a basic point for 
educational planning.
There was a spring-like climate in the beginning of the
new administration which strengthened many expectations of 
the so-called advanced groups in the public sector of 
educat ion.
A few months later, this climate began to fade as Poi—  
tella's main concern turned to obtaining sufficient funds
75. MEC/Secretaria Geral, III Plano Setorial de E d u c a ^ o  e Cultura, 1280.-1985,
Brasilia, 1979, In 1981, at the tenure of Gen, Ludwig this plan was re-edited with the 
title: "III Plano Setorial de Educa?3o, Cultura e Desporto.
76, Asked, later, about the main breakthrough of his administration, Portella, himself 
used the expression: "I think it (the breakthrough) was promoting the democratic 
redefinition of MEC, I would say with personal satisfaction that this period was a 
sort of MEC's spring," Playboy. Set, 1981, n, 74, p,26. He accepted with humor the 
interviewer's joking allusion to Praga's Spring,
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for his programme when the country entered a depresed 
economic stage. The shock of facing the federal
bureaucracy of finance was aggravated by the difference of 
personal style between Prof. Simonsen, the Minister of 
Planning until October 1979 and that of his successor, Mr 
Delfim Netto. ^
By mid-1980 a new, decisive cycle began in the tense
relationship between MEC and SEPLAN, when the budget
proposal for 1981 was to be decided by the planning body. 
The estimate of federal revenues for that year was quite
conservative in order to lower the level of expenditure 
and Portella was definitely displeased with the MEC's 
budgetary ceiling. The implementation of the cultural 
foundations (National Art Foundation, FUNARTE, and
National Pr6-Memoria Foundation, PR6-MEM6RIA) was refused 
as it related to new expenses on personnel, and this
irritated the minister inasmuch as he had committed 
himself with artists and intellectuals in Rio de Janeiro 
who strongly claimed for the new bodies.
These decisions were not what he expected from SEPLAN,
after recent contacts with Minister Delfim. No special
77, "Simonsen was a pragmatic man and said things very clearly, When he coould not go 
along with any of my demands he said: 'do not count on this', and I had to look for an 
alternative, But with his successor I never knew if the answer was yes or not, He 
said: 'Let us s ee 1,,, 'It is not easy',,, I remained paralyzed, He is sympathetic in 
the manner of dealing, He is skilled in embracing#,,, iile £ bom de ebrefo) He is one
of the best 'embracers' in this country,,," Playboy. Set. 1981, n, 74, p,26,
* Prof, Portella referred to the Brazilian habit of greeting friendly people by 
embracing them,
78, "He (Portella) felt deceived and disregarded by Delfim, who had visited him in his 
house and showed sympathy for his ideas and programmes and soon after cut his budgetary 
proposal", (Dr, Tarcisio Della Senta, who was Portella's close adviser and his 
Secretary for Higher Education, Interview with the author),
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responsiveness to his cause appeared from Palacio do 
Planalto and he decided to change his public discourse. 
His disagreement with SNI's veto on some of his
appointments in MEC became public. A large part of
university students had begun a strike (held between July 
and September 1980) and Portella seemed to be compliant 
with them. He advocated the lifting of the National 
Student Union’s (UNE) ban and publicly supported a boycott 
of school fees payment. From that moment he began to fall 
out of Palacio do Planalto's favour and, as the
difficulties in obtaining funds from SEPLAN increased, he 
suspected this was part of a right-wing conspiracy against 
him. 73 So weak was the position of Minister Portella that 
he refused to dismiss his senile General Secretary, Mr
Guilherme AragSo, openly criticized as inefficient, just 
because he feared that the Chief of SNI, Gen. Medeiros, 
would impose a new appointee, 30 With additional
criticisms, Portella's situation in the government 
deteriorated quickly. ei
University teachers' claims for major changes in the 
payment regime including better budgetary appropriations 
for education, by the last quarter of the year, formed a
worrying movement which threatened a general strike. 
Portella again found SEPLAN's doors closed and his 
frustration with the situation became a personal breach 
with Delfim:
"He condemned me to such a scheme of starvation", he remembered
afterwards, "that I could not say that I have duties of
79, Information from Dr, Della Senta, interviewed by the author,
80, Information from Dr, Demo, interviewed by the author,
81, "Two more criticisms were usually raised against him; the inefficiency of his 
administration and the constant quarrels among M E C 1s first rank directors, such as the
ones which led to the resignation of the Minister's Office Chief and the Secretary for
Higher Education," (Dr, Demo, interviewed by the author)
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friendship towards him, 1,3 3
In early November, federal autarchy university teachers 
start their general strike . Paldicio do Planalto advised 
Portella to harden negotiations with the strikers. He 
refused to do so and went his own way. He openly 
criticized the rigidity of the government. In the last 
week of November, the day before he left MEC, Portella 
accepted an invitation to hold a conference at the 
Congress about the crisis. There, asked about his
position between the two sides, the teachers and the 
government, he said:
"I am not a minister, I stand as a minister. I am a teacher and 
this condition places me on the other side of the river. On 
that side I will be much more comfortable."33
5. 3. 2. The "Ludwig affair"
Following Minister Portella's resignation in November 
1980, the appointment of a general on active duty to 
replace a professor in the Ministry of Education and 
Culture - just when the "Abert ura" entered its advanced
82, Playboy, Sept. 1981f n, 74, p.26, "At one tine Delfin joked anong friends - and 
later Portella was told - that the ninister of education could not differentiate a zero 
at the right fron another at the left of a point, The following week, at a conference 
in the Council of Brazilian Chancellors, Portella gave tit for tat and said that 'the 
history of this country will never be simply the history of inflation or the fight 
against the inflation, as sone people think," (Dr, Della Senta, interviewed by the 
author), The day he left the ministry, Portella joked with journalists about Delfim; 
"Well, fat men are usually good-natured people, He is the only bad fat man I know,,," 
Playboy, Sept, 1981, n, 74, p.26,
83, Playboy, Sept, 1981, n, 74, p,25, The text above incorporates the terms of Dr, 
Della Senta's report to the author,
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stage - attracted the attention of Brazilian public 
opinion and excited the press. After a conspicuous debut, 
Gen. Rubem Ludwig stayed in MEC for about the same short 
period as his predecessor <22 months) and had the same 
clashes with Minister Delfim Netto over MEC's budget. The 
story seemed to repeat itself, this time more notoriously 
because, prior to Ludwig, who was a distinguished military 
man, three ministers had already stepped down in the wake 
of conflicts with Delfim. This was indeed a special 
"dish" for the press which, after an intensive coverage of 
events, created an image of Ludwig as "the only minister 
to have ever stepped on Delfim" and the winner of the 
whole affair. More thorough observation of the events 
would show different results, at least for education 
f inance.
Rubem Ludwig was a member of the so-called "Group of the 
Planalto", the nucleus of the military which had led the 
political process among other military and civilian groups 
of the stablishment, since 1974. This group was actually 
an extension of Geisel's leadership and its most prominent 
figures <i.e, President Figueiredo himself, generals 
Golbery, Venturini and Medeiros) had been direct 
assistants of the former president. Ludwig himself, as 
colonel, had been Geisel's prestigious spokesman and was 
the executive secretary of the National Security Council 
<CSN) in Figueiredo's government. He had just been 
appointed general and sent to command the Military Academy 
of Agulhas Negras (which his son had joined as a cadet) 
when he was suddenly moved to replace Minister Portella. 
The circumstancial details of his appointment to MEC in 
November 1980 are described in Section 3.2.4. Besides the 
merits of a respected military career, those last years of 
living in Paldclo do Planalt o gave Ludwig some special
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relationship. Si'cl
Having managed, within a week of office, to put an end to 
a university teacher' strike already taking place, by 
means of obtaining from PalScio do Planalto a new payment 
and career plan, Ludwig used his political skill and
relationship to promote his position and discourse. He
organized MEC's Office for Social Communication headed by 
a professional journalist and was favoured by
acquaintances he had made among members of the press when
he worked in the area during Geisel's government. Ludwig 
basically adopted Portella's same plan (the III PSEC) but 
introduced marked changes into internal functional 
relations in MEC aiming at efficiency (Section 3.2.3). He 
was given a special delegation by President Figueiredo to 
make any changes in MEC's internal bodies or supervised 
organizations, so his Portarias were to have the effect of 
presidential decrees. This marked his image in the
federal bureaucracy as a "strong minister",
Ludwig assigned the internal management of the ministry to 
his General Secretary, Col. S6rgio Pasquali, making 
himself available for external and political contacts. He 
appeared at several public events and gave a discourse 
concerning the political significance of education. He 
related this to Figueiredo's main, often repeated 
political pledge ("I shall make this country a democracy") 
and contrasted this concept with that of the role of 
education in economic development.
84, Col, Pasquali, Ludwig's close friend since they were class-mates at primary 
school, described the general's political position in the group with analogies: 
"Ludwig had his own bright and political "specific gravity" but, beyond this, everybody 
in PaUcio do Planalto liked him", "Figueiredo liked him", noted Col, Mauro 
Rodrigues, another friend from the same turna' at military academy, Interviews with the 
author,
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"Making this country a democracy and reducing social 
inequalities are the pledges which permeate the whole political 
project of this government and consequently its educational 
project. In this context, education is a means of generating 
'political capital'. The economic aspect of education, the 
formation of human capital, is nowadays acknowledged. However, 
it appears equaly certain and more indispensable that the 
educational process takes up the feature of social and political 
capital, assuring the balance of development. (...) It is the 
duty of education to develop the capabilities of people so that, 
as responsible and conscious citizens, they can create a 
democratic society well-equipped to reduce social inequalities 
and to maintain pluralist and independent relationships. " es
The new minister made regular contacts with artist groups 
through his Secretary of Culture, a well-known designer, 
Mr Alulsio MagalhSes. He used a direct and frank way of
addressing himself to university teachers and invited them 
to present a draft bill to reform university administra­
tive structures. Soon it was generally accepted that 
"education had finally been given some place in the 
political scene".
Then, the time of facing the budgetary problem came to 
Ludwig as it had to Portella. Through his General
Secretariat, the minister prepared for the oncoming 
struggle for finance concentrated on the part of the
budget in which MEC was most vulnerable: the crucial
budgetary group of appropriations from the Ordinary 
Treasury for current expenditure, other than personnel, 
usually labelled "OCC". As early as March 1981 he handed
85, HEC/91. Discurso do Ministro Ruben Ludwig na Abertura do Congesso Brasilei ro de
Pessoas Deficientes, Recife, 26/10/1981, N2 10, 1981 (leaflet),
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the President a definite proposal about MEC's needs for 
1981 and 1982 with relation to OCC. Taking into
consideration the existing inflation rates (over 90% a 
year), MEC would need some additional Cr$ 31 billion 
(thousand million) for OCC until the end of 198JL (it had 
CrS 21 billion) and Cr$ 107 billion for OCC in 1982. the 
year whose budget was to be prepared in a couple of 
months. l3"s
After explanations and justifications at intermediate 
bureaucratic levels between MEC and SEPLAN, Ludwig sent 
Delfim an official letter - the "Aviso" n. 363, of 5/5/81 
- confirming and explaining the same figures, and two days 
later met him personally. In the following week, the 
MEC's budgetary ceiling for OCC in 1982 was fixed by 
SEPLAN at CrS 44.6 billion (EM n. 128, of 11/5/81), all 
Ludwig's demands being apparently ignored.
The necessity of observing the ceilings for OCC in the 
preparation of the budget proposals was explicitly urged 
on all ministries by Minister Golbery, on behalf of the 
President - but obviously by direct request of Minister 
Delfim - in two consecutive "Avisos?* (Aviso-Circular n. 2, 
of 14/4/81, and then another, n. 3, of 15/5/81) which is 
the most formal written communication at ministerial 
level. However, MEC held to its previous proposal. It 
made ready to elaborate its budget for 0CC/82 with a 
hundred linked institutions totalling CrS 108 billion, 
asking therefore for an extra-ceiling of CrS 63 billion. 
The angry reaction of SEPLAN was simply disregarded.
86, Information of this and following paragraphs were collected from files of M E C 1 s 
General Secretariat,
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Ludwig went to the President at the beginning of July to 
present and justify his proposal. He first regretted that 
SEPLAN had not defined anything about his request for 
supplement for 1981 until then. As for 1982, he argued 
that the official Federal Union's 1982 revenue would 
increase 75% over the estimated sum for the end of 1981, 
and MEC had proposed to increase only by 59% in OCC, in 
spite of having the Federal Union's largest network of 
linked institutions. According to SEPLAN's ceiling, the 
increase of only 18% would leave MEC's budget well below 
inflation rates. All difficult financial circumstances of 
the country being considered, it would be impossible to 
face MEC's responsibilities in such conditions. 
Furthermore, the curve showing the participation of MEC in 
total Union's Budget, a theme which had been politically 
largely used by the opposition, would remain declining (as 
it had since 1965). He reported he did not ask for real 
extra money except for primary education, school meals and 
the recovery of cultural patrimony. !i3'7
Constitutionally, the Budget had to be forwarded by the 
Executive Power to the Congress before the end of August 
and the ministries' proposals should go to SEPLAN in the 
second week of July. Ludwig met Delfim on 28th July. He 
was aware that SEPLAN always added to most ministries' 
budget proposals some "extra ceiling" money, finally. 
Portella had obtained CrS 5 billion over his CrS 16 
billion ceiling. SEPLAN's final decision came in the 
first week of August: from its CrS 73 billion request MEC
had been granted only CrS 3 billion, some extra-budgetary 
arrangements being promised for the first six months of 
school meals in 1982. In the wake of these events, the
87, The information in this paragraph is from the Minister's agenda for the meeting 
with the President,
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press had a political fact: a military minister of
education was finally found to be in the same situation as 
his dissident predecessor. The President accepted
SEPLAN's version and sent the Budget's bill to the 
Congress.
Ludwig resented the President's decision but avoided the 
press. He began thinking he could not stand the situation 
and decided to play tough or leave the ministry, and 
eventually the government. He made his dissatisfaction 
known to generals Medeiros and Venturini. He failed to 
appear regularly at MEC and went to Rio for more than one 
week without informing his whereabouts. Furthermore, he 
cancelled the conference he was expected to give in Escola 
Superior de Guerra. Paldcio do Planalto found out he had 
drafted a personal letter to the President explaining his 
position and his decision to step down from the 
government. He did not see the President during August. 
Finally, in the second week of September he attended an 
appointment with the President and made it clear that he 
thought education had not been fairly treated in the 1982 
Budget and that he had serious difficulty in running the 
ministry under such conditions. se To an anxious crowd of 
journalists who waited for his return from Pal&cio do 
Planaltot Ludwig announced that the President had agreed 
to restore MEC's early budgetary proposal. The event, 
cheerfully celebrated, marked Ludwig's political image, 
although the affair actually prolonged itself, far from 
press attention.
Shortly after this, Delfim made a courtesy visit to Ludwig 
at the general's house. Both men were interested only in 
a good relationship. Skilfully, Delfim made a point of 
taking up the matter himself and providing the best way
88. The information in this paragraph vas given the author by Col, Pasquali,
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of implementing the President’s decision, since 
interfering in the course of the Budget bill already 
submitted to the Congress perhaps would not be - as he 
argued - the most convenient decision for the Executive 
Power. Soon it was announced that the government would 
double an existing, temporary (three years, DL 1704, of 
23/10/1979) additional taxation of 5% on the profits of 
banks and other financial institutions to generate revenue 
for education. The burden of the political and economic 
consequences would be shared, therefore, and SEPLAN's 
budgetary policies would not be changed. . . A law-by- 
decree (n. 1885, of 29/9/81) was laid down, and the
ministers left details to be discussed later.
From late September until November (1981) President 
Figueiredo was seriously ill and underwent heart surgery, 
which was also traumatic for the delicate political and 
economic situation of the country. On the other hand, 
Ludwig preferred to leave the wounds to heal. Meanwhile, 
the Budget, in its initial SEPLAN version was approved by 
the Congress. Only in December was it agreed between the 
two ministers that SEPLAN would secure MEC CrS 30 billion 
for OCC which would be added to the 1982 Budget as a 
supplement. This figure did not meet the MEC's original 
proposal which one assumed to have been promised Ludwig by 
the President but was based on Delfim's estimate for the 
additional tax on the income banks (the source 
specifically created for that purpose). Ludwig understood 
the difference would be provided for later.
Nevertheless, at the end of the year a law-by-decree (DL 
1909, of 28/12/81) established a budgetary cut (formally a 
"temporary prevention of spending") of 12% on all OCC 
appropriations which cost MEC more than CrS 5 billion. 
Facing MEC's complaints, S E P L A N ’regretted that this was a 
general measure. It also asked for new plans and
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discussions on details of the promised CrS 30 billion and 
delayed the first decisions on the matter for more than 
three months. In the course of time, Mr Frederico Bastos, 
Delfim's Secretary for Finance and Budget, and the man who 
actually ran the federal government's budgetary policy, 
began to treat that ammount as a "MEC's reserve at SEPLAN 
to cover all ordinary needs of supplement for the whole 
year", regardless of the fact that inflation rates, even 
according to official records, were double the estimated 
annual 50%. Vainly, MEC insisted on being supplied with 
some CrS 14 billion as partial compensation for inflation 
effects which had been an administrative procedure for 
over a decade. Until the end of July, only CrS 19.5 of 
the accorded CrS 30 billion had been actually approved to 
MEC which simply kept several activities paralysed. When 
he left MEC in September (1982), to become Figueiredo's 
Minister of the Military Affairs, Ludwig felt exasperated 
with the "gently-cooking" tactics of Delfim which made it 
difficult for the general to use his direct-attack 
approach and eroded MEC's expectations for the 1981/82 
period. At the end of the year, MEC had been given
exactly CrS 30. 4 billion as an OCC supplement and, in late 
November, it managed to avoid the 12% cut down on its 
budget.
Notwithstanding these difficulties relating to the 1982 
Budget in progress, the budgetary proposal for 1983. which 
was to be prepared between May and August of 1982. 
extended the conflict and confirmed the prevailing 
position of SEPLAN,
Following approximately the same stategy used in the 
previous year, MEC concentrated on the section of the
89, General Ludwig's personal impressions reported in this and the following paragraph 
were related to the author, at the time,
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budget for OCC and anticipated SEPLAN's definition of 
ceilings, presenting its own plan and estimated figures to 
PalSco do Planalto. MEC would need CrS 191 billion for 
OCC/1983. That year, however, Ludwig and his general 
secretary felt that they could not "repeat the dose" of 
the previous year to the President, although Delfim's 
resistance was the same, since the basis of his argument, 
i.e., the financial situation of the country, had 
worsened. Thus, they sought alternative tactics: the
involvement of the so called "home ministers" <the ones 
who daily met with the President and had their offices in 
Paldcio do Planalto'), especially Gen. Venturini, the 
Minister of the Military Affairs, to whom the National 
Security Council <CSN> was linked. Ludwig had solid 
relations within CSN, as its former executive secretary.
Venturini asked CSN for a thorough report on the MEC's 
budgetary claims and several meetings were held between a 
colonel of the CSN's General Secretariat and a deputy 
general secretary of MEC's General Secretariat in the two 
bodies' headquarters in March and April. In early May, 
some days before SEPLAN defined the 1983 budgetary 
ceilings, Minister Venturini was given CSN's final report 
<Estudo NS 007/3$ SC/82, of 3/5/82) and Ludwig met the 
President. Yet this time, President Figueiredo "washed 
his hands", passing the matter on to SEPLAN. All of MEC's 
claims to have the CrS 30 billion adjustment to the 1982 
Budget included in the budgetary basis for 1983. projects 
were dropped and the OCC/1983. ceiling was fixed at CrS 
104. 6 billion which contrasted with the MEC's earlier CrS 
191 billion request.
MEC and its linked bodies prepared their budgetary 
proposal on the same basis of the original estimate, as it 
had done the previous year, and, by the end, presented a 
total request for CrS 194 billion for OCC, with an extra
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ceiling of CrS 89. 4 billion. Meeting Palacio do
Planalto's reasonable expectations, Ludwig avoided to 
create a climate of competition publicly with SEPLAN, as 
happened in 1981, and the General Secretariat's officials 
were forbidden to give any definite figure to the press on 
the matter. For its part, the officials of SEPLAN eased 
intermediate negotiations and cautiously repeated that 
final decisions would be conceded between the two 
ministers. In a last effort, Ludwig visited the President 
by the end of July before SEPLAN decided to give MEC CrS 
12.8 billion as extra-ceilng for OCC, which was still far 
from the CrS 89. 4 billion demand. In the first week of 
August, Ludwig obtained from Delfim, who had invited him 
for a meeting, some CrS 5.5 billion more and a promise 
that MEC would have a significant share in the newly- 
created extra-budgetary source, FINSOCIAL, so as to cope 
effectively with its costly programme of school meals. 30
Figures in Table 19, below, compare OCC budgetary 
positions from the end of 1980. — when Ludwig took over MEC 
— to the end of 1983. whose budget was prepared in 1982. 
still under Ludwig's administration.
Concerning short-term results , MEC had a 43% increase 
during the execution of the 1981 Budget <by means of 
supplements); Ludwig's decisive move in September of that 
year helped to achieve the peak at 1982 initial position. 
Nothing else, however, even at current values, could be 
added during the execution of the 1982 Budget. The 1980- 
83 results in real terms change definitely the picture. 
The curve is curiously symmetric. Real values decline 
from the peak of the September 1981 decisions to exactly
90, The information in this paragraph cones fron officials of the NEC's General 
Secretariat,
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the same position of December 1980. SEPLAN's strategy 
remained unaffected and the "odd CrS 30 billion" were 
fully "recovered" in two years. . .
TABLE 19
BRAZIL; RESULTS OF NEC's BUDGETARY PROCESS. Q £ L  1980-83
Cr$ Billion
POSITIONS 1 CURRENT 
1 i
1
1 $
REAL (1980)
Change 1980-83
1980 Final Position 14 14 100
1981 B u d g e t 21 11 79
1981 Final Position 30 15 107
1982 B u d g e t 47 12
Specially Obtained 30 8
Total 1982 Plan 77 20 142
1982 Final Position 77 20 142
1983 B u d g e t 121 15 107
1983 Final Position 117 14 100
Notes
1) "OCC" is short for ordinary appropriations from the Treasury for current
expenditure - except for personnel - and capital (equipment and permanent goods).
2) "Real"; at December 1980 prices. Inflation rates are from F6V Index (domestic
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supply), accumulated from 1980, 
Source. Financial records of the MEC's General Secretariat
A small event in October 1981 which did not come to public 
knowlege must be reported, as it is closely conected with 
the central issue of this section and the euphoric climate 
following the peak of the "Ludwig affair".
A draft of constitution complementary law came from the 
Ministry of the Treasury, with personal support of its 
Minister, Professor Ernani Galv^as, to the office of 
Minister Ludwig. The draft proposed a big National 
Programme of Education to be financed by an attachment of 
a minimum 10% of all federal tax revenues to education, 
favoured by allowances up to 5% of the income tax to 
spontaneously contributing firms and a permanent asset 
adjustment of all the Programme's funds to compensate 
currency devaluation. Funds would be deposited in the 
National Savings Bank <CEF> and would produce interest. A 
large participation of firms in training was assured and a 
special board would decide on programmes to be financed by 
the funds.
The project, whose characteristics clearly recalled the 
policies of 1967-73, was the initiative of Dr. Carlos G. 
Langoni, then the President of Central Bank of Brazil, who 
had previously met Ludwig at a cocktail party and had 
talked about his idea.31 Dr. Langoni is a well-known 
economist and professor of Get Olio Vargas Foundation who 
whote a PhD thesis on the economic returns of investment
91, Talks of Gan, Ludwig with the author, who was also handed Langoni's Programme, at 
the time.
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in education and whose ideas, supporting the government's 
strategy in financing education, had largely reverberated 
and been discussed during the seventies.3"’"
The draft contained two prudent assessments of MEC's 
bodies (General Secretariat and FNDE), pointing to some 
unrealism in the proposal, given the existing SEPLAN's 
policies on the matter, and the weak role of MEC, the top 
governmental agency for the area, on the scheme. The 
SEPLAN's appraisal on the matter was not known but,
following it, the Ministry of the Treasury did not refer 
to its draft any more. The fact is remarkable for the 
purpose of this work in that, in the early eighties, the 
idea of education as a priority investment sounded
politically extemporaneous.
5. 4. THE 1980-85 INDUSTRIAL ACTIONS BY FEDERAL
UNIVERSITIES
The years 1980-85 marked the life of Brazilian federal 
universities - the most important segment of the higher 
education system - as the time of a demanding movement
through which new teacher and other civil servant orga­
nizations rose and adopted a stance of labour— like poli­
tical opposition, with recurrent, prolonged paralyzations
92. Langoni, S, ft Study in Economic Growth: The Brazilian Case. PhD Thesis for the 
Chicago University, 1972, A summary of this thesis was twice published by E m i a s .  
Econ6micos (APEC, Rio de Janeiro) in 1972 and 1974 under the title: ft Rentabilidade 
Social dos Investimentos en E d u c a ^ o  no Brasil. Dr. Langoni also defended his ideas in 
magazines reaching different publics (Seguranga e Desenvolvimento. n, 22, 1973 and n, 
24, 1975; Revista Brasileira de Estudos Pedagdgicos. n.61, 1976; PaliiitA, n. 1, 1976; 
Pesquisa e Planeiamento. n. 1, 1971, He also published 0 Papel do Investimento em 
Educa;So e Tecnologia no Processo de Desenvolvimento Econdaico. Rio, IBRE/F6V, 1972,
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of federal university activities in an evident defiance of 
the law which forbade any civil servant industrial action.
This section focuses on this episode which is a shocking 
sign of the end of a cycle in the history of the struggle 
for finance for education in Brazil. Sharply contrasting 
with all preceding events on the issue during the 
authoritarian regime, now demand is expressed in a purely 
political fashion. The contenders are not only
governmental institutions and authorities representing 
social demands; even a debate on reasons for special 
funding of education has only a marginal role in the 
decision-making process, whereas corporatist stances
prevail. The episode, as a whole, reflects the general 
political change in the country from an authoritarian rule 
to a democratic one under the first effects of the policy 
of Abert ura.
The labour feature of the dispute draws attention to a 
very important aspect of the issue of education funding. 
Spending on education is basically spending on teaching 
personnel (consequently reaching administrative person­
nel), which means facing the labour issue. This was a 
crucial point under a developmentalist authoritarian 
regime, specially if one bears in mind that, in the case 
of Brazil, the state was the major investor for economic 
development and therefore had a permanent target (a
planning target, at least) of restricting current public 
expenditure in order to convey savings to capital
spending. The labour issue in the education area had been 
avoided in the political context of the authoritarian 
regime by the technical approach of education and the 
problem dealt with by bureaucratic planning bodies.33
93, During the period 1964-84 the issue of ill-paid teachers, particularly in primary 
schools, vas always pointed out as a main cause of the shortcoming of Brazilian
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The episode reveals the upsets caused in the nucleus of 
the government (inclusive of MEC) by the unusual way the
issue appeared, but particularly the fact that the 
authorities, after the first movements of Minister Ludwig, 
were crippled or politically paralyzed due to the techno-
bureaucratic position of SEPLAN ("The pay rise cannot be 
given because there is no money, and everybody knows the 
situation of the country; so there is nothing to
discuss"). The fallacy of this technical argument is
finally proved by the way concessions were made to other 
categories of civil servants.
5. 4. 1. Antecedents and causes
93, (cont,) education, A policy on a substantial rise in teachers' salaries was 
already formulated by the government's planning body for the area in the two first 
national development plans (1966 and 1968), But only in 1970, two presidential decrees 
were issued on the matter, numbers 66258 and 66259, both of them on 25/2/70, the second 
of them defining minimum salaries for different levels of teaching in the country, The 
policy chiefly affected the states and munictpios whose transfers from FPE/FPH were 
conditioned to the implementation of the measure, The Accountancy Court of each state 
was in charge of the control of the accomplishment of the decree, In spite of this was 
not observed, having fallen in the hands of state governors or mayors, hr Arlindo 
Corrda, one of those responsible for the policy, explains; "The act did not work 
because hr JoSo Agripino, a member of the Federal Union's Accountancy Court (TCU) and 
former governor of the northeastern state of Paraiba, rose up against it calling it 
'impracticable', Without the vigilance of TCU, we lost the capability to 
operationalize the decree", (Interview with the author), The basic cause of the 
regrettable failure of the policy, however, was the mismanagement and unstable 
financial situation of most, overstaffed states and Runiclpios, since they fear that 
other categories would press for treatment similar to that dispensed to teachers, 
Although of utmost importance, this issue lies outside of the scope of this work which 
is limited to the federal area,
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MEC was used to the purely technical treatment of the 
salary issue in federal educationl organizations, 
sheltered by the authoritarian rule of the regime, since 
labour paralyzations in public bodies were illegal (the 
term "industrial action" was technically inadequate if 
used to what happened in federal universities since 1980). 
Besides, public civil servants were not allowed to join a 
labour union.
The studies of the University Reform in 1968 formulated 
policies on better conditions for the teaching staff. 
Salary would combine with greater dedication to university 
activities, namely the full-time working regime, and 
higher levels of post-graduate training. The first
programmes did not come, however, before the fructful 
administration of Minister Jarbas Passarinho and salary 
rise was significant. 'B,A University foundations, recently 
created by the federal government to obtain administrative 
flexibility, were well settled at the general salary 
levels prevailing at the time.
From 1974, the government implemented the 1970 general 
plan of jobs and career for the civil service (Law 5645,
94, Decree 66259, of 25/02/70, connected to the programme of post-graduate education 
and scientific development, re-stuctured federal higher education teaching regines and 
introduced those of full-time, The increase in salaries, as intended, reached 
international standards, "The target of Minister Passarinho was that a higher 
education teacher, researching or teaching full-tine, should ern about US$ 2,000,00 
which was the then average of the respective United States university teacher's salary; 
a target which he achieved," (Col, ConfOcio Pamplona, Passarinho1s General Secretary, 
Interview with the author), According to the Art, 1 of Decree 66258/70, the salaries 
of the four-level teacher career, converted into US dollars at the oficial rate of 
February 1970 (US$ 1,00 = Cr$ 4,41) scaled from US* 2,786 to US* 4,195 a month, A 
bonus of 20X could be added to salary if the teacher forwent any other professional 
activity,
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of 10/12/70 and Law-by-decree 1341, of 1/11/74), which 
reached the administrative and technical staff of schools, 
prolonging the momentum of the early seventies for 
teachers, albeit for a short time.
The absence of a permanent corrective device against the 
corrosion of salary real values by inflation had already 
created a new situation in the late seventies. Since 
Geisel's government, a policy was introduced to mainain 
the level salaries in the federal civil service by giving 
them re-ajustment under inflation rates in order to avoid 
further increases in the public deficit which reached 
worring proportions in extra-budgetary accounts. 
Moreover, the 1974 policy to keep university foundations' 
salaries under control (Law 6182, of 11/12/74, Art. 19) 
simply was not observed, a serious issue which will be 
fully studied later in Chapter Six (section 6.3). The 
diverging course of these two variables generated a huge 
salary gap between the older group of federal 
universities, the autarqulas, and that of the foundations, 
despite having the same characteristics and being 
supported by the same kind of Treasury funds.
Table 20 highlights several aspects of the salary drop 
from 1976 to 1984. In addition, the salary gap between 
foundations and autarquias is also shown. Values are 
expressed in minimum salaries which was a legal and 
politically meaningful relation, actually used during the 
events.
TABLE 20
BRAZIL: SALARY DROP FOR THE STAFF OF UNIVERSITY A U T A R Q U m  AND ITS GAP IN RELATION TO
UNIVERSITY FOUNDATIONS, 1976-84
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CLASSES IN MINIMUM SALARIES IN REAL TERMS wm
FOUND,
MAR/76 JAN/82 JUL/84 MAR/76 JAN/82 JUL/84 JUL/84
FULL-TIME PROFESSOR 30-31 16-17 8-9 100 65 24 73
FULL-TIME LECTURER 22-23 9-10 5-6 100 52 21
H.E. SERVANT , SENIOR 26-27 12-13 6-7 100 59 20 35
H.E. SERVANT . JUNIOR 8-9 4-5 2-3 100 57 20
E.E. SERVANT . SENIOR 11-12 4-5 2-3 100 52 19
E.E. SERVANT . SENIOR 2-3 1-2 0-1 100 58 21 47
Notes
1) Minimum salaries; MAR/76 - Cr* 494,40 (US* 50); JAN/82 * Cr* 11,298,00 (US* 84); 
JUL/84 = CrS 97,176,00 (US* 51).
2) " dt/fr/v^ids/Foundations"; per cent comparison of the salaries of teachers/other 
civil servants of university autarquias vith those of university foundations (=100), 
Since there was a diversity of salary plans among foundations, the highest one was 
taken into consideration for calculations, and it was actually used at the time for 
political purposes,
3) Elected dates, "MAR/76": position at the 75/76 annual salary correction in federal 
civil service (the beginning of the salary decline); "JAN/82"; position after the 30X 
special increase of the salaries of teachers of university autarquias, plus the 40X 
81/82 salary ajustment in federal civil service (therefore, having the situation 
partially amended); "JUL/84"1, Position during the longest federal university strike,
4) "Full-time Professor", equivalent to Professor Titular, 40h$ "Full-time Lecturer", 
equivalent to Professor Assistants II, 40hs;
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5) "H,E, Servant": civil servant in a job which required higher education degree, 
"E.E,": civil servant in a job which required only elementary education,
Sources
1) MEC's General Secretariat
2) Monetary correction: Price General Indexes from GetGlio Vargas Foundation, Projeto 
ARIES, 1987, report 0010006,
On the whole, salaries shrank to 1/4 or 1/5 of their 
original size eight years before! In spite of special 
ajustments of 1/3 rise since 1981, in 1984 the same 
governmental body paid a teacher of a university autarquia 
about 30% less than his usually less experienced peer at a 
university foundation! As for other civil servants the 
gap autarquias/foundations was even deeper.
The event which made possible these movements was the 
creation of independent teacher societies in federal 
higher education institutions <IFES>. Yet in 1978, one 
year before the abolition of Law-by-decree 477, which was 
accused of having inhibited and disturbed university 
community life for a decade, some societies began emerging 
here and there, from the spontaneous and free association 
of teachers. They were formally constituted as
independent from the university or college and the 
government itself, with the purpose of representing and 
promoting the interests of teachers and university 
institutions. The first associations were formed at the 
University of SSo Paulo <USP), the federal universities of 
Rio de Janeiro, Paraiba and Pernambuco, but yet in 1980 
almost every federal university had its society which was 
called ADU <short for AssoclagSo de Docentes da 
Universidade>. ADUs congregated as a national committee, 
the National Co-ordination of University Teachers
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Association (CONAD); ADUs and CONAD made up a national 
entity, the National University Teacher Society (ANDES).
A few years later, other IFES' civil servants began to 
follow the teachers' example and changed the nature and 
activities of their existing associations which used to 
have as main goals the leisure and welfare of their 
members,
A changing course in the composition and stance of the 
leading groups in the movement must be recognized over a 
five-year period of direct confrontation with the 
government. Abandoning some ethically-inspired feelings 
which moderated the salary approach of the early times, 
most ADUs' and ANDES' leadership adopted labour corporate 
attitudes. Professor Paulo Rosas, of the Department of 
Psychology of the Federal University of Pernambuco, who 
was always close to the leadership of his university's 
ADU, standing as its candidate for the university 
chancellorship in 1983, and appointed as a member of 
CONAD, described the first stage of the move:
"I can remember meetings in the early times when many 
teachers felt embarrassed to strike for salary 
increases while other workers even in the area of 
education, such as primary school teachers or other 
federal civil servants in schools, were in quite a 
worse situation. Even the press and some malicious 
official reaction emphasized our salary claims. (...) 
The dissatisfaction with the government-university 
relationship was a key factor in forcing the 
movement's rise in such a striking way. Then, the 
unionist approach prevailed.
95, Interview with the author,
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As the movement matured by 1983, the paralyzation of 
university activities turned to be an instrument more
wisely used, and a definite step in the syndicalist
approach was taken. The initially aggressive style of the 
ANDES' president Dr Pinguelli Rosa (Federal University of 
Rio de Janeiro) became more self-confident and came to 
lead the moves in the political minuet with MEC in 1983. 
In July 1984 new elections were to be held for the ANDES 
board of directors as the country approached a politically 
decisive moment, choosing its first civilian president for 
two decades. The university teachers' movement then had 
its place in the scene where all political forces stood 
by for the oncoming new government. A group affiliated to 
the Workers Party (.Part ido dos Trabalhadores, PT) took 
over ANDES, and gave the organization a radical unionist 
approach to the university crisis, which actually had
overstepped the limits of a purely salary issue. 
Professor Paulo Rosas, who then stood as a candidate for 
the ANDES presidency, completed his report:
"ANDES had already achieved the legitimacy of 
university teachers representation. Political parties 
then started looking at the movement in a different 
light and PT had an active presence at many ADUs. 
Nationally organized, ANDES could be a useful 
instrument for implementation of a political strategy. 
Until 1984 ANDES had only had a single list of
candidates for its elections. Then, two strongly
opposing factions came up to spread a sort of
"splitting neurosis". ADUs of federal universities of 
Rio de Janeiro, Rio grande do Sul, Pernambuco, Par6, 
Amazonas and the University of Campinas lost the
elections against others under the leadership of the 
University of SSo Paulo by 47 to 53% of the votes. 
The sudden call-off of a then existing strike, 
unexplicably interrupting negotiations without 
consulting the university bases as usual, was a clear
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indication that the movement began to be commanded by
outside forces" <it was August, the 6th, three months
before the presidential election of Mr Tancredo Neves 
by the Congress took place, following intensive 
political negotiations).-**"
Figures of Table 21, can give a preliminary overview of 
the paralyzations of university activities, which were 
openly called on as industrial actions (greves) and
treated by the press as such. A summary of the motives of
the movement, as announced, is also presented.
96, Interview with the author,
TABLE 21
BRAZIL: POLITICAL MOVEMENTS OF FEDERAL UNIVERSITY STUDENTS,
TEACHERS AND OTHER CIVIL SERVANTS, DEZ/1980 - MAR/1985
YEAR/GROUP PARALYZATION (DAYS) CLAIMS OR BANNERS
Minor Major A B C D E F 6 H I
(continues)
Notes
1) "Claias or Banners" were individually counted fron aanifestos of the movement's 
leadership, irrespective of their iaportance for the mobilization,
2) "Minor/Major Paralyzation": distinguishes between actions affecting all or at least 
large sections of the federal systea of higher education schools,
3) % : Two figures separated by a / mean "Total gross paralyzation days" and (/) "Total 
net paralyzation days", The second case represents simultaneous paralzation of several 
categories in a same school, In the two cases, weekends and holidays were counted in 
when included in a period of paralyzation,
4) Key for the "Claims or Banners":
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A = Salary Claims
B s Abolishion or reduction of school fees
C = Other advantages or facilities
D * Claims about federal policies of administrative reform of the university, 
mainly those intended by the government 
E = General increase in public funds for education
F = Universal, free and public education
G = Reinforcement of university political movement or solidarity to it 
H = Nationwide political issues, not directly connected with school activities
I = Reinforcement of labour organizations or solidarity to them
YEAR/GROUP PARALYZATION (DAYS) CLAIMS OR BANNERS
Minor Major A B C D E F G H I
1980 - 56/-* 2 1 2  - 2 3 3 7 3
STUDENTS - 6 - 1 2 - 1 2 2 7 3
TEACHERS - 50 2 - - - 1 1 1
C. SERVANTS - - .
1981 50/- 7/- 2 1 4  - 3 2 8 1 1
STUDENTS - 2 1 2 - 2 1 4 - -
TEACHERS 20 5 2 - 1 - 1 1 4 1 1
C. SERVANTS 30 - - - 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12S2. -  63 / 33  4 1 4  2 3 4 6 3 -
STUDENTS - 2 - 1 2 - 2 3 1 3 -
TEACHERS - 31 3 - 2 1 1 1 1 - -
C, SERVANTS - 30 1 - - 1 - - 4
(continues)
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YEAR/GROUP PARALYZATION (DAYS) CLAIMS OR BANNERS
Minor
1983 2
STUDENTS 2
TEACHERS 
C, SERVANTS
1984-MAR/85
STUDENTS 
TEACHERS 
C, SERVANTS
IQIAL 52
Major A B C
3/1 6 - 5
1 2
1 3 - 2
1 3 - 1
163/77 4 - 8
2 -  -  1
84 2 - 1
77 2 - 6
307/174 18 3 23
D E F G H I
2 2 2 6 3 1
1 1 3  3 1
1 1 1 1 -  -
1 -  -  2 -
1 4 1 11 15 1
1 1 3  6 -
1 2 - 7 - -
1 - 1 9  1
5 14 12 34 29 6
Key for the "Claims or Banners":
A = Salary Claims
B = Abolishion or reduction of school fees
C s Other advantages or facilities
D » Claims about federal policies of administrative reform of the university, 
mainly those intended by the government 
E = General increase in public funds for education
F = Universal, free and public education
G = Reinforcement of university political movement or solidarity to it 
H = Nationwide political issues, not directly connected with school activities
I = Reinforcement of labour organizations or solidarity to them
Source; Division of Security and Information (DSI) of the Ministry of Education (MEC),
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Table 21 prompts the following remarks:
1) The activities of the three groups — students, 
tachers and other civil servants — coincided for the 
purpose of co-ordination only from 1982. Teachers had a 
dominant position in the number of paralyzed days 
reflecting their leadership; the civil servants movement 
erupted in 1982 and the participation of students was 
quite more modest than during the sixties.
2) The peak of paralyzation in 1984 reached 1/3 of the 
180 legal minimum number of school days, even if weekends 
and holidays were deducted.
3> Mobilization for the reinforcement of the movement 
is its most accentuated single aim. This appears more 
significant if one considers the usual practice of 
demonstrators to expand their list of claims either to
involve the wishes of all groups or to balance the image
conveyed through their most socially controversial claims.
4) Teachers seemed to have been more attuned to 
individual advantages than to issues of a wider context: 
the former (represented by letters A, C and G) totals 68% 
of all their claims.
5) Worries directly concerning the issue of funding 
education (letter E) - a claim expressed in broad,
repetitive terms - do not seem to play a special role in
the claimants' approach: they represent only 12% of total
claims.
5. 4. 2. Developments
An outline of the events of university staff movements and 
their relationship with the government starts in late 
1980, with a thorough victory for the teachers of 
university autarquias. The government was interested in 
quickly ending the crisis provoked by the resignation of
- 370 -
Minister Portella, as this was also important for the 
position of the new minister, Gen. Ludwig. This was the 
circumstancial political fact which caught SEPLAN by 
surprise. Ludwig took up the role of a direct represent­
ative of the nucleus of the government and created a fait 
accompli. Minister Delfim had to fall behind or provoke 
an inopportune confrontation. Decree 85487, of 11/12/80, 
brought a new career plan for autarquias, which gave 
opportunity to an increase in salaries but did not affect 
the autarquias/foundations dichotomy itself.
At that time a crucial precedent was set in favour of the 
strikers: the illegality of the paralyzation was not
formally pronounced and no deduction was made from 
salaries. The outcome of the conflict satisfied MEC, 
which did recognize the rightness of the salary claim. 
Punitive measures would impair the successful d6but of 
Minister Ludwig, who needed to build up good relations in 
this sensitive area of his ministry. 3-7 MEC alleged that 
there was no reliable control of attendance or absence on 
which to base punitive measures. This first move might 
have been decisive for the ensuing confrontations33 .
The winning movement thrived and a few months later could 
come back to MEC, with the claim of the salary gap between 
autarquias and foundations. This would represent a
massive increase in expenditure, summarily dismissed by 
SEPLAN. MEC was left with the problem without financial 
options, inasmuch as Ludwig had just had a clash with
97, This was the author's feeling in talks with Col, Pasquali, NEC's General 
Secretary, on the subject at the tine,
98, "I an sure that the following strikes would not have taken place if that first one 
had been won and controlled by the governnent," (Professor Herbert 6, Calhau, MEC's 
Subsecretary for Higher Education at the tine, who actively participated on the 
negotiations between the governnent and the teachers, Interview with the author,)
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SEPLAN's Minister Delfim over finance for MEC and had 
forced a presidential decision to be made in his favour 
(Section 5. 3. 2). The unfairness of the diversity in 
salaries was openly recognised but all that was achieved 
was an inocuous statement obtained from the acting 
President Aureliano Chaves in October (1981) providing in 
general terms, for a gradual elimination of the gap.®3
Needing to keep up mobilization, the ANDES'S leadership 
gave in to the demands of a group of new teachers, the 
” Colaboradores?\ which claimed immediate access to the 
first step of the career (they had then an inferior 
position due to an exceptional ingress in the manning 
tables, without competitive examinations, following the 
strike in December 1980). The general paralyzation was 
shortly renewed in November 1981.
The political setting of the dispute — then clear for the 
leadership of each side — could be explained as follows. 
The striking facts of the salary gap were politically 
devastating for the government, not least because of their 
scale but chiefly because their most sensitive aspect — 
the unfair treatment in the diversity between foundations 
and autarquias —  exposed an administrative failure of the 
regime over the years, during the 1970's. If the
government still decided to play tough, to refuse payment 
during paralyzation days and to clamp down on the illegal 
movement, the teachers might go to court to force the
99, President Figueiredo was tenporarily off duty (23/9 to H/ 1 1 /8 1 )  for heart 
surgery, Apart froi not being expressed by a decree, the fragility of the decision 
also came from the fact that the chances of its implementation by Figueiredo were 
almost of no account, as the matter had not been properly agreed with SEPLAN, as Mr 
Delfim Netto, also absent for most of Aureliano's tenure, did not participate in it, 
avoiding contact with his strained Vice-President (a fact openly commented on by the 
press),
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correction of the salary gap on grounds of isonomy, which 
would have resulted in a terrible blow to SEPLAN's 
strategy. Since this was not a likely government
decision, the best option for ANDES' political targets — 
including consolidating the position of the organization 
and wearing the government down — was to keep going with 
the paralyzations. An indecisive approach resulted,
therefore, the best setting for both sides of the dispute. 
MEC authorities, however, came out as the losers: as much
as the strikers, MEC was kept paralyzed with the problem 
(which was actually of SEPLAN' s> and without means to 
solve it.
One more reason made the position of the government 
authorities weaker. It could not always count on the 
total loyalty of the senior officials and chancellors in 
MEC. Many of them maintained an ambiguous position
between the two opposite sides. Most officials were 
university teachers themselves, temporarily serving in 
MEC's bodies, some of them even on universities' payrolls. 
Loyalty to the government and solidarity with their 
professional colleagues was the uncertain position of 
chancellors, who were themselves members of the teaching 
staff and could not forget that in a few years they would 
be back to working together with teachers. 100
100, "Actually, it was very difficult for many people in MEC not to divide their 
loyalty in those circunstances and to hide their sympathy for the teachers' cause", 
said Prof, Calhau, a senior official of the Secretariat for Higher Education (SESU), 
participating in most conflicts during the 1980-84 period and hiaself a teacher from 
the permanent staff of the iautarquia) Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, 
(Interview with the author), Interference in the sane feelings of sympathy to teachers 
struggles against the government in the course of the events was also recognized by Or, 
Tarcisio Della Senta, MEC's former Secretary for Higher Education (1979-81) and 
minister1 adviser (1982-84), (Interview with the author),
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Not only were the " Colaboradores?* awarded their request, 
but Ludwig managed to include a 30% additional percentage 
of salary increase for teachers from autarquias in the 
presidential decree which granted a 40% annual 
readjustment of salaries for the federal civil service 
from the first day of 1982. Although the pay rise had 
become insignificant after one year, it was the last
effective measure to be taken by the government to reduce 
the autarquias/foundations salary gap until it was
definitively eliminated six years later, in completely 
different political circumstances by Decree 94664, of 
23/7/87. Again, alleging practical means to identify the 
majority of teachers who had been out of work, MEC did not 
urge reductions of monthly payment.
The problem remained the same all the year - Ludwig left 
MEC in September - and, for the third consecutive time, 
the proximity of the final examinations in November 
brought a new paralyzation of class activities. This
time, however, the worse salary condition of other
university civil servants finally led to eruption and the 
administration of universities was halted altogether. As 
for university teachers, some minor alterations in the 
career structure were introduced by Decree 87867, of 
25/11/82, and the strike finished. Publicly, teachers 
presented the movement as successful, as the mobilization 
was larger, having the solidarity of some paralyzed 
foundations, and the legitimacy of ANDES representation 
recognized. MEC backed administrative civil servants, 
arguing the unfairness of the existing salary situation in 
relation to special increases awarded to teachers. The 
government, however, did not ease its position, and 
nothing was granted this time, although the payment for 
the paralysation days had not been refused either.
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Following the departure of Ludwig, Minister Delfim Netto 
stepped up SEPLAN's participation in the decision-making 
process on recurrent university claims. 101 For more than 
two years he "exchanged" courtesies with MEC's Minister, 
Ms Esther Ferraz — whom he reminded of their mutual 
particularity as ministers from SSo Paulo — for effective 
control of MEC*s finance-related demands. To teachers 
continuously pressing the government with warnings, 
including a successful day of "warning national 
paralyzation", SEPLAN replied with a sort of "bankruptcy 
argument": the government simply could not afford any
further burden to the Exchequer, as the chaotic situation 
of the economy, shaken by a 220% annual inflation, sank 
the country's 1983 GNP in a -4% deficit!
Nevertheless, an odd 20% bonus on the salaries of the 
civil servants of autarquias "for supporting teaching" <a 
feature inherent in the job's description) was announced 
in December (1983). Direct salary increases were to be 
avoided under the allegation that a privileged treatment 
of this group would raise an uncontrollable claim of the 
whole civil service for isonomous treatment. In fact, 
"the special attention" to federal civil servants in 
schools, the "precedent" argument and that of the 
"bankruptcy" had definite limits: the decrees which
actually created the bonus <laws-by-decree 2121, of
16/5/84, and 2123, of 5/6/84), only were signed by the 
President five months later, when similar bonuses had
already been granted to several other groups of the
101, Col, Pasquali, M E C 5 General Secretary throughout the whole period, commented on
the actual allocation of power in the nucleus of the government, in the last years of 
Figueiredo's government; "There was actually an inadequate command by Figueiredo in all 
these budget-related claims, He only said: 'Talk to Delfim',"
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federal civil service. 10;':
The delay in accomplishing promises and the modest 
financial effects of the bonus, given the proportions of 
the existing gap, dissipated political profits from the 
concession. Hence, at the second quarter of 1984, the 
salary claim movement of university staff re-appeared 
stronger. A unified mobilization of teachers and civil 
servants from autarquias and foundations carried out the 
most prolonged general paralyzation ever seen in Brazilian 
universities. The government had nothing else to offer. 
Previous arguments were repeated; at the same time, 
numerous drafts of an over— discussed bill on the 
administrative structure of federal universities, 
including the reajustment of salary policies towards 
foundations, passed from hand to hand among bodies of MEC, 
CFE, universities, CRUB and ANDES, keeping both sides of 
the dispute busy and dragging the conflict on for three 
continuous months. None of these drafts ever became law 
for the remaining period of the military government. The 
strike finished suddenly - probably by interference of 
external political forces to which a newly elected ANDES’ 
board of directors was linked - and the government 
promised to send a bill on the matter to Congress. The 
outcome this time was that the government was helped by 
external circumstances but university staff did not suffer 
any cuts to their monthly payments because of the 
paralyzat ion.
102, Police (20X), DL 2111, of 4/4/84; Finance Control Technicians (80X), DL 2112, of 
17/4/84; Doctors (up to 100%), 23/4/84; Court Civil Servants and Lawyers (40X), DL 
2117, of 7/5/84, Other bonuses were alio granted, and finally the general salary table 
for all civil servants in administrative or intermediate functions was increased (DL 
2130, of 25/6/84), Almost the whole federal civil service had its wages 
"exceptionally11 improved between April and June 1984,
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Concerning the overall results of the movements it is more 
precise to say: the government lost and education did not
win. The government was forced publicly to compromise
itself over an illegal strike, misrepresenting the 
strikers' position. Education failed
concessions were made without reference 
improvement.
5.5. CONCLUSIONS
Contrasting with the rationality of the economic approach 
to the education funding, the struggle for finance for 
education brings the true nature of the process to light. 
Decisive turning points in the changes in earmarked
sources and minimum percentages from tax revenues for 
education and the conflicts between education authorities 
and the central planning body clearly set the question in 
terms of political priorities. In this regard, the
outright aboli^shipn of special budgetary treatment for 
education in the 1967 and ' 69 constitutions, whilst the 
strategy was kept for other programmes, is a definite fact 
whose nature these events later revealed. Even the 
economic crisis of the country was never accepted by 
ministers of education or university teachers as a 
sufficient reason for failing to give education a 
budgetary treatment compatible to its needs.
Notwithstanding this, in the same events a "technical 
argument" — the necessity of a rational, overall 
allocation of funds by the planning body or that of 
balancing the budget by cutting down on public expenditure 
— repeatedly replaced (or hid) prevailing economic 
policies and strategies, ' namely extra-budgetary
to win when 
to education
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programmes, overborrowing and subsidizing, which actually 
caused the deficit and prolonged it.
From Geisel's government onwards, a progressive deflation 
affected the concept of education as an important 
instrument for development, as the policy on earmarked 
financial sources clearly implied. The following facts 
are examples.
Although proving a vital step forward in securing 
funds for for primary education, which, otherwise, the 
programme was consistently refused from the Treasury, 
Saldrio-Educag&o was never forgiven for its origins 
and developments outside the government's general 
economic policy. This uneasy position was revealed 
some years later when Saldrio-EducagSo needed 
financial updating or had its flow affected by the 
crisis of the Welfare System. These facts and a blunt 
opposition by political interests linked to the 
agricultural sector resulted in preventing the supply 
of financial means for the accomplishment of the 
constitutional mandate of general education between 7 
and 14 years of age, a fact made evident by statistics 
at the end of the decade. In spite of the fact that 
no state had individually reached this target, states 
were exempted from the 20% strict attachment of the 
FPE/FPM to education.
Education was the unfortunate, "necessary" victim of 
the policy of CDS/FAS/CEF for the whole social area. 
Lottery proceeds were given a new dimension in a 
lending Fund which was built up by half the existing 
education-supplier lotteries and the exclusive profit 
from the newer and larger of them, the L0T0. In other 
words, education had to share its hitherto privileged 
position with other social programmes.
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In the time of the government's the financial crisis, 
all earmarked sources had to join the "purge crusade" 
to cut down on the public deficit, and education loans 
were not waived in the general use of borrowing to 
alleviate foreign currency shortage.
From the early eighties, against a background of
economic crisis, the idea of education/development 
proved sterile and virtually disappeared. Other
motives were raised to justify the funding of
education, particularly the requirements of the social 
justice and the links between education and the 
cultural and political development. The messages of 
ministers Portella and Ludwig had strong repercussions 
in times of political liberalization whereas the 
"Langoni's project" could not even come to discussion.
Extra-Budgetary, earmarked financial sources were always 
welcomed by the Ministry of Education, under continuous 
pressure for funds, provided they came as a limited
subsidy to reinforcing ordinary appropriations from the 
Treasury. A serious problem ocurred, however, when these 
sources, after having reached large proportions of the 
total revenue and generated a strong dependency in
permanent activities such as schools, became unstable or 
were reduced.
The political fragility of education, including its 
current official justification among Congressmen's values, 
was apparent when requirements of "political survival" — 
whether in terms of serving a political clientele or 
reacting against an authoritarian regime — came on to the 
scene.
Finally, the way in which the of 1980-85 industrial 
actions by university staff broke out exposes the contrast
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of two political contexts in which the decision-making 
process of the education funding (in this case the policy 
of salaries) took place. In the transition from a techno- 
bureaucratic context to another where open political 
participation was possible, the government found itself 
trapped in the typical consequences of the former.
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CHAPTER SIX 
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE RATIONAL APPROACH
The mainstream of the government's economic approach to 
education funding implied that this process had to be 
intentionally conducted and not pluralisticaly driven by 
"external", often unwanted or inopportune social 
pressures. There was an economic rationality to be
asserted, before everything. Planning became, therefore, a 
major governmental activity, intimately connected to 
political will, and thereby, planning performers — 
supposedly professionals in the bureaucracy —  closely 
participated in political power.
Planning policies and instruments having been described in 
Chapter Two, this chapter investigates their fate in the 
issuing implementation process which features the real 
weight of other political and cultural variables thus 
opening the way to further reflections on the meaning of 
the economic approach when it comes to the political 
decision on allocating funds to non-economic services.
The basic among those variables is the privileged position 
of higher education in society, the patrimonial conception 
of the state or the patrimonial use of state resources by 
the performers of state functions and political 
centralization in its counter— productive results, 
particularly the attachment of a number of organizations 
to the government' structure and the autonomous activity 
of the federal bureaucracy.
6.1. EDUCATION PLANNING x EXPENDITURE ON UNIVERSITIES
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During the 1950's and most of the I960's there was an 
indisputable consensus among policy-makers, including 
Congressmen involved in education, about the priority of 
elementary education problems, at least at the level of 
discourse and policy. The long-discussed bill of
"Directives and Bases of National Education" which became 
law in 1961 (LDB) founded all its decentralizing strategy 
on the principle that states and municipios would be 
entrusted with the basic education. The realization of 
the poor situation of that level of education came to hurt 
national pride in the view of many influential people 
during the I960's.1
The, 1960 statistical census showed what increasingly 
appeared to be shameful figures. Brazil could not stand a 
40% illiterate population over 15 years of age! Even 
considering the sharp differences among regions and states 
—  figures were not so gloomy for some states of the South 
or South-east — the average schooling rate of the 
population between 7 and 14 years was about 50%, sadly 
falling lower in rural areas. 3/4 of schools in these 
areas were one-roomed schools where children of all ages 
and education levels had lessons together from a single 
teacher. With half of its teaching staff being improperly 
qualified and commonly working for pittances, the output 
of primary schools was extremely low. The system was, 
incredibly, unable to retain pupils: only one out of ten
children who entered school was still there eight years
1. Examples in the extreaes of the political spectrum go fron the inthropologiit Dircy 
Ribeiro, Goulart's Minister of Education (Speech to the Federal Education Council, CFE, 
on 21/9/1962) to the head of the Special Connisssion which was set up by the Military 
on education, Gen, Meira Hattos, (Meira Mattos' Commission Report, Section 2,10,2, 
Correio da Hanhg. 25/8/69), and the Minister of Education, Jarbas Passarinho, in the 
golden times of the 1964 regime in his annual address to Etcola Superior de Suerra on 
29/5/1970 (ESG, Ooc, CS0-123-70, p.4).
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later and 65% of them dropped out in the first three 
years, 70% of the new pupils were recruited after the 
normal age <7 years) and 1/4 of all primary school 
students were found unable to attain the next grade at the 
end of the school year. Even so, 20% of the remaining 
pupils had to combine study with some working activity in 
order to help their fami 1 ies. ;:"
In view of an increasing trend towards the Federal Union, 
the strongest element of the federation, becoming involved 
with secondary and higher education, the 1946 democratic 
Constitution defined education as the responsibility of 
local governments, the role of the federal government 
being subsidiary to them. States were supposed to set up 
their independent education system for primary, secondary 
and higher education. The 1961 important Law of
Directives and Bases of National Education (LDB) ordained, 
therefore, that all federal funds were to be shared in 
equal parts among these three levels of education (Art. 92, 
§ 1 ) .  3
2. Figure in this paragraph are from; BRASIL/flEC/SEEC, Estatlsticas da EducacSo 
Nacional, 1960-71. vol.I, Rio, 1972.
3, Speeches of members of the Federal Education Council (CFE), sone months after the 
issue of LDB, highlighted this policy: "Last month we received a report fron Deputy 
Paulo Sarazate in which he showed that in 1961 the Federal Union's expenditure on 
education was distributed like this; primary education; 9*J secondary education: 17%; 
higher education; 74%. The Law of Directives and Bases cones to alter this situation 
completely as it is going to force a distribution in equal parts amongst the levels of 
education, We will have to re-think the problem e n t i r e l y /  (Rev, Cdndido Padin, April, 
1962), "The distribution of resources itself, which is made in equal parts among the 
three levels of education, indicates that the Federal Union recognizes its action as 
supplementary, simply helping local services, not- replacing part of their 
responsibilities, as elementary education costs three times more than the others, (...) 
This is a trend which was definitively sanctioned by the 1946 Constitution and the
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A special concern of elementary education was also the 
line of the planning body of the Ministry of Education and 
Culture (MEC), the National Institute for Educational 
Studies (INEP), as long as it led the policy-making 
activity of the ministry. Social pressures over the 
accomplishment of the Constitution in relation to the 
general provision of elementary education led to the 1964 
national school census4 and the creation of Salario- 
EducagSo (Section 5.2. 1. 1). Particularly, primary
education was seen by the first general plan of the newly- 
arrived 1964 military government as deserving more 
straightforward financial support of the federal 
government than higher education did. The central
planning body attempted to introduce fee charges in public 
federal university institutions (episode later related) 
and constantly opposed a fast expansion of enrolment in 
them (Section 3.3. 1). A resolute option for primary 
education, particularly among the larger and poorer 
sections of the population, came back again as from the 
late seventies in the III National Education Plan (III 
PNE) when a key group of officials in the IPEA's National 
Centre of Human Resources (CNRH) affirmed their 
frustration with the way "the bourgeoisie and the elite 
had always appropriated state investments in education"*5 
and managed to have such convictions assumed by Minister 
Portella (1979-80) in III PNE which was carried on by 
Minister Ludwig (1981-82). There, higher education was not 
mentioned among the
c o m p o n e n t r y  Lav of Directives and Bases," (Prof, Anizio Teixeira, Hay, 1962), 
MEC/CFE, Plano Nacional de E du ca^o. 1962, pp, 65, 70, 71,
4, This important survey dealt exclusively vith children between 5 and 14 years of 
age, BRASIL/HEC-IBGE-INEP, Censo Escolar do Brasil, 1964. 1966,
5, Expression by Hr Divonzir Gusso, a senior member of CNRH's planning group, 
interview vith the author,
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priorit ies.®
The historically-rooted supremacy of higher education, 
however, has never been shaken. In its position as an 
essential social appanage of status in a pr6-industrial 
society, which Brazil was until recently, higher education 
institutions were always under the special care of the 
state as suppliers of the country's ruling 61ite. After 
the 1889-1930 hiatus in the central government's hegemony, 
the well-represented interests of higher education and the 
weakening of states public finances converged on the major 
trend of the so-called "federalization" of higher 
education institutions. The underlying political reality 
was exposed by the events from the end of Vargas 
dictatorship to the early sixties: while LDB lagged for
thirteen years in Congress owing to discussions and 
emotional discourses on the importance of a profound 
reform in the educational system to tackle the national 
problem of elementary education, several dozen higher 
education schools were put under federal control and 
maintenance ("federalization") by Congress itself and the 
system of 19 large federal universities was formed by the 
association of those schools. As described and emphasized
6, MEC/S6, III Plano Nacional da Educa^Io Cultura § Desporto, 1980-1985. 2ed., 1982, 
pp,15-20 ("Concepcio Fundanental" e "Linhas Prioritirias Nacionais"), Higher education 
is referred to in the section "Conplenentary Lines of Action", The policy is 
sunnarized in the III National Econoaic Developnent Plan 1980-85 (III PNE) in terns: 
"In the fields of education, culture and sports the following fundanental priorities as 
exposed; - education in rural areas (,,,); - education in urban outskirts -
cultural developnent (,,,); - participation-pronoting planning (,,,)) - inprovenent of 
the levy and distribution of funds (,,,), Without depriving other areas of education 
of their nerits, priorities concentrate on basic education and cultural pronotion," 
BRASIL/Presidfincia da Repdblica/SEPLAN, III Plano Nacional de Desenvolvinento Econdnico 
1980-85. 1981, pp.48-9.
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in Chapter One (Section 1.5), this trend was crucial for 
the development of the policies on education funding as 
financial interest of universities encrusted on the 
federal bureaucracy of education, namely the MEC, whose 
qualified staff was directly supplied by them. Except for 
a few fleeting periods, "MEC s political agenda was always 
prompted by universities", in the words of an experienced 
government adviser. 7
The fact was that, even in 1962, when the Federal
Education Council (CFE) met to study the implementation of 
the legal provision about the partition of federal funds 
in equal shares among primary, secondary and higher 
education, the councillors found themselves in a difficult 
position: the government had already spent about 70% more
money on its universities than the one-third legally
established! Facing reality, CFE stood in the National 
Education Plan (PNE, 1962) for the legal provision as a
target to be eventually reached by maintaining the 
expansion of the federal university system and the
rationalization of existing expenditure. Now and then, 
CFE recalled the legal provision of charging annual fees 
from students who could afford it but this was not
mentioned in the 1965 version of PNE.® Definitely CFE 
abstained from uncompromising measures, including a sort 
of "de-federalization" of some higher education schools, 
thus acting in accordance with the constitutional 
principle of the subsidiary position of the federal 
government in the organization of the system.
Political movements by higher education students, 
particularly their demonstrations and riots, had always
7, Mr Divonzir Gusso, interview with the author,
8, MEC/CFE, Plano Nacional de Educa^o. 1962, pp.39,40. MEC/CFE, Plana N a i i Q D l L d a  
E d u c a ^ o  (RevisSo 1965). 1965, p p . 15,16.
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been an integral part of Brazilian political life in this 
century and the National Students Union (UNE), surviving 
several regimes and lasting longer than any political 
party in the country, has a considerable tradition of 
political struggles. Sections 3. 1. 1 to 3.2.2 described 
the events in the first part of the 1964 military regime 
in which student movements were decisive for the course of 
university reform and the way in which the expansion of 
higher education was developed, entailing profound 
administrative changes in the whole system and giving 
place to the strengthening of the staffing patrimonial 
trends in educational organizations, as will be studied 
later in this chapter. ® It was reported previously in 
Chapter Three how budgetary appropriations for primary 
education were diverted to supplement universities and 
that the implementation of the newly created Brazilian 
Literacy Movement (MOBRAL) was delayed from 1968 to 1971 
because of the budgetary impact of the expansion of the 
higher education enrolments.
A typical point in which the power of higher education
students to make themselves heard clearly appeared was the 
recurrent issue of annual fees in public federal univer—  
sities and schools. In spite of a Constitutional and 
legal provision since 1946 (Art. 168, III, later repeated 
by Art. 38 of LDB, and again by Law 5537, of 21/11/68,
Art. 11) a restricted gratuity for secondary and higher 
education to those who demonstrated personal and family 
financial incapacity, no government has ever dared to 
regulate and enforce the imposition of fees. The simple 
announcement by unofficial sources that the application of
9, A circumstantial report of one of UNE's members on the organization's activities, 
particularly during the 1960's, in; Poerner, Artur J, Q Poder Jovem. 2ed, Rio, Ed.
Civi1iza^So Brasileira, 1978, See also; Gonsalves, T, and Ronagnoli, L, H. A Volta da
UNE, de IbiCma a Salvador. SSo Paulo, Alfa-timega, 1979,
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the law was intended, completely upset the life of
universities, brought about large and noisy mobilization 
of students, raised related political interests and 
finally turned out to be a headache for the government. 
The issue became a "taboo” to which authorities feared to 
refer in order to avoid causing further political unrest 
in higher education schools, which was considered a 
"sensitive area".
Three times during the 1964 regime the imposition of
annual fees in federal university schools came to be
cogitated or planned. The first occurred in 1965 when 
IPEA's economists developed a project in which fees in
each university would have to cover 30% of its total cost. 
Without the MEC's participation, the bill of the 
presidential decree was prepared and handed to Castello 
Branco, who had earlier approved the idea.10 In spite of 
having referred to it in his 1966 address to Congress, the 
President refrained from taking the subject any further 
and the studies have never come to public knowledge. 1 1
Three years later the notorious and controversial 
Commission headed by Gen. Meira Mattos (see sections 3. 2. 1 
and 3.2.2) briefly suggested the measure in its final 
report (item 1.4. 1) but the attached document with detail 
on the matter was never published or the suggestion
10, Information from the interview with Hr, Arlindo Corr6a, in charge of the project, 
who added: "They would have to agree, as a measure of force by the Revolution, The 
device would involve the universities1 own interest: charges would be proportional to 
the rationalization of their administration,1
11, "In higher education, the abolition of the indiscriminate gratuity in the federal 
system will make a supplementary action of the federal government in secondary 
education feasible," MEC/INEP, A EducagSo nas hensagens Presidenciais. Periodo 1890- 
1986. vol.2, Brasilia, 1987, p,385, Hr Arlindo Corrfca linked the President's decision 
to students riots occurring at the time,
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implemented by the Minister of Education. In 1981,
invoking reasons of social justice towards primary 
education and the total public resources available in the 
country, the Minister of Education, Gen. Ruben Ludwig 
publicly defended his personal conviction on charging 
students who could bear the costs of their higher
education. He consulted CFE on the issue (.Aviso n2 288,
of 3/4/81). In July 1981, CFE's appraisal — whose report
was made by Ms Esther Ferraz, later Minister of Education 
— found the policy fair, well-founded on the legal 
tradition, but not opportune for the reflexions of the
country's economic crisis on students' families, 13 Facing 
a series of industrial actions by higher education
teachers and having to leave the office some months later, 
Ludwig finally did not carry through his intention.
The conflict between the convictions of authorities on the 
priority which should be given to elementary education and 
the pressures from rooted positions of the public 
university system appeared once more during the privileged 
tenure of Minister Jarbas Passarinho (November 1969 to
March 1974). Recalling his early moments as a minister 
who had to decide on the guidelines of his administration, 
he said:
"Then I found myself with the question: 'which area to give
priority to?' We could not have secondary and higher education 
without good primary education. This was the point! Actually, 
we had to go first to eliminate illiteracy, and dry up the 
source of all subsequent problems."13 
The minister's general strategy was the selection of a
12, The appraisal (Parecer) was not approved without some controversy) four long 
declarations of vote being issued separately (originals of these documents obtained by 
the author at CFE's Secretariat),
13, Interview with the author,
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few "critical problems" which the earliest planning 
document of his administration clearly stated. The first 
of them was:
"At present, the greatest efforts are directed towards higher 
education which, however, only eleven primary education 
beginners out of one thousand manage to reach. " 1A 
Following the discourse and early approach of most 
previous governments, the MEC's plan raised bold targets 
to be achieved in primary education.
Soon, however, the time and energy of the dynamic minister 
and his general secretary were absorbed by higher 
education organizations, teachers and students who were 
always declaring themselves to be in crisis. Section 
3. 3.2 described the Minister's and his General Secretary's 
own testimonies and their efforts to cool down conflicts 
and meet claims from universities. To implement the 
university reform was a hard job; the Ministry had to 
reinforce its technical structure, and, in the words of an 
experienced MEC official,
"the complete hegemony of the Higher Education Department <DAU) 
in MEC's central administration, which stood out during the 
1975-78 period leaving the General Secretariat <SG) in the 
wings, was actually formed during Passarinho's tenure."1"1
As for other MEC's administrations, dozens of chancellors 
and vice-chancellors were always moving around in the of­
fices and corridors of the Ministry, pressing for special 
grants, budgetary supplements, advantages and exemptions 
from bureaucracy regulations. Indeed, what could be 
called a bureaucratic activism by university officials in 
MEC, canvassing for funds, is a good example of the way
14, MEC/SQ, Planeiamento Setorial. 1970, p , 15.
15, Hr Cl&udio Neiva, who held important positions in both DAU and SG for eleven years 
between 1972 and 1984, Interview with the author,
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the allocation of resources was finally carried out,
irrespective of the Ministry's general planning. A des­
cription of this administrative behaviour, in a paper by 
three Brazilian scholars who were close to events in MEC, 
is particularly adequate and deserving of quotation in
full: "*
"Bureaucratic activism seems to be the key strategy for
obtaining funds. It means being able to find out quickly about 
new projects, to identify leftover balances and to have an alert 
machinery to write competent proposals and meet deadlines. It 
also means finding out how much money is available in order to 
decide how hard to play the game. Some rectors aggressively 
tried to infiltrate the D A U  (Higher Education Department, from 1979 
Secretariat for Higher Education, SESU) bureaucracy and hired 
"representatives" in Brasilia who would advise them on fund
raising. Ability to spend fast and good bookkeeping are also 
essential because bureaucrats abhor poor accounting, incomplete 
projects and bookkeeping irregularities of all sorts. Efficient 
and thoughtful utilization of the resources does not seem to be 
important. The rationale behind bureaucratic activism is 'the 
more you try, the more you get'. Getting funds is a never- 
ending battle. "
"The other — not mutually exclusive — strategy for getting funds 
is to convince decision-makers that one has a most pressing 
need. Rhetoric does not seem to lead very far. Instead, the
number one strategy is the fait accompli: commit the money, run 
into deficits and let federal authorities worry about it. The 
more sophisticated versions of this strategy consist of making
16, Castro, C, H., Barros, H, and Amaral, T, C, "The Funding of Brazilian 
Universities: Formalism, Politics and Bureaucratic Activism", (Paper presented to the 
Twelfth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Rio, Brazil, 
9-14 August 1982, p,5. Incidently, the publishing of this study raised bitter comments 
by some officials at MEC and universities at the time for the sharpness of its 
language,
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deliberate mistakes in budgeting. For instance, underestimating 
the expenditure on politically sensitive rubrics and using the 
surplus to build, invest or do whatever could be postponed or 
foregone. The rule is: spend fast on priorities, on the
superfluous or on the bad projects. The deficits can be areas 
of personnel or better still, of students1 cafeteria or 
hospitals supplies. The threat of student riots or of deaths 
due to lack of medication are potent arguments for getting 
additional funds. Creative crisis management seems to be a 
reliable means of increasing university budgets. "
From another point of view, the following sections in this 
chapter will expand on other practices by university 
authorities related to staffing and the payment of 
university personnel. Together with the above-mentioned 
strategy of the fait accompli and the deliberate 
misleading in the official budgeting, they complete a 
picture of clear contempt for administrative law and 
federal controls. If it is not the case to say that they 
place themselves above the law, it is certainly true that 
they do not feel beneath it. In the constant game of 
evading rules and controls, university teachers — 
universities were run by them — found the risk stimulating 
and glamorous. In other words, they feel themselves 
sufficiently powerful to face up to the structure of the 
state, based on the tradition of higher education 
institutions whose authorities had always invoked the 
principle of university autonomy and, for administrative 
reasons, had never been sued. On the other hand, most 
university communities did not identify with the 
government politically and so barely considered its 
priority policies.
As a result of all these factors which show the privileged 
position of federal universities in the allocation of 
funds irrespective of official priorities, the share of
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higher education in MEC's budget has always been the 
biggest, often exceeding all the rest of federal 
programmes put together. In the period 1970-72, higher 
education received 49. 1% of total MEC's resources, 1 In 
1980, this percentage was 51.9, and had been higher in 
some previous years. 13 The 1984 budget, however,
registered 57.8% for the Higher Education Programme!13 If 
the huge national programme for school meals which were
supported by special, earmarked funds were not counted, 
the figure during the eighties would be about 75%.
Another overview of the results of the conflict between 
planning and political reality would be a comparison
between targets of the various governmental plans for 
primary, secondary and higher education and statistics
actually obtained at the time for which they were
projected (Table 22, below). In the four national plans 
issued between 1965 and 1975 (the 1979 plan did not 
present numerical targets), targets for primary education 
(7 to 14 years) are generally missed; those for secondary 
education (15 to 18 years) are often missed; targets for 
higher education, however, are always exceeded, except for 
those of the 1975 plan which projected an unrealistic 70% 
increase of enrolments in six years.
17, MEC/CAI, Aspects de I 1Organization et du Fonctionnement de l 1Education au BrSsil. 
(Report present* a la XXXIV*"* Session de la Conference Internationale d'Education, 
Bureaux International d 1Education), UNESCO, 1973, p,25.
18, MEC/SQ, Retrato Brasil. Educa^o, Cultura, Desporto, 1970-199Q. 1975, p.556,
19, I1EC/SQ/S0F, Report 003L010D, of 27/2/84,
TABLE 22
BRAZIL; SOME TARGETS AND RESULTS OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S PLANS FOR EDUCATION, 1965-80
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SCHOOLING
BASIC EDUCATION HIGHER EDUCATION
QUALIFICATION1
OF
TEACHERS 
SOME* FULL**
I ft R 6 L I  &
IQ 1970
PNE, 1965 100% SchR2_ _ _ _ _ _ 30* SchR 1st E > 50* SEF3 100* 60*
PED, 1968 
To 1974 
12 PNE, 1971
. +181 E*... +45* i__
80* SchR
44* E
1,850,000
+56* E 
580,000
+29,360
100*
To 1980.
12 PNE, 1971 100* SchR - 1,000,000 100*
22 PNE, 1975 90* SchR 2,500,000 1,700,000
a jJ L L lJ L L l.tA
1210. 68* SchR . .81. Sthfi. 1st E * 62* SEF3 80*s
+14* E +45* E +63* E +100* E
iazi 78* SchR6 . . . .  821.05a 937,593 86*
1980 84* SchR ,1.628,596 1,377,286 83*
Notes
1) 'Qualification of teachers': * Any school grade coipleted over priiary education- U  The nonal 
statutory course for teaching in priiary schools (nonal is to),
2) 'SchR"; Schooling Rate,
3) "1st E ) 50* SEF'; first-grade enrolient in higher education to be at least 50* of secondary 
education finishers, Siiilarly, '1st E * 62* SEF' stands for: first-grade enrolient in higher 
education to equal 62* of secondary education finishers,
4) "E"; Enrolients,
5) 1971 statistics, The National Strategic Plan (PNE, 1968) forecast the training of all the 
29,360 existing teachers without coipleted priiary education ("lay-teachers") and the nonal 
statutory course to 133,630 lore fully-qualified teachers, In 1971, the forier were still 25,000;
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there are no statistics available on the latter,
6) 1975 statistics,
Sources
BRASIL/HEC/CFE, Plano Nacional de Educa^o (RevisSo 1965). 1965, pp.3, 4; BRASIL/HINIPLAN, 
Prograea EstratSgico de Desenvolviaento 1968-197Q. Area Estrat6gica IX, Infraestrutura Social, 
EducagSo e Recursos Hueanos, Rio, 1969, p,76; BRASIL/HINIPLAN-HEC, Plano Setorial de Educa^o e 
Cultura, 1971-74, 1972; BRASIL, II National Developeent Plan (English Ed.). 1975, p,101; MEC/S6,
Rfitrato B u i i L  EducacgQ, Cultura, Desporto. 197Q-199Q. Brasilia, 1985; BRAS1L/HEC/SEEC,
Estatisticas da Educaggo Nacional 1960-71. vol.I, Rio, 1971; BRASIL/HEC/S6. HEC Dados. 1981,
Throughout the last two decades, plans bowed to reality. 
The trend of "federalizing" higher education institutions 
stood in spite of not being in accordance with the consti­
tutional principles concerned. This fact was, incredibly, 
overlooked as the basic factor driving most situations in 
which expenditure demand or faits accomplis left no room 
for alternative plans. One way or another, institutions, 
pressures and resources finally led to decisions favouring 
higher education, irrespective of its position in the 
plans.
Particular events of this trend will be investigated in 
the following sections 6.2 and 6.3, from different points 
of view.
6.2. EXPENDITURE ON PERSONNEL: RATIONALIZATION x
PATRIMONIAL CONCEPTIONS OF THE STATE
No doubt, the most important item in education cost is 
personnel expenditure. It is also natural to see mounting 
expenditure on personnel in a ministry whose system of
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schools expanded its enrolments as much as ten times in 
twenty years and still more than doubled it from 1970. 
Nevertheless, that expenditure tripled from 1970 in real 
terms, although salary levels of the majority of MEC-paid 
personnel (staff of Autarquias and central bodies) 
remained quite below the real value of the currency (see 
Section 5.4. 1). Such a disproportionate increase of 
expenditure appears intriguing even if one takes into 
consideration that new, more staff-intensive courses were 
opened, and training programmes required extra, substitute 
teachers. Actually, personnel share in total MEC's
expenditure nearly doubled between 1970 and 1983 in spite 
of massive capital expenditure in building university 
campuses. Table 23 introduces general figures and
proportions about the subject.
TABLE 23
BRAZIL: MEC's EXPENDITURE ON PERSONNEL, 1970-84 1
PERSONNEL EXPENDITURE
Current 
Cr$ Million
Constant 2 
Cr$ Million
TOTAL MEC's 
EXPENDITURE 
Current 
Cr$ Million
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
473. 5 
614. 2 
731. 6 
1,015.6 
1, 397. 9 
1,8 6 6 . 1 
3, 397. 6 
6, 952. 1 
10, 214. 4
473. 5 
522. 3 
520. 7 
588. 4 
604. 6 
596. 2 
744. 4 
1,051. 4 
1,071.2
100
110
110
124
128
126
157
222
226
1, 293. 2 
1, 566. 2
1, 811. 4
2, 283. 8
2, 901. 3
3, 863. 4 
6, 493. 0
11, 786. 3 
16,737.5
36. 6
39. 2
40. 4 
44. 5 
48. 3 
47. 9 
52. 3
59. 0
60. 4
(continues)
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PERSONNEL EXPENDITURE TOTAL MEC's
EXPENDITURE %
Current Constant 2 Current
Cr$ Million Cr$ Million Cr$ Million
1979 16, 767. 0 1, 115. 0 235 26, 912. 8 62. 3
1980 28, 013. 6 957. 3 202 46, 619. 3 60. 1
1981 55, 600. 0 960. 6 203 91, 825. 3 60. 5
1982 130, 273. 1 1, 146. 0 242 212, 912.5 61. 2
1983 327, 245. 3 1, 177. 9 249 536, 162.0 61. 0
1984 669,335.0 1, 505. 4 318 1, 257, 141. 0 53. 2
Notes
1) Initial position in the annual Exchequer's Budgets (ordinary and 
dedicated resources).
2) GDP Deflator, 1970 = 1.00.
Sources
MEC/SG/SOF. "Diagndstico da SituagSo Orsamentdria do MEC, 1970-79". 
1982, Tables 17 to 22; MEC/SG/SOF. Report 021LT85/25, of 15/3/83; 
MEC/SG/SOF. "Proposta Ornamentdria 1984". 1983, Table XXXIV.
In 1970, MEC's expenditure on personnel was 10. 4% of the 
total personnel expenditure of the Federal Union, inclu­
ding the Armed Forces; in 1980, it had jumped to 22. 2%. 30
Statistics on the number of total MEC-paid staff are rare 
— a definite political will would have been necessary to 
obtain relevant information from the reluctant
20, Associiflo Brasileira de Or^amento PGblico (ABOP), Revista ABQP, n,20, 1984, p,75,
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decentralised units — and not precise because, often, they 
did not report people who were actually paid but not 
regularly admitted at the time. It is possible, however, 
to have reasonably reliable information for four separate 
years. Increases are impressive:
1938 5,988
1960 23,481
1981 142,000
1985 166,325
The following two sections (6.2. 1 and 6.2.2) are not meant 
to give a thorough explanation of these numerical results 
but to describe some crucial reasons underlying the 
phenomenon to the extent that they contradict government 
rationalizing policies so strongly held during the same 
period.
6. 2. 1. Staffing law x procedures 
6. 2. 1. 1. The pattern
Chapter One (Section 1.2) has stressed the origins and 
some characteristics of the patrimonial concept of the 
state in the early formation of Brazilian public 
bureaucracy. Public positions in the civil service were 
conceived as a sort of share in the state. Still
21, Sources, 1938 and 1960: BRASIL/IBGE, Anu&rio Estatistico do Brasil, editions of 
1938, p ,812 and 1962, p,336 (information originally collected by DASP); 1981; special 
survey by MEC's Departament of Personnel (HEC/DP), ordered by M E C 's General Secretary, 
Col, Pasquali (information directly collected by the author at MEC/DP); 1985:
MEC/SG/SOF. Report P02L104C, originated for the monthly reports on expenditure on 
personnel by all M E C 1s units,
- 398 -
reproducing the old pattern — when public positions were 
granted by the sovereign's representatives, or even bought 
or inherited by the Alite as a patrimonial right — civil 
servants, particularly those in command positions, in some 
way felt themselves to be in possession of state patrimony 
or resources, disposing of its resources as a personal 
attribute <prebendalism). Through top bureaucrats,
politicians, who had often appointed them, closely 
participated in the state's resources in order to exert 
their patronage and clientele politics. Local leaders, 
often land owners and affluent businessmen, as supporters 
of politicians and bureaucrats, also had access to favours 
and sometimes public positions for some relative who did 
not follow the family business.
This basic pattern underwent a modification after the 
restless work of the Vargas-instituted Administrative 
Department of Civil Service <DASP>, for the sake of 
modernization and democratization principles in staffing 
and paying the civil service (Section 1.4.2). With 
abundant regulations on access to the civil service,
particularly the strict requirement of public competitive 
examinations, progression in a newly-structured 
professional career, training and detailed criteria for 
individual pay advantages, DASP introduced the idea of a 
civil service open to all but requiring serious
commitment, quite different from the old sinecures, and 
giving legally protected rights including stability.
Soon, an initial amalgamation with the old patrimonial 
tradition appeared. A public position in the civil 
service was seen, above all, as a source of rights to 
enjoy rather than a job to perform- Objective, legal 
structures were to replace personal criteria and favours 
of patrons and the consequent dependency on these. The 
stance vis-A-vis the nature of public position, however,
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stayed the same. Once having been submitted to entry 
procedures, the candidate took possession of the position 
and its advantages as a sort of citizenship right. He 
would never be dismissed or deprived of his pay. The most 
likely punishment for being negligent in his job would be 
a marginal place in the organization and no assignment of 
further work <!). As rights and corresponding duties 
multiplied in the extensive laws of 1936, 1939, 1948 and
1952, considerably more care was given to the implemen­
tation of the former. After 1946, public examinations 
were increasingly circumvented by decentralized autho­
rities and admissions carried out in the traditional 
manner. In spite of its unique position in the federal 
bureaucracy between 1936 and 1960, DASP was always under 
pressure from the populist politics — even coming from the 
Presidents themselves. Particularly in times of election, 
appointments were difficult to prevent although they were 
made as "provisional" to avoid legal obstacles.
In its fight to introduce rationality to staffing and pay 
procedures, DASP stuck to its regulations, lost itself in 
details and individual cases of hundreds of public federal 
organizations, and was often forced by political pressure 
to compromise or deal with faits accomplis. A second 
amalgamation with the traditional, patrimonial trends 
occurred then. DASP accepted formalism, turned a blind 
eye to increasing real admissions under the guise of 
temporary employment (not officially belonging to public 
service) and found legal ways of "blanketing-in" previous 
irregular admissions. The procedure was justified as a 
condition intended to put an end to the abuse and to 
ensure correct procedure for the future. People who had 
been hired for civil works, "special projects" of 
expanding services, substitutions or provisional 
appointments "while a public examination was approved or 
vacancies provided" invariably stayed in the organization
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after these situations had finished and, some time later, 
were " blanket ed-in" by some authority or decree by the 
President. In the end, the first selection and
appointment which had been made by patronage or clientele 
practices prevailed,
The 1930-created Ministry of Education and Health (health 
affairs were separated in 1953) and its autarquias, 
particularly universities, fully adapted to the pattern. 
Until the mid-sixties and even later in many educational 
bodies, head-prof essors < cat edrdt i cos') in large, 
traditional colleges, dominated the appointment of new 
teachers to their subjects, accidently accepting external 
political influence. In all other situations, however, 
particularly administrative and technical personnel 
admissions, the informal rule was that every boss staffed 
his body or section, at least in presenting his candidate 
to the authority above him. In a university, generally 
originated from the association of several pre-existing 
colleges, principals of these have never given up their 
traditional "rights" of staffing their schools. In the 
later decades, these practices receded a little under 
government pressure but remained alive and the more MEC 
increased its units, the more the trend became a nightmare 
for DASP representatives in central units of personnel 
administration. 2:2
22, Explaining these practices to the author, Mrs Luiza Pontual, a retired civil 
servant of the north-eastern Federal University of Pernanbuco, vho had been in charge 
of the implementation of DASP regulations in the university for many years, pointed the 
direct appointment of principals and head of most MEC's bodies by the President of the 
Republic, in the same way as carried out for their superiors, chancellors and 
ministers, as a cause feeding the trend, "We were appointed by the President the same 
as you", said principals to chancellors, in Mrs Pontual's words, In 1972, 622 people 
and soon about 400 more were included in official manning tables after being, in fact, 
admitted and worked in several colleges and bodies of the University of Pernambuco
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An official description of the situation against which the 
government's major administrative reform was launched did 
not mince matters:
"The President of the Republic, (...) in considering that: (... )
the administrative discontinuity, the job handout, the lack of 
regular staff selection and improvement and the repeated 
violations of the merit system resulted in increasing enormously 
the bureaucratic machinery and disorganizing manning tables, 
records and controls, making it difficult for the Administration 
even to know precisely the total number of civil servants, their 
exact remuneration, where are they working and what they do, 
(...) decrees: (...). ":23
Meeting the purpose of this section, a vital aspect to
look at is the real staffing procedures and the ensuing
"blanketing-in" devices, revealing the definitive fact of 
the previous unlawful admission. In 1978 in the last
stages of the more recent general re-organization of all 
federal civil servants, people who had been admitted 
through public competitive examinations, a constitutional 
requirement, did not amount to 15% in MEC!355 This
22, (cont,) between 1962 and 1970, Nevertheless, in that same university, 1,080 people
were again in a similar situation ten years later, in 1982, (Figures fron Mrs Wilma
Motta, head of the university's Department of Personnel),
23, Considtnndi of Decree 64335, of 9/4/69, which regulated the major provisions of 
Law-by-decree 200 on the personnel administrative reform,
24, An assertion by the former Secretary of Finance and Budget of the Secretariat of 
Planning of the Presidency of the Republic, Mr Frederico Bastos, on this matter is 
unambiguous: "The statement is true that there occurred engagements of new servants and 
teachers, or increases in salaries and other advantages in education organizations 
linked to MEC, without previous full authority by the President of the Republic, DASP 
or the ministers of state, However, this was not a peculiarity of MEC" (interview with 
the author),
25, Information from the Secretariat of Personnel of the Public Service Department 
(DASP),
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impressive figure introduces a crucial point for the 
understanding of the true cultural tissue of the Brazilian 
federal bureaucracy. The following paragraphs put
together the recurrent cycle: official reforms -> forms of
unlawful but real admission of personnel -» remedial legal 
provisions to "blanket-in" these personnel, from 1960 to 
1985.
6. 2. 1. 2. The early events
After years of surveys and studies, DASP concluded a new 
plan of jobs, careers and remuneration <PCC> — the 
previous one dated from 1948 — which became Law 3780, of 
12/7/1960, complemented by Law 3967 (I960). It was to be
a great re-start for the DASP's early aims of a well- 
organized, efficient and rational civil service. As a re­
start, all previous irregular admissions — chiefly the 
permanence of provisional appointees (interinos) in staff 
— were sanctioned, provided they fulfiled some minimum 
requirements, particularly a deadline related to the date 
of the law itself. CLT-hired personnel were organized in 
special manning tables, even without career perspective. 
The new PCC was enthusiastically implemented, but, as 
expected, some thousand people were not reached. They 
were not dismissed, however. They counted on the
compassion of many colleagues now fully integrated in the 
civil service and made up a good political platform 
themselves for populist politicians. Under pressure, the 
austerity champion President J&nio Quadros sanctioned Law 
4069 in 1961, and the majority of them had their situation 
regularized. The remaining few were supposed to be 
dismissed but were not. They waited patiently until they
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were absorbed in regular manning tables in 1974... ^
The 1967 Administrative Reform determined to put an end to 
previous abusive procedures. In thirty long articles Law- 
by-decree 200 drew a general change introducing principles 
of rationality and modern administration. In particular, 
two aspects of the new regulations must be highlighted. 
First, manning tables were to be adapted to budget and 
limits for expenditure on personnel, not the opposite <DL 
200, of 25/2/1967, Arts. 94, IX and 98). Second, the 
figure of the provisional appointment for public positions 
was definitely abolished as incompatible with the 
constitutional requirement of public competitive 
examinations <Art. 102). Instead, the reform instituted 
the hire of "specialists for research agencies and other 
specialized bodies" under the common labour law <Art. 96), 
but the use of the scheme on a temporary basis was 
reserved for ministers of state. 327 Extremely cautious
26, Information by Mrs Maria Helena Rodrigues, who was for a long time head of the 
Division of Job Evaluation (later Law and Planning) in MEC's Department of Personnel 
(interview with the author),
27, Explanatory Note, Brazilian law had three different legal labour systems, The 
common system which regulated labour relations in the private sector was structured 
under the Vargas dictatorship and continuously unfolded to meet new situations, It was 
called "Consolidation of labour law" (CLT) and employees under this system were named 
*tapregados', Public federal civil service and states civil services had their own 
special system, the public service regime, Traditionally, public positions were 
exclusive to subjects in this regime, Occupants were called public servant in a proper 
sense, They had a statute (in the federal government for the period under study, Law 
1711, of 28/10/52) and public administrative institutions normally deal with them, 
called funcionirios, As far as the federal government is concerned, until 1975 this 
was the ordinary system, CLT being used for specific types of activities or situations 
but without a career progression, From that year onwards new staff were admitted under 
the public service regime only to typical careers such as police, diplomacy, court 
service and tax collection, The ordinary system for the federal government became CLT
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about temporary labour, Article 111 said that casual 
services to federal administration were simply to be paid 
under receipt and this act would not generate labour links 
whatsoever and the expenditure would not be classified 
under the item "personnel". Law-by-decree 200 also
defined a policy of hiring private firms for some services 
such as cleaning, buildings security and equipment 
maintenance which are not specific to public 
organizat ions.
Unfortunately, the provision in Article 111 on temporary 
employment turned out to be the major outlet for the 
"autonomous" staffing procedures for some years. Using 
their legal competence, decentralized bodies moved 
budgetary appropriations in the item "services by third 
parties" (reference code 3. 1.3.0) to increase the sub-item 
"remuneration of casual services by individuals" 
<RemuneragSo de Servigos Pessoais, reference code 3. 1.3. 1) 
to enable a frequent use of casual services. The issue 
became precisely the indefinite permanence of the 
"collaborators" (as they were called) in the organization, 
confirming the Brazilian popular saying about the civil 
service: "The point is to get in; once in, never out".
People in this situation multiplied by thousands in MEC 
(example quoted in footnote 21). They showed themselves 
zealous and solicitous in carrying out the initial and any 
other task they were assigned, often ready to compensate 
for some idle, old civil servants. Many became useful 
and, in some circumstances, indispensable to their bosses
26, (cont,) (Law 6185), The idea was to introduce a new behaviour and administrative 
culture to the public service, The opposite seems to have occurred, however, CLT 
enpregados fully adopted the traditional pattern, Many legal advantages of the old 
public service regime have been applied to CLT hired personnel since then, The third 
system is the military one which has always been kept apart from others and had a 
different tradition,
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who were the first to take up the cause of the 
regularization of their place in the staff. This cause 
was structural, not individual, so all "collaborators" 
ended up following the industrious ones. Privately hired 
solicitors and attorneys of universities and other bodies 
brought up the argument that the actual working conditions 
of these people and those of any common employee were 
identical and CLT should be applied in their case, the 
terms of Law-by-decree 200 not being a legal excuse to 
mantain a situation which fell under a higher— ranked law 
<CLT>,
Even in 1969 some universities set on course a formal 
consultation to government juridical bodies in Brasilia on 
the matter. It came to the General Consultancy of the 
Republic <CGR> which issued its appraisal, forthwith 
approved by the President (Parecer CGR n^ 1-149/1969). As 
a consequence, the Minister of Education later issued an 
act ordaining the regularization of the situation of all 
"collaborators" who were to be formally hired and set in 
CLT-regulat ed manning tables (.Port aria n2 609/1971). 
Other ministries did the same. A MEC's first-ranked body 
(the Secretariat of Administrative Support) controlled and 
approved each manning table, publishing lists of names and 
salaries in the official newspaper (DiSrio Oficial da 
UniSo). DASP did not take part in this process but was 
alerted by it at the first moves and Decree 66715, of 
15/6/70, was issued regulating Article 111 of Law-by- 
decree 200. The device came to concern extraordinary and 
emergency situations only, such as serious accidents and 
public calamities. This "outlet" (the misuse of Article 
111) was supposed to have been closed...
Since public competitive examinations were generally seen 
as a complicated, unsuitable procedure, another handy 
"solution" for the staffing problem was worked out in
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MEC's central bodies, at the same time. A private firm 
which had been set up in Brasilia (Auditoria e 
Planejamento Ltd, AUDIPLAN) by a former civil servant 
miscopied the commercial model of leasing. AUDIPLAN was 
at the disposal of MEC's bodies to indicate candidates for 
any sort of job. Training was up to MEC which tranferred 
to AUDIPLAN the payroll value plus a percentage commission 
at the end of each month. A few years later the device 
was denounced and all personnel were formally absorbed by 
MEC in a CLT-regulated manning table under the aegis of 
Portaria n2 609/1971. The leasing idea, however, had been 
suggested by Law-by-decree 200 itself for some areas, and 
private specialized firms were largely used under 
agreement in these areas. In fact, beside guards and 
cleaning workers, some clerks and assistants for other 
sevices were always used by universities and MEC's 
decentralized units under the same agreement,-1'3
The practice diminished after an enquiry requested by 
MEC's General Inspectorate of Finances <IGF>, Circular 
Letter IGF n2 06/1973, from chancellors and principals on 
the nature of the personnel paid through the budgetry 
appropriations for "Services by Third Party - Firms" 
(reference code 3. 1. 3. 2), in 1973.
The staffing "triangular solution" (in MEC's informal 
jargon) had variations as from the mid-seventies. Instead 
of deals with firms, "technical cooperation agreements" 
(commonly called " conv&nios?') took place with other public 
bodies which provided personnel according to the MEC's 
needs and had regular corresponding financial support from
28, Information in this and the following paragraphs are from talks of the author with 
MEC civil servants, including Mrs Maria Helena Rodrigues, head of a Division of M E C 1 s 
Department of Personnel, who put the events and relevant legal acts in a proper order,
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the ministry or its units. State, municipal and even
federal public foundations were preferred for " convSnios" 
because of their administrative independence from most 
government controlling agencies. Total flexibility in 
admission procedures and pay conditions were assured. The 
more MEC's own foundations (particularly universities) 
expanded in the late seventies the more they were elected 
for " convSni os?*. All became easier and safer then, as 
heads of these institutions were appointed by MEC,
depended on it for almost all its current resources and 
there was no need for specific money transfers to pay 
personnel which had been put at MEC's disposal: the
ordinary transfers to the foundation's budget were 
generously increased and, finally, everybody was pleased 
with the operation, including the employees themselves, 
since foundations usually had higher salaries than the 
common civil service. From 1974 to 1982 MEC held a 
notorious convgnio with the University of Brasilia through 
which a hundred people were hired and supplied to MEC's 
central bodies, often under nominal indication by these.
The "triangular solution" involving foundations turned out 
to be independently used by MEC's departments and
secretariats through direct arrangements, involving third- 
rank budgetary bodies. MEC's General Secretariat between 
1981 and 1984 struggled to finish with the practice as it 
completely disorganized the ministry's personnel adminis­
tration, introduced salary inequities, eased expenditure 
restrictions and unbalanced the internal position of 
bodies, making the co-ordination difficult.23
As from the late sixties, most university autarquias came 
out with a more general and bold solution to by-pass
29, Talks of the author with Col, Pasquali, NEC's General Secretary at the time,
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allegedly abusive restrictions and controls of government 
bureaucracy: they created private "scientific societies"
(most of them foundations) or supported the independent 
creation of them by teachers. Actually composed by the 
university teachers themselves, these commonly called 
"adjunct foundations" (fundag&es paralelas') used 
university premises and all their facilities. In spite of 
being "phantom-institutions", they were quite active in 
chanelling grants and service proceeds to teachers' salary 
supplement. They were also used to provide administrative 
personnel and supplement salaries of any servant directly 
or indirectly involved in special research and new
programmes. Brazilian scholars usually believe that
research and post-graduate programmes would not have 
expanded as they did in the last two decades without 
devices such as this.
Other procedures of staffing or, more frequently,
suplementing salaries had formal approval from authorities 
— but not legal support — on the grounds of special, 
temporary activities. In 1970 the Minister of Education 
issued an act <Port aria n2 190) authorizing high-ranking 
bodies in Brasilia to supplement their staff and
remuneration, considering that the newly-passed Law 5645 
would still take some time to provide for that. Task- 
forces grupos-taref a" *) with shorter or longer duration 
became a useful device for identical purposes to carry out 
priority programmes. At the end of them, however, another 
"solution" had to be arranged for the situations 
created. 30 Special approval was obtained several times
30, Although not identical to the situation of task-forces, a curious case was that of 
a temporary programme with M E C 1s participation at this time, the Intensive Programme of 
Man-Power Training (PIPMO), Referring to the programme's temporary condition, the 
instituting decree (D, 75081, of 12/12/75) in its Article 12 provided that, at the end 
of the programme, its personnel would not be dismissed but distributed among the staff
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from the President by MEC, outside the entire system, to 
set up particular manning tables with higher salaries for 
some activities such as computer processing data, campuses 
and instalations planning, on the grounds of the real job 
market conditions.
6. 2. 1. 3, The later events
The widespread use of all these devices encouraged the 
government to implement a basic provision of Law-by-decree 
200 (Art. 94): a new plan of job, careers and remuneration
(PCC). Law 5645, of 10/12/1970, thereby, re-kindled hopes 
of many good-will civil servants and authorities who were 
worried about the administration-by-exception trend. The 
new PCC, however, was not simply a change in the 
denomination of positions or general salary increase. For 
each civil servant the move from the old to the new plan 
was to take place by a selective (not competitive) 
process, involving specific training and examinations. 
Merit was essential. Priority was given to public civil 
servants (funcionSrios ptiblicos^t called "first
clientele", then came CLT employees ("second clientele") 
and, at last, "other situations" were vaguely mentioned. 
Better remuneration and progression in the career 
structure were offered but full-time work (instead of the 
existing 4 to 6 hours a day) was also required for most 
groups. An irrevocable choice had to be made by all those 
in permanent tables, to enable the definition on the 
number of vacancies available for the next clientelle. 
Those who would opt for staying in the old regime would
30, (cont,) of the involved ministries, PIPMO had been created as temporary in MEC in 
1563 (D, 53324), managed to survive government changes and was reformulated by Minister 
Passarinho in 1972 (D, 70882), before its third temporary renewal,
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constitute separate manning tables, to be eliminated as 
their occupants retired or died. Centres of training and 
recruitment by public competitive examinations were to be 
set up. For some reason, the existing situation seemed 
more convenient for prevailing forces in the bureaucracy 
and only in 1974, with a new government, the implementa­
tion of PCC moved off (Law-by-decree 1341, of 1/11/1974).
First and second clientele entered the new PCC and 
pressures increased for the regularization of innumerable 
people in other situations. DASP decided the best thing 
would be to have all of them under the same system and 
finish the irregularities at once. The correctness of the 
process, however, imposed one condition: only those
admitted up to the date of the issue of the new PCC's 
implementation rules (1/11/1974) would be elegible.
Acts were issued in 1977 (Instrug&es Normativas 38, item
23, and 67). All sorts of people presented themselves for 
the process: those who had joined MEC's bodies through the
"triangular" schemes (the majority), task-groups, 
" Portaria n2 190/1970" and many others, including people 
paid in the form of Article 111 of Law-by-decree 200. . . 
What should be done, however, with those admitted from 
1/11/1970? In 1978, a movement led by the Head of the 
MEC's Department of Personnel, Mr Eraldo Tindco (later 
elected deputy), obtained the President's approval for the 
institution of a special manning table to be eliminated as 
their occupants retired or died.
Other event also demonstrated the "flexibility" in the 
implementation of the new job plan. As some colleges 
joined university foundations, the. prospects of much 
better salaries appeared for some of their civil servants 
who had opted for staying in the old PCC. In 1980, Law 
6781 waived the breach of their previous "irrevocable
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option" and they were able to be included in the new PCC, 
and even overtaking the ordinary civil servants by 
receiving a remuneration complement to equal that of other 
foundation employees.
Nevertheless, the saga of informal staffing procedures had 
not finished. The problem of the full regularization of 
the remaining "situations" and even the control of its 
expansion was still on the agenda. Mr Tindco's special 
manning table did not reach most of MEC's decentralized 
bodies and other ministries. The fact was that, among
people who remained outside the new PCC, some did it on
purpose for they already earned above PCC's levels (they 
did not want to have part of their salary "frozen") and 
others had recently been admitted through the same 
procedures. With the participation of SEPLAN, Law-by- 
decree 1874, of 9/7/81, instituted special manning tables 
compulsorily to protect people in all remaining 
situations, provided salaries remained unchanged in the 
move and the subjects were already being paid by budgetary 
appropriations classified as "personnel" (reference code 
3. 1. 1. 1) at the time, a provision intended to avoid some 
extra 18% expenditure on social security (not due in
"third-party services", the case for the existing 
situations). This restriction would significantly curtail 
the effects of the "blanketing-in". However, in an
untimely, short-cut move, four days before the issue of 
the law-by-decree, DASP obtained special authority from 
the President to implement the tables without any 
restriction (ExposigSo de Motivos n2 145, of 5/7/81), and 
this position prevailed over the subsequent law-by- 
decree. . . As conv&nios and all sort of third-party 
agreements resulting in staff provision had to be 
denounced, 1,006 people in MEC's central bodies alone were 
included in this last "special" table.
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Meanwhile, from late 1979 the government declared itself 
in a state of emergency due to a sharp financial crisis
(Section 4. 1). Decree 84817, of 18/6/1980 sternly forbade
any kind of new admission, whatever the process was, as 
well as any increase in the expenditure on third-party 
services. Only the replacement of retired, dismissed or 
deceased civil servants was allowed. The management of
the "special” tables, however, proved to be an ineffective 
means of control for these government purposes. At least 
in MEC, the rule of keeping them under gradual 
elimination, was not observed. Substitutions were made, 
the new admissions (without public examinations) often 
involving higher jobs and positioning the candidate 
straight at the top of the progression scale. In other
words, MEC administration enjoyed a completely "flexible 
use" of 1006 positions, whereas the general law and 
restrictions were in force for the majority, regular 
manning tables.
After the end of the military period, the new government 
still had to issue Law-by-decree 2280, of 16/12/85, aiming 
to put under control some resisting situations and unify 
all special tables, including some old tables which had 
been set up in the early seventies by special Presidential 
authority (computer technicians, etc. ) and which had 
survived all later legal changes.
6.2.2. Controls x practices in personnel expenditure
Figures on high personnel expenditure and recurrent 
procedures to circumvent legal regulations on staffing 
(previous section) give rise to a question: "How was the
money obtained against government policies?" Policies are 
implemented and upheld by means of controls which concern
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rational techniques. In large organizations or in the 
relationship between central and decentralized agencies 
there is always a certain "game of tag" involving those 
controlling and those controlled but also disclosing the 
real underlying issue: the narrow political limits of
technical administrative matters. This is the focus of 
the present section which analyses the practices of MEC's 
units in relation to personnel expenditure and with a view 
to obtaining further desired funds from financial 
authorities of the federal'government.
Until the sixties, payment of personnel in federal 
organizations was carried out directly by a Delegacy of 
the National Treasury in each state. As the number of 
decentralized units increased, that function became the 
reponsibilit y of each unit. Cash was transferred in 
correspondence to each main budgetary item, separately, 
and so accounted after payments (in the case of personnel, 
the so called "allotment 1", "verba 1"). Law 4320, of 
20/3/1964, completely modified federal financial 
procedures but most of its modernizing effects were 
implemented together with other improvements by the Law- 
by-decree 200, of 25/2/1967. Since then, all controls of 
expenditure became budget-related procedures, payments 
being made in a scheme of "single cashier" (.caixa unico')'. 
cash transfers were fractions of the total budget to 
supply any type of expenditure, indiscriminately. The 
main preventive procedure against a premature depletion of 
a budgetary appropriation was the formal commitment of an 
eventual, individual expenditure, the empenho. The
decision on spending and responsibility for payment was 
expressed by the empenho. A budget balance was its 
initial position less the empenhos' values, whether the 
payment had already been made or not, "Single cashier" 
and empenho, among others, were undoubtedly steps forward.
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As far as the budgetary appropriations for personnel were 
concerned, Law-by-decree 200 had changed the previous 
scheme in which they met approved manning tables,
including supposedly necessary vacancies, after each unit 
had declared its staff needs and discussed them with DASP 
for approval. According to the reform, budget limits 
following economic plans were to come first, fulfilment of 
vacancies depending on them. In its turn, the budget was 
based on the existing expenditure, as reported by 
budgetary units. At the heart of the expenditure control 
system, a crucial point remained: central bodies relied on
the original information by decentralized units to control 
them. Such data could be manipulated or expenditure
boldly made, and the rest would be invalidated. It was 
not long before MEC's decentralized units, chiefly the 
universities, discovered this as a weakness of their 
cont rollers.
Actually, before the reform of Law-by-decree 200 it was 
already a common practice among universities to fight for 
large manning tables and to keep an outstanding surplus
balance at the end of the year in their internal funds, of 
which they had full independence to dispose. 31
After its implementation in the new model, the Empenho
became a double-edged tool. To their own budgetary aims, 
universities (soon followed by other less audacious units) 
issued estimate-based empenhos% making up premature low
31, Information by Mrs Luiza Pontual, vho controlled personnel expenditure in the 
Federal University of Pernanbuco from its federalization (1946) until 1972, Commenting 
on this matter Mr Arlindo Corrfia, head of the sector dealing with education planning in 
MINIPLAN during the sixties, said; "Of course universities obtained far more funds than 
they actually needed in order to reinforce their own funds" (interview with the 
author),
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balances during the year as the basic information in order 
to get supplements or influence the definitions for the 
following year. Of course, the procedure generated
demands on MEC, often political conflicts. An inspection 
into the details of each empenho —  a model carefully 
established by Law-by-decree 200 to prevent abuses — of 
dozens of claiming organizations, would mean unending 
arguments between accountants and teachers, and probably 
would not last longer than the political pressures of 
chancellors on MEC's authorities. Meanwhile, real
payments according to unit's own schedules using the 
single-cashier scheme went ahead and, if the MEC's 
authorities resisted the budget expansion as desired, the 
result would be the delay of other really essential 
payments to the following year as f ait s-accompl is. 3:2
Taking these matters up to a conclusion in an administra­
tive inquiry and formally raising suspicion against 
university probity, proved to be a time-consuming, 
unpleasant task for the top MEC authorities, busy with 
substantial matters of education policy. Despite all the 
resources of a good accountancy system to identify abuses, 
soon the issue passed to its real field: the complex
relationship of power and interests among authorities in 
the bureaucracy. The full activation of technical control 
resources turned out to be useful for extraneous political 
decisions rather than for their own rational aims.
When, in 1972, budgetary authorities were convinced that
32, Mrs Qdete Lapa, a senior civil servant, in charge of M E C 1s budget for many years, 
quoted an example:: "University Autaquias purposely failed to pay the monthly
contributions to the National Welfare over their payrolls to be able to increase these, 
as both types of expenditure ran on the same budgetary item, That is why MINIPLAN, 
eventually created different items for these expenditures," (interview with the 
author),
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the empenho and the single-cashier scheme, good procedures 
in themselves, were abused in relation to personnel 
expenditure (the main budgetary item, particularly in MEC) 
a new scheme was added for all federal government- 
mantained organizations. A financial report to monitor 
personnel expenditure <ADP) had to be issued quarterly by 
each budgetary unit to the ministry's General Secretariat, 
the body legally in charge for these matters. Increases 
of expenditure from the previous report were to be 
explained in each ADP. Summaries of ADP's were to go to 
the Ministry of Planning (MINIPLAN later SEPLAN) to be 
used in their estimates of next budgetary limits and to 
compose a series with which future information was to be 
found compatible. In 1976 reports were requested monthly 
and ADP became ADMP, the responsibility of authorities for 
the trustworthiness of information being reinforced. The 
situation did change not in the least. "Inflating" ADMP 
became such a common practice among sectors dealing with 
budget in universities that officials of the MEC's Higher 
Education Department (DAU) came to suggest the practice, 
themselves. 33
During the seventies, ADMP inflations were decisive for 
the accumulation of surplus balances from federal 
transfers to personnel expenditure, which, according to 
existing law, were considered as revenues belonging to the 
unit for the following year. Thanks to them, some
33, Firs Odete Lapa, interview with the author, She referred explicitly to the head of 
the D A U 1s Budget Co-ordination, The SEPLAN's Secratary of Budget and Finances (SOF), 
Fir Frederico Bastos, the highest authority in the system also recognized the practice, 
although making a reservation about other criteria used by SOF/SEPLAN in its budgetary 
definitions (interview with the author). Explanations by units about significant 
differences in the information provided in previous AOP (ADMP) were easy to find and 
tiring to check on the spot: late payments, previously omitted payments for reasons of 
process, extra-time payments in academic seasons, or simply "mistakes",
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universities kept reasonable levels of current expenditure 
for ordinary maintenance, in spite of the gradual 
reduction in this kind of appropriation (see Table 14). 
Some even implemented independent campus developments. 34
Again perceiving the abuse of its instrument of planning 
and control, SOF/SEPLAN dealt a decisive blow to the 
practice, at least in relation to surplus-making. Decree 
84817, of 18/6/80, and Law-by-decree 1815, of 9/12/80, 
completely eliminated any use of surplus balances from 
Exchequer funds. Thereafter they would have to be
accounted as part of the following appropriations.
It is improbable that all these practices to increase 
personnel budget would have survived for two decades if 
they had not been able to count on some leniency by MEC's 
or even MINIPLAN's (SEPLAN) officials. The more power on 
budgetary matters concentrated in the central planning 
agency, the more easy-going the approach of some MEC's 
authorities was towards universities' "creative means to 
defend themselves".3-' This is true at least in relation 
to higher education central bodies. If any compromise
34, Information by a Vice-Chancellor of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, 
mentioning his own university among others, The proportion of personnel expenditure in 
the total transfers from the Exchequer to universities was so high (see Table 3 - INT) 
that a 5X surplus on it would mean a 30X increase in other current expenditure, an 
strong argument for organizations in permanent crisis of resources for this kind of 
expenditure,
35, Expression sometimes used with humour by an authority at SESU/MEC, 1981-83, Asked 
by the author why central controlling bodies did not use the payroll accountancy 
records themselves (reliable documents) to base ADMP upon, Mrs Lapa explained that 
accountancy services in many M E C s  units were generally late, and SEPLAN needed timely 
information, Besides, the checking between ADMP and balances at the end of the year, 
appeared to be useless because at that time, budgetary supplements had already been 
granted and the following budget had already been approved by Congress,
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cannot be supposed from most budget controllers in central 
bodies, it is possible that, for political reasons, top 
level authorities had turned a blind eye at the 
appropriate moment. 36
6. 2. 3. Misguided effects of the administrative reform
The 1967 administrative reform aimed at the simplification 
of bureaucratic procedures, the deflation of the federal 
machinery and consequently gains in terms of cost- 
efficiency. Law-by-decree 200 gave emphasis to personnel 
administration as mentioned in section 6.2. 1.2 but this 
proved not to be the main feature of the reform during the 
implement at ion.
An important reason for this could be seen in the fact 
that, as a part of the whole strategy, DASP was deprived 
of its previous function involving all administrative 
means and had it restricted to personnel administration. 
The Ministry of Planning <MINIPLAN> took command of the 
reform, setting up a special agency for it, the 
Administrative Reform Office (ERA), and priority was given 
to financial and management matters, the traditional and 
thorny area of DASP's jurisdiction being left to the 
responsibility of this body. This explanation for the 
poor results of the reform in personnel administration 
does not seem, however, to touch the problem deeply.
36, Interviewed by the author on the natter, Or JoSo Paulo Velloso, former MINIPLAN1s 
General Secretary (1964-69) and Minister of Planning (1970-78), said: "Yes, we knew 
about some tricky jokes by universities,,, The fact is that, in the end they always 
had some extra money during the year," Referring to some particular concessions by the 
minister of planning to universities claims, Mr Arlindo CorrAa (IPEA/MINIPLAN) was 
outright: "Veloso feared to displease the universities" (interview with the author),
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Indeed, these results were not very different when DASP 
had full command of the previous reforms. Moreover, from 
1975 its position was restored, 37
As a matter of fact, the government's policies and good 
will towards reforms entwined themselves round the long- 
rooted administrative culture of the state and converged 
on re-structuring organizations, not exactly on the 
behavior of staff. In this particular point MINIPLAN/ERA 
and DASP were found together as much before as after 1975 
(MINIPLAN had to approve new statutes and DASP to create 
or alter the ensuing positions in the body's chain of 
command, defining relevant remunerations.
Analysing statutory competences and services, eliminating 
superfluous bodies and changing others, altering lines of 
command and functional relationship in the organization, 
for the sake of rationalization and ef f ect i viness: these
became the favourite dish of the reform activities. After 
all, they appeared quite "technical", a task for expert 
administration advisers and so prestigious (administration 
as a regular higher education course and profession was 
still recent in Brazil). Besides, they were easily 
compatible with the existing structure of personnel in
37, Besed on his personal relationship with President Geisel, OASP's new Director- 
General, Col, Darcy Siqueira, his old friend and collaborator in Petrobris, became one 
of the more powerful figures in the government, DASP was reformed (Law 6228, of 
15/7/75 and Decree 76276, of 15/12/75) and renamed Administrative Department of the 
Public Service (not only "of the Civil Service") expanding its area to the so-called 
"general services" (installations administration and maintenance) and the delicate area 
of government-provided accomodation to officials of all level in Brasilia, 
Unprecedently, Col, Siqueira was given the status of minister of state, and the 1970 
plan of careers and payment of the civil service which was paralyzed for four years was 
implemented with an iron fist,
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command positions, so they did not bring trouble to the 
status quo in the organization; it would not be difficult 
for the head of the body to move previous bosses around 
under new denominations. Most organizations always had 
something to offer to the expanding course of development 
policies and some new positions, therefore, was the most 
likely balance of the re-structuring programme. Further, 
in many cases changes in the organization chart came to 
match the real profile of the informal activities and 
posit ions.
Indeed, there is no fixed organizational model or 
structure. It has to be finally implemented in the socio­
cultural context which dominates bureaucracies. Somehow, 
the organizational structure of Brazilian public service 
and the educational institutions, in particular, had to be 
a reflexion of the same patrimonialist trend which had 
inspired the expansion of staffs, out of central 
regulations and controls, as Section 6.2. 1 above has 
described. A comparative study on MEC's organizational 
structures after the 1967 reform (actually implemented 
from 1970) and its position eight and fifteen years later, 
as shown in Table 24, seems to support this stance and 
lead to further conclusions.
TABLE 24
BRAZIL: UPPER UNITS OF MEC' s ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 1 
AND PER CENT CHANGES IN THE PERIOD 1970-84
1970 1978 1978/70 1984 1984/78 1984/70
n. n. % . n. % %
(continues)
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1970 1978 1978/70 1984 1984/78 1984/70
n. n. % n. % %
1. Central Bodies
1.1. First-Rank Units 17 21 +24 16 -24 -6
1.2. Second-Rank Units 34 35 +3 52 +49 +53
1.3. Third-Rank Units 
2. Decentralized Units
3 11 +270 74 +573 +2,367
2. 1. Autarquias 54 54 0 52 -4 -4
2.2. Foundations 2 18 22 +22 26 + 18 +44
2. 3. Other Units 
Totals
8 14 +75 5 -180 -38
Simple Total 134 157 + 17 225 +43 +68
Weightened Total 3 494 640 +30 757 + 18 +53
Notes
1) Only commissioned positions were considered, limiting the 
counting to the three upper ranks of the structure. However, only 
one unit was counted for each decentralized unit, irrespective of the 
complexity of its internal composition. The region representations 
of MEC were counted together as a single unit.
2) Includes two public companies.
3) Weights. First-rank central bodies: 1; second-rank: 2; third-
rank: 3; decentralized units: 5.
Souces
BRASIL. Decrees 66296, of 3/3/70 and 66967, of 27/7/70; 
BRASIL/SEPLAN/SEMOR. Cadastro da Administra^go Federal. Ministry of 
Education and Culture, (file cards issued on- 10/7/79) p. 1-12; MEC. 
Regimentos e Estatutos. 1984; MEC/SG/SEMOR. "Codifica$So da 
Estrutura Funcional". Junho, 1985.
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Although referring only to the upper units of MEC's 
structure, the figures clearly show the uncontrollable 
expansion of the bureaucracy, making it difficult to deny 
the failure of the reform's rationalizing intentions. 
This corresponds to the perception of MEC's common civil 
servants or that of some of those who struggled for the 
implementation of the policies.30
6.3. THE CASE OF THE UNIVERSITY FOUNDATIONS
A typical example reuniting the two areas of conflict 
previously analysed in this chapter, higher education 
<6. 1> and personnel expenditure <6.2), was the 1968-85
experience of federal university foundations. Again in 
this case a disappointing fate of governmental policy
gives way to reflection on the meaning and limits of the
rational approach to the issue of education funding. 
Although the policy of instituting foundations had not 
been exclusive to higher education, in such a context the 
political attitudes of the subjects soon brought into 
light a striking conflict in which a modernizing
administrative institution such as foundation was 
completely distorted in an audacious series of moves by 
the universities. The autonomous use of public patrimony 
was the prevailing trend.
38, Mrs Qdete Lapa expressed her disillusion on the matter; "Everybody knows that no 
administrative reform was made to reduce expenditure) all ended up by increasing it, or 
they are not implemented" (interview with the author), Col, Pamplona, M E C 's General 
Secretary (1971-73) in decisive moments of the implementation of the reform, wondered 
how, from 1974 to 1981, when he visited the General Secretariat again, the body had 
increased so much; "We occupied 2/3 of a floor, about 120 people, and they do not fit 
in fewer than 3 floors with 300 people!" (interview with the author),
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In the last three decades, Brazilian federal bureaucracy 
has, incredibly, tolerated a conflicting situation in 
several other areas of the government, namely the 
existence of a dual system of institutions, equally 
supported by the government to perform non-economic 
services, differing among themselves to the point that one 
of them, the foundations, supposedly justified by the 
value of modernity, has been uniquely used to circumvent 
the rules of staff payment which were made by the 
government itself for the other, older institution, the 
civil service with its autarquias, which several political 
regimes were found unable to reform and retrieve from a 
rooted, undesirable administrative culture.
Besides illustrating this issue, the following paragraphs 
may lead to a better comprehension of the events described 
in Section 5.4.2 related to salary struggles of university 
teachers which were triggered by a pay disparity between 
autarquias and foundations.
Law-by-decree 200, of 25/2/67, the major administrative 
reform of the 1964 regime, gave a full-rights place to the 
institute of foundation (Art. 4, §2) in the federal
decentralized administration system, although it already 
existed in a few special cases. According to Brazilian 
law, a foundation is a patrimony, formally constituted by 
public or private will to support a specific, non­
commercial purpose.3®. What matters from a political 
point of view, however, is the administrative use of the 
institute. It came as a modern, new organizational
solution for a new idea in the government’s non-economic 
activity which would be damned from birth if the worn-out
39, On the historical and juridical aspects of the two institutes kautarquia and 
foundation) in Brazil, see; Senna, H, and Zorbalan, C, Funda^Ces no Direito e na 
fldministratfo, Rio, F6V, 1970,
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autarquia model were to be used. In the reformers' minds 
"foundation" would mean the possibility of a re-start with 
modern, flexible administrative techniques, free from a 
century-old culture and procedures of a heavy bureaucracy, 
closed in on itself. Instead, community participation 
would be a natural element in the policy-making of a 
foundation. Foundations would allow flexibility in job 
policy, which meant higher, differentiated salaries.
The government was aware of the risks of this last 
characteristic. Two years later, recognizing tendencies 
in the matter, Law-by-decree 900, of 29/9/69, made 
foundations an exceptional device: they were no longer
listed among the normal institutions of the federal 
decentralized administration (Art. 3), although, when 
existing, they were to be under ministerial supervision 
like any decentralized unit. Besides, one-third of
private participation in the patrimony and current 
expenditure of any new foundation was required (Art. 2, b).
Foundations, however, found favour with government 
expanding bureaucracy. In 1982, there were 42
foundations, most of them created from 1970, half in the 
Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC), without complying 
with the one-third requirement of private part icipat ion. Ac>
"Originally, university foundations were an experiment. The
policy was to test a new, flexible administrative mechanism
(...) Their paternity was of MEC's.
This assesment by a senior government official, contains 
crucial elements, essential in understanding the rise of
40. SEPLAN/SEST. Relat6rio Anual SEST. 1982. 1983; SEPLAN/SEMOR. Cadastro.-da. 
a d m i n i s t r a t e Federal. 1980.
41, Mr Edson Machado, who was a member of IPEA's (MINIPLAN) policy-making group on 
education from 1968, and later implemented the policy of university foundations as Head 
of Higher Education Department (1974-78), interview with the author,
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university foundations, not only by the simple mention of 
"flexibility", the same alleged reason for the adoption of 
foundations in general by the government.
As a matter of fact, from 1966 no more university 
autarquias were created and most of the higher education 
expansion . in the federal government in the last two 
decades was made by foundations, fifteen by 1984. ^  It is 
curious that such an important institutional fact had not 
been formally expressed in any of the major acts of the 
university reforms during the period. On the contrary, 
the Task-Group for the University Reform (Decree 62937, of 
2/7/68) concluded that there were no ponderable reasons 
for all universities to be foundations; autarquias, 
foundations, and even other institutional forms could be 
made eligible by the universities themselves, the 
important thing in this choice being to secure flexibility 
and freedom from bureaucratic stumblings (the Task-Group 
itself suggested a special institutional status of 
"educational aut arquias?'~). *i:B
42, Of important note is that the University of Brasilia (UnB) had been entirely set 
up from its beginning (1959-62) as a foundation, Its case, however is unique, As for 
the city of Brasilia itself, everything had to start from scratch, without the weight 
of previous existing elements, The lure of innovation attracted pioneers to the scene 
and gave them a privileged position in the decisions, UnB enjoyed the benefits of a 
generous distribution of lands by the government to the first institutions coming to 
the recently organized Federal District, So UnB could actually form a patrimomy, 
according to its juridical foundational nature, As the city of Brasilia expanded and 
became the major political, administrative and diplomatic centre in the country, the 
sale of some of its urban properties by the university actually gave it a patrimonial 
position completely different from other university foundations, although not the 
financial independence from the federal Exchequer,
43, BRASIL/MEC, Relatdrio Serai do Qrupo de Trabalho para a Reforma Universit&ria. 
Agdsto, 1968, p,8,
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A question has also to be asked on how fifteen foundations 
could have appeared in the same model without a formal 
policy having been defined, specially when, during the
1966-72 period in which almost all were created, MEC's 
administration changed three times and, between 1966 and 
1970 federal policy on education was mostly defined in the 
Ministry of Planning's EPEA <IPEA), not in MEC (Section 
2 , 2 . 2 ).
A more attentive look at the events shows that in most 
cases, "creation" meant absorption of previously existing 
state colleges, federal autarquias and even private 
schools associated in a single organization, the
university. The case therefore was that of a
federalization — as many others in the past —  and the 
existence was supposed of small bureaucracies somehow 
already under MEC's influence.
These reasons suggest that "flexibility" rather than 
"foundation" was the real motive for the decisions and 
that traditional trends in public administration could 
have led to the phenomenon approximately as they have done 
for the autarquias in the previous three decades, this
time under the modernizing pattern of the regime's 
administrative reforms.
Except for UnB (1962), most university foundations took 
their organization from previous existing colleges between 
1966 and 1970, some a little later, and this happened in a 
climate of innovation and administrative freedom, 
supposedly conditions for the rise of new, flexible and 
efficient organizations. Nevertheless, their position 
under ministerial supervision and their dependency on 
federal funds would naturally bring them to MEC's 
authorities to discuss their internal policies for the
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approval of the annual budget and other specially funded 
programmes.
When the implementation of the new job plan (Law 5645, of 
1970) came about in 1974-75 for the university autarquias, 
a rule on the matter appeared necessary to the government 
in relation to university foundations. Although the 
uniformity of a career structure and payment plan among 
foundations had been ruled out and their "flexibility" in 
paying their staff preserved, there always remained 
another side of the matter which was the equity towards 
autarquias* s staff. Bearing this in mind MEC's planners 
introduced some few basic rules in Law 6182, of 
11/12/1974, Article 19:
a) salary values and other financial advantages should 
be submitted to the minister of education's authority;
b) any differences in these salaries and advantages in 
excess of those of the autarquias was to be met by funds 
originated from sources of the foundation itself.
The law conceded a one-year moratorium for the second of 
these provisions to come into effect.
What actually happened until 1984 was officially declared 
in a letter from the Minister of Education, Mrs Esther 
Ferraz to the President of the Republic:
"Although initially following the same basic conceptions of the 
federal job, career and retribution plan (PCC) which was adopted 
by the autarquias, the majority foundations, since 1977, made 
significant changes in the structure of teachers career, in the 
forms of promotion and also in the tables of salary levels of 
both teachers and administrative personnel, all by invoking 
their peculiarities and necessary flexibility." (...) "The 
adoption of this practice, together with the criteria of semi­
annual readjustment (to meet the devaluation of the 
currency) by these organizations, brought about 
considerable salary gaps among the university
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foundations themselves and, chiefly, between them and 
the university autarquias, "
The crucial point of these events is implied in the 
Minister's words when she put the foundations as the 
subject of the disturbing "practice" and referred to their 
invocation of peculiarities and flexibility. But the 
technical report on which the Minister's letter is based 
is clear:
"From 1976, the majority university foundations made particular 
and disorderly changes and readjustments in the salary 
structure, besides the ordinary salary readjustments for the 
federal civil service, without ministerial approval, as required 
by Article 19 of Law 6182/74, and without defraying them with 
their own resources.
This contemptuous breach of the law, nevertheless, would 
not have been possible without some compliance by MEC, 
from which the money came anyway. In 1977, for some 
foundations, and in 1978 for all, an event was the turning 
point of what would soon become the "foundations affair". 
Third-rank bodies in MEC increased the personnel budget of 
foundations which claimed to have insufficient money from 
their own sources to face the payment of excess 
differences which had started the year before, including 
the reajustment on these differences due to the inflation 
(then round 40% a year). After having decided to assume 
the full burden of personnel expenditure for some 
university foundations, the second—rank budgetary body in 
MEC’s General Secretariat (CODEOR/SG) could not refuse the 
claims by all others for similar benefit. . .
44, Expos it; So ds Hotivos n2 80, of 28/6/84, pp, 2 and 4.
45, HEC/S6/Assessoria, "Estudo: A Situa;So Salarial das Funda?fies Universit&rias", 
(Internal Report), Junho, 1984, p , 15,
46, Information by Mrs Odete Lapa, Head of the Co-ordination of Budget and (cont,)
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Four years passed without denunciation of these events, 
money flowing easily to meet foundations' alleged needs 
and the matter being worked out in direct contacts between 
each foundation's representative and a handful of 
officials in DAU (later SESU) and SG, without the consent 
of the proper authorities.*1'7
In 1979, following the explosion of the country's economic
46, (cont,) Finance (C0DEGR/S6, later Secretariat of Budget and Finance* SOF/SG) of 
M E C s  General Secretariat, The manoeuvre which was concluded in SOF/SG began in the 
corresponding body of the Higher Education Departmment (CODEQR/DAU) headed by Mr Gerson 
Floriz, a former collaborator of Mrs Lapa, Asked by the author about the justification 
of the fact at the time* she said that the situation was already a fait accoaplit as 
the whole salary of involved people should not be impaired, After the first cases, it 
became unavoidable to extend the state for all,
47, It is difficult to realize how this could have occurred without other reinforcing 
reasons of motivations, Section 6,2,2 mentioned the practice in some MEC's bodies of 
hiring new staff through MEC's own foundations (supposedly more free of constrainsts of 
controls), the "triangular solution", A considerable part of the staff of DAU and 
CODEOR/SG* often well qualified people, had their salaries fully paid or complemented 
by university foundations, Some highly positioned officials in DAU (SESU) had the 
rental of comfortable houses for their use on the shore of Brasilia's lake* a 
privileged residential estate* defrayed by foundations, (Information from top 
authorities of the MEC's General Secretariat), On the other had* it was common 
knowledge in DAU (SESU) and in units involved with finances in the General Secretariat 
that the officials of the specific section of SEPLAN's Secretariat of budget and 
Finance (SOF/SEPLAN) dealing with MEC's budget had frequent visits from chancellors of 
university foundations in times of important budgetary decisions, which was not 
possible for ordinary MEC's units, The facility of employing people and leaving them 
working to another public body as intra-goyernmental cooperation was the major weapon 
of foundations, The wife of the head of this section in SOF/SEPLAN (1979-82) was 
employed by the University Foundation of Ouro Prito (in-State of Minas Gerais) with a 
good salary but worked in the administrative secretariat of the Federal Education 
Council in Brasilia (information given the author by the Chancellor of the university, 
Prof, Mauricio Lanski),
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crisis and after hard negotiations with Congress, the 
government managed to pass a bill on a severe job policy 
in order to alleviate the firms, reduce redundancies and
avoid an inflationary spiral, allegedly caused by integral 
recovery of inflation-depleted salaries (Law 6708, of 
30/10/79). Higher salaries were to be readjusted every 
six months by scaled-down percentages of the official 
price index, so that lower salaries could have the full 
monetary correction. All salaries directly paid by the
Exchequer's budget were to follow a different rule, with 
annual readjustments in special percentages which were 
intended to balance that budget and rapidly reduce the
public deficit. The general policy of salary readjust­
ments every six months was to be applied to state-owned 
companies which had their own revenues, but their job
plans, including non-salary advantages, were to be 
individually revised and approved by a National Council of 
Salary Policy, CNPS, <Art. 12).
The policy of the Secretariat of Planning <SEPLAN> was to 
include foundations in the second type of salary
readjustment, because their personnel was fully paid by 
the Treasury, but at the last minute the text was changed 
in the Presidency of the Republic and the foundations were 
exempted, falling within the general rules and treated as 
state-owned companies: a hard blow to the policy of
reducing the public deficit.43
48, Mr Frederico Bastos, Secretary of Budget and Finance of SEPLAN (talks with the 
author at the tine), Mr Bastos described his surprise in these terms; "When I saw the 
text finally approved I rushed to the office of the Minister (Mr Delfim Netto), 'Have 
you seen, boss, what they did?', I said showing him the text, 'This was not what we
wanted, These people are mad',11 The last-minute revision of the text had been made in
the Presidency's Staff Office (Casa Civil) and the crucial change was attributed to a 
suggestion to Minister Golbery do Couto e Silva by Dr Inocdncio M&rtires Coelho, a 
teacher in Law at the foundation University of Brasilia, who used to be in charge
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Several university foundations refused to apply the 
scaling-down percentages of Law 6708/1979 for the 
readjustment of their salaries, alleging that this would 
overturn levels in the teachers' career structure. Others 
compensated for the reduction of gaps between levels with 
special salary increases for the levels affected. Even 
after specific instructions by MEC's General Secretariat, 
four of them still resisted.4-3 Most university
foundations ignored or constantly delayed the submission 
of their job plans to CNPS's approval.30
The overall result of years of autonomous salary increases 
was devastating for the position of authorities in the 
complex MEC's personnel management (about 140, 000 people 
in the early eighties, in several different legal 
situations) in times of strict federal policies of public 
expenditure reduction. The main consequence, however, 
with sharp political repercussions, was the huge salary 
gap between foundations and autarquias' staff, which 
originated a long period of crises and industrial actions 
in MEC, as studied in Section 5. 4.
48, (cont,) of last legal revision of bills before they vent for signing by the 
President (Mrs NCibia MacSdo, a senior civil servant at the NEC's Secretariat of Higher 
Education, SESU, interview with the author),
49, NEC/S6/Assessoria, "Estudo: A Situa^So Salarial das FundagSes Universit&rias", 
(Internal Report), June, 1984, p , 16,
50, Mrs NCibia Macfido, who was a member of the technical group in charge of the co­
ordination of this work in NEC,
51, Some aspects of this issue were politically imflammable as in the example by 
Minister E, Ferraz in her above-quoted ExposigSo de Motives n2 28, p. 5: "As an 
example of this unacceptable discrepancy, one could mention the situation of the 
Auxiliar de Ensino (a category of university teacher at the 
bottom of the career) in full time and exclusive work who, in a large number 
of university foundations earns a salary higher than that of a Professor Titular (the 
top of the career) in the same work conditions in university autarquias, ■
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In 1982, after the crises of the first university 
paralyzations, MEC's General Secretariat faced the problem 
resolutely and reckoned that controlling foundations under 
specific rules would be easier than the immediate full 
recomposition of autarquias* s salaries, A ministerial 
regulation <Port aria n2 241, of 29/6/82) ordered each 
university foundation to organize its own plan of jobs, 
careers and remuneration for the ministerial approval 
according to article 19 of Law 6182/1974. Foundations, 
however, felt themselves comfortable in their situation 
and resisted creating what would result in controls over 
themselves, the reaction being the same as that towards 
CNPS. ss2
As time passed, the situation was increasingly embarassing 
to MEC, which monthly transferred money for irregular 
payments. A drastic attitude, making immediate compliance 
with the law a condition for the transfers, was 
politically impossible, as the situation would not have 
been consolidated over years without the complicity or 
even active participation of some of MEC's own bodies.
Following a formal recommendation by the General 
Consultancy of the Republic <CGR> which was approved by 
the President <Parecer n2 P-027/CGR, of 2/3/83), MEC began 
studies for a bill to re-instate in new bases the two 
legal provisions involved in the matter: a new parameter
for salaries (substituting article 19 of Law 6182/1974) to 
be established by the Minister of Education as a limit for 
financial transfers to foundations, and salary
52, Until 1984 only six university foundations had conplied with these obligations, 
Of particular note is that the lead in this uncoefortab-le problen was entirely of the 
General Secretariat, SESU, whose Head (1982-84), Or Gladstone Chaves de Helo, was a 
former chancellor of the University of U b e r U n d i a  Fundation, appeared reluctant to 
clear obstacles and press universities,
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reajustments for foundations coinciding with those for 
aut arquias, the exceptive device inserted in Law 6708/1979 
being abolished.33 The parameter would be the salary 
table of the University of Brasilia, which was 
approximately the average of foundations and had been the 
only one to have ministerial approval to introduce it in 
1976. Salary differences in excess of this parameter at 
the time would be "frozen" and absorbed by stages in
future readjustments of the paramiter.
The project of the bill was not handed to the President 
before June 1984 <ExposigSo de Motlvos n2 80, of 28/6/84), 
and such was the reaction by the university foundations — 
including a general strike — that the sticking point of 
the bill, the salary differences to be "frozen", was
changed before the issue of the law in the last days of 
the government: all salaries of university foundations
were equalized to the highest of them!
Making a balance of what he called "the experiment of 
university foundations", Mr Edson Machado stated:
"They soon copied the model of autarquias in their academic and 
administrative structure, except for the salaries, and finally 
were reduced to any other public body. As an experiment, it was 
unsuccessf ul, yes. "
Table 25 draws a comparison between university hut arquias
53, Actually, that vas a skilful Manoeuvre by Col.Pasqualy, MEC's General Secretary, 
vho asked for the co-operation of General Consuellor, his friend, and sent two 
officials of his personal confidence to suggest and discuss those and other provisions 
at C6R, Coning fron C6R, the basic contents of the bill would leave MEC in a better 
position to present and pronote the corrections, Infornation fron Col, Pasquali,
54, Interview with the author, The sane position is shared by Mrs Ntibia Macddo, who 
enphasized the fact that high salary levels were not followed or justified by an 
increase in acadenic production (interview with the author),
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and foundations and highlighted some facts. As younger 
institutions, foundations had fewer MsC and PhD teachers 
than autarquias but managed to position them in the two 
upper levels of the career in relatively higher proportion 
than the aut arquias did. In spite of having the minor
share in total educational burden and a less qualified 
staff, foundations were granted 50% more funds for these 
activities than autarquias and had their personnel 52% 
better paid, in relative terms.
TABLE 25
BRAZIL: SHARES OF UNIVERSITY m m V I A S m  FOUNDATIONS IN THE TOTAL FEDERAL UNIVERSITY SYSTEH,
1981/84 '
HcS & PhD Professors & Educational Hired Total Personnel
UNITS Sen, Lecturers Output (EO)2 Hours (HH) Budget / EO Budget / Hi
X in Staff X in Staff X X (Crt) (Crl)
31 M M M I ®  
17 FOUNDATIONS
44.0
34.0
39,3
36,6
76,1
23,9
74,8
25,2
69,628
104,182
324,979 
495,430
Notfift
1) Inforiation in the first three coluins on the left are for 1984, others for 1981,
2) Total teaching hours,
Sources.
MEC/SESU, TendOncias das IES na d6cada de 80. Brasilia, 1985, pp,48, 49, 60; HEC/SESU, "U*
tlecanismo de Acoipanhaiento do Deseapenho Acadtaico das IES". (Internal apprisal report) 1983, 
Tables 1 and 4; MEC/SESU. 'Execu?So Orcaaentiria das Universidades1, (Internal report) 1983,
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6. 4. THE FATE OF THE ANNUAL PROGRAMME-BUDGET
At the end of Section 2.4, the role of a modern instrument 
of rationalization and effectiveness of expenditure, the 
programme-budget for the administrative strategy of the 
government, was stressed. Expressing the operational 
structure of an activity, its executors, stages and 
integral parts, all connected by purposes and targets, the 
technique was the reassuring link between planning and 
implementation, a crucial point for the credibility of 
policies. The programme-budget was given a privileged 
position in the bureaucracy: special status, trained
staff, detailed regulations and a schedule of activities 
which virtually mobilized the whole ministry, during the 
annual season of the budget preparation, between May and 
J uly.
This section analyses the inner side of the events in the 
Ministry of Education and Culture <MEC> which explain how, 
15 years after being instituted, the programme-budget 
turned into a perfunctory routine, while the interests of 
budgetary units concentrated on accidental opportunities 
of additional funds. Besides, the centralization of most 
finance-related decisions in the Ministry of Planning, 
MINIPLAN (later raised to Secretariat of Planning of the 
Presidency of the Republic, SEPLAN, in 1975), as an 
exigency of the concept of rational planning, ended up in 
distorting this activity when the organizational structure 
was predominantly used for a single-minded control of 
expenditure.
6. 4. 1. The preparation of the annual budget
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The technique of programme-budget implied an initial 
evaluation of the results of the programmes in the 
previous period, the (re)formulation of policies,
priorities and targets, and then the allocation of all 
forecast funds among the executors of the main sections of 
programmes in amounts which corresponded to priorities and 
t arget s.
In MEC, the traditional practice was to ask each budgetary 
unit for estimates of their "needs", in the main items of 
expenditure — personnel, material, services by third 
parties, capital expenditure (permanent material,
equipment, developments), transfers to other executors and
other minor items. The MEC's budgetary bodies adjusted 
each unit's requests which were not found reasonable, 
following the so called "budget incremental principle"
(each budget is basically defined by the addition of some 
percentage onto that of a previous period) and treated 
separately new or special programmes. Main adjustments to 
the real limits of estimated revenues were carried out by 
the government's central planning body. For MEC, the 
budget's preparation worked on a routine-like basis, 
notwithstanding its high political interest.3 -’
As from the 1967 administrative reform, actually 
implemented in the early seventies, the budget was to 
become the programme-budget and start from total limits of 
federal revenues which were defined according to the 
central economic policy. Meanwhile, the budgetary units 
received the first instructions to start the budgetary 
process in March or early April (evaluations, definition
55, Infornation in this paragraph by firs Odete Lapa, head of NEC's budget co­
ordinating body for more than twenty years, Many of the following paragraphs are also 
due to talks with her and officials dealing with budgetary natters in NEC's General 
Secretariat,
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of priorities and other preliminary stages). During May, 
the allocation of defined revenue to ministries was made, 
the ensuing individual totals being called "ceilings”. 
When this move ocurred, surrounded by great expectation 
and political interest — newspapers opened space for the 
event — the federal budgetary process was triggered and 
began a sort of count-down period towards the 
constitutional deadline for its sending to Congress by the 
end of August. In not more than two weeks, MEC's central 
bodies, supposedly under the General Secretariat's co­
ordination — usually assisted by the budget co-ordination 
body (CODEOR, later SOF) — had to repeat the move at MEC's 
level and carry out the division of the Ministry's 
"ceiling" among its hundred budgetary units which were 
then allocated their individual "ceilings".
This number of units has always been crucial in MEC's 
budget activities (some units were still broken up into 
several sub-units). Some weeks previously, each unit had 
been given a set of large, complex budgetary forms in 
which programmes and their sub-divisions (three levels) 
had to be detailed in targets and relevant elements of 
expenditure and properly justified. Thereby, according to 
a tight schedule, representatives of all units attended 
individual meetings with its supervisory secretariats 
(Secretariat for Higher Education, SESU, Secreariat for 
Primary and Secondary Education, SEPS, etc. , ) and then 
with the General Secretariat, which supervised all and was 
responsible for the consolidation, completion and balance 
of the whole MEC's budget. Every unit was supposed to 
discuss its budget proposals, and to have its budgetary 
forms checked, amended and completed. Of course,
supervisory bodies kept some "unallocated" reserves, which 
has been put aside, in order to give them flexibility to 
better support meritorious units or programmes.
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This "budgetary pilgrimage to Brasilia" — units coming 
from everywhere in the country — crowded the corridors and 
rooms of MEC's central building, extending the work of a 
reinforced staff over evenings, fully mobilizing MEC's 
support services and causing stress to the decision­
making authorities. Political pressure for extra funds 
was enormous and each unit struggled using its own 
weapons, particularly "allies" of all levels in MEC's 
bureaucracy itself. With a view to the huge consolidation 
work, meetings had to finish two weeks before MEC's 
deadline to deliver its final budget proposal to the 
government's central budgetary body, SOF/SEPLAN, usually 
the end of July.
The process became even more pressing when a sort of 
"extra ceiling" was more frequently admitted by SOF/SEPLAN 
after the delivery of the budget, enlarging its estimates 
of revenues or using "reserves" put aside at the moment of 
the first "ceiling" allocation. With this prospect,
discussions and competition were turned to this "extra­
ceiling" which, as a simple expectation, had quite elastic
limits. On the other hand, SOF/SEPLAN, under greater
pressure, had also to turn its attention to the "extra
ceiling" requests.
Such was the two-month rush of the budget preparation in 
MEC, the Ministry with the larger number of budgetary 
units. As the years passed, the process was increasingly 
taken up by the handling of forms and a superficial
dispute over larger budgetary shares. The experience 
showed that each meeting with decision-making authorities
56. In an interview with the author, Mrs Lapa emphasized that "in SEPLAN, the apprisal 
of the budgetary proposal was not turned to the normal programmes included in the 
"ceiling" but to those in the "extra ceiling",
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could not last longer than some minutes and substantial 
information and discussions became rare. During the
seventies and early eighties several attempts were made to 
alleviate the process and make room for discussions on its 
intended essence which was the improvement of policies and 
achievement of educational targets. They proved
ephemeral, and even the use of computers throughout the 
process did not change its essence further.
Two facts definitely killed all efforts to give the annual 
budgetary process its real meaning. First, the exclusion 
of the biggest item of expenditure, the personnel 
expenditure, and some others, from all discussions on 
programmes. Second, the reduced proportion of the annual 
budget in the total amount of funds which, at the end of 
the year, had been granted to units as supplements from 
the Exchequer itself and from other sources, mainly as a 
means to compensate for the effects of inflation. The 
last paragraphs of this section deal with these two 
aspect s.
Before delivering "ceilings", SOF/SEPLAN requested an 
estimate of the expenditure on personnel for the current 
year from all ministries and took it into its calculations 
to define other positions for the following budget. New 
requests for staff, changes in the careers or other 
increments were strictly forbidden in the estimate origin­
ating from units. The "ceiling" for personnel expenditure 
was the first delivered, usually simply repeating the 
initial estimate for the current year. Profiting from its 
exclusive constitutional competence to initiate bills 
involving public expenditure (Art. 65), the government left 
out all possible general salary increments in the future 
budget to be decided after the approval of the budget by 
Congress, by the end of November, in order to condition 
this important decision to a more recent position about
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the course of federal revenues and evaluation of the 
economic policy. As a consequence, limits of personnel
expenditure were just communicated (back) to units, 
without surprises or further decisions, simply to be 
included in budgetary forms — as if this expenditure had 
nothing to do with the nature and targets of the 
programmes — in order to compose totals. The "ceiling" 
for the rest of the items of expenditure — generally
called "other current and capital expenditure, OCC" — 
formed the really expected figure. Only this amount was 
actually planned, allocated and discussed.
The idea that "personnel" was not affected by planning, or
at least belonged to another order of decisions, was fatal
for the programme-budget. It was, however the common 
f eel ing.
Besides the preliminary exclusion of all personnel 
expenditure from the intentional allocation for the 
programme-budget, other items of some central bodies, 
particularly the General Secretariat, were deduced from 
the "ceiling" (actually the "OCC ceiling"). Mrs Odete 
Lapa, who personally prepared the distrbution of the 
"ceiling" during most of the long period she headed the 
central budget-related section of the ministry (1958- 
1982), explains:
"When the 'ceiling' arrived, we had already worked out our fixed 
expenditures on the repayment of internal and external debts, 
contributions to international organizations, scholarships,
57, "Why include personnel expenditure in the 'cei1ing', asked a civil servant at 
NEC's General Secretariat, since it cannot be changed in the partition of money by NEC 
or increased at the request of individual units? 'Personnel' is 'personnel' and that 
is all," Asked by the author about this separate treatment of personnel expenditure, 
Nr Frederico Bastos, Head of SOF/SEPLAN, in a brief answer, summarized the consensus: 
"The amount of other expenditure may vary and even be reduced, 'Personnel' is sacred,"
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expenditure on the administration of the central building, etc. 
We separated the money for this expenditure and then worked out
how much the 'net ceiling' was in relation to the existing
positions of the budget. The resulting percentage was the
general increment to be added to the units' existing budgets, 
their peculiarities also being considered. Shares could always 
be altered by the reserve we kept with us.
The important thing to conclude from this naive method is 
the implied criterion: fixed and easily defined
expenditure came first and was not subject to the general 
increment percentage which finally restrained all 
substantial activities of education and culture in their 
expansion or recovery of inflation effects.
Section 4.2.2 emphasized the tremendous impact of 
inflation on MEC's budget in terms of the lost real value 
of funds and the strategic use of inflation effects by the 
government to reduce the public deficit. From the point 
of view of planning and its major instrument, the 
programme-budget, the problem consists of the real value 
of the budget in preparation, given the course of prices, 
and the multiple concessions of budget supplements during 
the year. Supplements became feasible because the tax 
levy, directly affected by mounting prices, frequently 
exceeded the cautious budgetary limits which had been 
fixed in the previous year. Supplements related to more 
specific, critical items of expenditure, such as those of 
ordinary maintenance (material and services) which monthly 
suffered the variation of prices, and, under renewed 
pressure, particular projects which had failed to be 
introduced into the annual budget the year before. Unlike 
the annual programme-budget with its "ceilings", 
supplements, though smaller, had no pre-defined limits,
58, Interview with the author,
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formalities or deadlines. Dealing with the possibility of 
activities being cancelled for lack of money, they gave 
way to powerful arguments. For all these reasons,
supplements gave rise to more demand, competition, and 
political moves. As in an interesting game, the chances 
of gaining or losing became higher.
The more supplements became frequent and significant in 
relation to the supplemented budgetary appropriations, the 
more the lack of interest in the programme-budget by the 
heads of MEC's units increased; the more the "ceilings", 
from 1980, were severely lowered by policies of public 
deficit cutting, the more this deviation of interest 
occurred. Thereby, many university chancellors or vice- 
chancellors sent lower— rank representatives to annual 
budget discussions and saved themselves for the hard 
political struggle for supplements which usually took 
place between September and November, sometimes earlier. 
In their turn, MEC's high officials, involved in the same 
situations as their clients from the units and facing the 
displacement of the demand, increasingly left the 
programme-budget to its fate. S3
The increasing proportion of supplements on programme- 
budgets can be seen from the gaps between initial and 
final positions of the budgets, as Table 26 shows. The 
trend increased steadily, and from 1981 supplements almost 
equal the programme-budget.
59. Explaining the move to the author. Prof. Herbert Calhau. who vas responsible for 
the allocation of funds anong universities (1979-82). spoke of "Budget 1" (the annual 
programme-budget) and "Budget 2" (the end-of-year supplements) and said that the 
inflation cycle had damned the General Secretariat's efforts to improve the methodology 
of the programme-budget to failure,
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TABLE 26
BRAZIL: GAPS BETWEEN THE INITIAL AND FINAL POSITION OF
MEC' s ANNUAL BUDGETS, 1970-84
INITIAL FINAL GAP 1
Cr* Million Cr$ Million %
1970 1, 293 1, 224 -5
1971 1, 566 1, 394 -11
1972 1, 811 2, 075 15
1973 2, 284 2, 288 0
1974 2, 901 3, 205 10
1975 3, 893 5, 194 33
1976 6, 493 10,135 56
1977 11, 786 15,300 30
1978 16, 737 23, 238 39
1979 26, 913 37, 375 39
1980 46, 619 73, 242 57
1981 91, 825 174, 768 90
1982 212, 912 397,053 86
1983 536,162 773,662 44
1984 1, 257, 141 2, 396, 807 91
Notes
* "MEC" stands for the Ministryof Education and Culture.
1) A negative gap in the early years was due to 
overestimates of some earmarked sources such as loans 
which actually were not realized during the year. The 
ordinary resources of the Exchequer have never been 
overest imat ed.
Sources
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MEC/SG/SOF. MDiagnostico da Situagao O^amentaria do MEC, 
1970-79". Tables 17 to 22; MEC/SG. Retrato Brasil: 
Educa^ao. Cultura. Desporto. 1970-1990. Brasilia, 1985, 
p.559; MEC/SG/SOF. Report T08L003T, of 8/10/86.
Section 5. 1 studied the rise and evolution of some special 
financial sources for education which were developed 
outside the main flow of funds, those from the Treasury. 
Some of them, such as internal and external loans and the 
transfers from the Fund for Support of Social Development 
(FAS) had a decision-making cycle completely different 
from the instances and times of the annual programme- 
budget. Others were reserved for certain purposes by law 
and sometimes entirely delivered to one institution only 
(in MEC's budget) which is the case of Sal6rio-EducagSo, 
contributions to the Brazilian Literacy Movement (MOBRAL) 
and proceeds from lotteries (for some years). A third 
group participated in the characteristic of the two others 
and there were some very important sources of funds for 
education whose allocation was decided outside MEC, 
namely, the sections concerning education in programmes by 
other Ministries and the percentage portions set aside to 
education in the States Participation Fund (FPE) and the 
Municipios Participation Fund (FPM). Having as a whole a 
large share in total federal funds for education (Table 
15), all these sources had, however, one point in common: 
they did not fit the methodology of the programme-budget 
in MEC, at least to the extent that it required a 
comprehensive allocation of funds from all sources 
according to overall planning and priorities.
This issue meets the last point about the position of 
personnel expenditure vis-A-vis the programme-budget and 
completes a picture of the real part of federal resources 
which were actually subject to an overall planning. Given
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in Table 27, this picture is undoubtedly gloomy about the 
fate of the 1964-74 policies which expected to find in 
planning the key-element for the rationality and success 
of federal investments in education. When the policies 
of the administrative reform put forward, from 1970, the 
implementation of the programme-budget, it seemed 
unacceptable that only 40% of all funds of MEC (the body 
legally instituted and supposedly able to carry out 
investments in education) were fully planned. Fifteen 
years later the situation had gone from bad to worse: 
even considering as "fully planned" the slice of funds of 
the "OCC ceiling" which was allocated in a rushed and 
increasingly formalistic process, such a slice did not 
reach 8% of total funds!
TABLE 27
BRAZIL: THE DROP IN H££.‘a PLANNING ACTIVITY ON FEDERAL FINANCE FOR EDUCATION,
1970-84
(Percentages)
FULLY PLANNED INDEPENDENTLY
in NEC 1 PLANNED
in NEC 2
1970 39,0 10,6
1971 31.6 12,1
t i t
1978 8.9 14,3
1978 10,8 14,7
i t *  l i t  t i l
1983 7.9 18,6
1984 7.2 13.1
NOT PLANNED INDEPENDENTLY
in NEC 3 PLANNED TOTAL
OUTSIDE NEC
26,4 24,0 100.0
28.3 28,0 100,0
i i i  i i i  i i i
36.6 40.2 100.0
35.3 39,2 100.0
• i • i i i  i i i
43.2 30.3 100,0
42.7 37,0 100,0
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Males.
* "MEC" stands for the Ministry of Education and Culture,
1) Ordinary Resources from the Exchequer for capital and current expenditure, 
personnel and repay of debts excepted,
2) Federal share of Salirio-Educa^Soi lotteries proceeds (until 1979), internal and 
foreign loans, contributions to the Brazilian Litteracy Movement (M06RAL) and the 
Social Investment Fund (FINSQCIAL), and the repay of debts,
3) Expenditure on Personnel,
4) State share of Saldrio-EducafEo, shares of the State and Hunicipiod Participation 
Fund (FPE/FPM) dedicated to education, and the education programmes of ministries other 
than MEC,
Squkas
MEC/FNOE, Financial reports of the Department of Planning of the National Fund for the 
Development of Education (FNDE), 1981; MEC/SG/SOF. Reports 021LT85/25, of 15/3/85 and 
T08L003T, of 8/10/86; MEC/SQ, Retrato Brasil. Edu ca^o, Cultura, Desporto, 1970-1990. 
Brasilia, 1985, pp.550, 572, 579; AssociagSo Brasileira de Qr?amento Publico (A60P), 
Revista ABQP, n,20, 1984, pp,61-63; BRASIL/IBGE, AnuArio Estatistico do Brasil (AEB), 
1983: BRASIL/IBGE, AEB, 1985: BRASIL/Caixa Econdmica Federal (CEF), Relatbrio Anual
FAS, 1985. 1986,
6. 4. 2. The discussions on the programme-budget at SEPLAN
The preparation of MEC's programme-budget and the 
decisions related to some details of the allocation of 
funds among educational programmes and organizations 
always had an external pole of reference in the 
bureaucracy: the central body in the federal government
for this area. The programme-budget had to be discussed 
with officials at this body —  initially DASP then MINIPLAN 
(SEPLAN) for most of the period under study — and the 
proposals defended before the final (usually only formal)
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decision at the level of the ministers and the President 
of the Republic. The specific technical approach of these 
officials towards the budget, however, was not always the 
same, and some understanding of the nature of the 
tendencies is essential for a true comprehension of the 
whole process.
1967 could be considered a landmark in a period when 
budget was a typical area of accountancy professionals 
<contadores ou tecnicos de contabilidade ptiblica). These 
professionals had built up a tradition of work since the 
thirties. All major laws on these activities originated 
from them, often acting in a cooperative way in nationwide 
conferences, gathering professionals from the Federal 
Union, the states and minicipiost often preceded by local 
meet ings. 67,0
The newly-created Ministry of Planning (MINIPLAN) in 1964 
began gathering new professionals and developing a new 
approach to the budget, relating it to macro-economic 
policies and medium- and long-term planning. These
policies, particularly those related to economic 
development, from the second government of the regime, 
appeared in the centre of the political strategy (Section 
2. 1.2). The administrative reform of Law-by-decree
200/1967 moved legal competences on financial statistics, 
official advice to states and municipios in public 
finances and the updating of the appendices of Law
60, The "First Conference of Technicians in Accountancy and Public Finances" generated 
Decree 1804, of 24/11/39; Law-by-decree 2416, of 17/7/40 cane fron the second of these 
conferences, and the third one, which was called on by a body of the Ministry of the 
Treasury which was a sort of official link between these professional neeting and the 
federal governnent, the "Technical Council of Econonics and Finances", after a long and 
hard work produced the draft of Law 4320, of 17/3/64, still in force,
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4320/1964, from the Ministry of the Treasury to MINIPLAN, 
which also replaced DASP for the preparation of the budget 
itself. Budget, then re-defined as programme-budget,
became an instrument of planning rather than of control 
and accountancy. These last two functions were left to a 
special system, the inspectorates of finance (IGF1s) in 
the ministries and corresponding sections of accountancy 
in all subordinated units, while formulation or evaluation 
of policies and budgeting were up to planning and general 
co-ordination bodies <the general secretariats, in the 
ministries).
In the next two governments no nationwide conferences of 
accountants or accountancy technicians were held to sub­
sidize federal regulations. Instead, new planning bodies 
were promoted or encouraged close to heads of governmental 
bodies of all levels. Although economists prevail in
planning bodies, they were not exclusive, other profes­
sionals composing staffs in specific areas on planning.
A feature which could be seen as a major cause of the
vicissitudes and failures of the planning system was then 
formed, namely the duality of organizational lines.
Accountants and planners have never reconciled themselves. 
It was easy to perceive in the structure of any large body 
the sections controlled by each of these groups. Although 
in some cases one of them prevailed, co-ordination was 
rare. In spite of mentioned changes at the top federal 
level, in most cases technicians in public accountancy
remained in effective control of the budget.
As from the reforms <1967), MEC's budget and other demands 
for funds, including loan programmes, had a decisive 
appraisal from a section of MINIPLAN which dealt with 
governmental plans on education,' before receiving routine 
treatment in budget-processing bodies. Technicians in
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this sector (soon transformed into the National Centre of 
Human Resources, CNRH, of the Institute for Economic
Applied Planning, IPEA) were firstly interested in 
educational policies and targets, and therefore, 
discussing the budget with them led to questions on the 
merit of the programmes themselves. S1
Although this function by CNRH had never ceased entirely, 
it was increasingly deprived of its importance for the 
decision-making process from 1974. Since this year, with 
a new government, an ascension of the Secretariat of 
Budget and Finance (SOF/SEPLAN) came to attract most
stages of the budgetary process in MINIPLAN. Epecially 
from 1979 onwards, officials with a professional
accountancy background predominated the staff at SOF, The 
head of SOF and holders of important positions had been 
collaborators of the new minister, Mr Delfim Netto, at the 
time of his previous seven-years tenure as Minister of the 
Treasury. It was openly commented on in governmental 
circles in Brasilia that Mr Delfim Netto had virtually
ostracised SEPLAN's specialized bodies in the Institute of 
Planning (IPLAN), which included CNRH. Yet in 1974, the
nationwide conferences, including federal, states and
municipios* accountants and technicians of accountancy
were reinstated with the full support of SOF/SEPLAN, 
although their scope was restricted to budgetary
matters. 65:2
61, Inform ation  by nr D ivon zir  Gusso, who j o in e d  CNRH/IPEA in the e a r l y  s e v e n t i e s ,
62, These c o n fe r e n c e s  were c a l l e d  N a t i o n a l  S e e in a r s  on P u b l ic  Budget" (SENOP's) and 
promoted by the  N a tio n a l  P u b l ic  Budget A s s o c ia t io n  (A60P) whose chairman, Nr Antdnio de 
0, Amado, was SOF/SEPLAN's head and from 1979 remained one o f  i t s  d i r e c t o r s ,  They 
d is c u s s e d  and approved important changes, some absorbed in  f e d e r a l  r e g u l a t i o n s ,  I 
SENOP was h e ld  in 1974, II and I I I  SENOP in th e  f o l l o w i n g  y ea r s ,  In 1977 the  
o r g a n iz a t io n  promoted th e  I n t e r n a t io n a l  Seminar on P u b l ic  Budget, in  B r a s i l i a ,  and in  
1978 the IV SENOP, V SENOP happened in 1981 and budgetary  r e s t r i c t i o n s  p reven ted  the
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This "return of accountants", peaking in 1979-84, 
coincided with the government's concern about mounting 
public expenditure. Controlling aims prevailed over
planning. The section in SOF/SEPLAN which dealt with 
MEC's budget was the better staffed. The more expenditure 
on personnel increased outside of the federal regulations 
the more the position of SOF/SEPLAN was reinforced. From 
the late fifties it became the dominant pole of the 
discussions and decisions on budgetary matters on 
education. SOF/SEPLAN's staff with its accountancy-
related background was not prepared to approach demands 
and appraise programmes from the educational point of 
view. Educational problems, policies and innovations
simply failed to be discussed at the vital opportunity of 
finance-related decisions!
The dominant approach of the control in budget discussions 
produced the noxious pattern of tense relationships 
between controller and controlled. A university teacher 
who acted for some years (1979-82) as an official at SESU 
in charge of budgetary negotiations involving 
universities, anslyses those relationships:
"There was an assumption of dishonesty by the Treasury- 
representative body towards the ‘internal client', making 
negotiations quite disagreeble. Negotiations tended not to be 
rational, I mean, built on policies, facts and reasons. At the 
least, each side believed that the reasons, the rationality, 
which were presented by the other part were there only to 
disguise some irrational reason. Besides, some clichd-roles 
interfered: he who claims is the ‘hero’, facing somebody
stronger and fighting for his rights; he who administers public 
money is the ‘vilain’ of the story. "<S7,3
62, (cont,) event in the following three years, similar, regional meetings taking place 
during the period,
63, Professor Herbert Calhau, interview with the author,
- 451 -
Meanwhile, the level of budgetary negotiations, without 
the balancing factor of educational policy itself, 
increasingly slid into the common bargains of the 
budgetary process in large bureaucracies, A MEC' s senior 
civil servant, in charge of the budget procedures for many 
years and frequently heading negotiations with SOF/SEPLAN 
described them:
"The centralization in SEPLAN became so high that the ministries 
spent the year ‘passing the hat* and each ministry provided for 
its ‘lobby’ in the government (influential people) or in its own 
structure, what was better. MEC have always had its ‘loud­
speakers’: the chancellors, the students, the school meals and
specific programmes affecting the political sensibility of 
powerful people such as university hospitals, scholarships and 
university restaurants. (...) Sometimes the grant of funds did 
not happen for the sake of education but because somebody of our 
units was prestigious to SEPLAN. For example, Minister Delfim 
Netto always supplied the Escola Paulista de Medicina, for 
personal reasons. Funds were allocated to our budget
specifically to meet the needs of symphony orchestras as a 
permanent way to fund a certain orchestra under the protection 
of Prof. BulhSes (Castello Branco's Minister of the 
Treasury). We tried to take advantage of cases such as this. 
‘If we are going to serve the Professor, I said, why not do the 
same to this and that institution also in the queue?’ and so we 
got one more small piece... If they complained, I said: ‘Let's
swop tokens, It is better than to owe each other favours',
And she concluded: "In that game nobody was without
int erest s !"
67, Mrs Qdete Lapa, in te r v ie w  with  the author,
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6.5. THE CASE OF THE NATIONAL FUND FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF
EDUCATION (FNDE)
The constitution of the National Fund for the Development 
of Education <FNDE> in 1968, according to a model of 
institutional planning for investments, and its eventual 
use, increasingly far from that model, is a typical 
example of the real position of rationalizing policies 
vis-^rvis the organizational and political trends.
As a basic instrument of rationalization of the 
government’s expenditure on education which was expected 
from the implementation of the National Strategic Plan 
1968-70, the Ministry of Planning <MINIPLAN> conceived a 
new institutional model. The idea was to concentrate in a 
large fund all governmental expenditure in the whole area 
of education which in some way could be classified as 
"investment". The model was actually the National Bank 
for Economic Development <BNDE) created in the mid-fifties 
to support new economic investment projects and which had 
proved to be a success. As its prototype in the economic 
area, FNDE would operate on a basis of projects, as an 
independent agency, legally able to appropriate funds from 
several sources, to decide on the approval of projects, to 
make agreements with any public or private organization 
and to monitor the implementation of the projects. FNDE 
would be a sort of "national education bank", and the idea 
raised lots of hope, including that the heavy and slow- 
moving bureaucracy of the Ministry of Education and 
Culture would not be a serious obstacle to the desired 
take-off of a new era for education in the country any 
more.
65, I n fo r a a t io n  in  t h i s  paragraph i s  fro a  Hr A rlin do  CorrAa (IPEA/HINIPLAN), who 
a t t r i b u t e d  the idea  of FNDE to  the  M in is ter  o f  Planning  h i n s e l f ,  Dr J o lo  Paulo V e l lo s o ,
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FNDE was created by Law 5537, of 21/11/68, and had its
institution completed by Law-by-decree 872, of 15/9/69.
It was set up as an autarquia, thus an independent body 
(although under ministerial supervision), consisting of a 
Decision-making Board and an Executive Secretariat. 
Through the composition of its Board, FNDE would be a 
high-ranking body in the Ministry, open to other sectors 
outside MEC and even the government. The Board was headed 
by the Minister and nine other members appointed by him: 
four from MEC, including the General Inspector of
Finances, a representative of MINIPLAN (SEPLAN) and
another of the Ministry of the Treasury; a businessman, a 
teacher and a student gave the necessary communitarian 
dimension to investments in education. Budgetary
proposals of all federal universities and secondary 
technical schools had firstly to be appraised by FNDE who 
also had to be informed about direct expenditure on
education by the states and municlpios as a previous 
condition to federal transfers to them.
Besides budgetary appropriations from the Treasury, the 
agency was legally provided with specific financial 
sources, such as the shares of the outcome of federal
lotteries reserved to education and the PETROBRAs Fund, 
the federal share of the Saldrio-EducagSo, returns of 
loans (a rare situation), interest from bank deposits and
other patrimonial proceeds. In a few words FNDE was the
image of a modern and rational institutional instrument, 
suitable to implement the 1966-73 policies of education as 
real investment for the development (Section 2.2.2).
Born to be new and independent but living under MEC's 
large shadow, FNDE was fated to be absorbed by it. The 
following paragraphs describe how the prevailing political 
and administrative situations in federal bureaucracy acted
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in this trend.
The first "cultural transplant" from MEC to FNDE occurred 
when the first basic staff of the agency was constituted 
by civil servants, most from the former National 
Department of Education which was shut down by the 1967 
administrative reform to give way to the General 
Secretariat. This group remained virtually intact in the 
key-positions of FNDE*s Executive Secretariat until 1985. 
Notwithstanding the personal dedication of this team to 
the organization and full identification with its aims, 
the crucial question for FNDE, after the first years of 
hard work to structure the services, turned out to be 
"what MEC expected from it".
Ministers had themselves represented at FNDE's Board by 
their General Secretaries. A much greater commitment from 
the top ministerial authorities would have been needed to 
enforce two basic legal provisions: the submission of
university budgets to FNDE and the information control of 
the states and municiplos' real expenditures on education 
as a condition of federal transfers to them. Soon this 
proved unrealistic: they had enough political conditions
to ignore or resist the accomplishment of the procedures. 
As far as the universities were concerned, only campus 
development programmes which were supported by loans had 
ther cash flow regularly running through FNDE. The 
decisions about the programmes themselves and the 
allocation of funds to universities, however, were 
prepared by a special body created for this (CEPES, later 
PREMESU and, from 1982, CEDATE).
66, I n t o n a t i o n  was b a s i c a l l y  c o l l e c t e d  f r o e  t a l k s  w ith  o f f i c i a l s  a t  MEC and FNDE 
whose Board the author b elonged  to  between 1981 and 1983,
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Sections 5, 1. 3 and 5. 1. 4 studied the reduction of some of 
the special dedicated sources which reinforced FNDE's 
budget. Ordinary appropriations from the Treasury were 
allocated to the budgets of the schools and universities 
themselves or their supervisor secretariats at MEC. The 
agency was also affected be the almost entire elimination 
of funds from this source to primary education which 
remained supplied only by SalSrio EducagSo. FNDE's
complaints about the shrinking of its budget did not stop 
the trend which Table 28 expresses.
TABLE 28
BRAZIL: TOTAL REVENUE OF THE NATIONAL FUND FOR THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION <FNDE> COMPARED WITH MEC1 s
TOTAL BUDGET, 1969-84 
(Percent ages)
YEAR % YEAR % YEAR %
1969 13. 2 . . . • i • 1979 30. 5
1970 12. 9 . . . . . . 1980 29. 0
1971 41. 8 . . . . . . 1981 18. 9
1972 40. 8 1977 41. 0 1982 22. 6 <15. 5 >1
1973 60. 9 1978 35. 5 1983 35. 5 <25, 7)
1984 19. 5 2
Notes
* "MEC s ta n d s  for  th e  M in is tr y  of Education and C u ltu re ,
1) The number between b r a c k le t s  ex c lu d e s  the revenu es  o f  th e  s c h o l a r s h i p s  granted  by 
f irm s  to  p u p i l s  a s  an a l t e r n a t i v e  f u l f i l m e n t  of  th e  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  o b l i g a t i o n  of 
p ro v id in g  employees and t h e i r  f a m i l i e s  with  primary e d u ca t io n ,  These funds are
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r e g i s t e r e d  and c o n t r o l l e d  by FNDE1s Accountancy but not dec id ed  upon by the  agency,  
Such c o n t r o l s  began in 1982,
2) I n i t i a l  p o s i t i o n  of the budgets ,
What ministers and other top MEC's authorities actually 
expected from FNDE was a role of opportune provider of 
extra money for specific, critical situations in which 
relatively small sums could be timely transferred to 
universities, states, municipios and even private 
educational organizations to solve or alleviate pressing 
political situations, without having to refer to MINIPLAN 
(SEPLAN) or even bother the President by asking for some 
extra money. 657
Naturally FNDE adapted to this expectation from superiors 
about its contribution. Its structure, however, was not 
able to generate new funds on a large scale. Its income 
was threefold: first, yields from some shares of two
state-owned companies (PETROBRAS and Vale do Rio Doce) and 
public securities <ORTN's> which were automaticly re­
invested; second, leftover balances of federal transfers, 
which, until 1981, autarquias were allowed to appropriate 
as their own funds for the following year; third, 
cancellations and restitutions of part of grants not 
transferred or used for some reason. These were called 
"own funds" of FNDE's. In relation to other resources, 
the large majority, FNDE was a mere cashier, decisions on 
allocation being made by other MEC* s bodies. This picture
67, The a e a o r ie s  of  Senator and fo r a e r  M in is te r  of Education , Jarbas P a ssa r in h o ,  about  
FNDE in the e a r l y  s e v e n t i e s ,  when i t s  budget peaked, were r e l a t e d  to  t h e s e  a l l e v i a t i n g  
ta s k s ,  "FNDE was of  a g r e a t  h e lp  to  us, Often d ur in g  ay v i s i t s  to  u n i v e r s i t i e s  in  
c r i s i s  because of soa e  tenporary  lack o f  aoney in th e  u n i v e r s i t y  h o s p i t a l  or s o a e th in g  
l i k e  th a t ,  I phoned the  General S ecr e ta r y  in  B r a s i l i a  and in 24 hours th e  aoney was 
t h e r e , 1 (Senator P a ssarinh o , in t e r v ie w  with  th e  a u th o r ) ,
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was completely defined from the early eighties.^3
Furthermore, the generation of fresh money for ministerial 
urgent needs had a perverse effect on the speed-up of the 
programmes supplied by FNDE's transfers. What happened 
was that, continually pressed to make more of its "own 
funds" available, FNDE entered the amount for the required 
expenditure in the budget and formally met it with 
corresponding revenue from existing yields. These,
however, were not actually withdrawn from the Central 
Bank, where they were deposited and automaticaly re­
invested. The cash could be provided by money of any 
nature in FNDE's bank account, thanks to the scheme of 
"common cashier" <caixa-tinico) introduced by the 1967 
administrative reform. e9 As a consequence, delays In the 
implementation of FNDE's programmes coincided with the 
interest of the agency because less pressure would be 
exerted on its cashier (enabling it to bear the onus of 
the device) and the leftover balances and cancellations 
were more likely to happen.
As time passed, FNDE, which had been conceived as an 
independent agency, increasingly became an integral part 
of MEC's central bodies. The Director— General of FNDE's 
Executive Secretariat participated in most internal 
meetings of these bodies, in spite of legally being a
68, Y ie ld s  fron s h a re s  and p u b lic  s e c u r i t i e s  were 7 , OX of FNDE1s  t o t a l  revenues in  
1981; l e f t o v e r  b a la n ce s ,  5,7X and c a n c e l l a t i o n s  and r e s t i t u t i o n s  0,8X ( in fo r m a t io n  fron  
FNDE1s P lanning  D i v i s i o n ) ,  In f a c t ,  t h i s  p ro p o r t io n  of  y i e l d s  was a r t i f i c i a l l y  
e l e v a t e d ,  s i n c e  s h a re s  and p u b lic  s e c u r i t i e s  were n o n e t a r i l y  updated a g a in s t  i n f l a t i o n  
(95X in t h i s  y ear )  and th e  r e s t  of the revenues were not, Only in  1983 d id  FNDE begin  
a n o d es t  progranne of  loa n s  to  e d u c a t io n a l  and c u l t u r a l  o r g a n iz a t io n s ,  u s in g  "own 
f u n d s ”, so  th a t  a return  fund co u ld  be g en era ted , but i t  was very s a a l l  s i n c e  th e  loans  
were s u b s id iz e d ,
69. "Ve would not hurt th e  goo se  th a t  l a i d  th e  go ld en  e g g s 1, joked a FNDE1s  o f f i c i a l ,
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decentralized unit. This legal condition, however, was 
pleasantly offered to MEC to enable the ministry to 
circumvent some budgetary restrictions to which central 
bodies, the so called "direct administration", were 
subject. 70 In the light of this assimilation to any of 
these bodies, it appeared normal that, from the 1970's, 
all members of FNDE's Board were MEC's officials in high 
positions, no matter that they were formally appointed as 
representatives of businessmen, teachers and students.
7. 6. CONCLUSIONS
The content of this chapter leads to some conclusions.
1> Social and cultural trends, not rationally defined 
policies, can explain the profile of the finance 
allocation in the Ministry of Education which was shown in 
Table 3 - INT, in the Introduction: the massive percentage
of the expenditure on personnel and the prevalence of 
higher education on the major, stable source of funds 
(taxes), squeezing other programmes towards special 
complementary funds.
2) Particularly, the privileged position of higher 
education in Brazilian society overwhelmed both the 
policies (or convictions) on whom the state first should 
care for and the law about public expenditure. The
70, For example, a l l  s u r p lu s  b a la n ce s  of c e n t r a l  b o d ie s  had to  return  to  th e  Treasury  
a t  th e  end of th e  year, B e fo re  t h i s  happened, MEC tr a n s fe r r e d  th o se  s u r p lu s  b a lan ce s  
to  FNDE as  a ' c o n t r i b u t io n  to  programmes o f  development o f  ed u ca t io n  by FNDE' and then  
in fo r m a l ly  in d ic a te d  to  th e  agency vhich  c a s e s  were to  be supported  w ith  the  money in  
the f o l l o w i n g  year ,  which d id  not form ally  break the  law,
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"federalization" of colleges and universities was the main 
institutional device by which these elite adhered to the 
strongest level of the state's political organization, the 
Federal Union, on whom they finally imposed their 
int erest s.
3) The pat rimonial ist conception of the state or the
prebendalist use of state resources by the bureaucracy is 
the deepest trend influencing the real course of events 
related to expenditure. One after the other,
rationalizing purposes of the 1967 administrative reform 
in MEC dropped, particularly in relation to staffing and 
organizational structures.
4> Political centralization which was used as the natural 
means for the effectiveness of planning had perverse 
effects. First when it sheltered historical
characteristics of bureaucracy; second, when the activity 
of planning bodies shifted from formulation of policies to 
control of expenditure.
5) The failure of the programme-budget was a major blow 
to rational processes of public investment. It is a good 
example of the above-mentioned tendencies completely 
undermining the modern, institutional instruments of 
planning. The same could be said about the case of 
foundations and FNDE.
6) Finally, the events analysed in this chapter highlight 
the political significance of cultural and social factors. 
Recurrent failure of government's rationalizing policies 
could not be attributed to a technical mistake in 
strategy. These factors frequently deal out the cards of 
the political game and constitute the basic elements of 
the choices and preferences of the political actors or 
their referential public.
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has analysed the historical formation and 
further developments of what I have designated an economic 
approach to the funding of education. The main features 
of that approach are: justifying education (and therefore
its funding) in terms of its contribution to economic 
development, particularly the formation of human 
resources; treating the expenditure on education as 
investment; and rationalizing it, especially through the 
use of technical instruments of planning. It did prevail 
during the decisive years of consolidation of the recent 
military regime in Brazil. Such an approach not only met 
a suitable, glamorous idea to compose its discourse, 
namely that of the investment in human resources for 
economic development and originated policies on special 
financial sources for education, but extended further and 
dominated the whole decision-making process.
The economic approach to the education funding in Brazil 
appears to be typical of bureaucracies; the decision­
making process on the matter was basically conducted under 
a bureaucratic stance. The bureaucracy usually assumes 
that convincing technical considerations are the core of 
the decision on spending, the "political factor" being a 
sort of external, unforeseen factor. Moreover, when the 
bureaucracy is sheltered by authoritarian rule — such as 
in the Brazilian case — political moves in the decision 
are even assumed as an interfering accident.
There is no place in the logic of the average bureaucrat 
for the political dimension, the issue of the "power 
seeking". It is as if the technical issue — the "how to 
deal effectively with the complexity" in order to achieve
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targets — were the sole one; however variable and 
difficult it may be to achieve the control of the 
environment, the use of technical means is the best way to 
succeed. Bureaucrats never manage to explain properly the
role of the political will in the decision-making process
and carry on with a conflicting relationship between 
technical and political elements of that process, 
accepting the reality of political decisions as the 
paradoxical prevalence of the irrational over the 
rat ional.
The events analysed in this thesis have stressed that the 
real nature of the decision-making process in the 
allocation of public funds is political; that he who 
argues is worthier than the argument itself. The real 
definition of priorities is first and foremost dictated — 
or at least limited —  by the relative positions of those 
participating in power, their institutional, ideological, 
economic and even personal interests. These lead the 
technical definition of priorities in plans or override 
them. The chances of success of the education-development 
argument in the competition for finance for education
equalled the "political weight" of its promoters or
sympathisers in the federal bureaucracy and people who 
effectively interfered in the political process at the 
time, mainly the military.
The economic rationality in spending on education has a 
purely instrumental role, be it in reasons for, or in the 
way of, spending. This seemingly obvious position should 
be taken to its full extent and applied to the situations 
of the rationality-inspired basic reforms by the 
government between 1967 and 1972, particularly in the 
administration of education organizations. Planning and 
rationalization of the expenditure do not affect the 
motives and intentions of spenders. Since administration
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and programmes did not produce the expected results, the 
government's bureaucratic reasoning firstly attributed the 
failure to lack of either planning or modern techniques of 
administration. At best, a long-term problem of
consciousness or unadapted mentalities was regretted. 
Thus, procedures, organizational structures and programmes 
were directly changed by relevant reforms. Bureaucratic 
analysis did not reach the determinant factor, the 
political conditions of the events, whether prevailing in 
the past or in the present; previous practices could have 
been even possibly allowed to remain in a gradual process 
of improvement.
The grim results of the 1966-72 planning and rationalizing 
reforms (Chapter Six) not only prove that fact by pointing 
to the disturbing effects of social and cultural trends, 
such as the position of higher education institutions in 
society, the patrimonial conceptions of the state, 
particularly in staffing and budgeting in the civil 
service, but also unveil a sensitive shortcoming of the 
bureaucracy; it administers rationality but is unable to 
control itself.
During the period studied, the military regime endowed the 
sectors of the bureaucracy in control of the technical 
instruments of economic planning, the "technobureaucracy", 
with the almost exclusive control on the decisions related 
to education planning and funding. This is a crucial 
point. The military are culturally inclined to accept 
technobureaucratic position under the value of respect for 
division of competencies. This is so because the military 
are a bureaucracy themselves. If this is borne in mind, 
it is easier to understand the special conditions under 
which the economic approach to education and ensuing 
policies were introduced and maintained.
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In the simple military reasoning, there were only three 
basic areas of decision in the government, although they 
overlapped in their order of precedence: the security,
which directly concerned them; that of politico- 
institutional changes which they conducted with the direct 
advice and co-operation of reliable civilian politicians 
who also secured the government's position in Congress; 
and the "technical area", which was entrusted to 
technicians, chiefly involving the administration of the 
economy and the general governmental functions. This 
third area was increasingly centralized within the 
planning body, a trend which stems from the fifties. In 
spite of accepting and stating the competence of educators 
in typical educational matters, the military re-affirmed 
that the relations of education with the government's 
general targets and the issue of resources was a matter 
for MINIPLAN/SEPLAN. The events related in Chapter Two 
show that the authoritarian attribution of that competence 
to the economy planning body preceded by several years the 
thorough acceptance of the economic approach in the 
Ministry of Education and throughout the educational 
system. From the economic side of educational programmes, 
including its financing, a whole meaning and justification 
for education itself was developed. The military position 
was, therefore, decisive not so much for the prevailing 
acceptance of this concept of education but for the 
appointment of those who were to run it.
From this point on, the whole cycle of the financing of 
education from 1964 to 1984 meets its coherence. Although 
absorbed to a large extent by the pressure for expansion 
and reforms of higher education, suitable room in the 
1967-72 governmental plans and new financial sources were 
provided for education by the economists in the Ministry 
of Planning (MINIPLAN, later' SEPLAN), following the 
current nationalist ideals. Under their leadership,
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education had good prospects and the situation even 
improved when the "implementation body", the Ministry of 
Education and Culture <MEC> was given a character among 
the best in the military, Minister Jarbas Passarinho 
(1970-73). Before those plans could mature, however, the 
momentum was lost with a change in the core of the regime 
and in the international economic situation. The
government stood for the policies of rapid development 
whose links with education were still reafirmed in the 
1974 plan (1975-79). The emphasis was moved, however, 
from general education to science and technology 
(including post-graduation), in the wake of a bold plan 
for building up the country's economic infrastructure.
This move was balanced in the government's political 
strategy by a nod towards "the social area" with the 
creation of the Social Development Fund (FAS), a policy 
from which MEC came out as a loser. The more the boom of 
the economy passed the more earmarked sources were 
restrained and attached portions of the budget fiercely 
fought over in order to obtain the best use of the 
resources in the economy. From the mid-seventies onwards, 
funds for education declined invariably. As from 1979, 
when the financial crisis became unavoidable, all that the 
central planning body expected from the "spending sectors" 
was that they join the crusade to cut down on the public 
deficit to allow for keeping some basic economic 
investment from the previous government running outside 
the Treasury Budget, whose savings had to be obtained at 
any price. No point was considered worthwhile in
defending a privileged position for education on grounds 
of its previously claimed condition of (long-term) 
investment in the economy.
Of course, at the top, the technobureaucracy knew 
perfectly its role in the system and had a clear idea of 
the real priorities in relation to some large governmental
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investment or subsidized programmes, timely advocated by 
both the military and the leading sectors in the economy.
In order to take up or to keep financial and
administrative resources in their hands, economy ministers 
and top officials used, instead, the "technical argument": 
"no planning is possible without the full control of 
resources; earmarked sources and similar devices bring
sclerosis to budget; we cannot go further on with such a 
deficit; we must balance the budget, and the cuts are 
general and unavoidable, some sacrifice being required 
from everyone". In their typical, rational approach, the 
average bureaucracy and the military are responsive to the 
"technical argument" and, since the political approach in 
economic matters is not usually theirs, such argument was 
frequently seen as a reasonable justification to resist a 
privileged budgetary treatment for education. This
misleading effect of the "technical argument" had a vital 
role to secure and reinforce the position of the top 
technobureaucracy and their strategic interests when
conflicts occurred over finance for education.
The real nature of the decision-making process in the 
allocation of public funds and the events of the 1964-84 
cycle of moves in the education funding lead to further 
conclusions in relation to the effects of the official 
policy.
Justifying education in terms of economic development 
actually meant setting a disadvantageous scene of 
contention for education, since choices and positions 
relate to a sole, quantitative value, not to a scale of 
values. The economic aggregative measurements of
relations between education and national income are too 
loose in their estimates to be collated with established 
macroeconomic analyses; too weak to secure higher levels 
on the scale of the generation of wealth; too idealistic
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to convince top government officials. This is what the 
facts suggest. In the good times of new plans in the late 
sixties and in the time of the "miracle" in the early 
seventies, reforms were launched with the purpose of 
adjusting both educational programmes affecting pupils 
over twelve years of age and specific higher education 
courses to the requirements of the job market; its 
implementation strove for most of the seventies; but the 
efforts for the accomplishment of the citizens' 
constitutional right to full primary education — the 
education level with highest rates of return in the 
studies of the "economists of education" —  did not find 
enough support to go on as long, and agonized during the 
seventies. In the bad times of the crisis no room could 
be found for either kind of programme. Education rather 
lost than was promoted by its assumed links to economic 
development; this association actually resulted in a 
subsidiary and submissive role. This is so that the final 
political fact remained the attribution of the full 
control of the government finance to those who co­
ordinated general economic interests.
One must go further, however, into the limitations of the 
education-investment discourse, vis-&-vis its chances of 
succeeding in the political reality of the contention for 
finance. It would be difficult for education to reach the 
level of interest of some strong contenders. Which are, 
indeed, the real interest of the so-called productive 
sectors of the economy —  the private and state 
enterpreneurs —  in the outcomes of education? They deal 
with limited organizational units and projects and are 
interested in their profitability at these limits. They 
are directly interested in specific, short-term 
educational results. Training is their major category, 
not general and elementary education. They often carry 
out the former by themselves and assume that the latter is
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a basic service to be provided by the government as so 
many others in society. The appeal of "education for 
economic development" may sound metaphoric to sectors 
lobbying the bureaucracy for state investments, a 
situation more often than not prevailing under regimes 
where democratic participation maintains a low profile.
This fundamental distinction between education and 
training, so far as critical decision-making implications 
are involved, is not sufficiently considered in the 
discourse on education-development and the studies on 
which this is based. Training is specific and
utilitarian. Education is general and involves many more 
purposes, frequently related to culture, individual 
development and social behaviour. Moreover, when it comes 
to education, arguments on rates of return stop well short 
of a rigorous cost-benefit analysis (the entrepreneurs' 
microeconomic approach) and rely on multi-caused 
phenomena, particularly changes in individual income. 
They inevitably stumble on the question: "How to measure
education in terms of tangible and long-term results?" 
Economist-minded metonymies to overcome the difficulty, 
such as those used in "shadow-prices" are not convincing, 
except as instruments to carry on with theoretical 
studies. On the other hand, similar questions block the 
way of a strictly economic reasoning on rationalization of 
educational costs: "What is exactly waste (or the best
use) of resources in education?" The nature of the 
educational activity poses a definitive limit on any 
economic or utilitarian approach.
Two facts in previous paragraphs must be emphasized: the
comparatively brief 1967-73 period during which the 
education-development concept positively influenced the 
funding of education and the disadvantageous position 
among typically economic programmes which was left to
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education by this concept. They show the fragility of the 
economic approach to education insofar as the decision­
making process of allocation of public finance is 
concerned. The policy was successfully introduced only 
due to the exceptional political conditions of the late 
seventies, particularly the nationalist ideals for the 
future of the nation. So feeble was this justification 
for spending especially on education in the day-by-day 
struggle for finance that it is reasonable to raise the 
hypothesis — the thesis does not come to present relevant 
facts — of a strategic substitution of other reasons upon 
which to base demands. Easier political control of 
demands could also result from the conceptual unification 
of governmental responsibilities.
In societies where social demands are immediate and basic 
conditions of living overdue, the decision on policies and 
their implementation are usually related to short or 
medium-term interests. Now, if the lessons from the case 
of Brazil are accepted on the fragility of the economic 
approach to justify education in the competition for funds 
and rationalize their use, one more question is raised: 
why should this approach suit developing countries, as it 
has been frequently emphazised by international advice, 
since the early sixties? Does this stance suppose the 
existence of authoritarian regimes to impose this long­
term policy on the decision-making process of allocation 
of public finance, as it happened in Brazil for a few 
years?
As long as these reasons and the conclusions of this 
thesis are consistent, a different approach to justify and 
rationalize the education funding should be sought. 
Education is a cultural service, above all. It fulfils an 
important role in the political development of a nation 
and positive but imprecise effects in the economy,
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particularly in the job market. Since the nature of the 
decision-making process in the allocation of public 
finance is political, political means and strategy should 
be thought of firstly. Its centre of gravity should be 
displaced from the bureaucracy to the sectors of society 
which are themselves directly interested in educational 
services. One must conclude, however, that the financing 
of education will not have better luck or increase at a 
faster pace than the nation's cultural and social values 
will allow.
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SOURCES
Although the structure and line of development of the 
thesis directly stem from its purpose, the choice of 
events, relevant details and linkages are mainly due to 
the author's experience of them, either as a chancellor's 
assistant in the management of personnel and budget 
matters (Federal University of Pernambuco, 1968-77) or as 
a Deputy General Secretary of the Ministry of Education 
and Culture (1981-84) in budgetary and financial matters. 
Information in the text, however, very seldom comes 
exclusively from this experience.
The two main sources are an extensive documentary research 
and a series of interviews of people* specially involved 
in decisions on planning and financing of education in the 
federal government. Documentary sources comprise
administrative acts (laws, regulations and official 
letters of federal authorities), financial reports by the 
relevant bodies of the central government, especially 
those issued with details for administrative use, and 
general conventional sources. Interviews (approximately 
fifty hours, the greatest part recorded) were carried out 
between September and November 1986, in Brazil. Other 
special talks with some of the interviewees and even other 
people at the time of events are sometimes quoted. The 
sources are seldom identified only by their position (not 
names), a restriction by them which the author had to 
abide by.
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At page 29. where one reads:
TABLE 1: BRAZIL; SUPPLY OF EDUCATION PER LEVEL OF SCHOOL, 1985
i i i i i i i i i i t i i i i i i i i i i t » i i i i i
Source, MEC/SG, Retrato Brasil. Educate, Cultura, Desporto. 1970-199Q. Brasilia, 
1985, p p. 122, 153, 265, 357,
One must read:
TABLE 1, BRAZIL; SUPPLY OF EDUCATION PER LEVEL OF SCHOOL, 1986
TOTAL PERCENTAGES OF TOTAL ENROLMENT
ENROLMENT PUBLIC SCHOOLS PRIVATE
(1,000) Total Federal State Municipal SCHOOLS
PRE-SCHOOLS 2,907,3 74,0 (5,0) (28,0) (41,0) 26,0
PRIMARY SCHOOLS 25,607,9 87,9 (0,5) (57,2) (30,2) 12,1
SECONDARY SCHOOLS 3,142,6 66,0 (3,0) (59,0) (4,0) 34,0
UNIVERSITIES 1,418,2 40,7 (23,0) (10,8) (6,9) 59,3
TOTAL 33,076,0 82,6 (2,0) (52,9) (27,7) 17,4
Source. MEC/SG/SEINF/Servi?o de Estatistica da EducagSo e Cultura, (Information
directly collected),
At page 37 <TABLE 3), where one reads:
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YEAR / 
PERIOD
1964
CURRENT 
Cr$ Million
13
CONSTANT 
1970/73 
Cr$ Million
1. 122
CHANGE 
IN PERIOD 
%
1984 56. 109 6. 590
Figueiredo's Government 2. 3
One must read:
YEAR / CURRENT CONSTANT CHANGE
PERIOD 1970/73 IN PERIOD
Cr$ Million Cr$ Million %
1964 162 1. 122
1966 559 1. 620
C. Branco's Government 22. 0
1967 570 1. 180
1968 830 1, 267
1969 1. 150 1. 389
C. e Silva's Government -3. 3
1970 1. 385 1. 415
1971 1. 758 1. 863
1972 2. 612 2. 596
1973 3. 165 3. 076
M&dici's Government 22. 8
- 2 -
1974 4. 305 3. 215
1975 6. 420 3. 541
1976 11. 242 4. 253
1977 22.133 5. 779
1978 35.089 6. 353
Government
1979 56. 109 6. 442
1980 87. 781 5. 179
1981 243. 146 7. 252
1982 529.856 8. 047
1983 1. 050. 685 6. 529
1984 3. 265. 394 6. 590
Figueiredo's Government
16. 2
2. 3
